Comparison of Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and North Atlantic naval combat

[Glider]

1) HMS Ulster Queen (6 x 4in, 1 x quad pom-pom and several 20mm) claimed 4 x AA kills during PQ18. USS Wainwright was the destroyer described above, but really her gunnery was not exceptional. Lundstrom rather carefully examined USN AA in the Pacific and it was no better than the RN's despite some claims to the contrary.

The Ulster Queen (a converted ferry) did exceptionally well largely down to Captain and the effectiveness of the crew. During attacks when he saw a group of approaching torpedo bombers he would leave the defensive ring and head directly at the incoming aircraft. As a result he put his gunners in a good position to fire but also disrupted the attacking formation.

Re the USS Wainwright we will have to agree to disagree on this. She was became very important to the defence of the convoy while she was there, not because of the number of aircraft she shot down, but because of her ability to keep attacking formations away from the convoy. This was due to her accurate long range fire which was far better than the average RN fleet destroyer.
On the 4th July while approaching the convoy to refuel, she was credited with keeping one attack at such a distance that the torpedo's were not a threat, on a second attack that got closer she shot down one of the senior officers. Officially she wasn't part of the convoy escort being assigned to the Cruiser escort but happened to be refuelling and was in the right place at the right time. When she finished refuelling and was about to leave the convoy another large group of He111 approached and split into two groups. She opened fire at one group starting at 10,000 yards and kept firing until it was considered to be too close to the convoy, when she switched to the second group. Of the first group only one bomber launched its torpedo which missed and of the second group two ships were hit.

A couple more comments

1) If the Germans were totally happy with the Italian Torpedo's they wouldn't have asked for the blueprints of the Japanese torpedo's. The main problem with the Italian torpedo's was they didn't work that well in shallow water.
2) Germany lost 42% of its trained torpedo bomber crews. That shows how few they had to start off with

 

[RCAFson]

The Ulster Queen (a converted ferry) did exceptionally well largely down to Captain and the effectiveness of the crew. During attacks when he saw a group of approaching torpedo bombers he would leave the defensive ring and head directly at the incoming aircraft. As a result he put his gunners in a good position to fire but also disrupted the attacking formation.

Re the USS Wainwright we will have to agree to disagree on this. She was became very important to the defence of the convoy while she was there, not because of the number of aircraft she shot down, but because of her ability to keep attacking formations away from the convoy. This was due to her accurate long range fire which was far better than the average RN fleet destroyer.
On the 4th July while approaching the convoy to refuel, she was credited with keeping one attack at such a distance that the torpedo's were not a threat, on a second attack that got closer she shot down one of the senior officers. Officially she wasn't part of the convoy escort being assigned to the Cruiser escort but happened to be refuelling and was in the right place at the right time. When she finished refuelling and was about to leave the convoy another large group of He111 approached and split into two groups. She opened fire at one group starting at 10,000 yards and kept firing until it was considered to be too close to the convoy, when she switched to the second group. Of the first group only one bomber launched its torpedo which missed and of the second group two ships were hit.

A couple more comments

1) If the Germans were totally happy with the Italian Torpedo's they wouldn't have asked for the blueprints of the Japanese torpedo's. The main problem with the Italian torpedo's was they didn't work that well in shallow water.
2) Germany lost 42% of its trained torpedo bomber crews. That shows how few they had to start off with

This is from Destroyer Captain, by Roger Hill, and gives some insight into the RN's viewpoint on USS Wainright's gunnery:

Two American destroyers and the Somali came across from the
cruiser squadron to fuel in turn. Just as the first was picking up
the pipe from the sea, he caught sight of the Blohm and Voss. He
hauled out and blazed away with all his guns; his rate of fire was
more impressive than his accuracy. It was really funny to see this
one destroyer firing away, and all the convoy and escort, including
the anti-aircraft ships, sitting and watching. The general opinion
was, he just had to celebrate the 4th July.

it wasn't exceptional and probably no better than Ledbury's.

The Axis powers all exchanged info on various devices, including torpedoes, and it really didn't mean much and the RAI torpedoes had an excellent operational record.

This is a series of stories about HMS Scylla during PQ18 and after:

https://www.world-war.co.uk/scylla_story.php

but probably every destroyer or larger ship would have similar stories.

 

[RCAFson]

This statement fascinates me.
Please tell me, if you would, how the Royal Navy would be able to launch effective air attacks at night, against Japanese elements, in 1942.

This is with the understanding that the IJN was well trained and well versed in night warfare.

Night strikes against ships at sea are exceedingly difficult unless the aircraft are equipped with ASV radar to find their targets, which the FAA aircraft had, and the IJNAF didn't (until ~mid 1943). The only successful USN torpedo attack at Midway was a night attack by an ASV equipped PBY.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Who said that? Or did you just make it up?

Merely referencing your constant belittling of IJN equipment, training and pilot performance in comparison to their MTO AXIS counterparts. (over a couple of threads)

I

Why is the KB always considered this unstoppable force able to launch an overwhelming strike against a carrier TF with all six fleet carriers, or even four carriers, when historically, they were never able to deliver on that premise?

Not considered "unstoppable", just far ahead of both the RN and the USN when it came to massed carrier attacks. Yes yes, Taranto, I'll give the RN that ONE shot but not on the same scale.

Never able to deliver? So Pearl Harbor was an accident? How's the Hermes career post March 1942, or Dorsetshire and Cornwall? Or the mass of merchant ships sitting on the bottom of the Indian Ocean?

By Aug 1942 (remember Pedestal was just one operation) the Axis AFs in the ETO/MTO had flown THOUSANDS (yes I am shouting) of strike sorties against Allied naval and merchant ships. The Axis AFs were fully trained in maritime strike operations and the Luftwaffe were considered by the USN as superior to the IJN:

I think Glider already addressed this earlier up thread.

Information Bulletin · No. 29

Antiaircraft Action Summary · World War II
October 1945
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
UNITED STATES FLEET

...ENEMY TACTICS AND EQUIPMENT
German
German air attacks against our surface forces were more effective than those of the Japanese, prior to the latter's use of suicide tactics, for the following reasons:

1. German aircraft were superior.
2. German pilots possessed greater skill.
3. German attacks were more highly co ordinated.
4. Our own air defense was weaker.
5. Our surface forces were not as modern or heavily armed as those in the Pacific."

One might pay close attention to issue #5.

But the KB was never 'fully constituted' against USN carrier TFs and performed poorly against it, in terms of coordinated strikes with the KBs full strength. The fact that the IJNAF was able to penetrate USN CAP at Midway, to repeatedly hit and cripple Yorktown with two strikes of 18 and 10 aircraft each speaks volumes about the poor performance of USN radar GCI and F4F-4 performance. The USN was quite open about this and yet when the USN's own criticisms are brought up it gets ignored or considered an insult. USN AA performance in 1942 varied from poor prior to Santa Cruz to excellent at Santa Cruz. See Lundstrom for a analysis of USN AA performance.

Must be why the USN lost those battles.

Criticism of the USN isn't "ignored" or "considered an insult" far from it, but it's your constant flag waving over the RN and belittling of everything from Pearl Harbor to Midway as a cakewalk for the USN compared to RN's operations in the MTO or even off Ceylon. You contend that the RN faced much harder and more numerous opposition on a magnitude so much greater than the USN did in the Pacific that they can't be compared. Perhaps a re-evaluation of some of your statements is in order.

You're free to expound your ideas, but make no mistake, the KdB would have absolutely savaged the RN in the Indian Ocean in March of 42 and Sommerville knew it, hence his tactics. Fletcher had no choice at Coral Sea (hence his tactics), he had to stand and fight, and fight he did, he did have the option to wait for TF16 had KdB shown up in force, but it was still GAME ON. After all, SOMEONE had to man up and help defend Australia, the RN sure as hell wasn't capable of it.

And whether you like it or not, or acknowledge it or not, the IJN and the USN were the varsity squads of carrier air warfare, the BPF was never more than the size/capability (after a training session with U.S.S. Saratoga) of a Task Group in the Pacific War.

This has been explained and I've referenced the explanations. What I don't understand is why pointing out known deficiencies in USN carriers and aircraft is considered a slight on the USN? Rather, it should be remembered that they overcame these issues with solid tactics, training and Intel, but we also have to bear in mind that the IJN also made many mistakes.

Sorry, I don't believe you mean any of that.

This all reminds me of a fella I used to know, he was a big, dyed in the wool Hurricane fan, at the slightest inference that the P-40 might have been equal to the Hurricane he'd be off on a tear. God forbit you mentioned to him that it might actually be a better plane than the Hurricane. Hell, I remember going a couple of rounds with that guy over his contention that the Mustang wasn't as good as late marques of the Hurricane, and that he could prove that with facts.

You all can continue, I'll read but I'm out on this one, it smacks too much of those hurricane/P-40/Mustang "debates" years ago.

 

[Schweik]

Hermes was sunk before any Fulmars arrived as were the other ships sunk by that strike. The Fulmars attacked after the Vals had finished their strikes. Of course there was no fighter cover over the two RN heavy cruisers sunk on 5 April. I didn't include the IJN strikes directed at Ceylon on 5 and 9 April.

The records state that 6 Fulmars got there before or as Hermes was attacked, and 6 more arrived after she was sunk.

Far more important to the ongoing debate I am referring to your claim that "The IJN flew about 180 attack sorties against units of the BEF on 5 and 9 April 1942. "

I'd really like to hear how you arrive at that number. If you are only counting strikes that found and attacked Carriers, this doesn't track. The only attack against a RN carrier was on April 9

After launching attacks against the port city of Trincomalee at 7:00 in the morning, a recon plane from Haruna spotted the Hermes and the KB launched 80 x D3A at 10:35. The first group of D3A, consisting of 32 dive bombers, found and immediately sunk Hermes. Not all of them actually got to drop bombs before Hermes was clearly done for, so they were forced to seek out other targets - The HMES Hollyhock, the Athelstone, the tanker Sergeant and the cargo ship Norvikien.

By your own criteria, the main argument you have been making for the last 15 pages -- the claim that the IJN launched 180 sorties against the BEF but only 27 at Midway (etc.) is complete B.S. - only 32 Japanese bombers attacked before the RN carrier was gone.

This is from the Wiki:

"They were spotted off Batticaloa, however, by a Japanese reconnaissance plane from the battleship Haruna.[41] The British intercepted the spot report and ordered the ships to return to Trincomalee with the utmost dispatch and attempted to provide fighter cover for them.[42] The Japanese launched 85 Aichi D3A dive bombers, escorted by nine Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters, at the two ships. At least 32 attacked them and sank them in quick order despite the arrival of six Fairey Fulmar II fighters of No. 273 Squadron RAF. Another six Fulmars from 803 and 806 Squadrons arrived after Hermes had already sunk. The rest of the Japanese aircraft attacked other ships further north, sinking the RFA Athelstone of 5,571 gross register tonnage (GRT), her escort, the corvette Hollyhock, the oil tanker SS British Sergeant and the Norwegian ship SS Norviken of 2,924 GRT.[43] "

They list their source as Bloody Shambles Vol II, which I don't have but I'm sure somebody here does.

 

[Schweik]

You all can continue, I'll read but I'm out on this one, it smacks too much of those hurricane/P-40/Mustang "debates" years ago.

I love how y'all keep lumping me together with him. I'm not doing anything other than you did right there- calling him on his BS.

 

[RCAFson]

Merely referencing your constant belittling of IJN equipment, training and pilot performance in comparison to their MTO AXIS counterparts. (over a couple of threads)

IOWs, you made it up. Placing all the naval AFs into their proper historical context isn't belittling, rather it's discussing naval aviation history. The IJNAF deployed aircraft that would not have been acceptable to any other AF, this gave them lightweight aircraft with good performance by naval AF standards but it came at a real cost in survivability. The IJNAFs aircraft were not modern by 1942 land based AF standards, nor were most naval AFs aircraft, but the RN was pitted against a very powerful land based AF with better performing and more modern aircraft than those deployed in the Pacific. This is just a fact, and any "belittling" is being done by those who pretend this isn't true.

Not considered "unstoppable", just far ahead of both the RN and the USN when it came to massed carrier attacks. Yes yes, Taranto, I'll give the RN that ONE shot but not on the same scale.

Never able to deliver? So Pearl Harbor was an accident? How's the Hermes career post March 1942, or Dorsetshire and Cornwall? Or the mass of merchant ships sitting on the bottom of the Indian Ocean?

Against carrier TFs. Yes, the KB did hit Dorsetshire and Cornwall and then Hermes (obsolete with no aircraft onboard) with large strikes and this was arguably the highwater mark for the IJN carriers after PH, but they never located the BEF and Somerville's carriers and they never launched their full strength against a USN carrier TF. It's a historical fact that KB never massed it's full strength against any Allied carrier TF, and the closest they came to that was their 5 fleet carrier raid on Ceylon.

I think Glider already addressed this earlier up thread.

I don't think anyone has really addressed the massive weight of Axis AF attacks on the RN and Commonwealth navies in the ETO/MTO from April 1940 onward. We've only looked at tiny snippets of the big picture. Against the Arctic Convoys just from April - Sept 1942, they flew 600 strike sorties, against Pedestal alone, they flew ~220, if we added up all Axis AF attacks in 1942 directed against RN and Commonwealth navies it would be in the thousands, and far higher than what the IJNAF was able to do in 1942.

One might pay close attention to issue #5.

Yes, the USN, by their own admission, was facing a weaker AF in the Pacific, with stronger forces of their own.

Must be why the USN lost those battles.

In some cases they did lose and/or won because of gross errors by the IJN.

Criticism of the USN isn't "ignored" or "considered an insult" far from it, but it's your constant flag waving over the RN and belittling of everything from Pearl Harbor to Midway as a cakewalk for the USN compared to RN's operations in the MTO or even off Ceylon. You contend that the RN faced much harder and more numerous opposition on a magnitude so much greater than the USN did in the Pacific that they can't be compared. Perhaps a re-evaluation of some of your statements is in order.

I'm not the one flag waving. I am discussing the naval airwar in historical context.

Y

ou're free to expound your ideas, but make no mistake, the KdB would have absolutely savaged the RN in the Indian Ocean in March of 42 and Sommerville knew it, hence his tactics. Fletcher had no choice at Coral Sea (hence his tactics), he had to stand and fight, and fight he did, he did have the option to wait for TF16 had KdB shown up in force, but it was still GAME ON. After all, SOMEONE had to man up and help defend Australia, the RN sure as hell wasn't capable of it.

??? We know what happened historically at Ceylon in April 1942, and the RN was defeated, but the losses were not severe and the KB never even located the RN's fleet carriers. Coral Sea was not about an invasion of Australia, and no Fletcher didn't have to fight and wouldn't have until reinforced, if the full KB arrived. By defending Ceylon, and the IO the RN was also defending Australia and also the entire Allied strategic situation. But I think your comments here, might be considered 'flag waving' N'est-ce pas?

And whether you like it or not, or acknowledge it or not, the IJN and the USN were the varsity squads of carrier air warfare, the BPF was never more than the size/capability (after a training session with U.S.S. Saratoga) of a Task Group in the Pacific War.

More flag waving on your part. Historically, USN Fleet Admiral King repeatedly asked for RN carriers in 1942. We all know that by 1944/45 the USN had expanded radically.

Sorry, I don't believe you mean any of that.

Yes, I'm sure you do, and that's why it's so difficult to have a calm and rational discussion about certain topics.

This all reminds me of a fella I used to know, he was a big, dyed in the wool Hurricane fan, at the slightest inference that the P-40 might have been equal to the Hurricane he'd be off on a tear. God forbit you mentioned to him that it might actually be a better plane than the Hurricane. Hell, I remember going a couple of rounds with that guy over his contention that the Mustang wasn't as good as late marques of the Hurricane, and that he could prove that with facts.

You all can continue, I'll read but I'm out on this one, it smacks too much of those hurricane/P-40/Mustang "debates" years ago.

More flag waving.

 

[Schweik]

IOWs, you made it up. Placing all the naval AFs into their proper historical context isn't belittling, rather it's discussing naval aviation history. The IJNAF deployed aircraft that would not have been acceptable to any other AF, this gave them lightweight aircraft with good performance by naval AF standards but it came at a real cost in survivability. The IJNAFs aircraft were not modern by 1942 land based AF standards, nor were most naval AFs aircraft, but the RN was pitted against a very powerful land based AF with better performing and more modern aircraft than those deployed in the Pacific. The RN was pitting their obsolescent biplanes and not quite fighters against an array of Spanish Civil War era antiques from Italy (also biplanes, cloth covered trimotors etc.) and a handful of good but exceedingly short range German planes. This is just a fact, and any "belittling" is being done by those who pretend this isn't true.

Fixed it for you.

I don't see anyone claiming the F4F was a superb aircraft, it's really you who insists, against all the evidence, that woefully obsolete (or badly designed) aircraft like the Sea Hurricane, Fulmar, Skua, Swordfish and Albacore were superb, or at least better than everyone elses, and also simultaneously pretending that 1930's era Italian planes were more dangerous than the deadly dive bombers of the IJN carrier battlegroups.

Even though it only took 32 of them to sink a RN carrier...

 

[RCAFson]

The records state that 6 Fulmars got there before or as Hermes was attacked, and 6 more arrived after she was sunk.

Far more important to the ongoing debate I am referring to your claim that "The IJN flew about 180 attack sorties against units of the BEF on 5 and 9 April 1942. "

I'd really like to hear how you arrive at that number. If you are only counting strikes that found and attacked Carriers, this doesn't track. The only attack against a RN carrier was on April 9

After launching attacks against the port city of Trincomalee at 7:00 in the morning, a recon plane from Haruna spotted the Hermes and the KB launched 80 x D3A at 10:35. The first group of D3A, consisting of 32 dive bombers, found and immediately sunk Hermes. Not all of them actually got to drop bombs before Hermes was clearly done for, so they were forced to seek out other targets - The HMES Hollyhock, the Athelstone, the tanker Sergeant and the cargo ship Norvikien.

By your own criteria, the main argument you have been making for the last 15 pages -- the claim that the IJN launched 180 sorties against the BEF but only 27 at Midway (etc.) is complete B.S. - only 32 Japanese bombers attacked before the RN carrier was gone.

This is from the Wiki:

"They were spotted off Batticaloa, however, by a Japanese reconnaissance plane from the battleship Haruna.[41] The British intercepted the spot report and ordered the ships to return to Trincomalee with the utmost dispatch and attempted to provide fighter cover for them.[42] The Japanese launched 85 Aichi D3A dive bombers, escorted by nine Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters, at the two ships. At least 32 attacked them and sank them in quick order despite the arrival of six Fairey Fulmar II fighters of No. 273 Squadron RAF. Another six Fulmars from 803 and 806 Squadrons arrived after Hermes had already sunk. The rest of the Japanese aircraft attacked other ships further north, sinking the RFA Athelstone of 5,571 gross register tonnage (GRT), her escort, the corvette Hollyhock, the oil tanker SS British Sergeant and the Norwegian ship SS Norviken of 2,924 GRT.[43] "

They list their source as Bloody Shambles Vol II, which I don't have but I'm sure somebody here does.

I have Bloody Shambles Vol II and Hermes was sunk prior (at 10:55) to the Fulmars arriving (12:15), as were the other Allied ships in the area. The Fulmar pilots saw sinking ships and incorrectly assumed that one of them was Hermes, and this has led to many incorrect accounts since then. Hermes was long gone before any Fulmars arrived.

By units of the BEF I meant Cornwall and Dorsetshire on 5 April, (53 Vals despatched according to Shores but 88 according to Stuart ) and Hermes on 9 April (85 Vals despatched) and I must confess that I made a mistake here as I incorrectly tallied the numbers of IJN strike aircraft despatched on both occasions at ~180 when the actual number was 138 according to Shores and 173 according to Stuart:
Leonard Birchall and the Japanese Raid on Colombo - Canadian Military Journal

 

[Schweik]

So wait a minute, strikes against the RN which never find carriers but attack port facilities and cruisers count as attacks on carriers in your model, but strikes against the USN which don't find the carriers don't count?

How do you count aircraft that arrived after the only carrier present was sunk?


Is there some reason why your big argument uses different standards for the RN vs the USN?

 

[RCAFson]

Fixed it for you.

I don't see anyone claiming the F4F was a superb aircraft, it's really you who insists, against all the evidence, that woefully obsolete (or badly designed) aircraft like the Sea Hurricane, Fulmar, Skua, Swordfish and Albacore were superb, or at least better than everyone elses, and also simultaneously pretending that 1930's era Italian planes were more dangerous than the deadly dive bombers of the IJN carrier battlegroups.

Even though it only took 32 of them to sink a RN carrier...

You were claiming the F4F was a superb aircraft and presenting prototype performance figures rather than those for combat ready aircraft. I pointed out it's actual performance, just as I've pointed out the actual performance of all the aircraft under discussion. The problem here is that many people prefer to flag wave rather than have an honest discussion free of nationalist pretensions.

 

[RCAFson]

So wait a minute, strikes against the RN which never find carriers but attack port facilities and cruisers count as attacks on carriers in your model, but strikes against the USN which don't find the carriers don't count?

How do you count aircraft that arrived after the only carrier present was sunk?


Is there some reason why your big argument uses different standards for the RN vs the USN?

I didn't count the two strikes directed against Ceylon on 5 April (91 strike aircraft) and 9 April (91 strike aircraft) . The IJN launched 4 strikes on 5 and 9 April. two strikes (182 strike aircraft) against Ceylon and two strikes (~138 to 173 strike aircraft) against units of the BEF.

 

[Schweik]

I didn't count the two strikes directed against Ceylon on 5 April (91 strike aircraft) and 9 April (91 strike aircraft) . The IJN launched 4 strikes on 5 and 9 April. two strikes (182 strike aircraft) against Ceylon and two strikes (~138 to 173 strike aircraft) against units of the BEF.

You can only have one standard when you are making a comparison between two things. They must share this standard for the comparison to be meaningful.

You aren't using the same criteria quite obviously, for example with Eastern Solomons - their second strike (maybe - I haven't checked) didn't find the carriers they were looking for. Well, that is exactly what happened for all but 32 of the aircraft that went looking for British carriers at Ceylon.

• if the criteria is just sent a strike out against "units of" a carrier group, then the USN numbers are much higher.
• if the criteria is actually bombed or tried to bomb a carrier, then the RN numbers are much lower.

You can't have it both ways mate.

(And if the criteria is just air attacks against shipping there a ton more you missed. Like those ones I posted earlier around Java)

 

[Peter Gunn]

More flag waving.

Pot, meet kettle.

I'll break it to you gently, you're the last one on this board to be accusing anyone of that, just sayin'.

 

[Schweik]

You were claiming the F4F was a superb aircraft

Please show me where I ever wrote that. Maybe you confused "better than a Hurricane" with "superb". There is a LOT of mileage between a Hurricane in 1942 and "superb"

and presenting prototype performance figures rather than those for combat ready aircraft. I pointed out it's actual performance, just as I've pointed out the actual performance of all the aircraft under discussion. The problem here is that many people prefer to flag wave rather than have an honest discussion free of nationalist pretensions.

No, as you, me, and everyone else reading this thread knows very well, I was literally posting links to ALL the performance figures from WW2aircraftPerformance.org except the one you cherry picked. Please show me where those were all "prototype" performance figures. There is always variance in testing.

You have been quoting from First Team a lot. Here is what First Team says about the F4F-4 (volume 1, page 140 - link via google books here:

Top speed 278 knots / 320 mph, initial climb 2,190, 12.4 minutes to 20,000 feet. Did he cherry pick that? Because it's very similar to the numbers I posted.

Who precisely has their thumb on the scale here? Who is emphasizing outlier data and demanding we ignore everything else?

 

[slaterat]

Really? lol

Who precisely has their thumb on the scale here? Who is emphasizing outlier data and demanding we ignore everything else?

I don't think the KdB would of lasted 2 weeks against the combined forces of the axis in the Mediterranean. Their tinder box carriers would of been quickly put on the bottom of the sea with their poor air cap and damage control. These are two very different theaters and different tactics and equipment. The much tighter waters of the Mediteranean, infested with aircraft and submarines, lead to the development of the armoured carrier and the sophisticated and effective air defense of the FAA. Conducting air strikes at night also became a specialty. The open waters of the Pacific lead to longer ranged aircraft with an emphasis on offence but limited to daylight flying only.

 

[GrauGeist]

I don't think the KdB would of lasted 2 weeks against the combined forces of the axis in the Mediterranean.

Pretty sure Japan was an Axis nation, too...

 

[fubar57]

That would certainly tip the odds in favour of the Axis over the KdB

 

[Schweik]

Really? lol


I don't think the KdB would of lasted 2 weeks against the combined forces of the axis in the Mediterranean. Their tinder box carriers would of been quickly put on the bottom of the sea with their poor air cap and damage control. These are two very different theaters and different tactics and equipment. The much tighter waters of the Mediteranean, infested with aircraft and submarines, lead to the development of the armoured carrier and the sophisticated and effective air defense of the FAA. Conducting air strikes at night also became a specialty. The open waters of the Pacific lead to longer ranged aircraft with an emphasis on offence but limited to daylight flying only.

Nice spin on the whole thing I'll give you that.

I think every aircraft carrier, even to this day, is pretty much a 'tinderbox', they are full of aviation fuel, bombs, machine gun and cannon ammunition, torpedoes, mines, AAA ammunition, and fuel, hydraulic fluid and all kinds of other flammable substances used by the ship itself. Any time a bomb or torpedo goes off in, on or near one it's a potential catastrophe. But I see no evidence to assume that Japanese carriers were in any way inferior to USN or RN types. Those armored decks didn't seem to save RN CVs getting sunk right and left - they lost 14 which is a lot considering they weren't part of any major carrier battles.

Compare Zuikakau with Indomitable (the carrier at Pedestal) - 1942 vintage for both:

Launched: 1939 (Z) / 1940 (P)
Displacement: 32K tons loaded (Z) / 29K tons loaded (P)
Speed: 34.5 knots (Z) / 30 knots (P)
Range: 7K miles (Z) / 11k miles (P)
AA: 16 x 5 In, 36 x 25mm (Z) / 16 x 4.5 in, 48 x 40mm, 10 x 20mm
Aircraft: 72+12 (Z) / 50 (P)

Zuikaku is faster and carries 22 more aircraft. Indomitable has more AA and a longer range. I don't see that as sufficient to make a vast difference. Nice to have a few more AA guns and armored decks but I think I'd rather have 20 Zeros protecting the fleet.

Which brings me to Japanese CAP, it was undoubtedly the best naval fighter protection in the world in 1942. Who was better? Sea Hurricanes and Skuas? Fulmars? Nor was the US CAP as good either.

And the famous night attacks... it's a neat trick - getting them working on Swordfish in 1940 is a really neat trick, and Taranto was a triumph. But by 1942 trading night attacks at short range for not being able to do day attacks at all is not much of a trade. Nor was airborne radar unique to British aircraft. PBY Catalina's were doing low-level night attacks at Guadalcanal, and sunk a bunch of ships that way. They eventually had multiple "Black Cat" squadrons in the Solomons and elsewhere doing night ops. They put radar on TBF / TBM Avengers as well, starting in late 1942, and widespread by 1943 (becoming standard on TBF-1 and TBF-1D). Avengers even shot down a few aircraft in night combat in 1944.

 

[Schweik]

I'd really like to see evidence that the British navy, fleet air arm, or carrier fleet was specifically developed to fight in the Med. It's certainly not my area of expertise by any stretch but I find that very unlikely.

Swordfish and Hurricanes have very short range because they were built in the 30s and not very aerodynamic.