Comparison of Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and North Atlantic naval combat

[GrauGeist]

By the way, when people refer to "armored deck", I'm fairly sure they're aware that only 65% of the deck was armored. And the armor was only 3" (7.8cm) thick.
The fore-deck and afterdeck were half that and the elevators were not armored.

These were not impervious ships and were just as vulnerable to torpedoes and AP bombs as any other warship.

What made the USN's "fragile" carriers survive bombing attacks, was their superior fire control.

Of the 12 US carriers sunk during WWII, only three were sunk outright by aircraft (2 by kamikaze, 1 by bombers).
1 was sunk by gunfire from a warship, 4 were torpedoed by submarines (1 German, 3 Japanese) and 4 were scuttled (the IJN helped in one scuttling by torpedoes from destroyers Akigumo and Makigumo).
Of those 12, only 4 were fleet carriers.

 

[RCAFson]

Please show me where I ever wrote that. Maybe you confused "better than a Hurricane" with "superb". There is a LOT of mileage between a Hurricane in 1942 and "superb"



No, as you, me, and everyone else reading this thread knows very well, I was literally posting links to ALL the performance figures from WW2aircraftPerformance.org except the one you cherry picked. Please show me where those were all "prototype" performance figures. There is always variance in testing.

You have been quoting from First Team a lot. Here is what First Team says about the F4F-4 (volume 1, page 140 - link via google books here:

Top speed 278 knots / 320 mph, initial climb 2,190, 12.4 minutes to 20,000 feet. Did he cherry pick that? Because it's very similar to the numbers I posted.

Who precisely has their thumb on the scale here? Who is emphasizing outlier data and demanding we ignore everything else?

This is from First Team, V1 (from my post 240):

It was the USN themselves that stated that the F4F-4 performed poorly, with a very poor climb rate:

"Fighting Six spent the last few days of March learning about the new model Grumman they would take into battle. They were not impressed: "The planes are like a TBD with a fish,"(7) a grave insult. On 1 April, Gray led a division of four F4F-4s out to the Enterprise at sea for training exercises. He observed the mock torpedo attack on the carrier by Torpedo Six, then landed on board to demonstrate to the air department the features of the F4F-4. That day the squadron took delivery of fifteen F4F-4s just arrived from the West Coast. This was the beginning of a big exchange of aircraft, so Fighting Six would have all available F4F-4s. Gray turned over most of his F4F-3s to Fighting Three and ended up with twenty-three F4F-4s and four F4F-3s. Fighting Six was the first carrier fighting squadron to attain the recommended operating strength of twenty-seven airplanes.

On 3 April with the Enterprise back in port, Fighting Six shifted back to NAS Pearl Harbor to install new gear and commission the factory-fresh planes. Three days later Gray shot off a rocket to Halsey offering his opinion of the Grumman F4F-4 fighter.(8) The performance of the folding wing Wildcat was "exceedingly unsatisfactory." The weight, he felt, simply was too much for the available horsepower, a fact most detrimental to the aircraft's climb and maneuverability. He noted that the F4F-4 had the "feel of a fully loaded torpedo plane." In tests, VF-6 pilots discovered that the climb rate of a fully loaded F4F-4 was only 1,500 feet per minute up to 15,000 feet. Thereafter even that anemic climb rate fell off drastically to 600 feet per minute at 22,000 feet of altitude. Gray found it took almost forty minutes and nearly half of the fuel supply to coax an F4F-4 up to 32,000 feet..." (Lundstrom, First Team).

After Midway, where 28 IJN strike aircraft, in two strikes were able to penetrate the USN GCI directed air defence where the USN had about 60 available fighters, Nimitz sent off a message urgently requesting Merlin engined fighters:

"..Spruance and Browning rated the Grumman Wildcat "greatly inferior'' in comparison with the nimble Japanese
Zero. On 20 June Nimitz relayed their fears to King, noting the "extreme and apparently
increased superiority performance of 0 fighters'' was mitigated only by the vulnerability
of Japanese planes and the superior tactics of the U.S. Navy fighter pilots. "Overall results
have been bad and will be serious and potentially decisive with improvement that must
be expected in enemy tactics.'' Remarkably he called for army Curtiss P-4OF Warhawk
fighters to replace navy F4F Wildcats and Brewster F2A Buffaloes in all marine fighting
squadrons defending forward bases and even asked that the P-4OF "or comparable type"
be tested for carrier suitability; In the meantime the F4F-4s must be lightened, and their
ammunition supply increased even should that require reverting to four guns in place of six.
The swift introduction of the Vought F4U-1 Corsair fighter was an "absolute priority.'' Thus
after Midway the top fleet commanders experienced a serious crisis of confidence over the
effectiveness of the basic U.S. carrier fighter, a worry that would soon influence Fletcher's
most controversial command decision..."
(Black Shoe carrier Admiral, p.200)

The problems in USN GCI fighter direction are detailed in Friedman's Fighters Over the Fleet, but it exacerbated the issues with the F4F-4, since they had such a poor climb rate that it was essential that radar GCI directed them accurately and in sufficient numbers to break up the IJN attacks. By Mid 1942, the RN FAA had had over two years experience with radar GCI and they used it to make effective use of the Fulmar, for example, which had a similarly poor rate of climb:

"The aircraft on board the British carriers were inferior to the
attackers [PEDESTAL] in performance, but that was more than balanced by superior
tactics based on radar fighter direction. The US Navy agreed that at this
point British fighter control was superior. In July 1943, with the US
carrier force badly drawn down, Victorious operated with Saratoga in the
Southwest Pacific. Because her fighter-control techniques were considered
superior, she was made fighter carrier, with all the fighters of both
carriers on board: thirty-six Martlets and twenty-four US F4F-4s." (Friedman, Fighters Over the Fleet)

 

[Tom17]

Schweik,
'Those armored decks didn't seem to save RN CVs getting sunk right and left - they lost 14 which is a lot considering they weren't part of any major carrier battles'.
The RN lost 5 CVs during WW2.
3 to torpedo (u-boat) Courageous, Eagle and Ark Royal; 1 to surface gunfire , Glorious; and 1 to air attack, Hermes
AFAIK none of them had armoured decks ( Illustrious onwards)
Tom

 

[Peter Gunn]

Nice spin on the whole thing I'll give you that.

But I see no evidence to assume that Japanese carriers were in any way inferior to USN or RN types. Those armored decks didn't seem to save RN CVs getting sunk right and left - they lost 14 which is a lot considering they weren't part of any major carrier battles.

Actually IJN carriers were perhaps inferior in design, they did not have armored decks and their hangars were totally enclosed, kinda' the worst of both worlds. Shattered Sword gives a good comparison (albeit a quick two paragraphs or so) on this. The enclosed hangars apparently magnified bomb hits in said hangars as the force of the explosion had no where to vent. Also they IJN crews couldn't dump ordinance out of an open side like the USN carrier crews could.

USN = No armored decks but open hangars for ventilation/ordinance disposal and the ability to warm up aircraft in the hangar.
RN = Armored decks with good ventilation although not open to the sea like USN ships.
IJN = No armored decks and no ventilation or ordinance disposal capability i.e. worst of both worlds.

Other than that I agree with you pretty much on the carriers.

Cheers

 

[Schweik]

Schweik,
'Those armored decks didn't seem to save RN CVs getting sunk right and left - they lost 14 which is a lot considering they weren't part of any major carrier battles'.
The RN lost 5 CVs during WW2.
3 to torpedo (u-boat) Courageous, Eagle and Ark Royal; 1 to surface gunfire , Glorious; and 1 to air attack, Hermes
AFAIK none of them had armoured decks ( Illustrious onwards)
Tom

Hmmm, yeah that's what I get for believing google, I was a bit too hasty there.

Wikipedia mentions 8:

Ark Royal (CV)- sunk by U-boat
Audacitiy (CVE)- sunk by U-boat
Avenger (CVE)- sunk by U-boat
Courageous (CV)- sunk by U-boat
Dasher (CVE)- sunk by 'unknown explosion'
Eagle (CV)- sunk by U-boat
Glorious CV)- sunk by batleships Scharnhorst and Gniesenau
Hermes (CV)- Sunk by IJN bombers

Note I'm using the acronyms "CV" and "CVE" just to distinguish between fleet carriers and escort carriers. Some of these also look like conversions from other ship types.

 

[Schweik]

Actually IJN carriers were perhaps inferior in design, they did not have armored decks and their hangars were totally enclosed, kinda' the worst of both worlds. Shattered Sword gives a good comparison (albeit a quick two paragraphs or so) on this. The enclosed hangars apparently magnified bomb hits in said hangars as the force of the explosion had no where to vent. Also they IJN crews couldn't dump ordinance out of an open side like the USN carrier crews could.

USN = No armored decks but open hangars for ventilation/ordinance disposal and the ability to warm up aircraft in the hangar.
RN = Armored decks with good ventilation although not open to the sea like USN ships.
IJN = No armored decks and no ventilation or ordinance disposal capability i.e. worst of both worlds.

Other than that I agree with you pretty much on the carriers.

Cheers

Fair enough- and interesting I wasn't aware, or I guess I'd seen it but hadn't thought about it - of the open sides of the US CVs.

Still, I don't think any of this makes that much difference except around the margins. One or two bombs yeah damage control can maybe handle it. IJN carriers survived bomb hits many times too. US did seem a little better about it, but if they got hit just right or with too many bombs, they were done. There are of course some extreme cases like the Franklin, but a lot of that I think (good and bad) comes down to luck.

 

[SaparotRob]

Probably PTO was richer in targets? Just thinking aloud.

I was going to post something very similar myself.

 

[Schweik]

This is from First Team, V1 (from my post 240):

It was the USN themselves that stated that the F4F-4 performed poorly, with a very poor climb rate:

"Fighting Six spent the last few days of March learning about the new model Grumman they would take into battle. They were not impressed: "The planes are like a TBD with a fish,"(7) a grave insult. On 1 April, Gray led a division of four F4F-4s out to the Enterprise at sea for training exercises. He observed the mock torpedo attack on the carrier by Torpedo Six, then landed on board to demonstrate to the air department the features of the F4F-4. That day the squadron took delivery of fifteen F4F-4s just arrived from the West Coast. This was the beginning of a big exchange of aircraft, so Fighting Six would have all available F4F-4s. Gray turned over most of his F4F-3s to Fighting Three and ended up with twenty-three F4F-4s and four F4F-3s. Fighting Six was the first carrier fighting squadron to attain the recommended operating strength of twenty-seven airplanes.

On 3 April with the Enterprise back in port, Fighting Six shifted back to NAS Pearl Harbor to install new gear and commission the factory-fresh planes. Three days later Gray shot off a rocket to Halsey offering his opinion of the Grumman F4F-4 fighter.(8) The performance of the folding wing Wildcat was "exceedingly unsatisfactory." The weight, he felt, simply was too much for the available horsepower, a fact most detrimental to the aircraft's climb and maneuverability. He noted that the F4F-4 had the "feel of a fully loaded torpedo plane." In tests, VF-6 pilots discovered that the climb rate of a fully loaded F4F-4 was only 1,500 feet per minute up to 15,000 feet. Thereafter even that anemic climb rate fell off drastically to 600 feet per minute at 22,000 feet of altitude. Gray found it took almost forty minutes and nearly half of the fuel supply to coax an F4F-4 up to 32,000 feet..." (Lundstrom, First Team).

After Midway, where 28 IJN strike aircraft, in two strikes were able to penetrate the USN GCI directed air defence where the USN had about 60 available fighters, Nimitz sent off a message urgently requesting Merlin engined fighters:

"..Spruance and Browning rated the Grumman Wildcat "greatly inferior'' in comparison with the nimble Japanese
Zero. On 20 June Nimitz relayed their fears to King, noting the "extreme and apparently
increased superiority performance of 0 fighters'' was mitigated only by the vulnerability
of Japanese planes and the superior tactics of the U.S. Navy fighter pilots. "Overall results
have been bad and will be serious and potentially decisive with improvement that must
be expected in enemy tactics.'' Remarkably he called for army Curtiss P-4OF Warhawk
fighters to replace navy F4F Wildcats and Brewster F2A Buffaloes in all marine fighting
squadrons defending forward bases and even asked that the P-4OF "or comparable type"
be tested for carrier suitability; In the meantime the F4F-4s must be lightened, and their
ammunition supply increased even should that require reverting to four guns in place of six.
The swift introduction of the Vought F4U-1 Corsair fighter was an "absolute priority.'' Thus
after Midway the top fleet commanders experienced a serious crisis of confidence over the
effectiveness of the basic U.S. carrier fighter, a worry that would soon influence Fletcher's
most controversial command decision..."
(Black Shoe carrier Admiral, p.200)

The problems in USN GCI fighter direction are detailed in Friedman's Fighters Over the Fleet, but it exacerbated the issues with the F4F-4, since they had such a poor climb rate that it was essential that radar GCI directed them accurately and in sufficient numbers to break up the IJN attacks. By Mid 1942, the RN FAA had had over two years experience with radar GCI and they used it to make effective use of the Fulmar, for example, which had a similarly poor rate of climb:

"The aircraft on board the British carriers were inferior to the
attackers [PEDESTAL] in performance, but that was more than balanced by superior
tactics based on radar fighter direction. The US Navy agreed that at this
point British fighter control was superior. In July 1943, with the US
carrier force badly drawn down, Victorious operated with Saratoga in the
Southwest Pacific. Because her fighter-control techniques were considered
superior, she was made fighter carrier, with all the fighters of both
carriers on board: thirty-six Martlets and twenty-four US F4F-4s." (Friedman, Fighters Over the Fleet)

So your whole, frequently reposted statistical analysis of IJN sorties vs. RN / USN carriers is shown to be B.S., and all you can resort to is repeating the same mid-war report you already posted three times, and some subjective commentary by a modern author?

Here are some of the objective facts:

• The F4F, in various forms remained the main Naval and Marine Corps fighter for the US until late 1943 when the F6F finally started to arrive. The Marines started to get some F4U Corsairs from February 1943 but in small numbers, and it took a while to figure out how to use it. It was the F4F, undoubtedly a mediocre design, which held the line against the IJN, and along with some land based types, and in fact broke the back of the Japanese naval air forces in WW2
• That report you posted was only one side of a debate about the F4F-F, and was not the last word.
• With the right tactics, including but not limited to Thach Weave, the F4F became a viable opponent to the excellent Japanese fighters (despite it's mediocre performance)
• The same is also true for many land based types such as the P-40 and in the Pacific, China, and the MTO, and the P-38 and F4U in the Pacific
• No Hurricane unit ever did successfully make this kind of adaptation in any Theater however and by the end of 1942 they were no longer operating as front line fighters
• The Hurricane and Sea Hurricane by contrast, were marginal performers (similar to the Wildcat) but with extremely limited range and endurance, as noted by numerous British pilots and commanders
• The Fulmar was a marginal performer and a marginal dogfighter, and was too slow and low-flying to intercept many Axis bombers
• The US could have certainly acquired Sea Hurricanes if they wanted them, God knows enough Hurricanes were being produced including in Canada,
• but instead it was the other way around, the British acquired as many Martlets and later Hellcats as they could get.

 

[Schweik]

By the way, the Samar Island engagement with Taffy-3 et al, did include Japanese naval air attacks - On Oct 25, 20 x D3A bombers escorted by A6Ms, which were intercepted by FM-2 fighters from VC-10 originally from the Gambier Bay. I haven't yet found all the details of this engagement but there were at least two claims*

Also on Oct 25, starting at 10:47, several USN ships came under kamikzae attack - according to Wikipedia the first kamikaze attack from an actual kamikaze unit in WW II.
USS CVE Kitkun bay destroyed a kamikaze aircraft at 11:08
USS Fanshaw Bay took a near miss at around the same time
USS White Plains took a near miss with 11 sailors injured
USS Kalinin Bay was hit and severely damaged
USS St. Lo was sunk by a kamikaze

I do not know what type of aircraft made up the kamikaze unit.

*"After the sinking of the GAMBIER BAY, Ensign McGraw also landed on the MANILA BAY and, on the afternoon of the 25th, he was launched with other pilots from that ship. During this afternoon flight his group intercepted a formation of ten to twenty Vals flying in to attack the escort carriers. McGraw, in this engagement, shot down one Val and one Zeke.
Action on the 25th was fast and furious. Lieut. J. R. Jackson made one direct hit on a Japanese heavy cruiser with a five-hundred-pound bomb. Ens. W. C. Shroyer made two direct hits on a heavy cruiser with five-hundred-pound bombs. Lt. (jg) C. F. Hunting shot down a Zeke."

There were also apparently attacks by Land based bombers, with FM-2's from Gambier Bay making claims on the 24th. Per the Gambier bay survivors website:

"On October 24th Ens. Courtney assisted in breaking up an attack on American transports by more than 15 twin engine bombers. He was credited with assisting in destroying one Sally and the probable destruction of one Lily. The same day Lieut. R. W. Roby shot down one Lily and assisted in shooting down one Sally and Lieut. Seitz shot down a Sally [Ki-21]. Lt. (jg) Phillips probably destroyed two Zekes and Lt.(jg) Dugan down two Sallys. On the same day, Joe McGraw and others in a CAP flight intercepted a group of fifteen to twenty-one twin engine bombers escorted by six to eight Zekes. McGraw destroyed two Lilys [Ki-48] and damaged a third."

This was obviously much later than 1942 but unless it is proven that these were actually Betty's or something, it puts paid to the notion that land based Japanese bombers never attacked US Navy ships. I seriously doubt it was the first time, as such bombers were based near other naval combat zones, but I haven't checked my books yet.

 

[SaparotRob]

Off the top of my head, we're comparing 1st and 2nd generation carriers (close enough). Akagi and Kaga were conversions. At their time of "construction" nobody knew what to do with carriers. The earlier RN carriers were pretty much in the same boat. The early American aircraft carriers, CV-2 and CV-3 were the coolest looking aircraft carriers ever built.

 

[SaparotRob]

I'm not looking through Star Spangled glasses but I do have a pair of Ray-Bans.

 

[SaparotRob]

Off the top of my head, we're comparing 1st and 2nd generation carriers (close enough). Akagi and Kaga were conversions. At their time of "construction" nobody knew what to do with carriers. The earlier RN carriers were pretty much in the same boat. The early American aircraft carriers, CV-2 and CV-3 were the coolest looking aircraft carriers ever built.

I was actually going somewhere with this but then, you know.

 

[Schweik]

I like the ones converted from battleships, especially if they still had some of their big guns. I know they weren't ideal in many ways,. but they look tough.

 

[SaparotRob]

The Lexingtons had twin 8"(?) gun turrets right by the island.

 

[Schweik]

The Lexingtons had twin 8"(?) gun turrets right by the island.

Yeah I think Saratoga too, right?

 

[Schweik]

Apparently Lexingtons big guns were taken off and made into shore defense cannon in March 42

 

[RCAFson]

So your whole, frequently reposted statistical analysis of IJN sorties vs. RN / USN carriers is shown to be B.S., and all you can resort to is repeating the same mid-war report you already posted three times, and some subjective commentary by a modern author?

Here are some of the objective facts:

• The F4F, in various forms remained the main Naval and Marine Corps fighter for the US until late 1943 when the F6F finally started to arrive. The Marines started to get some F4U Corsairs from February 1943 but in small numbers, and it took a while to figure out how to use it. It was the F4F, undoubtedly a mediocre design, which held the line against the IJN, and along with some land based types, and in fact broke the back of the Japanese naval air forces in WW2
• That report you posted was only one side of a debate about the F4F-F, and was not the last word.
• With the right tactics, including but not limited to Thach Weave, the F4F became a viable opponent to the excellent Japanese fighters (despite it's mediocre performance)
• The same is also true for many land based types such as the P-40 and in the Pacific, China, and the MTO, and the P-38 and F4U in the Pacific
• No Hurricane unit ever did successfully make this kind of adaptation in any Theater however and by the end of 1942 they were no longer operating as front line fighters
• The Hurricane and Sea Hurricane by contrast, were marginal performers (similar to the Wildcat) but with extremely limited range and endurance, as noted by numerous British pilots and commanders
• The Fulmar was a marginal performer and a marginal dogfighter, and was too slow and low-flying to intercept many Axis bombers
• The US could have certainly acquired Sea Hurricanes if they wanted them, God knows enough Hurricanes were being produced including in Canada,
• but instead it was the other way around, the British acquired as many Martlets and later Hellcats as they could get.

F4F-4 = 1200hp, 7975lb and 260sq ft wing area (F4F-4A/B = ~7800lb)

Sea Hurricane IB = 7015lb, 1300hp (12lb boost) or 1440hp (16lb boost) and 258sq ft wing area

Compute the power to weight ratio of a Sea Hurricane IB and an F4F-4

Compute the wing loading of each aircraft.

Which aircraft is likely to turn better?

Which aircraft is likely to climb better?

Which will likely have a shorter TO run?

Did USN F4F-4 pilots complain about poor climb rates? Did they complain about poor maneuverability? Did they complain about high fuel consumption during climbs?

Liquid cooled engines have lower specific fuel consumption at high power settings, so the Merlin will use less fuel during combat and during climbs.

At Midway, F4F-4s that didn't engage in any combat began running out of fuel after 4hrs.

Finally, for a look at why the Sea Hurricane was retired, compute the power to weight ratio and wing loading of the folding wing FM2 and the Seafire III.

The Sea Hurricane IIA/B/C missed Pedestal but served for another two years aboard RN CVs and CVEs.

 

[SaparotRob]

Apparently Lexingtons big guns were taken off and made into shore defense cannon in March 42

But still, cool?

 

[SaparotRob]

I think we've established that the Wildcat and Hurricane were less than optimal naval aviation supremacy aircraft. That would definitely be a factor in comparing the different theatres.
In the North Atlantic, fleet defense didn't require first rate fighters. Breaking up unescorted bomber attacks was the task, not attacking/counter attacking opposing fleets. The convoys would put as much distance as possible from hostile airfields. Fulmars, Sea Hurricanes and Martlets would suffice if only to disrupt attacks. Anti-aircraft weapons were perpetually upgraded and increased as soon as practicable.
There may be some similarities between the PTO and the MTO, however.
Consider Axis airfields as unsinkable aircraft carriers. RN fleets maneuvering to avoid the "flight decks" of opposing air fleets. Scrambling aircraft up to altitudes those planes were not enthusiastic about reaching (No supporting data, just what I got from this thread). The quality of Allied aircraft was far more important in the Med and was found lacking. The attacks on the Med convoys were more incessant than the attacks on the American forces by the IJN/IJA. The LW possibly had superior planes to the IJN but no Air Force in the world could match the IJN in training, experience and dedication in anti ship warfare. At least up to the Battle of Santa Cruz.
The PTO was a battle between opposing air fleets launched from aircraft carriers as well as unsinkable aircraft carriers. Henderson Field, Rabaul, etc. It involved land based aircraft crewed by navy, army and marine personnel. Both side's air forces were (for the most part) trained in anti ship warfare. The Axis air forces in the PTO may have had less robust planes but they had the craft to put ordnance on target.
This may be where comparison differs. The PTO aircraft were designed (some better than others) and crewed anti ship specialists. The raids were fewer but more intense.

 

[SaparotRob]

This thread brought up the attacks on the American task forces during the battle of Santa Cruz. Drachinifel just did the fourth of a series of videos on Guadalcanal fleet actions. "IJN 2/USN 2". It really goes into the attacks on the American fleet. I usually space out on after-action reports but this one was entertaining.
He also has a separate video on anti-aircraft guns "enforcing the no-fly zone".
And yes, he has one on armoured vs unarmoured carriers.