Could the Allies defeat Germany only with air power?

[vinnye]

I do believe that there would have been plans to have the Royal Family relocated to North America (probably Canada?) along with the Crown Jewels and as much treasure as possible in the event of an invasion.
What this would achieve - I am not sure except that there would have been some figurehead for any resistance movement.

I am not certain who would have had the A bomb first? The Allies were certainly concerned onough to destroy the heavy water that had been produced by Germant, and attack Peenamunde to hanper the progress being made.

Without the distraction of the Russian campaign - Britain may not have been able to hold out long enough to become the American airforce base needed to pursue the airwar in late 1941?

If the USA was to try to use airpower - even the B29 - I doubt it had the range to make the trip/
Also Germany would have been able to develop its jet aircraft programs to make the persecution of that air war extremely costly.

So, my thoughts are - no the Allies could not use airpower alone to defeat Germany.

 

[michaelmaltby]

Agreed. But .....:

".... I am not sure except that there would have been some figurehead for any resistance movement."

The Commonwealth was held together by a wee bit more than "figureheads" but ..... Americans never quite grasp that .... understandably, I guess.

Canada had a variety of minor royalty with us as guests during the war -- many young uns. The Commonwealth was/is Plan B, Plan C, Plan D .... etc. for the preservation of Magna Carta Parliamentary democracy ..... geographical options .... so to speak.

MM

 

[parsifal]

The heavy water plants were producing H3O, not enriched uranium. The technology needed to produce a "H" Bomb as opposed to an "A" bomb are several orders of magnitude.

Ive read a report somewhere, that estimates the germans were at least 10 years off producing their first "H" bomb. They were not making any significant efforts into "A" bomb development, though I will stand corrected if people have specific information.

Edit;

I found this article online, which appears to give a pretty good non-scientific history of the development of nuclear weapons before and during the war. I can see my comments above are very wide of the mark, compared to this article, except for the crucial bit of information that the germans were very, very far away from developing nuclear weapons.

Anyway here is the link, and people should make their minds up for themselves:

German Nuclear Weapons

 

[Siegfried]

On topic:
In response to the initial question, posed at the head of this thread:

Could the (W) Allies defeat Germany only with air power?The answer is unequivocally yes.

Anybody attempting to discuss Nazi Germany's "options" in war (without reading and understanding this work), is (IMO) treading on very thin ice.

My two cents, FWIW.

Without a war in the east the Reich has several million more men to dedicate to air defense. More pilots, more FLAK and FLAK ammunition, more aircraft factories. Millions less causualties. More money to put into radar systems research as well as it was the Germans abandoned a promissing line of radars in 1942 for lack of adaquete resources. Advanced aircraft types could be proceded with rather than shelved for lack of resources to develope them. The allies had many failed designs but a few worked; the Germans had less options to produce duds hoping for a good design.

The Luftwaffe would be far more capable of protecting its canals and railways. They in ancase were only put put of action well after d-day when allied forces could opperate fighters from France. With no war in the east there would be a million more troops stationed along Normandy and that invasion just wouldn't succede.

Furthermore with less demands in the east its likely a secondary truck manufacturing industry could grown to bypass the velnerable railways and canals (to an degree).

Tooze is idolised, but his book is devoid of facts, figures. He just expects you to trust his interpretation of someting he has seen but not seen fit to publish. Some elements of this
book will stand but others will fall when scrutinised.

In 1941 the Luftwaffe introduced the Wurzburg Riesse radar which was a giant 7m dish version of the 3m dish Wurzburg. It had connical scan, 0.15 degree bearing accuracy and 16m range accuracy. There was nothing like it till the US SCR 584 which only saw service in 1944 (though was available in 1943). Though bulky Wurzburg Riesse could do the job if money was spent in building enough of them.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... Tooze is idolised, but his book is devoid of facts, figures. He just expects you to trust his interpretation of ....."

110-odd pages of Tables and annotated footnotes is hardly devoid..... ... .. in a 790 page book.

You are free to agree with him or not, according to your mind set, but Tooze is first and foremost an economist .... and the facts and figures 'framework' of Nazis economy is no secret - but what Tooze sees in the figures are the political choices that Nazis leaders and politicians had to make ... and the consequences.

I know of no other historian that has brought this political perspective (economic politics, war strategy) to the Third Reich besides Tooze. That doesn't make him an IDOL ... just clear headed.

MM

 

[Siegfried]

".... Tooze is idolised, but his book is devoid of facts, figures. He just expects you to trust his interpretation of ....."

110-odd pages of Tables and annotated footnotes is hardly devoid..... ... .. in a 790 page book.
MM

I've got the book, data is extremely sparse, often unreadable graphics and tables, sources of the tables not provided, poor indication of sources. I am very unimpressed. He may as well be just another historian wanting to be paid for opining.

Tooze is presented as some kind of econometrician who has scientifically proven something. He hasn't done a solid job at all. The book doesn't deserve half the praise it gets despite his novel approach. Not to be trusted yet.

 

[parsifal]

".... Tooze is idolised, but his book is devoid of facts, figures. He just expects you to trust his interpretation of ....."

110-odd pages of Tables and annotated footnotes is hardly devoid..... ... .. in a 790 page book.

You are free to agree with him or not, according to your mind set, but Tooze is first and foremost an economist .... and the facts and figures 'framework' of Nazis economy is no secret - but what Tooze sees in the figures are the political choices that Nazis leaders and politicians had to make ... and the consequences.

I know of no other historian that has brought this political perspective (economic politics, war strategy) is the Third Reich besides Tooze. That doesn't make him an IDOL ... just clear headed.

MM

Overy makes a similar, if somewhat older analysis, he is a historian and an economist.There are in fact a number of pretty good analyses of the German management 9or more correctly mismanagement) of their war economy.

 

[Siegfried]

I have done extensive reading on this "problem"...not on the internet either.

Hitler's opinions on (his words, not mine) "Jewish science" are a matter of record.

As he (Hitler) is the one (ultimately) holding the purse strings of Nazi procurment policies, this will require a fundamental shift in his "Weltanschaung"; and from my examination of the German leader's psyche, the likelyhood of this ever happening are remote.

Next?

I don't know what books you've read but there are a lot of bad ones out there. Mark Walkers are probably the best on this topic.

The whole jewish science thing was really a carear move by disgruntled academics playing politics to secure academic positions and support. Ultimatly Goebells let it fade away when it started to get to rediculouse and when Heisenbergs mother had a word with Goebells's mother. Hitler seems to have played no direct part in it at all. It played little part in the German nuclear effort. People like Paul Harteck and Kurt Diebener were intellectually and morally quite capable of building an atomic bomb if given the resources. Hartek almost succeded in building the worlds first reactor bar for something as trivial as lack of dry ice. Heisenberg was equivocal about a bomb on many levels and not a driver in the matter at all.

Essentially the German program became a nuclear power program with a reactor planed but not bomb, the reactor was seen as an easier target and a stepping stone to a possible bomb. They probably could have gone critical sometime in 1943 bar shortage of materials and 1944 bar for the collapse of Germany, perhaps earlier. Clara Dopels work had shown that. They had several subcritical reactors that showed neutron multiplication factors. The last one at Haigerloch called the B8 (BVIII) had a neutron multiplication factor of 7 and only needed a 50% increase in volume (about 15% in linear diminesions). The Germans new about fast and slow netrons, morderators and control rods made of cadmium. That they did not know this arises from Goudsmits hatchet job.

Basically the Germans knew how to dimension a reactor.

The loss of Gustave Hertz isoptope seperation work, he was foreced to leave academe and work for Siemens for his jewish background, didn't help German efforts in this area but nevertheless the Germans built and succesfully ran two devices that achieved enrichment: a uranium sluice and an ultra-centrifuge. Enrichment was not neccessary to make a reactor. Heavy Water could make small compact reactors without the use of enriched uranium: one reason the Germans focused on it. The desired for heavy water supplies which was a byproduct of electrolysis in Norway never materialised. Plants using new techniques such as the Geibe exhchange method could not be built by the time they were ready in 1943 or so. Low temperature low pressure fractional distillation was seen as vulnerable to bombing due to the height of the distillation columns.

A bomb effort would have followed a succesfull reactor demonstration : either based around uranium enrichment or plutonium.

From my understanding Heisenberg was asked if it were possible to build a bomb that could effect the outcome of the war, this he correctly ansered no as he couldn't do anthng within a year. Not even the USA could resource that.

Assuming a succesfull reactor from a generous supply of heavy water in say late 43 triggers a bomb program the Germans would take another 2 years to late 1945 to make an atomic bomb.

 

[parsifal]

I've got the book, data is extremely sparse, often unreadable graphics and tables, sources of the tables not provided, poor indication of sources. I am very unimpressed. He may as well be just another historian wanting to be paid for opinining.

Tooze is presented as some kind of econometrician who has scientifically proven something. He hasn't done a solid job at all. The book doesn't deserve half the praise it gets despite his novel approach. Not to be trusted yet.

So, are you saying the german economywas well managed, and efficient? What point or conclusion are you leading to here?

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... Tooze is presented as some kind of econometrician who has scientifically proven something. He hasn't done a solid job at all. The book doesn't deserve half the praise it gets despite his novel approach. Not to be trusted yet...."

I don't think economics is science .... and neither is history .... so with my bias exposed, Siggy, you just sound cynical about Tooze's notoriety ... or is it idolatry. But I do appreciate your vast store of detailed information on a whole range of subjects.

I would love you to comment on two areas Tooze covers that were eye-openers to me and to German-Canadian friends: The Volkswagen Peoples Car, and The Peoples Radio (to hear the Hitler broadcasts) . To me - both were very revealing about Nazis' economics in the consumer state.

Please respond - I know you will have insights on these - and I'm all ears for good insights, my friend.

MM

 

[Trilisser]

Perhaps a question that air power fanatics don't like: would WW2 have had a substantially different end result if there had been no air power at all, i.e. there would have no aircraft in existence at all?

 

[Jenisch]

Overy at least considerates equally economic, strategic and even the moral factors in Why The Allies Won. He argues it's wrong to considerate only the economic and numerical side, and I agree with him.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... Perhaps a question that air power fanatics don't like: would WW2 have had a substantially different end result if there had been no air power at all, i.e. there would have no aircraft in existence at all?"

So ... WWI didn't happen ..... ?

Puzzled in Toronto

MM

 

[iron man]

'Once fully mobilized for war, the USA has the industrial power to squash Hitler...many times over.

If completely paving England over with airfields is seen as a requirement to meet these ends, then it will be done.

All the resources that the Third Reich can muster will do nothing to change this'.

Ironman, The problem is one of logistics. The USA's industrial power and manpower that can be brought to bear is well documented.
The problem is that Europe is a long way from Detroit.

I'm not convinced that Germany could be weakened enough to unconditionally surrender with conventional bombs.
If the allied decision was to attack by air alone that the final blows would have to be nuclear.
This would have been possible after the success of the Japanese A bombs.
When? Again that is uncertain, Maybe the late 1940's as already suggested on this thread,

Its interesting to speculate but, that is all we can do with any of the suggested scenarios.

John

Ummm...please?

Bolded 1) The logistics of supporting the historical bombing effort...(while also concurrently supporting an unprecidented build up of a land force, sufficient to guarantee sucess in a cross channel invasion) was easily provided for in the historical case.
Bolded 2) Read my cited source...This is what actually happened.

"Wunderwaffen" and all that "Luft '46" stuff notwithstanding...The USAAF will just continue to "bring it" (in ever increasing volumes), and Hitler's "house of cards" will collapse.


Seems I've sparked a return to debating the actual topic...go figure.

I will respond to the rest of the replies tomorrow am (MST)...I also have a life, (outside of this "stuff") and that takes precidence.

 

[Trilisser]

".... Perhaps a question that air power fanatics don't like: would WW2 have had a substantially different end result if there had been no air power at all, i.e. there would have no aircraft in existence at all?"

So ... WWI didn't happen ..... ?

Puzzled in Toronto

MM

....Assume that at the end of Aug. 1, 1939 all the aircraft in the world would fail to start till the end of the war...

 

[parsifal]

Perhaps a question that air power fanatics don't like: would WW2 have had a substantially different end result if there had been no air power at all, i.e. there would have no aircraft in existence at all?

Short answer is yes. Airpower was never decisive of itself. it still isnt. It cannot take and hold ground, cannot control the worlds oceans, is not that good at killing stuff, yet without it, achieving ground victories at acceptable cost becomes virtually impossible. This is especially true for the attacker. Without air power, reconnaisance becomes virtually impossible, so attacks are delivered more or less in the dark. Whilst airpower does not kill things on the ground all that well, they do inhibit movement and interdic the flow af supplies and replacements.

Airpower in the strategic sense is a little harder to quantify, but it still has a substantial impact on industrial outputs and manpower availability. The germans expended huge amounts of treasure and manpower on their defences against the allied airborne bombardment over germany.so too did the allies in their attacks, but the allies can still count their efforts as a victory, because they could afford the cost, the axis could not

 

[Readie]

Ummm...please?

Bolded 1) The logistics of supporting the historical bombing effort...(while also concurrently supporting an unprecidented build up of a land force, sufficient to guarantee sucess in a cross channel invasion) was easily provided for in the historical case.
Bolded 2) Read my cited source...This is what actually happened.

"Wunderwaffen" and all that "Luft '46" stuff notwithstanding...The USAAF will just continue to "bring it" (in ever increasing volumes), and Hitler's "house of cards" will collapse.


Seems I've sparked a return to debating the actual topic...go figure.

I will respond to the rest of the replies tomorrow am (MST)...I also have a life, (outside of this "stuff") and that takes precidence.

Shades of Pk40 Ratsel I think Chris.

John

 

[Siegfried]

So, are you saying the german economywas well managed, and efficient? What point or conclusion are you leading to here?

One thing point Tooze does assertively dismisses is that the Germans were not in an war economy footing in 1940, 1941 or 1942 and that Hitler was just too afraid to cut into leasure time. This turns out to be myth and part of the usual looney tunes historian regurgitation of supposed Nazi/German total incompetance. They most defineity were on a war economy footing however the major investment was going into building factories, tooling, making mass production facilites etc to make the weapons since German factories were not setup for mass production. Once that was complete focus and manpower could shift to production. Speer reapt the benefits of this when he took over after Fritz Todt's death in a plane crash.

As far as the German over spending on weapons, they didn't. They spent enough to win against France and Poland simultaneously. Once the threat of these nations had been neutralised and they were occupied the resources they once used on military expenditure was no longer required by them and could be appropriated for the Reichs security needs.

In general its is likely true that it was difficult for the Germans to export enough to import the special materials they needed for manufacture of weapons: eg nickel, chromium etc etc and that this would have created a foreign exchange problem. He notes that barter arrangments with Sth America were a poor bargain for the Germans. However for the Germans security of export and import markets was more important.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Shades of Pk40 Ratsel I think Chris.

John

How?

If I understood him correctly, all he said is that with the US Industrial might, the Germans were bound to lose. If that is not a fact, then I don't what is...

By the way he joined back in 2006. Way before P-40K-5/Ratsel.

 

[parsifal]

I see. I believe this conversation has been had before.....Tooze does indeed say that there was no slack in the german economy in the early years, and he does say that many socalled civilian projects were really capital investment programs for armaments production, but he says anything but that the the nazis managed their wartime economy efficiently. I would suggest that you are being selective in your use of tooze here....seeing and using what you think is useful and agreeing with your preconceptions and agenda driven points of view, and dismissing as meandering and confusing and unsupoorted arguments for those bits of the book that dont agree with what you are looking for.

To give a more balanced appraisal, I have attached the link of a review of Tooze's book, so that people who have not read the book may decide for themselves on what his principal views aree, and the quality and depth of support that is contained in his work:

Review: The Wages of Destruction, Adam Tooze | afoe | A Fistful of Euros | European Opinion

Another review makes this observation regarding toozes assessment:

"To sum up: Tooze shows Hitler's Germany was always too hampered by shortages of raw materials, notably crude oil and rubber but also iron ore and coal, animal feed and fertiliser, foreign currency and even labour, to attempt an independent industrial and commercial existence in peace, let alone a campaign of European conquest. He exposes the latent mismanagement of the Nazis and their wartime economy. For all the ingenuity of cynical opportunists such as Hjalmar Schacht, at the Reichsbank until 1939, and Speer, at Armaments after 1942, Germany passed through a succession of hair-raising mostly self inflicted financial and resource crises that hampered its armies and helped to bring on the final collapse".

If this is an accurate review of Toozes book, then he is hardly singing the praises of Nazi economic management.


What is your opinion on the management of the economies of the occupied territories? Do you consider the reich forced devaluations of currencies and artificial pegging of exports by occupied territories to be good management of the economic resources of the conquered territories.

Also what is your take on on Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht ? Why did hitler sack a man many consider to be the one of the most gifted prewar bankers in Europe.