Could the Allies defeat Germany only with air power? (1 Viewer)

[fastmongrel]

In short, if the USSR attacked Japan INSTEAD of Germany, leaving us completely free to help Britain, then yes, the Allies could win the air war.

Erm the USSR didnt attack Japan till Aug 45 and Germany attacked the USSR first.

 

[ccheese]

I think you underestimate the Luftwaffe.

Very much so......

Charles

 

[vinnye]

I am sure that someone will correct me if I am wrong, but didn't the LW commit about 75% of its resources to the Eastern front at one time?
I know that fighters were withdrawn to meet the bomber threat over Berlin later on - but no Eastern Front means a lot more LW to redeploy!

 

[Procrastintor]

I didn't say it'd be a cake walk, I said it could be done. Also, the Uk and Canada diverted forces to the PTO as well, so, in a one theater scenario, they'd have their guys back as well. And as for the U-boats, destroyers and Sub-huntin planes dealt with the Japanese subs just fine, so U-boats would be a problem, but nothing unhandleable.

 

[Jenisch]

Christos military and intelligence corner: Eastern Front Aircraft Strength and Losses 1941-45

The LW fighter strenght in the East doesn't look very impressive.

The Wages of Destruction, Adam Tooze, page 410:

The territories that Germany had conquered in 1940, though they provided substantial booty and a crucial source of labour did not bear comparison with the abundance provided to Britain by America. The aerial arms race was the distinctive Anglo-American contribution to the war and it played directly to America's dominance in manufacturing. But though the disparity in aircraft deliveries was extreme it was not untypical. A similarly vast gulf was also evident in relation to energy supplies, the most basic driver of modern urban and industrial society. Whereas the Anglo-American alliance was energy rich, Germany and its Western European Grossraum were starved of food, coal and oil.The disparity with respect to oil was most serious. Between 1940 and 1943 the mobility of Germany's army, navy and air force, not to mention its domestic economy, depended on annual imports of 1.5 million tonsof oil, mainly from Romania. In addition, German synthetic fuel factories, at huge expense, produced a flow of petrol that rose from 4 million tons in 1940 to a maximum of 6.5 million tons in 1943. Seizing the fuel stocks of France as booty in no way resolved this fundamental dependency. In fact, the victories of 1940 had the reverse effect. They added a number of heavy oil consumers to Germany's own fuel deficit. From its annual fuel flow of at most 8 million tons, Germany now had to supply not only its own needs, but those of the rest of Western Europe as well. Before the war, the French economy had consumed at least 5.4 million tons per annum, at a per capita rate 60 per cent higher than Germany's. The effect of the German occupation was to throw France back into an era before motorization. From the summer of 1940 France was reduced to a mere 8 per cent of its pre-war supply of petrol. In an economy adjusted to a high level of oil consumption the effects were dramatic. To give just one example, thousands of litres of milk went to waste in the French countryside every day, because no petrol was available to ensure regular collections. Of more immediate concern to the military planners in Berlin were the Italian armed forces, which depended entirely on fuel diverted from Germany and Romania. By February 1941, the Italian navy was threatening to halt its operations in the Mediterranean altogether unless Germany supplied at least 250,000 tons of fuel. And the problems were by no means confined to the Reich's satellites. Germany itself coped only by dint of extreme economy. In late May 1941, General Adolf von Schell, the man responsible for the motor vehicle industry, seriously suggested that in light of the chronics hortage of oil it would be advisable to carry out a partial 'demotorization' of the Wehrmacht. It is commonly remarked that the Luftwaffe suffered later in the war because of the inadequate training of its pilots, due in large part to the shortage of air fuel. But in 1941 the petrol shortage was already so severe that the Wehrmacht was licensing its soldiers to drive heavy trucks with less than 15 kilometres of on-road experience, a measure which was blamed for the appalling attrition of motor vehicles during the Russian campaign. Shortages made themselves felt across the German economy. So tight were fuel rations that in November 1941 Opel was forced to shut down production at its Brandenburg plant, Germany's largest truck factory, because it lacked the petrol necessary to check the fuel pumps of vehicles coming off theassembly line. A special allocation of 104 cubic metres of fuel had to bearranged by the Wehrmacht's economic office so as to ensure that there were no further interruptions.

Page 450:

Though the continental bloc could certainly satisfy both 'ideological' and 'pragmatic' criteria, the advocates of a long-term alliance with the Soviet Union were never in a majority in Berlin and this too was as much for pragmatic as for ideological reasons. In the long term a genuine alliance would have involved an unacceptable degree of German dependence on the Soviets. As General Haider noted in his diary in December 1940: 'Every weakness in the position of the Axis brings a push by the Russians. They cannot prescribe the rules for transactions, but they utilize every opportunity to weaken the Axis position.' In a Eurasian continental bloc, it would be the central power, the Soviet Union, not Japan or Germany, that would ultimately occupy the dominant position.The Third Reich had no intention of slipping into the kind of humbling dependence that Britain now occupied in relation to the United States, mortgaging its assets and selling its secrets, simply to sustain the war effort. That this was the direction in which Germany might be headed was evident already in the spring of 1940. Just prior to the German offensive in the West, Moscow demanded as part payment for its raw material deliveries the construction of two chemicals plants in the Soviet Union, one for coal hydrogenation (synthetic fuel), the other to embody IG Farben's revolutionary Buna process (synthetic rubber).
The Soviet Union was to have full access to both the blueprints and the complex instrumentation necessary to monitor the high-pressure reactions. Not surprisingly, IG Farben balked and with the support of the German military the deal was blocked. But the fact that the Soviets could even make such demands indicates the seriousness of the German dilemma. The hugely increased volume of trade needed to sustain Germany's blockaded Grossraum was bound to give the Soviet Union ever-increasing leverage. By the autumn of 1940, Germany's dependence on deliveries of raw materials, fuel and food from the Soviet Union was creating a positively schizophrenic situation. In trade negotiations, German machine tools
were one of the means of settlement prized most highly by the Soviets. Such exports, however, were in direct conflict with the preparations of Germany's own armed forces for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Astonishingly, rather than interrupting the Soviet deliveries to prioritize the Luftwaffe, Göring in early October 1940 ordered that, at least until 11 May 1941, deliveries to the Soviet Union, and thus to the Red Army, should have equal priority with the demands of the Wehrmacht. Even in the immediate prelude to operation Barbarossa, Germany could not afford to do without Soviet deliveries of oil, grain and alloy metals.The willingness to engage in such bizarre compromises reflected the increasing concern in Berlin over the precarious situation of Germany'sraw material supplies.
As the military-economic office of the Wehr-macht concluded at the end of October 1940: 'Current favourable raw material situation (improved by stocks captured in enemy territory) will,in case of prolonged war and after consumption of existing stocks,re-emerge as bottleneck. From summer 1941 this is to be expected incase of fuel oil as well as industrial fats and oils.

There's a difference between a Germany that has defeated the USSR according to the Barbarossa planning, and hence acquired significative resources, and a Germany that doesn't attack the USSR at all (the case proposed in this thread).

 

[Jenisch]

Other thing: have you people already think about the potential of the US and Britain devoting their efforts to the air war? The Western Front in '44 had 5.5 million men, mostly from ground troops. Imagine all this personal in the Air Force or working in the industry for the air effort. One can say something similar about the German Army without being in Russia, but the Germans lacked the fuel and resources to dramatically expand the LW and their industry. I think there would be some fierce air fighting, but in the end the much superior in industry and fossil fuels Anglo-American alliance would have broke the back of the LW. After this was done, the Allies would wide their material advantage and then could start to think in launch an amphibious assault in Europe. Or they coud keep Europe under siege and deal with Japan first before do that.

 

[CORSNING]

I'm sorry guys. I have not read one word of this thread (yet). My dad was a GRUNT in WW2 and the answer to the original question is NO! The Army/Marines/Navy/Air Corps will all tell you the same thing. They all have a special purpose, but if you don't have someone on the ground securing the turf, it's just an elusive momentary dream of victory. And that is all I have to say about that.
God bless you all, Jeff.

 

[Procrastintor]

Never thought of that Jenisch.

 

[DonL]

Christos military and intelligence corner: Eastern Front Aircraft Strength and Losses 1941-45

The LW fighter strenght in the East doesn't look very impressive.

The Wages of Destruction, Adam Tooze, page 410:



Page 450:



There's a difference between a Germany that has defeated the USSR according to the Barbarossa planning, and hence acquired significative resources, and a Germany that doesn't attack the USSR at all (the case proposed in this thread).

Mr. Toozie did very heavy mistakes and you can't compare any german economy in real-life to a german economy without any war in the east!

1. The german economy suffered very badly on skilled workers through the mobilization of the Wehrmacht at 1939 to 150 divisions of the Heer (ground troops)
2. At July 1940 it was decided to reduce the Wehrmacht to 120-100 division. Every german division had a required strength of 16000 men.
3. At August 1940 Hitler ordered the attack to the UDSSR and the expansion of the Wehrmacht to 180 divisions.
4. The Wehrmacht lost till 31.12.1944 5.880.000 casualtys only at the east front.
5. 1.170.000 men dead; 1.062.000 missed ; 3.535.000 wounded.
6. Source Rüdiger Overmans

7. So if we subtract 50 divisions (each with 16000 men) we have 800000 men more skilled worker or men to be trained as pilot at 1940.
8. If we took the numbers from the casualtys of the Ostfront and the numbers from 1940 we have from 1941 to 1944 6.6880.000 more skilled workers and or men to be trained as pilots from 1941 -1944.
9. We have from 1941 not a single engine which absorbed a single drop of fuel on the way to Moscow, Stalingrad or any other place at the UDSSR.
9. Since 1942 the german economy developed a system to recycle aluminium from shot downed or crashed aircrafts (mainly enemy 4 engine bomber aircrafts).
10. After this system the german aviation industry had no serious problems with the supply of aluminium.

So in summary I would be very interested of the performance of the USAAF especially with Wildcats at 1942 to such an improved LW and also later in the war, where Germany could concentrate their efforts totaly to the LW and the U-Boots without any problems with fuel supply.
I think there would be a very very rude awakening for USAAF!

 

[Procrastintor]

Remember, air power only, no U-boats. Theyd have to get some planes past the Wildcats to destroy a Carrier (carriers are allowed as they are just mobile runways)

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Remember, air power only, no U-boats. Theyd have to get some planes past the Wildcats to destroy a Carrier (carriers are allowed as they are just mobile runways)

If no U-Boots, then no Carriers. They are not just mobile runways. They fall under sea power. Aircraft are a Carrier's firepower. Instead of cannons, they use aircraft. You can't allow one thing, but not allow the others main defense for it.

Can't have your cake and eat it too...

Thats like saying you can have a soccer net, but no goalie to defend it.

Besides, do you think that the Wildcats could stop all the aircraft thrown against them? Underestimate much?

 

[Jenisch]

But DonL, I repeat, the Allies would have 5.5 million extra men avaliable. It's out of my knowledge, however, how many of them in both sides could become pilots. The Allies also would have all the Lend-Lease that did not went to the USSR. I don't know, but the impression I have is that it would be a bloody air war, but one that the Allies still could win. Of course, then you have to considerate the oil coming from the USSR, which was also a factor.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

The outcome would be the same. The Allies would probably still win. Germany would never outproduce them.

At most I think the Germans would be able to do is fight them to a stalemate.

 

[DonL]

But DonL, I repeat, the Allies would have 5.5 million extra men avaliable. It's out of my knowledge, however, how many of them in both sides could become pilots. The Allies also would have all the Lend-Lease that did not went to the USSR. I don't know, but the impression I have is that it would be a bloody air war, but one that the Allies still could win. Of course, then you have to considerate the oil coming from the USSR, which was also a factor.

I don't disagree Jenisch, but till the end of 1942 the LW would have the technical superioty through the Bf 109 F-4 and the FW 190 A-3.
And yes the USA had outproduced the third reich in any way, but the casualtys to the RAF and USAAF would be extreme especially at 1942 and 1943, when the LW was technical equal to it's enemys.
My intention with this post was to show "Procrastintor" that this is not a singlesided adventure and far away from a fast-selling item.

 

[Procrastintor]

Again, never said it was single sided, but Germany is much smaller industrywise, manpowerwise, not to mention the US had the UK, Canada, and LE FRENCH RESISTAAANCE on their side even without counting Russia.

 

[Jenisch]

but the casualtys to the RAF and USAAF would be extreme especially at 1942 and 1943, when the LW was technical equal to it's enemys.

How those extreme casualities would occur?

 

[DonL]

Again, never said it was single sided, but Germany is much smaller industrywise, manpowerwise, not to mention the US had the UK, Canada, and LE FRENCH RESISTAAANCE on their side even without counting Russia.

do you have read my post 509?

I think that it would be possible to take on Germany on air power alone (w/o USSR) if the US didn't have to divert forces to the PTO and CBI. If our carriers had been parked in the Atlantic/Mediterranean instead of the Pacific, then all those Wildcats, Warhawks, Liberators, Corsairs, Hellcats and all the other aircraft that became famous in the Pacific would be in the ETO and MTO, bringing all their famous hurt with them. The pilots that became famous in the AVG would be raining pain on the Luftwaffe instead of the IJAAF, and the Black Sheep's Corsairs would be flying over pine trees and snow instead of Palm trees and sand. In short, if the USSR attacked Japan INSTEAD of Germany, leaving us completely free to help Britain, then yes, the Allies could win the air war.

I realy ask you what Wildcats, Warhawks, Liberators can do against Bf 109 F-4, Fw 190A3 (both with drop tanks) and ME 110F?
To a comparison report of the US Navy showed, that a FW 190A5 fighter bomber was superior to a Hellcat F3F and equal to a F4 U-1 Corsair, so what is with a clean Fw 190A fighter?
The Ju 88 and Do 217 ( especially with Fritz X) were to my opinion the absolute best anti ship a/c's at the whole world 1942-1945.
The anti ASW of the US Navy we have seen at 1942 at the big bang of Doenitz IXC attack of the east cost of the USA.

So I will claim that the US Navy will suffer plenty of a/c's and (war) ships, even carriers at 1942/1943 against the LW and KM and only the introduction of the F4 U-4, the P51 Mustang and the very advanced anti ASW tactics and technologies of the Royal Navy not the US Navy, would change the outcomming!

 

[DonL]

How those extreme casualities would occur?

With the loss of every single air craft carrier that would try to attack european homeland through the Atlantic, Mediterranean or Norway (1942/43) and countless of fighter a/c's which would try to fight the LW near at their bases.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

But those Carrier planes are going to have a hard time landing in the water, since we are not including seapower right?

Just saying...

 

[wuzak]

With the loss of every single air craft carrier that would try to attack european homeland through the Atlantic, Mediterranean or Norway (1942/43) and countless of fighter a/c's which would try to fight the LW near at their bases.

Wait...the Luftwaffe will destroy all the extra deployed aircraft carriers. Did they destroy all the ones that were deployed historically?