Could the British have sent enough aircraft to Singapore to make a difference?

[parsifal]

I disagree with your conclusion, the "army" of the British Aussie units were able to fight the Japanese, but the Indian troops that were facing the japanes for the first 6 weeks were unmotivated inexperienced. With more effective resistance the campaign could have been much different

It could have been different, but the troops you are talking about simply were unavailable. And the british and Austraqlian units were only marginally better than the indian troops at halting the japanese. The British in particular were obsessed with protecting their flaks, and covering their lines of communication. Every time the Japanese hooked them, the british obliged and fell back, The Australians made a decent stand, but lost far more than they killed, particulalry in terms of ewquipment....they had to be pulled back to Singas After that one battle the Australians were little better than a battlegroup.

Agreed. If the British are able to give a solid resistance to the Japanese in Malaya it would prevent attacks on other more distant targets.



I agree too, but the problem is it was never going to happen....the allies, particulalry the british could not deal with the fast moving "Infantry Blitzkrieg tactics used by the Japanese. The could not understand that all they had to do was hold firm, make sure they have a credible counterattack force, and then crush the enveloping hook as they emerged from the Jungle. It took the British more than two year to work this out....the Aussies kinda had it worked out by the end of 1942


Let's review the timeline here:
Western Forces
8 Dec Japan invades Malaya
There are 3 CW divisions in Malaya in the first 6 weeks, + a few other brigades.

the 11th Indian is basically destroyed by the attacks of the 6th of Jan.
the 9th Indian has been mauled during the fighting of Dec.
The 8th Australian hands the japanese a bloody nose in an ambush, but 1 brigade of the division is destroyed in the fighting of the 19th/20th as the green Indian brigade guarding the flank gives way.

So by the 20th of Jan, the Japanese have dealt a crushing blow to all 3 Allied divisions.
The Japanese 15th army launchs their main attack into Burma on Jan 20 after they have effectively neutralized all of the allied divisions, and they are confident of victory.
No other attacks are made by west force until the Japanese invade DEI on 14 Feb after Singapore has been effectively defeated (Japanese forces capture the water supply ammo dumps on 13 Jan and capture/neutralize all allied airpower, Singapore's fate is sealed.
Now, if the British had managed to hold back the Japanes in northern malaya, or repulsed the assault on Singapore, the DEI invasion would be postponed, as they needed to use the troops aircraft from the malaya campaign to hit DEI.

Eastern Central Force
The Japanese only make landings in Dutch Borneo (11 Jan) after the main US force has been bottled up in Baatan, and the air 7 naval forces have been neutralized.
If there had been an effective Allied air force in southern Philippines for example, I doubt that the Japanese would have attacked DEI Borneo.

This is the same mistake as was made in the Dieppe thread....it assumes a perfect strategy for the allies to an historical japanese plan, and makes no allowance for altered japanese plans and forces. and the japanese had plenty of reserves they could call on at short notice, far more than the British could ever hope to find.

If the battle in northern Malaya had been more successful for the british , the Japanese wouold have committed their strategic reserve, the 15th army, which would have been in action in a day or two. They would have also called on elements of 14th army, sitting in Palau, waiting for Singas to fall....perhaps a week away from deployment. They had two or three divs ready for immediate shipment in Japan, to cover just such an eventuality.

A more successful British battle in the opening days of Mala would have succeeded inmaking the japanese mad, and thats about it

 

[Freebird]

This is the same mistake as was made in the Dieppe thread....it assumes a perfect strategy for the allies to an historical japanese plan, and makes no allowance for altered japanese plans and forces.

No, I'm not at all. The purpose of this thread is to look at the options ramifications of any of these actions.

and the japanese had plenty of reserves they could call on at short notice, far more than the British could ever hope to find.
If the battle in northern Malaya had been more successful for the british , the Japanese wouold have committed their strategic reserve, the 15th army, which would have been in action in a day or two.

Would they comit the 15th army? very likely.
In a day or two? Not a chance!
The Japanese do not have any reserves to commit at short notice, and in doing so they will have to scrap other plans.

Lets look at their reserves:
The 15th army (33 55 div) is tasked with capturing Thailand, and is engaged in December with gaining control of the northern portions of the country. Although Thailand signed an armistice on Dec 21, there was still some resistance from the population.
By early 42 the 15th is on the Thai/Burmese border preparing for the Burma campaign.

The Japanese are very short of shipping throughout the war, but especially in the first few months when they are building up forces in Truk, Pulau Rabaul etc etc, and sending occupying forces supplies to the Gilberts, Ellice, Solomons various other Pacific territories.

The Japanese Imperial Guards division was scheduled to join the Malay campaign after invading SE Thailand, but was forced to travel overland to Malaya, and the first regiment from the division doesn't arrive until early Jan.
The limited capacity of the Thai rail net is heavily taxed with supplying two Japanese armies (15th 25th) so they don't really have the option of moving many troops around.

The only real available reserve is the 56th division in Japan, which would have to use the limited shipping to transport to Malaysia.
Had the Malay campaign gone beadly for the Japanese, they could indeed call on some units of the 15 th army, but that would of course destroy any chance of a January attack on Burma.

They would have also called on elements of 14th army, sitting in Palau, waiting for Singas to fall....perhaps a week away from deployment.

14th area army? The were busy invading the Philippines.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_Fourteenth_Area_Army
Again, any forces drawn in to Malaya from the Central or Eastern Force
would push back pland to attack Borneo Indonesia

They had two or three divs ready for immediate shipment in Japan, to cover just such an eventuality.

Which divisions are you talking about?
The 56 division is sent to Thailand in early '42, to join the 15th army attack on Burma.
Again, the Japanese logistics is quite strained, they simply don't have loads of transport available.

A more successful British battle in the opening days of Mala would have succeeded inmaking the japanese mad, and thats about it

No, it would have delayed attacks on Burma Indonesia, caused Japanese casualties which they could ill afford, and burned up the limited Japanese logistics capabilities.

 

[Freebird]

It could have been different, but the troops you are talking about simply were unavailable.

No, actually there are available trained troops, and the transport to get them there.
I'll go into some detail on this in the following post.

And the british and Austraqlian units were only marginally better than the indian troops at halting the japanese. The British in particular were obsessed with protecting their flanks, and covering their lines of communication.

I would disagree.
The Indian troops were almost all raw, poorly equipped and with minimal training, and furthermore they had much less enthusiasm to fight for "King Empire" than the British or Commonwealth troops.
If you look at the performance of the individual battalions, the better trained equipped British Aussie forces were able to give solid resistance to the Japanese, but were flanked or forced to fall back as supporting troops gave way.
The performance of the 1st Leicesters at Jitra, the Argyll Surtherlands and the Australians were contrasted by the fragile and often disorganized resistance of the Indians

Every time the Japanese hooked them, the british obliged and fell back, The Australians made a decent stand, but lost far more than they killed, particulalry in terms of ewquipment....they had to be pulled back to Singas After that one battle the Australians were little better than a battlegroup.

They were only two brigades to begin with, so the loss of most of a brigade was a crippling blow.