Could the British have sent enough aircraft to Singapore to make a difference?

[buffnut453]

That cuts both ways. Japan did not have all that many aircraft during December 1941. Nothing at all like what Germany had to face from 1943 onward in places like Tunisia, Sicily and Salerno. Furthermore airpower is inheritly less effective in the jungle. Well trained and led British troops could have simply shrugged off the Japanese air raids just as German soldiers did.

Colin,

You're quite right. According to the Japanese Monograph dealing with the air campaign for Malaya and Singapore, the IJAAF never managed to replace losses so any substantive extension to the duration of the campaign would have been presented huge problems for the IJAAF.

Cheers
B

 

[buffnut453]

So, in the second half of November, who would you send to replace Brook-Popham?

Problem is the second half of November is too late to influence anything. If the Army and RAF has not been training for realistic missions for several months, appointing a new commander isn't going to make a difference. What was needed was an earlier acceptance that the forces assigned to Malaya were inadequate and the relocation of additional RAF and Army units in mid-41 to enable acclimatisation and working up of appropriate tactics. Of course, nobody in their right mind would redeploy forces from existing combat zones to reinforce an area which, at that time, was not under attack.

 

[buffnut453]

The intell being received was attrocious, and the assessments were coloured by white supremacist claptrap.

Parsifal,

Can you please specify what intelligence was atrocious? Was it all bad? Also, can you cite sources please?

Many thanks,
Mark

 

[parsifal]

Main source is "The Pacific War" by Joh Costello, London 1981, various extracts, but most relevantly pages 103-107, where he deals in some detail with the British preprations to defend Singapore. Similar comments and reports received by the predecessor to Brook Peopham (I believe his name was Dobbie), where it was argued that airpower was a cheaper and surer way of protecting the port than battleships and ground troops. Brooke Popham on his arrival read a report by the recently arrived navala attache from Tokyo, that assessed Japanese airpower capabilities. I believe this mans name was Bond (not James incidentally), who was instructewd by Popham not to overrate the capabilities of the Japanese air force. In other words the report was doctored from the start for political reasons.

On the basis of this doctored repport, Popham declared Japanese aviators were hopeless, short sighted and their best equipment was about the standard of the A4. He declared " Let England have the Spitfire and the Hurricane" ....Buffaloers are3 quite good enough to defend Malaya"....

Costello also seems to be relying on the book "Great Britain and the Origins Of the Pacific War", by Lowe P (Oxford 1977) in making those claims. He ,akes similar statements, and is mentioned in Costellos bibliography

There are other sources that make very similar claims about British utter misreading of Japanese capabilities, and the abilities of the Buffalo in particular to being and adequate type on which to base the malayan defence

Ther are also pertinent comments by Parnell and Lynch in their 1 volume history of the RAAF and even the venerable Eddie Bauer makes some refernces to these assessments

 

[LDSModeller]

488 Squadron recieved 9 Mk II Hurricanes
to replace it's destroyed Buffaloes.
The Hurricanes did not even receive squadron codes. On Jan 27 1942, out of the nine, 2
were destroyed on the ground at Kallang and 7 badly damaged all within
a days of receipt during a Japanese bombing raid.

One thing that perhaps needs to be said here, is that Singapore was destined
to be lost, not withstanding the Pukka Sahib mentality of the British Ruling class
(Civilian/Military) and the brave fighting by British/Commonwealth servicemen/women
(notably Highlanders, gave the Japanese troops, looking to cross the causeway, a very
bloody nose).

Comments by Fl Lt John "Hutch" Hutcheson B flight commander 488 Squadron Kallang-Singapore
might help bring things into perspective.

Quote
"many people have laid the blame for loss of Malaya/East Indies on Britain. This is not just....

Great Britain had been through Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and a heavy reverse in the
Middle East. All the men and equipment lost had to be made good.

....... the amount of lend lease equipment being made available to Britain
was of no account. Much of this equipment was obsolete and only accepetd to keep
faith with the American manufacturers after the fall of France.
I myself saw cases and cases of American aircraft that were destined to remain
crated. They were of no operational use and past their day. Britain had to supply all needed
equipment or a very big proportion of it. She had to re-arm herself against posible German
attack and re-equip the Middle East forces.

Imagine how badly off we would have been if we had lost the Middle East instead of Malaya.

Possibly if we had diverted sufficient equipment to Malaya to hold it, the Japanese would not have
attacked, which would mean that the entry of America at that stage anyway would have been
very problematical.

To make Singapore strong enough to make it obvious to the Japanese that it would be a very tough nut,
would have required equipment and men intended for the Middle East should be diverted with a consequent
weakening of Egypt and the whole Middle East.

Remember also that the war was very real in the Middle East, but only a threat as far as the Far East was
concerned.

There was always the chance that it might be avioded.

Sir Robert Brooke-Popham has often been criticised because he said that Singapore could withstand any assault.
What else could he say? Come and attack us Japan? We could only offer feeble resistance. certainly it
was a bluff, but he had no choice.

Still this is not a political arguement. It is the Story of Singapore as I a fighter pilot saw it. ......."
End quote:
From Last Stand Singapore-The Story of 499 Squadron RNZAF (by Graham Clayton)

Obviously for the Armed Forces and civilians interned by the Japanese they felt betrayed, and some who
escaped were counted as cowards for not surrendering to the Japanese.

Sorry for the long dialogue but hopefully it will help in the discusion

Regards

Alan

 

[buffnut453]

I haven't read Costello - must check that one out. I think we need to be careful about linking Brooke-Popham's public statements to what he truly believed. His "Hyper Hurricanes...Buffalos are good enough for Singapore" comment was made during a question-answer session with journalists. B-P could hardly have gone into such a setting stating "Well, I think the Buffalo is a crock and we're going to get massacred if the Japanese attack us."

The comment about using aircraft to defend Malaya because they're cheaper than troops or battleships was entirely in-line with concepts of policing the Empire between the wars. The thinking was that aircraft were more easily redeployed and hence could meet threats in different locations more rapidly than other forms of military force. Modern doctrine refers to the "ubiquity of air power" which is, in a sense, what was being sought by this policy. Such an approach was fine so long as the main opponent was outside attacking range but as soon as Japanese forces moved into French Indo-China in mid-41, the holes in the Malaya defence strategy became woefully apparent.

Finally, my personal research into FECB indicates that they actually had a pretty good handle on the capabilities of Japanese aircraft. This is based on accessing original documents at the National Archives in Kew, as well as the British Library and Imperial War Museum. The key shortfall seems to have been the means of presenting this information to the aircrew because none of the fighter in Far East Command had intelligence officers on-staff.

Cheers,
Mark

 

[Freebird]

Problem is the second half of November is too late to influence anything. If the Army and RAF has not been training for realistic missions for several months, appointing a new commander isn't going to make a difference. What was needed was an earlier acceptance that the forces assigned to Malaya were inadequate and the relocation of additional RAF and Army units in mid-41 to enable acclimatisation and working up of appropriate tactics. Of course, nobody in their right mind would redeploy forces from existing combat zones to reinforce an area which, at that time, was not under attack.

Yes, I havn't given you much, have I?

As you correctly point out, there's not really much that can be done earlier (regarding aircraft).
From the Fall of France -> Nov 1940 Britain's #1 concern was the threat of invasion.
> Nov 1940 Greco-Italian war, Britain sends aircraft to Lemnos Crete. Also building up DAF for "Compass"
>Feb - April 1941 Britain is sending troops aircraft to Egypt dealing with Rommel's offensive in the desert.
> Mar -> May sending troops aircraft to Greece, then defending Greece Crete.
>Jun -> Dec 1941 sending urgently needed aircraft supplies to the Soviets.

There wasn't really any respite where they could deal with the situation in Malaya.
Not until matters become critical in Nov could the high command turn it's attention to Malaya.

Well, I'll be generous, I'll give you from the beginning of Nov. That's 5 weeks. Suppose that you were put in charge, what would you do about the air forces in Malaya?
Assuming that the Med can't be weakened either.
(I'll post a different thread about the ground situation)


OK, about aircraft.
The British did see the need for more aircraft, they just ran out of time to send them.

There was also a window of oppertunity to assemble proper air defence for Singapore, if it was done quickly. There was a Japanese air raid the first day of the conflict, but there were no major air raids on Singapore again until Dec 30, however it became almost daily after that.
The best option is to get aircraft from the US if possible, rather than stripping existing aircraft already in other theaters. In the fall of 1941, the US is making at least 200 P-40's per month (D E), 200 P-39's, ~150 P-38's, had just started production of the P-51A, and were about to start production of the P-47.

In fact the British have several hundred aircraft in the US (bought or L-L) including the P-40D and the P-39D's which were considered unsuitable for combat in the ETO.

Suppose instead of crating these aircraft up to spend weeks or months on a ship bound for Africa, the British ask Roosevelt to send the P-40's to Hawaii on a US aircraft carrier, to takeoff a few hundred miles south of Hawaii. (similar to the Malta fly-offs)
From a position about 350 miles south of Hawaii, they could fly to the US Navy airfield on Palmyra Island, then across the South Pacific via Kiribati, Samoa, Fiji, N. Caledonia to Australia. This tactic had already been used to send aircraft to Egypt and to the Soviets across Africa via the Takoradi Air Route

By Dec 7 1941, the US has already completed the airfields on Fanning island Kanton Island, but are still building the one on Penrhyn Island.
All of these flights are also within the P-40's 900 mile range (w/drop tanks) although the Fanning to Kanton leg is at the maximum range.

 

[Shortround6]

Some of the Aircraft for the Flying Tigers were flown in from across Africa, the Middle East and India.
The problems with these long distance ferry flights are many, and long over water flights with single engine aircraft just add to the navigation problems.
Planes arrive needing a fair amount of maintenance.
Delivery's get strung out as planes experience maintenance issues along the way. A bad magneto, fouled plugs or even a blown fuse can delay a particular plane for several days. I have read an account of an American pilot whose Unit (equipped with rather tired P-40s from a training unit) was redeployed from California to the east coast right after Pearl Harbor. While most of his unit made it fairly quickly they wrote off at least one plane and it took him (by far the worst performance of the unit) 15 days to make it across the US due to mechanical malfunctions and weather.
While this is still much quicker than crating the planes and sending by ship through the Panama Canal it does point out that long range multi hop ferry flights were nowhere near as routine as they seem today.
You also have a logistics problem, each P-40 is going to need roughly 200 gallons of fuel for each stop. For 50 planes that is 10,000 gals (or 30 tons) per airfield on the route. While some Airfields may have enough fuel others are going to need it brought in. By ship means lots of pre-planning, by air means lots of transport flights which might not be readily available in the fall/Winter of 1941/42. You are probably going to need a twin engine plane (Lockheed Hudson, or C-47, Blenheim?) to act as a navigator for every 4-6 fighters.

Could it be done? yes.
Was it done? yes.
But not at a few days notice.
It took planning, preparation and logistics.

 

[davebender]

Here is a better source. It has the complete Japanese OOB for December 1941.
Pacific Theater, Order of Battle, 8/7.12.1941

Japanese 25th Army (i.e. tasked to invade Malaya)
25th Army, Southern Expeditionary Army, Imperial Japanese Army, 8.12.1941
5th Infantry Division.
18th Infantry Divsion.
56th Infantry Division.
Guards Infantry Division.
3rd Armored Brigade. 216 light tanks total.

Japanese 3rd Army Air Force Division (i.e. S.E. Asia. They supported the Malaya operation).
3rd Army Air Force Division, Imperial Japanese Army, 8.12.1941
35 x modern Ki-43 fighter aircraft. Plus a bunch of antiques like the Ki-27.

IJN 22nd Naval Air Flotilla. Based in South Vietnam.
22nd Naval Air Flotilla, 11th Air Fleet, Imperial Japanese Navy, 7.12.1941
132 modern G3M and G4M medium bombers. These aircraft sank TF Z.
25 x modern A6M2 long range escort fighters.

All told Japan had only about 200 modern combat aircraft committed to the Malaya operation. Compared to several thousand modern British and American aircraft in the Mediterranean during 1943. Japanese aircraft (and ground forces) committed to the Philippines were much smaller.

I find it difficult to believe that a couple hundred Japanese aircraft made a decisive difference. British forces in Malaya were defeated on the ground by a smaller number of invading Japanese troops who had superior training and leadership. The same goes for the American defeat in the Philippines.

 

[dennis420b]

well a longer defense would have, needed resupply, that would require that Navy to get involved, there would have been a showdown between opposing navy's, and given the situation, i give it to the Japanese, so i say doomed.

 

[buffnut453]

Davebender,

I don't know the source for your IJAAF ORBAT data but, according to Japanese sources, the following fighter units and strengths were available:

59 x Ki-43 of the 64th and 59th Sentai
108 x Ki-27 of the 1st, 11th and 77th Sentai

All these fighters were concentrated on Phu Quoq Island or on the airfields on the French Indochina mainland nearby.

Kind regards,
Mark

 

[buffnut453]

well a longer defense would have, needed resupply, that would require that Navy to get involved, there would have been a showdown between opposing navy's, and given the situation, i give it to the Japanese, so i say doomed.

We can what-if 'til the cows come home on this one. I tend to agree that longer defence would have required additional resupply but, again, that cuts both ways. The Japanese were stretched very thin logistically. A longer campaign would have hurt the Japanese as much, if not more, than the British. Even with a major Naval victory, the Japanese would have had to land sufficient forces and supplies in Thailand to maintain operational and tactical momentum. Singora was the key to Japan's attack. Without it, Yamashita would have faced a much longer over-land invasion from Indochina through Thailand during the height of the Northwest Monsoon when most roads in the region (except those nice metalled roads in Malaya) turned to quagmires.

 

[davebender]

Do you have historical data to support this claim?

Japanese forces which invaded Malaya were short on ammunition and other such consumable supplies. I suspect the British defenders were better supplied then the Japanese invaders.

 

[buffnut453]

Do you have historical data to support this claim?

Japanese forces which invaded Malaya were short on ammunition and other such consumable supplies. I suspect the British defenders were better supplied then the Japanese invaders.

Sorry Dave but who's your question addressed to? Dennis, me or someone else? Just wondering...

 

[Freebird]

well a longer defense would have, needed resupply, that would require that Navy to get involved, there would have been a showdown between opposing navy's, and given the situation, i give it to the Japanese, so i say doomed.

OK, I've edited the original post a bit, so let's confine this discussion to the Malaya/Singapore/DEI air campaign. I'll post a separate thread about the ground war so that we don't get mixed up. 8)

Davebender,

I don't know the source for your IJAAF ORBAT data but, according to Japanese sources, the following fighter units and strengths were available:

59 x Ki-43 of the 64th and 59th Sentai
108 x Ki-27 of the 1st, 11th and 77th Sentai

All these fighters were concentrated on Phu Quoq Island or on the airfields on the French Indochina mainland nearby.

Kind regards,
Mark

That's closer to what I've seen.
Falk gives a figure of 600 Japanese aircraft used in Malaya/Singapore, including those sent during the campaign as reinforcements, and presumably including non combat patrol recce units.

 

[renrich]

dennis touched on this but how are the British to get the aircraft to Malaya and keep them supplied with gasoline, etc. when they don't have control of the sea. The US faced the same problem in the PI. The Japanese controlled the sea in that part of the world, just as Britain did the English Channel and practically speaking, the Allies could not wrest control of the sea from the IJN. A little later, the US kept pumping airplanes into the battle in SE Asia, (Java, Sumatra) and all they did was lose the airplanes.

 

[buffnut453]

dennis touched on this but how are the British to get the aircraft to Malaya and keep them supplied with gasoline, etc. when they don't have control of the sea. The US faced the same problem in the PI. The Japanese controlled the sea in that part of the world, just as Britain did the English Channel and practically speaking, the Allies could not wrest control of the sea from the IJN. A little later, the US kept pumping airplanes into the battle in SE Asia, (Java, Sumatra) and all they did was lose the airplanes.

That was the purpose behind the string of airfields through Burma. The idea was to stage aircraft from India through Burma to Malaya. Again, resupply convoys continued to reach Singapore unopposed through a fair proportion of January 1942 - and that was after the Force Z debacle. I have no doubt that the Japanese would have struggled to disrupt British supplies if Singora had been held by British/Thai forces in Dec 41.

 

[LDSModeller]

Do you have historical data to support this claim?

Japanese forces which invaded Malaya were short on ammunition and other such consumable supplies. I suspect the British defenders were better supplied then the Japanese invaders.

One of the things which helped the Japanese was the fact that British/Commonweatlh
personel vacated their bases without destroying fuel/ammunition/food supplies.

All the Japanese had to do was move in and use them -Japanese referred to them
thereafter as Churchill Supplies.

This fact really peeved off the more southern island defenders knowing that
Japanese aircraft shooting/bombing them, were using their own fuel and ammo
against them

(from Last Stand Singapore- Graham Clayton (his father served witth 488 Sqn at Kallang)

 

[renrich]

Nevertheless, the IJN had sea control, and they did cut off convoys to Malaya just as they did to Sumatra and Java. They also caught and sank many ships trying to evacuate those areas. In the long run, after losing sea control the Aliess were doomed in the PI, Malaya and the Indies.

 

[buffnut453]

Renrich,

We need to be a tad careful here. If the Japanese invasion of Singora had failed, then there would have been no need for Force Z to sail north in early Dec 41. Thus your statement that the Japanese would have had complete control of the sea must be questioned.

With intact airfields in northern Malaya still occupied by the RAF, and a complete string of reinforcement airfields running back through Burma to India, it's pretty reasonable to assume that supplies could have arrived in Singapore right through Jan 42 if not further into that year.

Cheers,
Mark