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Question: on her fatal voyage, Hurricanes landed on the HMS Glorious? I didn't know that and I wonder, where were they stored? If they staid on the flight deck, might their presence have interfered with normal flight operations?
Fascinating video. Something else that it brings to my mind: now, the theory that Glorious was low on fuel is described as false. However, am I understand that it is only false insofar as Glorious was not critically short on fuel? Given that some of her boilers were shut down, may we assume that she still was at least somewhat low on fuel?I know. The sh#tshow that was Glorious' sinking is covered nicely here.
To launch monoplane carrier aircraft like the Fulmar or Wildcat, yes you need the ship to go to full speed and turn into the wind. But not for Glorious' Sea Gladiator and Swordfish biplanes. I bet you with a reasonable cross wind one could take off in a Sea Gladiator starting from a dead stop and fly across the 81 ft wide flight deck and make it into the air. Glorious also had two hydraulic catapults.If so, might this be the reason why there were no CAPs? I understand that carriers had to turn into the wind and get to as high speed as possible so that the planes will have enough lift to take off. Might such a maneuver have consumed too much fuel in the eyes of a captain more worried about the fuel stores than the presence of strong enemy units that he did not expect?
Thank you, if I may ask, how did you come by such a rather specific and virtually obscure piece of information?Glorious was selected to receive the Hurricanes because her elevators were wide enough to handle the fixed wing Hurricane and consequently the Hurricanes and RAF Gladiators were stowed in the hangars.
So, may I take from this that biplanes had considerably shorter take-off distances than most monoplanes? Or do I misunderstand the relevant physics?To launch monoplane carrier aircraft like the Fulmar or Wildcat, yes you need the ship to go to full speed and turn into the wind. But not for Glorious' Sea Gladiator and Swordfish biplanes. I bet you with a reasonable cross wind one could take off in a Sea Gladiator starting from a dead stop and fly across the 81 ft wide flight deck and make it into the air. Glorious also had two hydraulic catapults.
My thanks to you, too.That is a general rule of thumb but varies with aircraft and carrier. Turning into the wind is usually done not only to increase wind speed over the deck but to eliminate any crossword as much as possible.
Escort carriers were able to launch Spitfires in the Med on near windless days so launching Gladiators at a similar speed doesn't seem like a big deal.
Ships will often cruise with some boilers shut down to save fuel. How many are shut down or what percentage of full power the boilers that are lit is another question.
Fascinating video. Something else that it brings to my mind: now, the theory that Glorious was low on fuel is described as false. However, am I understand that it is only false insofar as Glorious was not critically short on fuel? Given that some of her boilers were shut down, may we assume that she still was at least somewhat low on fuel?
If so, might this be the reason why there were no CAPs? I understand that carriers had to turn into the wind and get to as high speed as possible so that the planes will have enough lift to take off. Might such a maneuver have consumed too much fuel in the eyes of a captain more worried about the fuel stores than the presence of strong enemy units that he did not expect?
I know. The sh#tshow that was Glorious' sinking is covered nicely here.
Too bad the RAF Hurricanes weren't just refueled and sent on their way. Here's the location where Glorious sank, 487 nautical miles from RAF Scatsta on Shetland, UK, within the 520 nmi range of the Hawker Hurricane on internal fuel. Send a Swordfish to guide them. The RAF Gladiators will have to stay behind. But clearly the idiot ex-submariner in command thought there was no threat, so why fly off your RAF Hurricanes.
Which brings me back to this thread, and preparedness of the RN's carrier force. Since 1917, every RN submarine commander must pass the Perisher, weeding out any candidates who can't make the grade. Perhaps something similar was needed for the RN carrier force? First of all, the C/O should be a former aviator, or must prove that he understands naval aviation, such as the need for a CAP and boiler readiness when you're sailing though hostile waters. Next, the admiral or vice admiral in charge of carriers needs to understand that you don't use your fleet carriers for ASW. These two moves alone save HMS Glorious and Courageous.
It's too bad the USN and RN carrier fleets didn't war game this out in the 1930s. A Battle of Bermuda or thereabouts; Lexington, Saratoga and Ranger vs. the three Outrageous class.There is a book I recommend that bears on this subject, "Bombers versus Battleships" written by a fomer RN officer. He describes how the RN happened to have two carriers put in for repairs at Norfolk, VA, and the crews managed to sit down and figure out how to do air defense the way the USN did it. They even got some USN radios that helped a great deal.
There is a book I recommend that bears on this subject, "Bombers versus Battleships" written by a fomer RN officer. He describes how the RN happened to have two carriers put in for repairs at Norfolk, VA, and the crews managed to sit down and figure out how to do air defense the way the USN did it. They even got some USN radios that helped a great deal.
It's too bad he didn't survive to account for himself. I suspect he'd have met with Byng's fate.HMS Glorious was lost because the captain wanted to hurry back to Enland to court martial an officer
No, it was not how to work with the RAF radar system on land but how to do it for carriers at sea. What can I say? Go read the book. He does not get the Battle of Midway quite right but everything else was news to me. For example, the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse would have been easy to avoid, if not for stupidity. And the HMS Glorious was lost because the captain wanted to hurry back to Enland to court martial an officer who refused to use Swordfish against ground targets in Norway.
There is a book I recommend that bears on this subject, "Bombers versus Battleships" written by a fomer RN officer. He describes how the RN happened to have two carriers put in for repairs at Norfolk, VA, and the crews managed to sit down and figure out how to do air defense the way the USN did it. They even got some USN radios that helped a great deal.
It's too bad he didn't survive to account for himself. I suspect he'd have met with Byng's fate.
Perhaps that's why he wasn't commanding a submarine any longer, as that has to be a high pressure, relentless responsibility. The RN lost 79 submarines in WW2, more than the total submarine fleet (60 boats) of September 1939.The more I read about D'Oyly Hughes the more I think he was not mentally stable.
The included quote in my post, above, discussed the use of radar GCI at sea onboard HMS Curlew, an AA cruiser fitted with Type 280 airwarning/gunnery radar during the Norway campaign. This was the beginning of naval radar GCI which was later expanded after new RN carriers were fitted with radar and radar became common on cruisers and larger ships All the RN's learned lessons were passed onto the USN and the training of USN fighter direction officers, mentioned on page 168 of Bombers vs Battleships, was based upon RN/FAA radar GCI experience.