Could the Luftwaffe have done a better job supplying the 6th army at Stallingrad

Shortround6 said:

A supply container may be much bulkier for it's weight than bombs. While there maybe room in the fuselage (or not, depending on fuel tanks):

http://img35.imageshack.us/img35/2922/heinkelhe177a5greifarti.jpg

Getting any real amount of supplies though the existing hatches and passageways may have been a real problem.

Good transports have large volume in addition to good weight capacity. High performance bombers have small fuselages (small volume).

Click to expand...

And that is exactly why they stretched the C-141. It typically was full of cargo well before any weight limit was met. They increase the cargo volume capacity 30%, but interesting enough, increased max weight from 325k lbs to 342k lbs without changing the wings or the engines. It was obviously overpowered when I flew it, which is not bad at all, you never have too much thrust. It was originally designed to carry one minute man ICBM.

Shortround6 said:

A supply container may be much bulkier for it's weight than bombs. While there maybe room in the fuselage (or not, depending on fuel tanks):

http://img35.imageshack.us/img35/2922/heinkelhe177a5greifarti.jpg

Getting any real amount of supplies though the existing hatches and passageways may have been a real problem.

Click to expand...

A good point.

The statistics for the He 177 are even worse than my original post. It could carry eight 250Kg containers (2000Kg) but this only amounted to 1,120 Kg of supplies,according to Fiebig again. I'm not surprised he considered the four tonnes of fuel needed to deliver this a poor investment

Cheers

Steve

It only struck just me now. The HE177 might not have been the best choice as a transport but it could have been usefull towing gliders. I wonder how many Go242 or Me 321 were available in that timeframe. I'm not saying it would have been the best option, towing overloaded gliders thrue heavy defended airspace, but it might have given some relief. Anyway would it have been a viable option if enough gliders were available?

rank amateur said:

The HE177 might not have been the best choice as a transport but it could have been usefull towing gliders.

Click to expand...

It's an interesting thought but I think other types might have been better glider tugs. The He 177 wasn't structurally a very robust aircraft.

I've never seen any mention,or suggestion of gliders for Stalingrad but someone may know more.

Cheers

Steve

Towing gliders can be very tough on engines. The engines have to put out more than usual power for extended periods of time at low airspeeds which can lead to cooling problems. Some planes did better than others at this. It is not just the power to weight ratio of a particular plane but the cooling system of the plane. Planes with marginal cooling to begin with probably make lousy glider tugs.

I think cooling wasn't exactly the strongpoint of the db610. So bye bye He 177. What else can we use to drag these gliders?

rank amateur said:

I think cooling wasn't exactly the strongpoint of the db610.

Click to expand...

True,but a lot of He 177 engine fires were caused by fractured or abraided fuel lines leaking their contents which pooled in the nacelles with predictable results. The problem was much ameliorated,though not solved,by simple remedies like improved servicing schedules.
The engines were difficult to service and access. Being fitted to some extent inside inside the wing meant that space was limited. Walter Baist,who was responsible for the He 177 engine testing programme at Rechlin remembers the maze of fuel,oil and hydraulic lines and electrical and instrument leads as a "sardine can" arrangement. He also remembered that there were problems with leaks at connection points. Oil fires were caused due to oil foaming (a familiar Daimler Benz problem) leading to a loss of lubrication. The resultant engine failiures often,with con rods through the side of the engine after little end bearing failiures,led to the loss of oil which then caught fire on the exhausts.

I do agree with Shortround that they were far from ideal glider tugs.

Cheers
Steve

A aircraft pulling a glider has very limited manuverability, they wouldn't be able to jink around much to avoid the flak batteries the Soviets installed soon after surrounding Stalingrad. A transport pulling a glider, low level, would be a very easy target, for flak, and of course for fighters too.

You guys are so much more patient than I. I looked back on the history of this thread, and saw an ungly, unseemly, and fo me, an embarassing stouche. You guys have put some semblance of respect back into the discussion. Keep it up.

Some interesting tidbits I've compiled from several books....

January 9 1943 Saturday: A new sight greets the defenders of the city. At 0930 hours the first of seven Fw 200 'Condor' four-engined aircraft lands in the snow at Pitomnik airfield. The 'Condors' are from a group of eighteen reconnaissance bombers, taken from KG 40 on the Atlantic coast and thrown into the Stalingrad airlift with the designation Kampfgruppe ZbV 200, led by Major Hans Jurgen Willers. The reconnaissance aircraft-turned-transports are based at Stalino, some 300 miles away from the battle area. The seven Focke-Wulf converted transports bring four and a half tons of fuel, nine tons of ammunition and twenty-two and a half tons of provisions on their first flight. On the return flight they take out 156 wounded. But the 'Condors' suffer losses. One aircraft has to return with engine trouble, and another is unable to take off. Two more 'Condors' are hit by Russian anti-aircraft fire and a fifth goes missing with twenty-one wounded on board.

January 10 1943 Sunday: In a desperate gamble to increase the airlift to Stalingrad, Major Willers of the new KGzbV 200 makes use of two Ju 290 heavy bombers, known as 'flying furniture vans'. The first flight into the city is made by Hptm. Hanig who returns successfully. These large aircraft are able to bring ten tons of supplies and take out about eighty wounded men.

January 13 1943 Wednesday: At Pitomnik airfield, a Ju 290 heavy bomber takes off from the airbase with eighty wounded on board, rolls over and crashes. Only one person survives. The survivor explains to officials that as the plane took off in the steep climb from the airfield, the unstrapped wounded men inside slid to the back of the aircraft and overloaded the tail, making it uncontrollable.

January 16 1943 Saturday: The Luftwaffe abandons Pitomnik airfield as the Russian offensive advances. Six Ju 87 Stukas and six Bf 109s, volunteers from JG 3 acting as airfield defense, are able to take off as the airfield is attacked by Soviet infantry. The fighters, led by Hptm. Germeroth and Hptm. Kurt Ebener, are ordered to the airfield at Gumrak. But the airfield is not ready for the fighters and as they land, disaster strikes. The first Messerschmitt overturns in a snow drift. Four more of the fighters hit bomb craters as they land, leaving only one flyable Bf 109 left, flown by Oblt. Lukas. Lukas decides that the airfield is too dangerous and flies off to the west.

Gumrak airfield is also supposed to be the airfield for the numerous transports bringing supplies. But the wreck-strewn airbase forces the Ju 52 Gruppen, led by Oberst Morzik, to land in a maize field near Sverevo. A bombing attack on the field later by the Russians destroys fifty-two of the transports on the field.

Back at Pitomnik airfield, the Russians use abandoned German direction finding equipment to mislead the German aircrews. Several pilots are deceived into landing at the airfield and are taken prisoner.

January 18 1943 Monday: Lt. Hans Gilbert, flying one of the remaining Fw 200 'Condors', lands at snowbound Gumrak airfield. Although he breaks his tail skid on landing, he is able to take off with General Hube of the armoured force, as per his orders to evacuate the General. Later a He 111 lands at Gumrak with Major Thiel, Gruppenkommandeur of III / KG 27. He is sent by VIII Fliegerkorps to report on the condition of the airbase – described by radio message's as "day-and-night operational." Major Thiel reports,

"The airfield is easy to pin-point from 4,500 – 5,000 feet owing to its rolled runway, its wreckage and the numerous bomb craters and shell holes. The landing cross was covered with snow. Directly my machine came to a standstill the airfield was shot up by ten enemy fighters – which, however, did not come lower than 2,500 – 3,000 feet owing to the light flak that opened up on them. Simultaneously it was under artillery zone fire. I had just switched off the engines when my aircraft became an object for target practice. The whole airfield was commanded by both heavy and medium guns situated – so far as one could judge from the open firing positions – mainly to the south-west . . .
"Technically speaking, the airfield can be used for daylight landings, but at night only by thoroughly experienced aircrews. . . Altogether thirteen aircraft wrecks litter the field, in consequence of which the effective width of the landing area is reduced to eighty yards. Especially dangerous for night landings of heavily laden aircraft is the presence of the wreck of a Bf 109 at the end of it. Immediate clearance of these obstacles has been promised by Oberst Rosenfeld. The field is also strewn with numerous bomb canisters of provisions, none of them saved, and some already half covered with snow . . .
" When I returned to my aircraft (after reporting to General Oberst Paulus) I found that it had been severely damaged by artillery, and my flight mechanic had been killed. A second aircraft of my section stood off the runway in like condition. Though I had landed at 1100 hours, by 2000 hours no unloading team had appeared, and my aircraft had neither been unloaded nor de-fueled despite the crying need for fuel by the Stalingrad garrison. The excuse given was the artillery fire. At 1500 hours Russian nuisance planes (U-2s) began to keep watch on the airfield in sections of three or four. From the outset I made it my business to look into the air control system and established that before 2200 hours it was quite impossible to land a single plane. . . If one approached, the seven lamps of the flare path would be switched on, offering a target visible for miles, whereat it would be bombed by the nuisance raiders above. The only possible measure was a short flash to enable the aircraft to position its bomb canisters . . ."

Click to expand...

You might conclude that the Russians gave it any effort to prevent Stalingrad from being supplied from the air. In retrospect I should have opened a second topic: could the German grond forces have done a better job aiding the luftwaffe in supplying the 6th army at Stalingrad?

well that opens a whole new debate. To what extent was 6A controlling the situation. In my opinion by the time of the Russian counteroffensive the Germans were losing control of the situation, and could do little to prevent the encirclement. If they cannot prevent the encirclement, and the logistic situation in the rear areas remains the same (ie no decent airfields forward, a rail supply situation stretched to the limit, no Black Sea transport to speak of etc), I cant see much changing at all

I don't think the 6th controlled anything outside of Stalingrad. Not when they were surrounded by the Russians anyway. Despite all the desperate attempts, the used resources and individual acts of heroism I still have the feeling that the overall effort lacked coordination. Germany had lost the inititive. Maybe Hitler even needed the loss off the 6th and Stalingrad to start over with a clean slate ( I was gonna write tabula rasa but my latin is lousy) like they did months later.

Its getting off topic, but in my view, the whole 1942 offensive was a mistake. After the bitter fighting of the winter 1941-2, the German army was not really in good condition to undertake a general offensive. They chose instead to strip out 2 out of the 3 front commands and continue a limited offensive on the southern front. But whilst that achieved a temporary solution for a part of their front by doing that, the very fact that they could not undertake a general front wide offensive says volumes on the limited manpower, equipment and above all logistic limits they were operating under.

I think a strategic defence/offence was the best answer for the heer by 1942. Use the Summer to consolidate, rebuild the frontline strengths, improve the levels of logistical support behind the front. Fortify as much as possible. Perhaps even with a mind to falling back to the Dnepr. Defeat Soviet incursions by intelligent counterattacks and mobile warfare tactics. In that way defeat the Soviets in a type of battle (fluid mobile operations) that they were still not good at. A set piece, general offensive with such limited resources as the germans possesed smacked of megolomania and was never going to end well. Stalingrad in my opinion was a reward reaped for an offensive ill considered and under resourced.