Could the Luftwaffe have done a better job supplying the 6th army at Stallingrad

[DonL]

Not obeying direct orders was only 'permitted' if the endresult was an undeniable victory.

I have my doubts, that the retreat from Rommel at El Alamein was an undeniable victory from the viewpoint of Hitler!
That's nearly the same situation and I very hardly believe that all soldiers that would got out of the box (6th Army) would have had the viewpoint of undeniable victory, the same as the soldiers of the Panzerarmee Africa after El Alamein.

Edit:
According to many german historians and many Wehrmacht Generals that were asked/interviewed to the issue Stalingrad and break out, many of them strongly believe that General von Reichenau the commanding General of the 6th Army till January 1942, known as a strong Nazi, but with a strong personality and a gifted General, had ignored Hitler's order and had ordered the break out between 21-25 November.

 

[davebender]

No such thing in warfare.

As DonL said, a Colonel General should have the nuts to make a decision and accept the consequences. He owes that to his soldiers.

 

[stona]

Goering's assesment of the 6th army's needs may or may not have followed the manual,I don't know. He is the sort of man who would have made the calculation fit whatever suited him. Frau Junge may have been closer than Goering! Zeitzler implies that Goering's assessment was different to the army officers present,that he knew better.
His assessment of Luftwaffe capabilities was laughable.
Richthofen's frustration with the Luftwaffe leadership in Berlin was exactly because of these sort of calculations. They sat down worked out that he had x,y or z Gruppen,that they could carry so much materiel and the operation was doable.
Richthofen,other Luftwaffe officers and even Army officers who were at the sharp end knew this was utter nonsense.
I've already given an idea of the sort of operational ready rates that the various aircraft of Luftflotte 4 were achieving. It was these sort of facts,along with the weather,vulnerability of the transports,lack of trained crews,lack of spares, eventually a lack of a landing ground in the pocket or an airfield within 350Km of Stalingrad, amongst many others, that were ignored by men like Goering and Jeschonnek doing there back of an envelope calculations back in Berlin.
That's why Richthofen and many others said it was not an achievable task and continued to argue for alternatives,even whilst they did what they were ordered to do. History has proved them right. At least they tried.
Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

As DonL said, a Colonel General should have the nuts to make a decision and accept the consequences. He owes that to his soldiers.

Absolutely. Sadly Paulus doesn't seem to have been that kind of man.

Cheers
Steve

 

[rank amateur]

I have my doubts, that the retreat from Rommel at El Alamein was an undeniable victory from the viewpoint of Hitler!
That's nearly the same situation and I very hardly believe that all soldiers that would got out of the box (6th Army) would have had the viewpoint of undeniable victory, the same as the soldiers of the Panzerarmee Africa after El Alamein.

El Alamein was most certainly no victory but neither was Dunkirk but it could be sold to the general public as a magical escape performed by the ever popular escape artist Erwin Rommel.
In other words a glorious victory. You can rest assured that it would have gone in the historybooks as a victory if Nazi Germany had won the war.

 

[rank amateur]

Goering's assesment of the 6th army's needs may or may not have followed the manual,I don't know. He is the sort of man who would have made the calculation fit whatever suited him. Zeitzler implies that Goering's assessment was different to the army officers present,that he knew better.
His assessment of Luftwaffe capabilities was laughable.
Richthofen's frustration with the Luftwaffe leadership in Berlin was exactly because of these sort of calculations. They sat down worked out that he had x,y or z Gruppen,that they could carry so much materiel and the operation was doable.
Richthofen,other Luftwaffe officers and even Army officers who were at the sharp end knew this was utter nonsense.
I've already given an idea of the sort of operational ready rates that the various aircraft of Luftflotte 4 were achieving. It was these sort of facts,along with the weather,vulnerability of the transports,lack of trained crews,lack of spares, eventually a lack of a landing ground in the pocket or an airfield within 350Km of Stalingrad, amongst many others, that were ignored by men like Goering and Jeschonnek doing there back of an envelope calculations back in Berlin.
That's why Richthofen and many others said it was not an achievable task and continued to argue for alternatives,even whilst they did what they were ordered to do. History has proved them right. At least they tried.
Cheers
Steve

Which brings me back to my startingpoint: Could Von Richthoven as a repressentative of the Luftwaffe have suggested anything that would have improved the delivered tonnage. And if he could what would it have been?

 

[davebender]

I find it difficult to believe Goering didn't have that information in front of him. He had a staff to read readiness reports from the various Luftflotte and keep status boards up to date.

 

[DonL]

El Alamein was most certainly no victory but neither was Dunkirk but it could be sold to the general public as a magical escape performed by the ever popular escape artist Erwin Rommel.
In other words a glorious victory. You can rest assured that it would have gone in the historybooks as a victory if Nazi Germany had won the war.

I don't disagree,

but the direct order from Hitler to Rommel was, he should hold the frontline till his army gets a victory or dies!
That was the order, nothing else!

Rommel ignored this and ordered break out and escape. After he has dictated this order he dictated a letter to his wife with last regards and the explanation that he is convinced that he will die for this order! That's documented from primary sources.

He had the nuts to make a decision!

 

[Sagittario64]

how do you supply hundreds of thousands of nearly ammunition and fuel starved troops and vehicles into an area surrounded by even more enemy troops, loads of enemy AA guns, and scores of enemy fighters? its hard to say. the Germans used everything, but..............its an unlikely prospect that you can keep transport losses low enough to keep up the airdrops and subsequent evacuations for more than a week, which is not enough to fly out the entire 6th army and the other axis forces. you're losing airfields to ground forces, having to run transports through the ring of anti-aircraft artillery around Stalingrad, land on the airfields which are under enemy artillery fire, and fly out with the maximum load(still under shell fire), having to be refueled at the airstrips from nearly exhausted fuel supplies. oh and you have to manage not to be shot down by enemy fighters, and you have to be mindful of accidental friendly fire too.
thats in addition to hitler spouting his usual last stand orders, so both enemy and friendly forces worked against the german airlifts and airdrops around stalingrad

 

[davebender]

27 June 1942
Rommel drives British forces out of Marsa Matruh, which is located about 100 miles inside Egypt.




28 June 1942.
To: Benito Mussolini.
From: Adolf Hitler.
Subject. Afrika Corps redeployment to Europe.

Herr Mussolini,

Deutsches Afrikakorps has accomplished it's mission to assist your forces in driving Perfidious Albion out of Italian territory. All German army and airforce units currently serving in North Africa will now be withdrawn to Europe. We expect this redeployment to be completed NLT September 1942.

I am confident the gallant Italian armed forces can defend Italian North Africa from any future British attacks.

Good luck!

Adolf Hitler



Appendix A. Forces to be withdrawn.

Fliegerführer Afrika
.....JG27
.....StG3
.....ZG1
.....1.(F)/121
.....19th AA Division.

DAK.
.....15th Panzer Division.
.....21st Panzer Division.
.....90th Motorized Division.
.....164th Motorized Division.
.....556th Rear Area Security Command.
.....More logistical units then I care to count.

 

[DonL]

But Dave for what please?

Stalingrad was a child of Hitler, at october it had absolutely no strategical or tatical impact, nor an economy impact, Stalingrad was dead!
You can retreat the 6th army without a problem to the Don/Tschir frontline. Stalingrad was unimportant only at Hitler's ill brain it was important, because his soldiers were standing at the Wolga!

Edit: The danger of the encirclement was well aware to the germans since the beginning of november!
That wasn't a secret but Hitler's thought he knew better!

 

[Juha]

Time only for short not notes.

Airsupply could have been made more effective.
a) better all weather installations on a/fs inside the encirclement
b) an extra a/f near the city, so deliveries could have continued even after the Soviets tightened their grip.
c) to do something to Soviet AA guns just outside the encirclement.

Even before the encirclement the supply situation of 6th A was precarious. Weather and soviet air and partisan attacks on the only rail link to Stalingrad had had their effects. So even if Paulus would have tried to break out that might well have ended to disaster, stopped on open steppe the 6th A could not have been able to held out long. That would easily bring the collapse of whole AGs A and B fronts and a catastrophe also on at least part of 1st PzA (parts may have got to Kuban). As Korsun showed, troops getting out of encirclement with only their personal weapons were initially rather useless and had to sent to rear for R&R. Keil's Stalingrad is an excellent book on the subject lots of info on supply and material situation.

On obeying or disobeying, in principle easy to answer but von Sponek ended in a military prison and was shot after 20 July 44 assassination attempt. And IIRC it was von Manstein who demanded that he should be put on court martial. Hausser got scot free on harkov but his superior, Gen. Lanz got sacked, as got von Rundstead on Rostov in dec 41, Guderian, Bock etc numerous others for not obeying . Rommel was a special case because of his propaganda status and maybe his former status as a CO of Hitler's body guard. Also Hitler had had bad times vs AG A commander and his own staff on Caucasus shortly before.

And 6th A never attempted to break out or coming within 14mls from the relief column, it was the relief force, 6th, 17th and 23rd PzDivs + sundry German and Romanian units which did the movements.

On 6th A forces, 2 Inf.Divs (Mot) were OK, (29th and 3rd?), they had rested and re-equipped for an attack to Baku (so out of touch was the German strategic planning already) but the 3 PzDivs were rather poor state even before the beginning of the Soviet attack, and during it 14th Pz lost most/much of its arty to Russian cavalry etc and their fuel situation was precarious.

Juha

 

[DonL]

Even before the encirclement the supply situation of 6th A was precarious. Weather and soviet air and partisan attacks on the only rail link to Stalingrad had had their effects. So even if Paulus would have tried to break out that might well have ended to disaster, stopped on open steppe the 6th A could not have been able to held out long.

On 6th A forces, 2 Inf.Divs (Mot) were OK, (29th and 60th ?), they had rested and re-equipped for an attack to Baku (so out of touch was the German strategic planning already) but the 3 PzDivs were rather poor state even before the beginning of the Soviet attack, and during it 14th Pz lost most/much of its arty to Russian cavalry etc and their fuel situation was precarious.

Which timeline? November or December?
Between 20-25 November the army was intact with food, fuel and munition for six days and the way to Nischne Tschirskaja was absolutely possible as intact formation.

The 29 ID mot. was 100% fresh with 54 tanks, one whole battalion, and had made "mincemeat" out of the 57th soviet army at 20 November.

 

[davebender]

That might be counter productive. You would need additional construction units to build and maintain all weather airfields. More units to supply.

 

[parsifal]

Manstein:
Both your claims are wrong.

Manstein wasn't involved between 20-25 Nevomber at Stalingrad, he took command of the Heeresgruppe Don at 26 November.
His first radio to Paulus was: We will come to get get you out, make praparation that the Army can stroke south!
After that he criticised General Weichs hard for his orders (see above) to the 29 ID mot. at the 21 November!

At 19 December Manstein had done the very specific order to Paulus to make preparation that Wintergewitter (shake hands with Hoth) and Donnerschlag (break out of the 6th Army) can go hand in hand. He couldn't order Donnerschlag without Hitler but his plan was that Hitler would be overtaken by events.
At 19 December General Schulz Ia Heeresgruppe Don radioed again to General Schmidt Ia 6th Army to force Wintergewitter as soon as possible (without waiting of Hoth to reach the Businowka) with the preparation that Donneschlag can go hand in hand with Wintergewitter!
That was all what Manstein could do with his power, without to make a kind of suicide! He wanted absolutley the break out of the 6th Army!

What is a correct claim, that Manstein wanted at January 1943 that the 6th Army was fighting as long as possible to bind several soviet army's, but he wanted always the brake out of the 6th Army as long as it was possible (till 21-22 December)!


Manstein believed he could break into the encirclement with a moderate committment of forces. He grossly under-estimated the new abilities of the red army, and over-estimated the abilities of the heer to alter the situation.
Very wrong! That was alone Hitler's decission. Manstein wanted as much units as possible! Hitler denied more units from France, only the 6th Pz. Division and only Manstein personal intervention was helpfull to get the 17.Pz Div. later, after Hitler had denied this unit for days!

You are entitled to your opinion, however, I would point out that your statements are unsubstantiated opinion at this stage. As I have read material from good sources that back up the opinions I have expressed I will defer to those sources in preference to your unsubstantiated claims.

Principal sources I have used are Beevors book on Stalingrad, Hardesty's book on the Red Air Force, Haywards book on the defeat of the Luftwaffe in 1942-3 and some basic statistics from Costellos book on WWII statistics. Previously I have also used Bartovs book on the German Army as well, as well as the small book by Tsouras (strictly speaking he is just the editor....the authors are German officers) on German army operations on the East Front.

I am not going to post a comprehensive reply...we both know where that will end up, however just one observation...You claim that 6th Army had only suffered 10000 casualties (thats ten thousand) to the 23 November 1942. I cannot accept 10000 as a credible figure, and at home have source material that will give 6th Army casualties in a fair amount of detail. Typically, for the whole of the eastern front, the heer was running casualty rates of around 40% for its frontline formations, that is units were operating at 60% of their authorised strength...when the system was working correctly, there was a steady rotation of personnel to and from convalesence, with about 20% of the total casualty figures never able to return due to death, capture, excessive wounds and the like. One problem faced by the heer, as detailed in Halders Diary, is that in periods of heavy intensity casualties shipping out of units far exxeeded personnel returning to the front. I need to dig out his diary, but i recall Halder noting that at the time of Operation Typhoon, casualty rates were running at over 30000 per week, whilst returns were running at just 12000.

In Stalingrad, the system broke down....Germany even before the encirlclement was operating on overstretched lines of communication, with one effect being that the wounded tended to remain close to the front as there was simply not the transport to get them evacuated properly. Moreover the fighting at Stalingrad was exceptionally heavy, and that blanket estimate of 60% strength was greatly exceeded in the battle. Authorised strengths of most units were down to about 40% or less by the time of the battle. As to the claim of just 10000 casualties for the whole of 6th Army, I aasked my father, who was there and decorated twice. I asked him...."did the 6th Army suffer 10000 casualties to the 23 November?". He wants to know what you are smoking. He says that his division alone had suffered more than 10000 casualties by the time of the encirclement (from August through to November). He says he was one of the lucky ones.....he was wounded on the 24th and flown out of the pocket several days later.

Perhaps you meant 100000 which would still be too low but at least plausible

Also, claiming that military units on the Eastern Front were at 100% full strength is very unuaual. Any movement, any combat was bound to result in losses. In the advance from Minsk to Smolensk, apart from combat losses AGC suffered breakdown rates of up to 50% in its tank formations. Similar breakdown rates were suffered by the Motorized units. In the over-extended environment of Stalingrad, it is simply implausible that ANY unit however fresh would be at completely full strength. I have the unit history of the 29th at home will check its status as at 20 November and get back to you.

 

[Juha]

Which timeline? November or December?
Between 20-25 November the army was intact with food, fuel and munition for six days and the way to Nischne Tschirskaja was absolutely possible.

late Nov, look Keil's book, it is in German, 14th and one other PzD consumed much of their fuel during the combats against encircling Russians and then during the withdrawal back to the defensive circle

The 29 ID mot. was 100% fresh with 54 tanks, one whole battalion, and had made "mincemeat" out of the 57th soviet army at 20 November.

As I wrote, 29th was re-equipped [as was pone other, probably 3rd, not 60th as I wrote errously in my earlier message) and what happened during the battle between 29th and 57th depends totally are you reading the German or Soviet story of that battle. Soviet side disagree with that "mincemeat". The 3 PzDivs had worth of a couple coys of modern tanks (Pz III lg, III 75, IV kz and IV lg) each.

Juha

 

[DonL]

@ parsifal

I realy don't know to what are you refering!!!!!!!!!
I haven't said with one word. that the 6th Army had only suffered 10000 casualties, I have said, that at the day of 23 november were 10000 casualties in the box, which must be transported at a break out! That was my statement!

You are entitled to your opinion, however, I would point out that your statements are unsubstantiated opinion at this stage. As I have read material from good sources that back up the opinions I have expressed I will defer to those sources in preference to your unsubstantiated claims.

Oh I think my statements are very substantiated and very well researched with lot of primary sources from the german units and documents from the Heeresgruppe Don!!

As I wrote, 29th was re-equipped [as was 16th, not 60th as I wrote errously in my earlier message) and what happened during the battle between 29th and 57th depends totally are you reading the German or Soviet story of that battle. Soviet side disagree with that "mincemeat". The 3 PzDivs had worth of a couple coys of modern tanks (Pz III lg, III 75, IV kz and IV lg) each.

The 29. ID mot. was equipped with Panzer IV and Panzer III.
Then the soviet books can also explain why the IV. mech Korps of Major General Wolskis was stopping at Sety after he heard the catastrophe of the 57th at radio? And he only moved forward late of 22 November after the direct and personal order from Jeremenko?

Also, claiming that military units on the Eastern Front were at 100% full strength is very unuaual. Any movement, any combat was bound to result in losses. In the advance from Minsk to Smolensk, apart from combat losses AGC suffered breakdown rates of up to 50% in its tank formations. Similar breakdown rates were suffered by the Motorized units. In the over-extended environment of Stalingrad, it is simply implausible that ANY unit however fresh would be at completely full strength. I have the unit history of the 29th at home will check its status as at 20 November and get back to you.

Do this!
The 29th was 100% refreshed at the 20 November at completely full strength! And the 29th suffered minor to no losses against the 57th soviet army!

 

[Juha]

That might be counter productive. You would need additional construction units to build and maintain all weather airfields. More units to supply.

Nope, during russian winter and one would only needed some specialists, workforce was already there, supply units of many depleted divs in static positions had muscle power unutialiazed.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

I realy don't know to what are you refering!!!!!!!!!

Thankyou for admitting that you dont have much clue as to what was happening, because thats precisely what I am referring to.

I haven't said with one word. that the 6th Army had only suffered 10000 casualties, I have said, that at the day of 23 november were 10000 casualties in the box, which must be transported at a break out! That was my statement!

Even that statement is erroneous. Just one division had over 4500 casualties billetted within the city awaiting evacuation at the time of the encirclement

Oh I think my statements are very substantiated and very well researched with lot of primary sources from the german units and documents from the Heeresgruppe Don!!

Well post them if you have them. I know that you think your replies are well researched and substantiated (and by extension...reasonable). I never claimed that you did not have a high opinion of yourself. Trouble is, I dont believe you, and I dont have a high opinion of your "facts". Thats an opinion, incidentally. And note well, i am criticising what you say, not what you are.

 

[DonL]

I have no problem with it, whether you believe me or not!

I challenge you, if I think you give unsubstantiated claimes or quotes and bring forward my arguments!
After that, every member or reader can decide to himself, which arguments are better or which researched opinion is more substantiated!