cherry blossom
Senior Airman
- 515
- Apr 23, 2007
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There were several major problems for the Japanese in building an engine based on the DB 601.I agree.
If Japan wants the Ki-61 program to be successful they must sink some serious money into facilities for manufacture of the DB601 engine and it's sub-components. ...
I agree. So Japan must count the cost before choosing this option. Building a poor copy of the DB601 engine is simply a waste of money.several major problems for the Japanese in building an engine based on the DB 601.
I hope that we are not hijacking this thread and turning it into a history of Axis failure to cooperate. Searching the internet seems to find many versions of "In March 1938, Kawasaki signed an agreement with Daimler-Benz of Germany for obtain manufacturing rights to the liquid-cooled inline engines then under development by the German firm. In April 1940, a Kawasaki engineering team visited Daimler-Benz in Stuttgart to obtain plans and samples of the DB 601A engine, then being used in the Me-109" which is taken from Kawasaki Ki 61 Tony. The question is why did they waste two years? I suspect that one problem would have been how the Japanese were going to pay the Germans. Japan had little foreign currency and neither had fully convertible currencies. Thus they probably had to negotiate a barter deal possibly involving soy beans from Manchuria. The other issue would have been futile negotiations over the fuel injection system and perhaps also the electrical equipment. All the prototypes of the Ki-60 were powered by imported DB-601 engines and those of the Navy's D4Y by imported DB-600 engines. The prototype of the Ki-61 in December 1941 may have been the first real use of a Japanese built engine. There would have been two consequences from the delay in producing the engines. Firstly, without engines there was little pressure to rush aircraft development. This did have some good consequences as three He-100s arrived in Japan and some ideas were incorporated in the Ki-61's structure. Secondly, without running Japanese built engines, it was impossible to find the problems such as those involving the crankshaft pin. Had a Ha-40 been available for a prototype in December 1939, it seems likely that testing would have led to a design with shell bearings for 1941 production which would have been much more reliable.I agree. So Japan must count the cost before choosing this option. Building a poor copy of the DB601 engine is simply a waste of money.
On the other hand....
The DB601 / DB605 was an excellent WWII era aircraft engine. If Japan spends the money to produce a reliable copy it could power more aircraft models then just the Ki-61.
Good question!! According to Wikipedia, the DB 601 was first run in 1935, 150 were ordered in February 1937 and production began in November 1937. The source given was in Russian, so that trail went cold for me. Two Bf 109s powered by DB 600s had taken part in an international meeting at Zurich in July 1937 but the Bf 109D in production in 1938 were still powered by Jumo 210s (AFAIK as sources differ). Thus even the DB 600 may not have been available in quantity in 1938 although there seem to have been enough DB 601s to power a range of prototypes (Bf 109s, Bf 110s, Bf-162s and He 111Gs with the last in airline service). However, according to "Aeronautical research in Germany: from Lilienthal until today", Volume 147, Ernst-Heinrich Hirschel, Horst Prem Gero Madelung (Springer, 2004, ISBN 354040645X) page 212, the DB 601 Re III was supplied to both Messerschmidt and Heinkel in Spring 1938 and gave 1660 hp. Thus, although production of the DB 601 was not exactly racing when Kawasaki signed the initial agreement, it may have been clear that the basic design could survive for 5 minutes under higher load and at faster rpm. It is also quite clear that by early 1939, reliable engines were being mass produced for the Bf 109E. Thus there was at least one wasted year.Does some one want to tell us WHEN the DB601 was demonstrated to be a RELIABLE mass production engine?
As a known quantity rather than predictions or promises.
How many months do the Japanese have to make up their minds and considering their options ( how many PROVEN liquid cooled V-12s were there in the world in 1938/39?) I think it was more a case of take what they could get and hope it worked out.
Considering the trouble with early Merlins, Vultures, Peregrines, Griffions, Bristol sleeve valve engines, the Napair Sabre, it took a lot of faith in many cases to sign onto a new engine. Sometimes it worked and sometimes it didn't.
If the Japanese could see into the future well enough to predict that they couldn't build the DB 601 then they should be able to see that they couldn't win the war either.
They should have been able to see that it would be much easier with blueprints and tools for the Bosch components (i.e. the fuel injection and electrical systems).....
If the Japanese could see into the future well enough to predict that they couldn't build the DB 601 then they should be able to see that they couldn't win the war either.
During August 1938 DB601 production at Genshagen reached 200 engines per month. So I think the Japanese knew what they were getting when they signed the license agreement.WHEN the DB601 was demonstrated to be a RELIABLE mass production engine?
Curtiss now pushes for true 2-speed supercharged R-2600, so, in late 1942, things improve. With 390 mph at 15K, disadvantage vs. competition is thin, as noted during the Battle of Kursk.
Can you put together a similar what-if chain of events for the P-38?
British order initial batch with Merlins as you suggest for P-51.
Go for it!