Why airplanes were designed the way they were.

[Bretoal2]

Author is Greg Baughen. There are 4-5 books (?)

He does use a fair amount of hindsight.

However other authors have pointed out that some of the British (and French) officers did tend to cherry pick the experiences of the 1st WW to suit their own view points during the 20s and 30s and discount experiences that were contrary.

And what some officers wanted vs what they could actually get approved/authorized may not be the same thing.


The British were far from the only air force to go down the path that lead to the Lysander. The French went even further down that path but with the fast fall of France for a number of reasons the French Air force failings tend to get over looked.
View attachment 790602
They had ordered almost 1400 of these with 730 delivered and while these were an improvement on this
View attachment 790603
60 built with the observer in the gondola instead of in the nose. Faster than a Lysander but without fighter escort they were equally doomed/ineffective. I won't go over other nations except to point out the German Hs 126, which was replaced by the Storch.

The problem here was that the Auster is more survivable than it is give credit for for several reasons. Any recon plane short of a single seat fighter (very high speed bomber?) needs escorts or air supremacy to survive. You can limit losses by picking the mission/s. Hedge hop, don't fly more than a few miles into enemy territory and get out quick, don't try to play light bomber and so on. And Austers are a lot cheaper than Lysanders. Pilots aren't but stupid tactics/missions are going to lose Lysanders, Potez 63.11, Hs 126s etc in large numbers.

EVERYBODY fell into the strategic bomber trap and the idea that a few hundred bombers could destroy a single city and cause rioting in the streets and the forced surrender of the central government. So bombers were seen as cheap alternatives to land armies, Navies, and tactical aircraft. The more bombers you had the faster you could force the enemy to surrender.

British and French had done some good things with tactical air in 1918. Problem was that was costly. But not as costly as losing the battle as a whole. And this is where the lessons taken go in different directions. Air force/s say " we cannot afford such losses long term" and they are right. But the losses should not be long term, only at peak times and/or emergency to archive or stop a breakthrough. And the losses to the army of failing to stop a breakthrough (or failing to achieve one if blocked part way through) are going to be very high for the countries involved. Air forces are supposed to part of the country, not fighting their own war.

On September 3, 1914, the German offensive towards Paris was at its peak, when the Allies discovered that the enemy troops had changed their course towards the south-east.

The Franco-British troops immediately redeployed and the resulting confrontation caused the Germans to stop and the Schlieffen Plan to fail.

The movement of enemy troops had been discovered by french Aviation, who demonstrated that the Germans were not where expected.

As in 1937-1939 the French Air Force was preparing... for the war of 1914, it was normal that, in memory of these decisive days of September 1914, they had to be equiped with a very large number of observation planes to the detriment of fighters, bombers and assault aircraft.

Which, by the way, was not of much use in May 1940 since the Germans were advancing faster than the observations were being reported to the Allied headquarters. But that's another story!

 

[Greyman]

from data sheets

Mohawk III (Twin Wasp SC3-G)
Take off over 50 ft (max wt) 630 yards (6,717 lb)
Landing over 50 ft (light wt) 600 yards

Mohawk IV (Cyclone 205A)
Take off over 50 ft (max wt) 550 yards (6,662 lb)
Landing over 50 ft (light wt) 600 yards

-----

From A&AEE:

Mohawk I (Cyclone 205A)
Take off run 295 yards
Take off distance after clearing 50 ft screen 485 yards (6,317 lb)
Landing run 360 yards (note, not the usual 'after clearing 50 ft screen' figure)

Mohawk II (Twin Wasp SC3-G)
Take off run 290 yards
Take off distance after clearing 50 ft screen 465 yards (5,962 lb)
Landing run 475 yards (note, not the usual 'after clearing 50 ft screen' figure)

 

[Shortround6]

On September 3, 1914, the German offensive towards Paris was at its peak, when the Allies discovered that the enemy troops had changed their course towards the south-east.

The Franco-British troops immediately redeployed and the resulting confrontation caused the Germans to stop and the Schlieffen Plan to fail.

The movement of enemy troops had been discovered by french Aviation, who demonstrated that the Germans were not where expected.

As in 1937-1939 the French Air Force was preparing... for the war of 1914, it was normal that, in memory of these decisive days of September 1914, they had to be equiped with a very large number of observation planes to the detriment of fighters, bombers and assault aircraft.

Which, by the way, was not of much use in May 1940 since the Germans were advancing faster than the observations were being reported to the Allied headquarters. But that's another story!

Trouble is they forgot all the lessons of 1917-1918.
Where unescorted observation planes got shot down in prohibitive numbers and escorted observation planes did not.
Same with bombers/assault aircraft.
Or the lessons of 1918 where even fighters doing strafing could affect the ground battle. They took losses but losing several dozen fighters in return for a ground offensive/ breakthrough being halted/slowed for enough time to get more troops and artillery into position really stop it all seem to have been forgotten.

Air power was not only reason for stopping the German offensives of 1918 but it's contribution seemed to get forgotten/overlooked and the use/s of air power went back to the older ways of thinking. Much like the French thought they would have time to respond to German advances in 1939/40 like they did in 1916-17 and not be caught flat footed like they had been in 1918.

 

[Bretoal2]

Trouble is they forgot all the lessons of 1917-1918.
Where unescorted observation planes got shot down in prohibitive numbers and escorted observation planes did not.
Same with bombers/assault aircraft.
Or the lessons of 1918 where even fighters doing strafing could affect the ground battle. They took losses but losing several dozen fighters in return for a ground offensive/ breakthrough being halted/slowed for enough time to get more troops and artillery into position really stop it all seem to have been forgotten.

Air power was not only reason for stopping the German offensives of 1918 but it's contribution seemed to get forgotten/overlooked and the use/s of air power went back to the older ways of thinking. Much like the French thought they would have time to respond to German advances in 1939/40 like they did in 1916-17 and not be caught flat footed like they had been in 1918.

It was in September 1914 that aviation made it possible to recognize the movements of the German troops without delay and to counter them.

In the spring of 1918, the main reason for the failure of the German offensive was the reading of their secret messages despite a code that they believed to be "unbreakable" (GEDEFU 18 for GEheimschrift DEr FUnker 18), and which had nevertheless been broken by a brilliant cryptologist of the French service, Captain Georges Painvin. The story was only revealed in the 1980s and is known as the "radiogramme de la Victoire".

And, yes, indeed, in 1940 the French thought they "had time", but as I said above, the German tanks were running faster than the aerial observation reports - often obtained, in fact, at the cost of heavy losses.

 

[Shortround6]

In 1914 the airplanes were not shooting at each other (mostly).
Observation/ reconnaissance could be carried out with very low losses. Ground AA guns were nearly non-existent and rather ineffective if they did exist.
So could bombing although the very limited load carrying ability of the aircraft limited the bomb loads and range and bomb aiming was primitive.
This state of affairs didn't last long. Balloons and kites had been used for aerial observation in the 2nd half of the 1800s and soon aircraft with machine guns were shooting at each other to limit the enemies abilities for observation (artillery fire) and recon. Many armies had balloon corps/units for observation.
Things changed rapidly and both aircraft and unit make up/composition changed as did tactics/techniques and doctrine. Unfortunately some of the early lessons may have taken up too much importance in the evolving doctrine. Many squadrons got a few single seaters to engage enemy aircraft while the bulk of the squadron had two seat aircraft of rather different performance. It took a few years for squadrons of single seat fighter/pursuit aircraft to become common. While they were somewhat effective as ground strafers they suffered heavy losses performing such missions. Slow and fragile aircraft operating well within the effective range of rifle caliber machine guns was not a good idea for regular harassment. There a number of discussions as to the suitable employment of aircraft in the land battle with different points of view. Given the conditions of the time most people gave up on the trench strafing idea. They were probably right. However in the Spring 1918 German offensive/s the allies faced emergency conditions. The Allies may have known the offensives were coming as you say. How much was known about the exact locations and strength? German idea was to try to by pass points of resistance for deeper penetration So the Germans didn't have an exact plan of attack. The thinking was interesting but both sides had problems with communications and logistics and moving supporting artillery into position.
Both the French and British used aircraft for strafing/light bombing in the absence of artillery to assist ground units in holding ground while other units were moved into position/s.
Losses were heavy but the Germans were stopped, the defending units held or retreated slowly. How much was due to the aircraft and how much the Germans out running their supply?
But once the lines stabilized the air units went back to normal missions. Using machine guns and light bombs on troops that are trying to move and not dug in is different than trying to damage well dug in troops.
British and French seem to have forgotten those few weeks and stuck to the doctrine that strafing and bombing of front line troops would cost too many aircraft regardless of what the situation on the ground was. Of course they also managed to forget that the only way WW I recon planes got more than 15-20 miles past the front lines was with dedicated fighter escorts. Granted that was with 100mph airplanes but the idea that 200-240mph airplanes could spend even several dozen minutes in enemy airspace without getting the attention of enemy fighters didn't seem to be part of the thinking. Some planes and pilots managed it right, too many did not and the fighters were doing their own thing.
In 1918 both the French and British escorted their recon planes and bombers with fighters/pursuits and the fighters/pursuits often delayed strafing/light bombing until the recon planes and bombers were on the way home. they also carried light bombs on the recon planes to make up for the shortage of bombers.
Again these commanders were responding to emergencies that they did not expect to last more than few days before the lines got stabilized and the air squadrons could rebuild and go back to normal.
But the ideas was not picked up and expanded on and in fact a lot of 'doctrine' was codified. Bombers were for bombing long distance targets. Fighters were to conduct their own war while the bombers conducted theirs and the recon planes did their own thing/s.

 

[Holtzauge]

An interesting observation that can be made about Entente and Central powers (mainly Germany) design philosophies during WW1 was that there was a difference in priorities: Generalizing, one could say that the Entente favored speed while the Germans prioritized climb.

Not to say that the Entente did not care about climb, but their designs show that they paid greater attention to details that could increase speed than the Germans did. One telling thing is that during the so-called German fighter trials where different design were pitted against each other, the Germans meticulously measured climb rates with barographs and evaluated based on these. However, they did not measure speed, and were content to just stack the different designs in order of how fast they were. You can also see it in the late war designs such as the Siemens Schukert D.IV and the Pfalz D.VIII etc. which were both very climb optimized. In addition to climb rate, ceiling was also given priority by the Germans given that reconnaissance aircraft often sought refuge from interception by flying as high as possible. The British and French on the other hand, lead the speed race with their (for the time) very fast S.E.5a and SPAD X.III.

My theory about this is that the Germans at the time were more concerned with shooting down bombers and reconnaissance aircraft than establishing any kind of air superiority, probably in some sense sensibly dictated by them being outnumbered. In addition, I don't think the idea of air power as we know it had dawned yet, and the idea was more to ensure that enemy reconnaissance aircraft did not return with valuable data concerning troop movements and strength dispositions. Probably because the powers that be were all either infantry, artillery or cavalry men, and that any solid form of air doctrine was yet to be formulated by the General staff.

I write a bit about this in my book WW1 Aircraft Performance, mainly as a theory for why the Germans fielded aircraft with many exhibiting very cambered airfoils, exposed engines, drag-inducing exhaust stacks and radiator piping, while the Entente paid more attention to streamlining and even introduced profiled solid rods as bracing instead of conventional high-drag bracing wire.

 

[MikeMeech]

In 1914 the airplanes were not shooting at each other (mostly).
Observation/ reconnaissance could be carried out with very low losses. Ground AA guns were nearly non-existent and rather ineffective if they did exist.
So could bombing although the very limited load carrying ability of the aircraft limited the bomb loads and range and bomb aiming was primitive.
This state of affairs didn't last long. Balloons and kites had been used for aerial observation in the 2nd half of the 1800s and soon aircraft with machine guns were shooting at each other to limit the enemies abilities for observation (artillery fire) and recon. Many armies had balloon corps/units for observation.
Things changed rapidly and both aircraft and unit make up/composition changed as did tactics/techniques and doctrine. Unfortunately some of the early lessons may have taken up too much importance in the evolving doctrine. Many squadrons got a few single seaters to engage enemy aircraft while the bulk of the squadron had two seat aircraft of rather different performance. It took a few years for squadrons of single seat fighter/pursuit aircraft to become common. While they were somewhat effective as ground strafers they suffered heavy losses performing such missions. Slow and fragile aircraft operating well within the effective range of rifle caliber machine guns was not a good idea for regular harassment. There a number of discussions as to the suitable employment of aircraft in the land battle with different points of view. Given the conditions of the time most people gave up on the trench strafing idea. They were probably right. However in the Spring 1918 German offensive/s the allies faced emergency conditions. The Allies may have known the offensives were coming as you say. How much was known about the exact locations and strength? German idea was to try to by pass points of resistance for deeper penetration So the Germans didn't have an exact plan of attack. The thinking was interesting but both sides had problems with communications and logistics and moving supporting artillery into position.
Both the French and British used aircraft for strafing/light bombing in the absence of artillery to assist ground units in holding ground while other units were moved into position/s.
Losses were heavy but the Germans were stopped, the defending units held or retreated slowly. How much was due to the aircraft and how much the Germans out running their supply?
But once the lines stabilized the air units went back to normal missions. Using machine guns and light bombs on troops that are trying to move and not dug in is different than trying to damage well dug in troops.
British and French seem to have forgotten those few weeks and stuck to the doctrine that strafing and bombing of front line troops would cost too many aircraft regardless of what the situation on the ground was. Of course they also managed to forget that the only way WW I recon planes got more than 15-20 miles past the front lines was with dedicated fighter escorts. Granted that was with 100mph airplanes but the idea that 200-240mph airplanes could spend even several dozen minutes in enemy airspace without getting the attention of enemy fighters didn't seem to be part of the thinking. Some planes and pilots managed it right, too many did not and the fighters were doing their own thing.
In 1918 both the French and British escorted their recon planes and bombers with fighters/pursuits and the fighters/pursuits often delayed strafing/light bombing until the recon planes and bombers were on the way home. they also carried light bombs on the recon planes to make up for the shortage of bombers.
Again these commanders were responding to emergencies that they did not expect to last more than few days before the lines got stabilized and the air squadrons could rebuild and go back to normal.
But the ideas was not picked up and expanded on and in fact a lot of 'doctrine' was codified. Bombers were for bombing long distance targets. Fighters were to conduct their own war while the bombers conducted theirs and the recon planes did their own thing/s.

Hi
There were a lot of documents relating to the use of air power throughout WW1 by all combatants, constantly changing of course due to changes in the battlefield, aircraft and weapons technology. Relating to British documents prior to the German Spring Offensive, the GHQ Memorandum of January 1918 (from OH 'War in the Air' Vol. IV):

Also an extract from the rather longer memorandum of February 1918 'Fighting in the Air'(updated from previous edition and related documents), source 'War in the Air' Vol. VI Appendices Volume (Appendix XX), relating to ground attack:

I hope that is of interest.

Mike

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
Continuing from my previous post. After the Spring Offensive and during the 100 Days, the air operations became increasingly sophisticated (although still hindered by the weather conditions) using various communication systems (including the Central Information Bureau) to co-ordinate air operations between Army and Corps squadrons plus artillery. An example of the orders/instructions for the 24th September 1918, first Army squadrons:

And Corps Squadrons:

Also where needed Corps squadrons could also drop food supplies (also barbed wire coils) and lay smokescreens using 40 lb phosphorous bombs. Other specialist documents included air/artillery co-operation procedures (from the end of 1914), air/cavalry, air/infantry and air/tank.

Mike

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you.
We can see that there were both doctrine and from that specific instructions for aircraft (squadrons) to support Ground operations in land battles.
They were working on the type (D) machines motioned in the Feb 1918 document but few got to the front before the war ended.
One such was the Sopwith Salamander

which had a 605lb armored box making up the forward fuselage. 210 were built but after the fact, none were used in combat. There may have been other aircraft for this role?

This plane used pretty much the same wing and rear fuselage as the Sopwith Snipe, the same engine, the same armament. It was was about 530lbs heavier empty, The armor box was used as the forward fuselage/engine mount. It was just under 500lbs lighter gross weight. It had about 9 gallons less fuel.
The increase in weight did not change the speed much but it changed the climb to 2000 meters (6500ft) from 5m 10s to 9m 5s and cut about 6500ft from the ceiling (1/3 lower)

Going back to the Feb 1918 document, This was just one of 4 different types (categories) of machines they thought were needed. ALL were important.
Maybe the armored ground attack plane may not have been a real good idea? But that role/mission had disappeared, as had close cooperation between even the fighter squadrons and the Bomber/Recon squadrons.
Somehow much of what had been learned and written down in those documents was lost/forgotten or sidestepped by the 1930s.
The French didn't have time to really relearn it. It took the British quite a bit of time in North Africa or at least to be accepted as other than a temporary aberration.

 

[MikeMeech]

Thank you.
We can see that there were both doctrine and from that specific instructions for aircraft (squadrons) to support Ground operations in land battles.
They were working on the type (D) machines motioned in the Feb 1918 document but few got to the front before the war ended.
One such was the Sopwith Salamander
View attachment 792934
which had a 605lb armored box making up the forward fuselage. 210 were built but after the fact, none were used in combat. There may have been other aircraft for this role?

This plane used pretty much the same wing and rear fuselage as the Sopwith Snipe, the same engine, the same armament. It was was about 530lbs heavier empty, The armor box was used as the forward fuselage/engine mount. It was just under 500lbs lighter gross weight. It had about 9 gallons less fuel.
The increase in weight did not change the speed much but it changed the climb to 2000 meters (6500ft) from 5m 10s to 9m 5s and cut about 6500ft from the ceiling (1/3 lower)

Going back to the Feb 1918 document, This was just one of 4 different types (categories) of machines they thought were needed. ALL were important.
Maybe the armored ground attack plane may not have been a real good idea? But that role/mission had disappeared, as had close cooperation between even the fighter squadrons and the Bomber/Recon squadrons.
Somehow much of what had been learned and written down in those documents was lost/forgotten or sidestepped by the 1930s.
The French didn't have time to really relearn it. It took the British quite a bit of time in North Africa or at least to be accepted as other than a temporary aberration.

Hi
At the end of 1917 BEF GHQ put a request to all armies to supply information on and ideas for air/infantry co-operation after the experiences of 1917. Among the many responses was this one from Maj, L Walker commanding 15th Squadron RFC, reference armoured single-seaters:

During 1918 there were trials and fitment of seat armour on Sopwith Camels:

Correspondence in the files indicates that Nos. 4 Sqn. AFC, plus 203 and 208 Squadrons of 1st Brigade RAF, had been issued with these plates. HQ RAF also sent a reply to the 1st Bde. reference No. 22 Sqn. stating that "No. 22 Squadron should indent for the RE.8 type of armoured seat for fitting on Bristol Fighter machine." By 21 July Nos. 73, 43 and 54 Sqns. of the 9th Brigade had six armoured plate seats per squadron.

Although there could be 'high casualties' on these missions (mainly from Arthur Gould Lee books referring to Cambrai) it was hardly always the case, for example activities on 27th March 1918, during the Spring Offensive:

Also of note that 'fighter' pilots may have complained about the dangers of low flying but Corps squadron pilots and observers, flying slower and less agile aircraft, on Contact and Counter Attack patrols (as well as machine gunning and bombing enemy troops) were flying at these heights on a regular basis. With the limited information available it also appears that Scout pilots who had previously been Corps pilots or observers were less likely to complain, they may have felt rather 'safer' flying single-seaters at those heights than they had in Corps aeroplanes?
It is interesting to note the 'lost knowledge' during WW2, however, there were plenty of ex-WW1 pilots who should have known the details, for example Leigh-Mallory had written the book on air/tank co-operation and its problems during WW1.
You may be interested in a Helion book that is meant to be on their Autumn publishing list this year:

(Biased report - I did write one of the early chapters, not as long as I wanted as there was a word limit for us all of course).

Mike

 

[Shortround6]

I am sure you are aware of the Sopwith T.R. 1

That was flying in Feb 1918. Unfortunately they used a Camel with a 110hp engine which sort of limited things.

Bullet resistance of Wicker was not great.
There was supposed to be a sheet of armor covering the underside of the fuselage from the firewall to the main tank behind the pilots seat.
One report estimated that normal fighters used for low altitude work might be 30% per day (how many missions per day?) which both explains the need for armor (bigger engines) and the desire of some RAF officers to forget the whole idea.
It was effective but costly.

 

[marathag]

Maybe the armored ground attack plane may not have been a real good idea? But that role/mission had disappeared, as had close cooperation between even the fighter squadrons and the Bomber/Recon squadrons.

The Plane Boeing wants you to forget, the GA-2 from 1921

This armored monster had a 37mm cannon and 5 machine guns
Heavy(6784 pounds empty, 9089 loaded), underpowered with an unreliable direct drive 700hp W1 W18 of 2779 cubic inches.

and a beast to fly, reportedly used as a punishment aircraft for wayward pilots at McCook Field. Water leaks valve spring breakage and vibration problems were never resolved. Packard had introduced their 2500 series engine for more power at 2/3rds the weight, and was reliable

 

[nuuumannn]

"This is Baughen's fifth publication on early twentieth century British or French air power and as with his previous works there are serious flaws on display in the most recent volume to be published. The work is aimed at a general audience rather than the academic community, and this is one of its major failings. The bibliography is exceptionally limited and from this it appears that the most recent historical works published in the last ten to fifteen years have not been consulted. It is not clear if the author is simply unaware of these works or has deliberately not engaged with them as he is unable to counter the arguments being made in them as they firmly refute his own. This makes Baughen's claim to have written a definitive history of air power in Britain inherently questionable. It is, however, not only the lack of academic rigour which highlights real failings within this book. The author clearly does not (either deliberately or inadvertently) understand basic air power concepts such as air superiority and how fundamentally important these are for the conduct of any aerial operation."

Ouch! If I received a review like this I'd stop writing altogether!

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I am assuming this is sarcasm as it also ignores the the bomber boys in the RAF of planning for 2000 (4000 if they could get them) long range heavy British bombers.

And here we get to the heart of the matter.
Hawker and Supermarine both failed to meet the specification. Hawker by a little and Supermarine by a lot. There is also a difference between prototypes and service models.

Hurricane prototype at 5672lbs needed 265 yd take off run and 430 yds to clear the 50ft barrier. corrected for zero wind. Not bad but the problem was landing. It needed 475 yds from 50ft. with brakes and with a 5mph wind. Everybody who thinks they should have cut 30-60 sq feet of wing area please raise your hands
Problem really hits home when the weight for a service Hurricane I with wooden two blade prop hit 6040lbs and the take off run went to 370yds and distance to 50 ft went to 580yds.
Now lets add another 50 gallons of fuel had see how much runway we need
Things got better with the 2 pitch propeller but that was around 3 years after the Hurricane prototype flew.

Take-off figures for the Spitfire prototype are not listed on WWII Aircraft Performance but Aug through Dec 1938 K.9787 gave the following results.
K.9787 was almost 500lbs heavier than the prototype.

420yd take off run with 720 yds to 50 ft. and landing run was 380 yds with brakes. This was corrected to no wind and standard atmosphere. With an 8mph head wind and at 20 degrees F (?) the take off run was 367yds and it took until 640yds to clear the 50ft distance. Landing ground run was 315yds.

So which brave (but suicidal) pilots want to strap a 50-60 gal tank to the plane and take off from a standard RAF fighter field on a hot summer zero wind day so they can escort any sort of bomber across the channel? Things got better with two pitch prop with the take-off run shortened to 320yds and distance to 50 ft down to 490yds.

109 with Jumo engine was designed to carry two machine guns and only 270 (?) liters of fuel and had better flaps (not saying much), You can use a much smaller wing when the plane only weighs around 4400lbs.

Yes my sarcastic nature got the better of me. As you point out the technology available at the time limited what was possible. When the Spitfire was being designed in 1934 the Merlin itself was an unknown commodity, constant speed propellers were in their infancy and 100 octane fuel was a dream. Long range escort fighter were envisioned as aircraft as large as the bombers they would protect. The Spitfire was designed for the purpose of intercepting enemy bombers and that it did very well indeed. The specification it was based on was very much a stretch in terms of maximum speed required being over 100 mph faster than the Fury it was to replace. To put this into perspective the Spitfire had as great an increase in maximum speed over the aircraft it replaced than the new fangled jets had over their piston engine opponents in 1944. It really was a quantum leap

 

[Reluctant Poster]

"Fools" is more than a little harsh.

Remember the geographical pposition and the historical situation from WW1. Geographically, Germany itself has a relatively short North Sea coast to fly from. In WW1 Netherlands stayed neutral (and again did so until May 1940 along with Belgium) and France didn't fall until June. The route to Germany's industrial heartland was therefore expected to be from bases in France or via the long way around the north of the Netherlands. Except in 1939/40 the French, at least initially, wouldn't allow anything larger to be based on their soil.

An isolationist USA couldn't be foreseen, or at least guaranteed, to enter any war on the British / French side. It took 3 years in WW1.

The fall of the Netherlands and Belgium in May 1940 followed by France in June 1940 changed everything.

I was being sarcastic. I get tired of people slagging the Spitfire (not you) for not being perfect in 1944 ten years after it was designed. All its contemporaries except for the ME109 were no longer in production let alone considered to be frontline fighters. The fact that it was still a very capable aircraft is extraordinary in the full sense of the word. The Me 109 and the Spitfire's careers spanned the full length of the piston engine monoplane era (I don't count quasi biplanes such as the P-26 with it fixed undercarriage and wire bracing). They replaced biplanes and were replaced by jets, a magnificent achievement attesting to the correctness of their original designs

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Author is Greg Baughen. There are 4-5 books (?)

He does use a fair amount of hindsight.

However other authors have pointed out that some of the British (and French) officers did tend to cherry pick the experiences of the 1st WW to suit their own view points during the 20s and 30s and discount experiences that were contrary.

And what some officers wanted vs what they could actually get approved/authorized may not be the same thing.


The British were far from the only air force to go down the path that lead to the Lysander. The French went even further down that path but with the fast fall of France for a number of reasons the French Air force failings tend to get over looked.
View attachment 790602
They had ordered almost 1400 of these with 730 delivered and while these were an improvement on this
View attachment 790603
60 built with the observer in the gondola instead of in the nose. Faster than a Lysander but without fighter escort they were equally doomed/ineffective. I won't go over other nations except to point out the German Hs 126, which was replaced by the Storch.

The problem here was that the Auster is more survivable than it is give credit for for several reasons. Any recon plane short of a single seat fighter (very high speed bomber?) needs escorts or air supremacy to survive. You can limit losses by picking the mission/s. Hedge hop, don't fly more than a few miles into enemy territory and get out quick, don't try to play light bomber and so on. And Austers are a lot cheaper than Lysanders. Pilots aren't but stupid tactics/missions are going to lose Lysanders, Potez 63.11, Hs 126s etc in large numbers.

EVERYBODY fell into the strategic bomber trap and the idea that a few hundred bombers could destroy a single city and cause rioting in the streets and the forced surrender of the central government. So bombers were seen as cheap alternatives to land armies, Navies, and tactical aircraft. The more bombers you had the faster you could force the enemy to surrender.

British and French had done some good things with tactical air in 1918. Problem was that was costly. But not as costly as losing the battle as a whole. And this is where the lessons taken go in different directions. Air force/s say " we cannot afford such losses long term" and they are right. But the losses should not be long term, only at peak times and/or emergency to archive or stop a breakthrough. And the losses to the army of failing to stop a breakthrough (or failing to achieve one if blocked part way through) are going to be very high for the countries involved. Air forces are supposed to part of the country, not fighting their own war.

Lets not forget this beast

The last hurrah for this was at the attack on Pearl harbor when a couple were destroyed on the ground

 

[SaparotRob]

Lets not forget this beast

View attachment 793446
The last hurrah for this was at the attack on Pearl harbor when a couple were destroyed on the ground

You're right. We shouldn't forget this plane. Especially since it has such an easy-to-remember name.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

You're right. We shouldn't forget this plane. Especially since it has such an easy-to-remember name.

I thought everyone would remember the iconic North American O-47A

 

[Shortround6]

It is a shame we couldn't have given a few hundred to the Soviets, where it could have been given a proper "soviet"* nickname
Like....
"Glass and galvanized coffin for 3 brothers"

* unknown in Soviet Union except as told to western writers.......over vodka.

 

[SaparotRob]

I thought everyone would remember the iconic North American O-47A

I understand it's a favorite at air shows. By the crews. You can load a lot of stuff in it.