parsifal
Colonel
And again, thjs figure are not the outright losses. The majority are recoverable losses, airframes returned to depots for rebuilds. Outright losses, were about 1/4 of that total
Crucial points of the Battle of Britain? (1 Viewer)
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And again, thjs figure are not the outright losses. The majority are recoverable losses, airframes returned to depots for rebuilds. Outright losses, were about 1/4 of that total
parsifal
Colonel
If , as being claimed here, the LW was losing 350 aircraft on the eastern front and 299 on other fronts, that brings the total loss rates to 700 for the month. If you add the other totals for other months June to December you get a figure of 4711 aircraft lost. Murray is not being genuine here, however, as these figures include recoverable losses. From June to December the front line strength of the LW barely moved, from 3572 to 3440. In that same period there were about 6000 acceptances for new aircraft. Training and non-operational accidents accounted for 35% of total losses.
At those rates, unless some of those losses are recoverable, the LW would cease to have exist by about September. Clearly it did not. For a slightly later period Caldwell shows that recovery rates on the eastern Front were roughly twice that what they were in the West. The reason was that relatively few aircraft on the eastern front relatively speaking were being shot down...for the latter part of the war, air combat casualties accounted for about 14% of casualties, whereas total losses were just touching 50%. Outright losses on the western front, were always four or five times greater as a proportion of the totals of listed losses. Why, because unlike the eastern front, a much larger proportion of losses were occurring in the air. In the east large numbers were being damaged for various reasons, like landing and take off damage, and the logistic network was being stretched to the limit, such that the regular front line reapir and maintence facilities could not cope. large numbers of aircraft were being damaged and not repaired at the front, despite the official LW "policy". they were being returned to the factories and rear depots.....there was a massive facility at Lvov for example, for repair (I think). These aircraft were being listed as losses, but were being repaired and returned for service, exactly the same as their tanks were being recycled in this way.
After my stepfather was wounded at Stalingrad, and had recovered, he was sent to Holland, where he was employed in a similar depot to repair MG42s for the Army. MGs would suffer damage, be detached from the TOE of the unit, sent to the depot repaired and then re-issued. If we were to look at losses for MGs, these items would be listed as a loss. But they arent a real loss. they are temporarily taken out of service for a while, whilst being repaired, and then returned. Thats, not a loss, thats a measure of the heavy fighting the heer was going through at that time. And for the Eastern Front, the poor logistics of that front. Same basic deal for the LW
At those rates, unless some of those losses are recoverable, the LW would cease to have exist by about September. Clearly it did not. For a slightly later period Caldwell shows that recovery rates on the eastern Front were roughly twice that what they were in the West. The reason was that relatively few aircraft on the eastern front relatively speaking were being shot down...for the latter part of the war, air combat casualties accounted for about 14% of casualties, whereas total losses were just touching 50%. Outright losses on the western front, were always four or five times greater as a proportion of the totals of listed losses. Why, because unlike the eastern front, a much larger proportion of losses were occurring in the air. In the east large numbers were being damaged for various reasons, like landing and take off damage, and the logistic network was being stretched to the limit, such that the regular front line reapir and maintence facilities could not cope. large numbers of aircraft were being damaged and not repaired at the front, despite the official LW "policy". they were being returned to the factories and rear depots.....there was a massive facility at Lvov for example, for repair (I think). These aircraft were being listed as losses, but were being repaired and returned for service, exactly the same as their tanks were being recycled in this way.
After my stepfather was wounded at Stalingrad, and had recovered, he was sent to Holland, where he was employed in a similar depot to repair MG42s for the Army. MGs would suffer damage, be detached from the TOE of the unit, sent to the depot repaired and then re-issued. If we were to look at losses for MGs, these items would be listed as a loss. But they arent a real loss. they are temporarily taken out of service for a while, whilst being repaired, and then returned. Thats, not a loss, thats a measure of the heavy fighting the heer was going through at that time. And for the Eastern Front, the poor logistics of that front. Same basic deal for the LW
OldSkeptic
Senior Airman
- 509
- May 17, 2010
That's largely (plus other pilots notes) what I based my analysis on. But if you got serious about a LR Spit then you had the option to add a bob weight to the elevator controls (as Quill mentioned in his LR test) which helped during that period of 'worst stability', still unstable of course but helped markedly for that first 1/2 to an hour when it was at it's worst (depending on the flight profile of course).
The history of bob weights are interesting. First introduced as a crash measure in the Spit V because of serious CoG issues, then when the elevator horn fix came through they were removed on the V and not used on most other subsequent fighter models. The Spit VII always had a bob weight due to the effects of friction on the elevator cables because of the pressurised cockpit. Don't know for sure but I'd expect the later pressurised PR versions probably did the same.
So it was doable. People forget the Mustang fully fueled up was pretty horrible too and they managed it. Read some pilots accounts where some of the more experienced ones kept a larger amount of fuel in the rear tank than normally recommended, because they had learned to deal with it and it gave them that extra margin for return fuel (always a nice thing), not a good idea for a newbie naturally.
On a Spit VIII/IX loaded to that level it used 26-30 UK gals just on the initial climb to 20,000ft, by which stage things are starting to settle down, so the flight profile would just be an initial dead straight climb and again a bob weight would help somewhat during that period.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
The Problem with the Schnellbomber concept is that it only works for short period of time. Given equivalent engines and aerodynamic knowledge the intercepting fighter can always be faster than the bomber (at least up until around Mach 2 and then it is a materials problem) and it takes less time to design a fighter than a bomber.
Germans drew the wrong lesson from Spain and believed that speed and three 7.9mm MGs on rather restricted mounts were enough of a defense which left them playing catch-up for too much of the war.
parsifal
Colonel
nah, we are squabbling like 10yos again, buts a good discussion just the same.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
That was (and still is) the problem with technology. As soon as a breakthrough enters the arena, everyone scrambles for a new threat upgrade. The moment you introduce a new platform, you had better be ready to improve what you already have...the moment you rest on your laurels, you've lost.
The Spanish Civil War was a terrible expiriment. Antiquated technology was sharing the battlefield with new technology and produced distorted results. The problem here, was the general staff wasn't taking into consideration all the factors of the battlefield. They just looked at the successes and patted each other on the back instead of asking why they were acheiving such high results.
The Luftwaffe did have several airframes early on, that would have met the Schnellbomber criteria, but waffled and whizzed away the opportunity (as always) until the Ar234 came along.
Even still, a Schnellbomber can only produce so much, in the way of results, as a high-speed bomber can only carry a limited amount of ordnance in order to retain it's high-speed. Devoting a large amount of production for high-speed bomber production isn't practical, as the strike value of a high-speed bomber returns little in the way of dividends. They certainly have their value in the way of surgical strikes, priority targeting and even propeganda, but not much else beyond that.
Yes, but only problem is that Battle of Britain 'discussion' has been left a long way behind!
We can recall that Re.2001, Ki-61 and P-40 were capable to lug around much more internal fuel than the BoB trio, on about same engine power (1050-1150 HP) and without any 'trick' aerodynamics. Those 3 of the 'other' fighters weren't cannon fodder for the BoB trio.
Agree with Dave regarding technology, but this is no reason not to do something though, if it was, you'd never put anything into service for fears it'd be overtaken by the time you did. The concept worked very well in the Mosquito, and even once the Germans introduced jet fighters to intercept it, the Mossie was an effective aircraft in the jobs that it carried out. The Ar 234 was unstoppable over the UK because of its speed and altitude and was a formidable weapon, just because the Allies might have produced something to counter it eventually would be a silly reason for the Germans not to attempt to put it into service. The short period of time might be enough to force a change in long term strategy - obviously depending on a given situation, but if you are not going to try, why bother playing?
Interestingly the Arado 234C might have given the Germans 2 years of impunity over Britain.
The Arado 234A reconnaissance aircraft flew at 480 mph, the Arado 234B was wider and slower (461mph) because the jettison-able takeoff trolley/landing skid system had been replaced with a conventional undercarriage which lead to a widening of the fuselage to restore the fuel volume lost in stowing the wheels. These version were propelled by 2 x Jumo 004 engine of 900kg thrust each. (total 1800kg)
The next progression was the Arado Ar 234C which was powered by 4 x BMW 003A engines of 800kg thrust each. (total 3200kg i.e. 77% more than the Ar 234B).
The Ar 234C was actually over powered and Mach limited and not thrust limited. The Mach Limit was just over Mach 0.8. Four of these aircraft were actually delivered to the Luftwaffe. The BMW 003 engine actually had a higher cruise thrust than the Jumo 004 and was in anycase mach limited so could have carried out its mission, with bombs at Mach 0.8 all the way. Granted it is a small bomb load.
We now have a situation that the only two aircraft that might intercept it: the P80A (which was slower anyway, the P-80C was some time away) and the Meteor III were also Mach limited at around the same Mach. When a modified speed Meteor III which was essentially a prototype Meteor IV with entirely new Derwent V engines broke 600mph in late 1945 it did so at sea level where the Mach was 0.8. One almost killed Eric Brown due to Mach Tuck. Likewise with later P-80 which broke 600mph at lower altitudes.
There might have been tweeks such as sharpened leading edges and an uprated engine for the P-80 to get a few extra 0.05 mach.
The next stage of development for the Arado 234 was a swept crescent wing like the Handley Page Victor. The wing had a high sweep in its inner portion with a reduced sweep but finer profile on the outer portion to break the Mach 0.8 limit while retaining good handling. This double sweep arrangement also meant the C of G didn't change much which meant the fuselage and its attachment points did not need to be redesigned, which was very attractive from a manufacturing point of view. One wing was built and ready to be mated to a fuselage when British troops over ran the Arado 234 testing centre and Unwittingly wrecked it.
Basically the RAF needs the Miles M.52 to stop it which is ready when?
There was an Arado 234D which used the uprated Jumo 004D engine and was expected to fly 494 mph, perhaps enough to match a Meteor III and or P-80A but it was expected to use this version mainly in maritime roles where the worst it might run into was a navalised spitefull.
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Well, it's true, but the Re.2001 and Ki-61 entered service well after the Spitfire I, and the P-40 was actually "cannon fodder" if it flew higher than 15/20 000 ft.
OldSkeptic
Senior Airman
- 509
- May 17, 2010
Nah, the 234 real use was for photo-recon. Sure it was fast, but it all comes back to bombing accuracy and the correct targets. Say, in some wonderful wishland they had 1,000 of them in say late 43 (totally impossible of course, but this is a thought experiment) What could they do? There has been no photo recon for 3 years over the UK, so they don't know what to hit any better than they knew in the BoB. Light bomb load therefore they have to get down low to achieve bombing accuracy where they are as vulnerable as anything else to flak. They would have just lost lots, while the allies had the option of hammering their airfields at will (either through tactical or strategic bombers) further hampering them.
Funnily enough their V1 campaign was more rational (the V2 was a joke). The V1 was cheap to develop and build so they could throw thousands at the UK, Antwerp, etc. It cost the allies far more in resources to defend against them that it cost the Germans to use them, so it was a sort of strategic win for them. Unfortunately the V1 was so inaccurate and thanks to great counter intelligence (read R.V Jones book) they were mislead so that it became even more inaccurate. Their lack of photo recon meant they had no idea what was being hit by any objective measures.
The dominance of Allied photo recon is always underestimated by most commentators. Both at the tactical and strategic levels. High altitude PR Spits and Mossies along with low level Spits and Mustangs (the 'Dicers') dominated the battlefields and airspace throughout the Continent for years. The Germans usually had no idea what was happening, they knew nothing about the D-Day build up for example, while their counterparts (well those who used it properly) had very clear ideas of what they were facing.
Again the Germans had nothing with the performance of the high alt PR Spits and Mossies, they went everywhere with impunity. The low level boys had a rougher time of course because of flak, but the low level PR Spits and Mustangs were still way above the performance levels of their opposition.
Trouble was the prop airframes the Germans had could be matched quite easily. Yes the 109 could (and were) used for high alt PR, but they didn't have the performance advantage that stopped them from being shot down. The 190 had the same issue, yes it was good at low altitude but not good enough to survive against the defences the UK had. And none had any real range.
Again back to RV Jones as an example, he had mapped all the German Channel radar network, so before and during D-Day it was easily destroyed and spoofed.
So the only useful contribution the 234 could have made was as a PR plane, no matter how many they had. Good contribution no less though. With that sort of info in June 44 Rommel might have been able to persuade Hitler to give him the forces to kill the invasion in Normandy... maybe (he only had about 3-7 days to do it, after that it was only a matter of time). Poor old Rommel, wonder boy until Monty thumped him .. again and again and again.....
I was pointing out to the thing that there was no much (any?) technological gap between those 3 fighters and the BoB trio. The Re.2001 and P-40 (no letter), P-40-B and -C were just a bit more than re-engined pre-war fighters.
The P-40 was not cannon fodder for the Spit I/II/Hurricane I/II/Bf-109E, ie. BoB fighters.
I found Parsifal's post on a re-reading of this thread. I substantially agree with the gist of the argument but not the timing. For the British 1938 should read 1925. Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB) was formed in January that year and had moved to its Uxbridge headquarters by May.
The two senior officers were Air Marshal Sir John Salmond who featured heavily at the Air Ministry throughout the BoB period, and Air Commodore F V Holt, his chief of staff. Wing Commander J S T Bradley was in charge of training. Major General E B Ashmore was in charge of ground defences. ADGB controlled fighters and bombers but Air Commodore Brooke-Popham, who in 1922 had been put in command of the world's first staff college for air force officers at Andover, was given command of fighters under the newly formed 'Fighting Area'.
There was another very important officer who initially took charge of 'Operations, Intelligence, Mobilisation and Combined Training.' This followed a chance meeting with Holt at the RAF club in Picadilly. This officer was a certain Keith Park, recently returned from Egypt.
The ideas about air defence developed in 1926/7 had not changed in principle twelve years later at the outbreak of the war. Park always credited Holt and Ashmore for much of this work. He also credited Brooke-Popham with laying the foundations of Fighter Command and with being one of the first to appreciate the value of scientists to the air force. Fighter Command was not created between 1936 and 1939. Not even Dowding's driving force could have achieved that. It was built on a decade of effort by officers including Park, many of whom are largely forgotten.
Cheers
Steve
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
An interesting and little known fact (among the general population) about the Battle of Britain, was Italy's limited participation.
Their performance was less than spectacular, however.
Their performance was less than spectacular, however.
Airframes
Benevolens Magister
Dave, it's arguable whether Italian forces actually took part in the Battle, as their main participation was after what is now considered the 'official' end of the Battle. That said, you are correct in including them, as, when they did participate, it wasn't known that the Battle had ended 'officially'.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Sad to say, their participation/performance was such, that it makes for an obscure footnote in history.
Airframes
Benevolens Magister
But a nice photo of a crashed aircraft in Rendelsham Forest, and stories of bottles of Chianti, cheese and other stuff on board, and a Fiat on it's nose on the beach !
