Curtiss-Wright: Loss of Don Berlin and downfall (1 Viewer)

[Reluctant Poster]

Neat! I wasn't aware there were any Tomahawks left in flying condition. (or airworthy C series engines for that matter)


Sounds like something better to do with an engine that's already due for a tear-down and rebuild. (kill two birds with one stone)





And Shortround, in regards to V-1710 logistics in the field, wouldn't it make sense to supply spare components to depots in Britian servicing Merlins? (the idea of full licensed production in the UK also came to mind, but that seems to make little sense given the engine production rationalization established in 1939, but dedicating enough resources to allow servicing/repair/rebuild of V-1710s seems more sensible) Unless, of course, that's what already happened historically.

The PTO would still be more problematic, though perhaps licensed production of the V-1710 would be attractive in Australia? They seemed to favor licensing American designs over British ones (mostly radial engines) and having that resource in the South Pacific might be useful even if still a great distance from most of the front lines. (much closer than the Continental US, though, let alone Allison/GM facilities) V-1710 powered aircraft were more critical for the PTO than ETO in general and having access to that engine might also make for more useful options in Australia's indigenous fighter project compared to their attempts using the single-stage R-1830. (a straight up license for the Allison engined P-51 might have made the most sense given the timing involved too, and given the existing relationship between NA and CAC and the Mustang Mk.I was in production before development of the Boomerang had even started)

One would hope it took some time. While management is a skill many engineers don't ever get (one of the senior managers at my last aerospace employer had his secretary rate his direct reports, who were all engineering managers, because he couldn't be bothered), engineering managers are rarely hired in as such right out of school.

Alas, true. An article I read about the V-bomber development stated that the UK had fewer engineers working on all the V-bombers than Boeing had working on B-47 hydraulics. I'm not sure I believe that; I suspect that there is a problem with job titles, which don't necessarily correspond between two US companies, let alone US and UK companies.


As a recovering aeronautical engineer, I'm actually pretty cognizant of how few engineers may be working in a given specialty at even a large company: we had one engineer, who dealt with all the anti-ice systems when I was at HSD; she worked about half-time on anti-ice systems and about half-time on gearing. While she would get other engineers (frequently me) assigned to anti-ice or gears (anti-ice was fun; I like heat transfer), she was basically the only engineer on either. Different countries had (it's much less today) significant differences in engineering education. Continental Europe, starting with France, had formal, university-level education for engineers before the US, and I think the US did before the UK; one of the benefits of this is that university-trained engineers are likely to be more capable of moving to different specialties (my engineering career included gas turbine engine testing, structural fatigue analysis, aerodynamics, thermodynamic modeling of gas turbine engines and aircraft environmental control systems, low-observables analysis, and writing data reduction software).

The claim that Boeing had more engineers working on hydraulics came from Bill Gunston in Bombers of the West.

 

[pinehilljoe]

One would hope it took some time. While management is a skill many engineers don't ever get (one of the senior managers at my last aerospace employer had his secretary rate his direct reports, who were all engineering managers, because he couldn't be bothered), engineering managers are rarely hired in as such right out of school.

Alas, true. An article I read about the V-bomber development stated that the UK had fewer engineers working on all the V-bombers than Boeing had working on B-47 hydraulics. I'm not sure I believe that; I suspect that there is a problem with job titles, which don't necessarily correspond between two US companies, let alone US and UK companies.


As a recovering aeronautical engineer, I'm actually pretty cognizant of how few engineers may be working in a given specialty at even a large company: we had one engineer, who dealt with all the anti-ice systems when I was at HSD; she worked about half-time on anti-ice systems and about half-time on gearing. While she would get other engineers (frequently me) assigned to anti-ice or gears (anti-ice was fun; I like heat transfer), she was basically the only engineer on either. Different countries had (it's much less today) significant differences in engineering education. Continental Europe, starting with France, had formal, university-level education for engineers before the US, and I think the US did before the UK; one of the benefits of this is that university-trained engineers are likely to be more capable of moving to different specialties (my engineering career included gas turbine engine testing, structural fatigue analysis, aerodynamics, thermodynamic modeling of gas turbine engines and aircraft environmental control systems, low-observables analysis, and writing data reduction software).

I thought it was only the companies Ive worked at. Ive spent my career in aerospace. Many of the disciplines are one deep or if they are more than one deep there is one grey beard that makes the project come together.

 

[swampyankee]

The claim that Boeing had more engineers working on hydraulics came from Bill Gunston in Bombers of the West.

That rings a bell.....
I still don't entirely believe it.

 

[swampyankee]

I thought it was only the companies Ive worked at. Ive spent my career in aerospace. Many of the disciplines are one deep or if they are more than one deep there is one grey beard that makes the project come together.

I think most of the higher level engineers (not engineering managers, but high level technical people) in the industry know each other by reputation. Overall, it's pretty small community: one of the engineers I once worked near (she was in structures) was Nicole Piasecki, Frank's daughter; another was the son of Chuck Keys, a chief engineer from Boeing, a third was one of the test engineers who did the fatigue testing on the Comet. When I worked in the biz I could probably get a message hand-delivered with no more than three steps to just about any active aeronautical engineer in the West.

 

[jetcal1]

I think most of the higher level engineers (not engineering managers, but high level technical people) in the industry know each other by reputation. Overall, it's pretty small community: one of the engineers I once worked near (she was in structures) was Nicole Piasecki, Frank's daughter; another was the son of Chuck Keys, a chief engineer from Boeing, a third was one of the test engineers who did the fatigue testing on the Comet. When I worked in the biz I could probably get a message hand-delivered with no more than three steps to just about any active aeronautical engineer in the West.

Large industry, small community. Reputation is everything.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Curtiss Wright had far more problems than the loss of Donald Berlin. The attached copy of the Truman Committee Report makes fascinating reading. and it doesn't even address the disastrous development of the R-3350.

 

[Admiral Beez]

When it comes to failed US aeronautical firms it's not Curtiss that comes to mind. I think of Brewster and maybe Vultee.

 

[swampyankee]

When it comes to failed US aeronautical firms it's not Curtiss that comes to mind. I think of Brewster and maybe Vultee.

Well, Curtiss still exists.

 

[Kevin J]

When it comes to failed US aeronautical firms it's not Curtiss that comes to mind. I think of Brewster and maybe Vultee.

If you look at all the projects that Curtiss had, perhaps it's not surprising that they eventually failed. They did have some major winners though, the Commando, Seahawk, Warhawk and Helldiver

 

[Reluctant Poster]

If you look at all the projects that Curtiss had, perhaps it's not surprising that they eventually failed. They did have some major winners though, the Commando, Seahawk, Warhawk and Helldiver

I would not consider the Commado to be a major winner with its propensity to explode in mid air which took too a long time to cure. The Helldiver was far from a winner.

 

[swampyankee]

The P-40 Hawk series were under-rated aircraft, for certain, but there were far too many problems with the C-46 and the SB2C Helldiver to call them "great successes," and the Seahawk was possibly the best aircraft ever designed for the scouting role that was already moribund in 1944, at least in the USN and RN (they had carriers). For the other roles, e.g., SAR, a bit more space for rescuees would likely be more useful than a quite few knots in airspeed.

Curtiss's troubles were far more systemic than the presence or absence of Don Berlin (who, one should add, did not do spectacularly well with, say, the P-75).

 

[wuzak]

The P-40 Hawk series were under-rated aircraft,

I would have thought the same, but reading threads in here has now convinced my otherwise.

 

[Shortround6]

He is often listed as having something to do with the XP-55.

Most biographies have him leaving Curtiss in Dec of 1941 but Wiki is rather conflicted about this.

"During World War II, Berlin was Chief Engineer and the head of design at Curtiss-Wright. "
"A number of experimental programs were begun during this period, including the revolutionary Curtiss-Wright XP-55 Ascender that never achieved production status"
"Although designed by George A. Page Jr., Berlin oversaw the design of the Curtiss C-46 Commando "
" He also supervised the development of the Curtiss SB2C Helldiver, designed by Raymond C. Blaylock, the company's last major production aircraft series "

If he left at the end of 1941 then he was head of design for only about 1/3 of the war counting the starting as the invasion of Poland.

While design work and concept of the XP-55 started in 1940 and a flying scale model was built at company expense the US Army didn't order a full sized prototype until July of 1942, 6-7 months after Don Berlin had left Curtiss? It doesn't fly until July 1943, a year and half after he left Curtiss?

The story about the C-46 Commando cries out for clarification. The CW-20 was built in St. Louis Missouri which is a fair distance from Buffalo NY. Not impossible, merely difficult. Work started in 1937. However after a number of changes production started slowly, very slowly, on two production examples were complete as of Dec 7th 1941. Don Belrin leaves curtiss the same month? By Nov 1943 743 changes had been made to production models. This is from Wiki so corrections welcome.

As for the SB2C, again form Wiki "The first prototype made its maiden flight on 18 December 1940.[9] It crashed on 8 February 1941 when its engine failed on approach, but Curtiss was asked to rebuild it. The fuselage was lengthened and a larger tail was fitted, while an autopilot was fitted to help the poor stability. The revised prototype flew again on 20 October 1941, but was destroyed when its wing failed during diving tests on 21 December 1941.

The Helldiver doesn't enter combat until Nov 1943, nearly 2 years after Don Berlin left Curtiss and after 880 modifications had been mad to the design.

It is very difficult to reconcile these different accounts, even with Mr Berlin working for Curtiss on a consulting basis while he worked on the P-75 project.
And what company the size of Curtiss-Wright is going to depend on a chief designer or supervisor working part time for them on a number f projects while he works for another company full time on an aircraft design for the full time company?

Maybe wiki has it wrong and left Curtiss later?

 

[Zipper730]

When it comes to failed US aeronautical firms it's not Curtiss that comes to mind. I think of Brewster and maybe Vultee.

What went wrong with Vultee?

 

[swampyankee]

What went wrong with Vultee?

It was bought by Consolidated, forming CONsolidated Vultee AIRcraft. Vultee only existed as an independent company from 1939 to 1943.

Curtiss-Wright does still exist, with a total revenue of about 2.5 billion USD/year, and 9,000 employees. During WW2, it peaked out at about 180,000. For comparison, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft's (as part of United Aircraft) workforce peaked at about 40,000 during WW2, and is about 38,000 today (as part of United Technologies and Raytheon).

C-W's engine side also had some pretty serious issues during WW2, including significant quality control shortcomings.

 

[Zipper730]

It was bought by Consolidated, forming CONsolidated Vultee AIRcraft. Vultee only existed as an independent company from 1939 to 1943.

No, I meant why? Why did they get bought out?

 

[BobB]

Grumman is another example. In some ways Grumman was at the top of its game in the Mid/Late 60s. Aircraft developed on contracts won in the 60s would fill Carrier Wings composed of F-14s, E-2s, A-6s, they designed, built and performed flight operations for the Lunar Module an incredible contract. Leroy Grumman left the company in 1966, by '94 they were not in the phone book.

Tom Kelly was the Proposal Manager then Chief Engineer of the LEM, his Book Moon Lander offers a good view of Grumman in the 60s. He wrote when Grumman lost the Space Shuttle to North American Rockwell it was the beginning of the end of Grumman.

One writer suggested that when Grumman started working for NASA, NASA didn't like their work culture and insisted that they do things the NASA way. Leroy may have been lucky to leave in 1966. https://dra.american.edu/islandora/object/thesesdissertations:109/datastream/PDF/view

 

[GregP]

Hey gjs238, with respect to post #12, Don Berlin returned to Curtiss-Wright in 1963 and, as I said earlier than post #12, helped guide them into the sensor business.

Not harping or criticising, just saying Don DID help guide Curtiss-Wright into the post-aircraft business, albeit way after WWII.

 

[Zipper730]

One writer suggested that when Grumman started working for NASA, NASA didn't like their work culture and insisted that they do things the NASA way. Leroy may have been lucky to leave in 1966. https://dra.american.edu/islandora/object/thesesdissertations:109/datastream/PDF/view

They seemed to have a remarkable work ethic.

 

[BarnOwlLover]

I know that I'm late to the party with this, but as far as the Curtiss XP-46 underperforming, could it be just that it was too underpowered for the weight of the aircraft. It weighed (fully equipped) about the same as a Spitfire IX, but only had 1150 hp, instead of the Spitfire IX that had (depending on Merlin fitted) 1550+-1700 hp. I think that power to weight had a lot to answer for there.