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EwenS, Without the effort on my part, I did not realize the complicated nature of these attacks. As most things in life or war, things are never as simple as the first blush would suggest.Regarding Operation Chastise, opinions about its success or otherwise, have varied from 1943 onwards. Maybe at best a tactical success from a brilliantly executed operation. But strategically?
As for not conducting further such raids a few points to consider.
1. The Upkeep mine was not well suited as a weapon for destroying all dams. It worked well enough on concrete gravity structures like the Mohne & Eder. It didn't work on the Sorpe (which IIRC Speer considered the most important to the Ruhr). The Sorpe dam had a concrete core with earth banks on each side.
The attack technique for the Sorpe nvolved the aircraft running along the length of the dam and releasing the Upkeep unspun, in the hope it would roll down the waterside slope. It was estimated that at least 5 accurately placed Upkeeps would have been required to weaken the structure sufficiently for the water to do its work.Only 2 aircraft survived to attack it.
The RAF returned to the Sorpe dam in Oct 1944 with 12,000lb Tallboys and still didn't breach it.
2. While not all the crews of 617 were, as suggested by the movie, hand picked and experienced, a significant effort went into training at low level. That meant withdrawal from regular operations.
3. The attack profiles for these targets were extremely difficult to fly. It is a tribute to the determination of the crews that carried out the mission, especially when several had to make multiple runs before dropping their bombs.
4 .The losses on Chastise were heavy - 8 of 19 crews dispatched. One of those survivors turned back, never having made it much beyond the Dutch coast due to flak damage.
5 .Immediately following Chastise, the Germans reinforced the defences of its dams. More flak was brought in, barrage balloons were added, and wooden booms placed at distances from dam faces in a bid to protect them.
6. With the element of surprise lost (One bomb from a crashed aircraft was captured intact when the self destruct device failed) further dams raids would have been even more hazardous to undertake.
Regarding Operation Chastise, opinions about its success or otherwise, have varied from 1943 onwards. Maybe at best a tactical success from a brilliantly executed operation. But strategically?
1. The Upkeep mine was not well suited as a weapon for destroying all dams. It worked well enough on concrete gravity structures like the Mohne & Eder. It didn't work on the Sorpe (which IIRC Speer considered the most important to the Ruhr). The Sorpe dam had a concrete core with earth banks on each side.
2. While not all the crews of 617 were, as suggested by the movie, hand picked and experienced, a significant effort went into training at low level. That meant withdrawal from regular operations.
3. The attack profiles for these targets were extremely difficult to fly. It is a tribute to the determination of the crews that carried out the mission, especially when several had to make multiple runs before dropping their bombs.
4 .The losses on Chastise were heavy - 8 of 19 crews dispatched. One of those survivors turned back, never having made it much beyond the Dutch coast due to flak damage.
5 .Immediately following Chastise, the Germans reinforced the defences of its dams. More flak was brought in, barrage balloons were added, and wooden booms placed at distances from dam faces in a bid to protect them.
6. With the element of surprise lost (One bomb from a crashed aircraft was captured intact when the self destruct device failed) further dams raids would have been even more hazardous to undertake.
Anybody making claims of US goods to Nazi Germany needs to explain the route and length of voyage, for something rated as vital as bearings the US should have been keeping very tight control of distribution, so what was the country of destination according to the export documents? To around May 1940 the trade routes to Europe were largely open, plenty of friendly neutrals. For the next year comes via Japan/the USSR and Türkiye, after that only Türkiye. Sending bearings from Philadelphia to Germany in 1943/44 would be a gigantic failure on many levels, agreed it is preposterous.I am reading "Vanishing Act" by Dan Hampton (2024) ....
He states that the SKF ball bearing company's Swedish exports to Germany during WWII mitigated the effects of the 8th AAF bombing of German manufacturing in Schweinfurt. Along with high grade iron ore exports, the ball bearings may have allowed Sweden to remain neutral during the war.
Have I not seen some new numbers in the recent past that somehow validate this? His book doesn't have comprehensive footnotes so it's hard to tell how he would substantiate this fundamental claim. Even an evaluation of the numbers he uses in his argument show that Swedish and its U.S. subsidiary in Philidelphia (shipped through intermediate countries) shows they made up an insignificant % of the total required by the German war industry. [2 million bearings/month vs. 50,000/mo. from SKF-Philidelphia] To go on to say in a note on page 116 that the Schweinfurt raids were extremely costly to the 8th AAF and that SKF-Philidelphia made up the shortfall is preposterous to me.
Two well researched papers on the Swedish ball bearing export arrangements with Germany during WWII show that they supplied about 10% of their needs during the war through 1943.
Others have commented on the dams raid, apart from the technical troubles to really do the Ruhr dams alone, ignoring the rest of the German economy, would have required a bigger force and the understanding they would go out the next night to break any dams still standing, soon after that the defences would be too strong.I remember years ago reading the biography of Albert Speer. I realize some of it may have been self serving, similar to a de-Nazification tribunal report, but I noted his conclusions on the effects of strategic bombing by both the RAF and USAAF. He believed that the British failure to continue bombing the other related dams associated with the Mohne was a strategic mistake and left the Ruhr valley supplied with water and power. He was also puzzled by the cessation of US bombing of the ball bearing plants in Schweinfurt and Erkner in Apr, 1944. These targets were heavily defended especially in the Fall of '43. His opinion was that a continued bombing campaign in the Spring of '44 would have accomplished what the target planners had predicted and brought Germany's war materiel production to a virtual halt. We know that the 8th AAF shifted in Apr from oil and ball bearing targets to transportation targets in support of the Normandy invasion. He mentioned the exhausted stock piles and that imports could not make up the short fall.
Am I missing something?
AF | City | Date | Target Struck | Sighting | Atk | Lost | H.E. | I.B. | Frag | Total |
8th | Schweinfurt/Kugelfisher | 17-Aug-43 | Bearings | Vis | 54 | 9 | 25.0 | 88.0 | - | 113.0 |
8th | Schweinfurt/VKF 1 | 17-Aug-43 | Bearings | Vis | 78 | 4 | 145.0 | 40.0 | - | 185.0 |
8th | Schweinfurt/VKF 2 | 17-Aug-43 | Bearings | Vis | 51 | 23 | 127.2 | - | - | 127.2 |
8th | Paris/Hispano-Suiza | 15-Sep-43 | A/Ieng & Bear | Vis | 78 | 3 | 229.0 | - | - | 229.0 |
8th | Schweinfurt/Kugelfisher | 14-Oct-43 | Bearings | Vis | 81 | 10 | 165.7 | - | - | 165.7 |
8th | Schweinfurt/VKF 1 | 14-Oct-43 | Bearings | Vis | 61 | 35 | 63.0 | 74.1 | - | 137.1 |
8th | Schweinfurt/VKF 2 | 14-Oct-43 | Bearings | Vis | 86 | 15 | 166.5 | 13.5 | - | 180.0 |
8th | Paris | 26-Nov-43 | Bearings | recalled | - | 4 | - | - | - | - |
8th | Paris/Bois-Colombes | 31-Dec-43 | Bearings | Vis | 57 | 1 | 164.3 | - | - | 164.3 |
8th | Paris/Ivry | 31-Dec-43 | Bearings | Vis | 63 | 0 | 188.2 | - | - | 188.2 |
BC | Wuppertal/Elberfeld/Jaeger | 30-Jan-44 | Bearings | OBOE (N) | 9 | 0 | 9.0 | - | - | 9.0 |
BC | Wuppertal/Elberfeld/Jaeger | 02-Feb-44 | Bearings | OBOE (N) | 1 | 0 | 4.0 | - | - | 4.0 |
BC | Wuppertal/Elberfeld/Jaeger | 04-Feb-44 | Bearings | OBOE (N) | 1 | 0 | 1.2 | - | - | 1.2 |
BC | Wuppertal/Elberfeld/Jaeger | 07-Feb-44 | Bearings | OBOE (N) | 4 | 0 | 4.0 | - | - | 4.0 |
BC | Wuppertal/Elberfeld/Jaeger | 08-Feb-44 | Bearings | OBOE (N) | 3 | 0 | 2.9 | - | - | 2.9 |
BC | Wuppertal/Elberfeld/Jaeger | 09-Feb-44 | Bearings | OBOE (N) | 3 | 0 | 2.7 | - | - | 2.7 |
BC | Wuppertal/Elberfeld/Jaeger | 11-Feb-44 | Bearings | OBOE (N) | 2 | 0 | 2.0 | - | - | 2.0 |
BC | Wuppertal/Elberfeld/Jaeger | 12-Feb-44 | Bearings | OBOE (N) | 1 | 0 | 1.0 | - | - | 1.0 |
8th | Schweinfurt/Kugelfisher | 24-Feb-44 | Bearings | Vis | 238 | 11 | 399.3 | 175.3 | - | 574.6 |
BC | Schweinfurt | 24-Feb-44 | City | H2S (N) | 662 | 33 | 1,372.8 | 1,160.8 | - | 2,533.6 |
8th | Stuttgart/VKF | 25-Feb-44 | Bearings | Vis | 55 | 2 | 76.0 | 39.5 | - | 115.5 |
BC | Schweinfurt | 25-Feb-44 | City | Vis (N) | 5 | 0 | 2.2 | 0.7 | - | 2.9 |
8th | Berlin/Erkner VKF | 08-Mar-44 | Bearings | Vis | 468 | 36 | 300.4 | 761.0 | - | 1,061.4 |
BC | St. Etienne/La Ricamarie | 10-Mar-44 | Bearings | Vis (N) | 16 | 0 | 64.0 | 14.2 | - | 78.2 |
8th | Schweinfurt/Kugelfisher | 24-Mar-44 | Bearings | H2X | 60 | 0 | 51.5 | 78.8 | - | 130.3 |
8th | Schweinfurt/Kugelfisher | 13-Apr-44 | Bearings | Vis | 153 | 14 | 202.5 | 138.7 | - | 341.2 |
BC | Schweinfurt | 26-Apr-44 | City | Vis (N) | 217 | 23 | 155.0 | 593.2 | - | 748.2 |
BC | Annency/Schmidt-Roost | 09-May-44 | Bearings | Vis (N) | 37 | 0 | 125.6 | 0.6 | - | 126.1 |
8th | Leipzig/DKF | 29-Jun-44 | Bearings | Vis | 17 | 0 | 42.5 | - | - | 42.5 |
8th | Leipzig/DKF | 07-Jul-44 | Bearings | Vis | 48 | 3 | 75.0 | 44.8 | - | 119.8 |
8th | Schweinfurt/VKF 1 | 19-Jul-44 | Bearings | Vis | 173 | 2 | 299.5 | 102.1 | - | 401.6 |
8th | Ebelsbach/Kugelfisher | 19-Jul-44 | Bearings | Vis | 54 | 0 | 130.0 | - | - | 130.0 |
8th | Leipzig/DKF | 20-Jul-44 | Bearings | H2X/Vis | 75 | 9 | 95.0 | 48.9 | 26.8 | 170.7 |
8th | Schweinfurt/VKF 1 | 21-Jul-44 | Bearings | Vis | 99 | 1 | 174.5 | 57.8 | - | 232.3 |
8th | Ebelsbach/Kugelfisher | 21-Jul-44 | Bearings | Vis | 70 | 2 | 90.0 | 69.7 | - | 159.7 |
8th | Schweinfurt | 09-Oct-44 | I/A | H2X | 329 | 0 | 811.2 | 4.7 | - | 815.9 |
BC | Schweinfurt | 12-Oct-44 | City | OBOE (N) | 2 | 0 | 1.8 | - | - | 1.8 |
BC | Schweinfurt | 27-Oct-44 | City | Vis (N) | 1 | 0 | 1.0 | - | - | 1.0 |
BC | Schweinfurt | 31-Oct-44 | City | Vis/DR (N) | 2 | 0 | 4.0 | - | - | 4.0 |
8th | Schweinfurt | 22-Feb-45 | RR/Br | Vis | 1 | 0 | 3.0 | - | - | 3.0 |
8th | Schweinfurt | 23-Feb-45 | M/Y | Vis | 12 | 0 | 35.5 | - | - | 35.5 |
month | aircraft | oil | transport | Total |
Jan-44 | 2150.6 | 980.4 | 1902.1 | 11679.2 |
Feb-44 | 3924.6 | 0 | 1835.9 | 18339.4 |
Mar-44 | 3533.1 | 128.5 | 1179.5 | 21046.6 |
Apr-44 | 6226.1 | 0 | 2281.4 | 24931.3 |
May-44 | 3278.6 | 2872.9 | 10083.7 | 36006.6 |
Jun-44 | 2070.5 | 4966.1 | 9795.3 | 58271 |
Surely it was a strategic operation - a raid againt the enemy's means of production?
Compare the damage of Operation Chastise to other strategic raids - surely it was much greater than most?
Two dams were destroyed, which required the redeployment of some labour from the Atlantic Wall to repair.
A few factories were destroyed, several were damaged.
Agricultural land was rendered usely for a year or two.
Several bridges were destroyed.
True enough.
In planning they had identified several less important dams that would have been more susceptible to the bouncing bomb.
But would they be worth the effort/risk to attack?
Certainly the crews were extensively trained, as much to do with low flying and navigation at night as anything else.
If other raids were to happen, they may have not been flown at low altitude, except for the actual attack run.
Some more than others.
I think the Eder was harder than the Mohne.
Smaller dams may have been even more difficult.
Yes, they were in terms of loss percentage, but not compared in pure numbers to other BC raids at the time.
One of the bombers lost the bomb when it hit a wave crossing the channel.
Which is diverting resources from other areas.
The British also upgraded the defences at important dams in Britain.
Yes, further raids would have been much more difficult.
And success was far from guranteed.
Also, a number of ball bearing applications were redesigned to use plain bearings.
I have a vague memory of reading about a mission in teh wake of teh first Schweinfurt raid where a BOAC Mosquito carried diplomats to Sweden to negotiate the purchase of Sweden's ball bearing production. Anybody know of this?
Not the point being made.So the Germans had a bomb to work with - but did they have a bomber capable of carrying it?