I am reading "Vanishing Act" by Dan Hampton (2024) which describes in detail the aftermath of the Doolittle raider which landed in Russia after bombing Japan on 18 Apr, 1942. While the raid itself has been dealt with in detail by a number of authors, and Lt. Col. Hampton has broken some new ground, my interest is in one specific assertion he makes about strategic bombing in Germany in his background narrative.
He states that the SKF ball bearing company's Swedish exports to Germany during WWII mitigated the effects of the 8th AAF bombing of German manufacturing in Schweinfurt. Along with high grade iron ore exports, the ball bearings may have allowed Sweden to remain neutral during the war.
Have I not seen some new numbers in the recent past that somehow validate this? His book doesn't have comprehensive footnotes so it's hard to tell how he would substantiate this fundamental claim. Even an evaluation of the numbers he uses in his argument show that Swedish and its U.S. subsidiary in Philidelphia (shipped through intermediate countries) shows they made up an insignificant % of the total required by the German war industry. [2 million bearings/month vs. 50,000/mo. from SKF-Philidelphia] To go on to say in a note on page 116 that the Schweinfurt raids were extremely costly to the 8th AAF and that SKF-Philidelphia made up the shortfall is preposterous to me.
Two well researched papers on the Swedish ball bearing export arrangements with Germany during WWII show that they supplied about 10% of their needs during the war through 1943.
I remember years ago reading the biography of Albert Speer. I realize some of it may have been self serving, similar to a de-Nazification tribunal report, but I noted his conclusions on the effects of strategic bombing by both the RAF and USAAF. He believed that the British failure to continue bombing the other related dams associated with the Mohne was a strategic mistake and left the Ruhr valley supplied with water and power. He was also puzzled by the cessation of US bombing of the ball bearing plants in Schweinfurt and Erkner in Apr, 1944. These targets were heavily defended especially in the Fall of '43. His opinion was that a continued bombing campaign in the Spring of '44 would have accomplished what the target planners had predicted and brought Germany's war materiel production to a virtual halt. We know that the 8th AAF shifted in Apr from oil and ball bearing targets to transportation targets in support of the Normandy invasion. He mentioned the exhausted stock piles and that imports could not make up the short fall.
Am I missing something?
He states that the SKF ball bearing company's Swedish exports to Germany during WWII mitigated the effects of the 8th AAF bombing of German manufacturing in Schweinfurt. Along with high grade iron ore exports, the ball bearings may have allowed Sweden to remain neutral during the war.
Have I not seen some new numbers in the recent past that somehow validate this? His book doesn't have comprehensive footnotes so it's hard to tell how he would substantiate this fundamental claim. Even an evaluation of the numbers he uses in his argument show that Swedish and its U.S. subsidiary in Philidelphia (shipped through intermediate countries) shows they made up an insignificant % of the total required by the German war industry. [2 million bearings/month vs. 50,000/mo. from SKF-Philidelphia] To go on to say in a note on page 116 that the Schweinfurt raids were extremely costly to the 8th AAF and that SKF-Philidelphia made up the shortfall is preposterous to me.
Two well researched papers on the Swedish ball bearing export arrangements with Germany during WWII show that they supplied about 10% of their needs during the war through 1943.
I remember years ago reading the biography of Albert Speer. I realize some of it may have been self serving, similar to a de-Nazification tribunal report, but I noted his conclusions on the effects of strategic bombing by both the RAF and USAAF. He believed that the British failure to continue bombing the other related dams associated with the Mohne was a strategic mistake and left the Ruhr valley supplied with water and power. He was also puzzled by the cessation of US bombing of the ball bearing plants in Schweinfurt and Erkner in Apr, 1944. These targets were heavily defended especially in the Fall of '43. His opinion was that a continued bombing campaign in the Spring of '44 would have accomplished what the target planners had predicted and brought Germany's war materiel production to a virtual halt. We know that the 8th AAF shifted in Apr from oil and ball bearing targets to transportation targets in support of the Normandy invasion. He mentioned the exhausted stock piles and that imports could not make up the short fall.
Am I missing something?
