parsifal
Colonel
i think adler wants more focus on its military defeat rather than the moral defeat that it suffered. i would have thought "defeat" can be interpreted on many levels however.
Defeat of the Luftwaffe
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".... post that does not have to do with the Defeat of the Luftwaffe"
How can you take an organization seriously that was run by an overweight, morphine-addicted, egomaniacal mobster ..... (he personally 'owned' Austria after the take-over)
Right, CrewChief ...
MM
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E5XG0LYz5B4
Galland confirmed this!
Bubbi, Galland, Bar, Specht, Marseille, etc., were the real leaders of the Luftwaffe. The higher ups would have been wise to listen to them.
Unit commanders in the end, made the most critical of choises. They ignored the FAT MAN Hitler, and concentrated on how and where to surrender.
They (Luftwaffe pilots) did the best they could.
Unit commanders in the end, made the most critical of choises. They ignored the FAT MAN Hitler, and concentrated on how and where to surrender.
They (Luftwaffe pilots) did the best they could.
parsifal
Colonel
I dont think LW leadership doctrine or tactics was, overall, any better or worse than that of its opponents. Goring is often blamed for systemic and doctrinal failures within the LW. Sometimes deservingly, but often as a convenient scapegoat for a wider failure.
In the end the LW was defeated by two related issues: overuse/over-extension (as one issue), and inadequate resources (as another issue) compared to their opponents. from those fundamental weaknesses grew a whole plethora of other failures. those "other" failures are numerous, and extend to such issues as inadequate training schedules, insufficient training aircraft, overworked crews, inadequate type replacements, inadequate logistic support (on some fronts). All are relevant, but all can be traced or linked back to that same root cause....resourcing.
In the end the LW was defeated by two related issues: overuse/over-extension (as one issue), and inadequate resources (as another issue) compared to their opponents. from those fundamental weaknesses grew a whole plethora of other failures. those "other" failures are numerous, and extend to such issues as inadequate training schedules, insufficient training aircraft, overworked crews, inadequate type replacements, inadequate logistic support (on some fronts). All are relevant, but all can be traced or linked back to that same root cause....resourcing.
Right, CrewChief ...
MM
Is there a problem?
The war guilt of Germany 70 years after the war has nothing to do with the defeat of the Luftwaffe. Nore is the question of who is worse, the Russians or the Germans? We let threads go off topic here and there if it is a good discussion, but eventually it is time to get back on topic. Is that a problem?
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Galland had his own post war agenda. Distancing himself from the nazi regime was high on his list of priorities and he was very good at it.
The reasons for the Luftwaffe's defeat have been well covered already. They were systemic failiures at many levels (including Galland's) and the mechanisms for defeat were in place before or very early in the war.
Ratsel,unit commanders surely implement strategy,they don't make it. They have a much greater input over tactics.
Some junior leaders can I concede have an influence above their rank,usually by politicing (bending the ears of groups of their seniors who may share their view) and by-passing their chain of command to the point of disloyalty. On the British side Douglas Bader's influence as a mere squadron leader in the "Big Wing" debacle would be an example.
Bader,a shameless self publicist,had a lot in common with Galland.
Cheers
Steve
Let's not forget that the Nazi's did execute some Generals, and not all. were envolved with the June 44 plot. I can't remember the exact figures, but something over 14,000 Wehrmacht men were excuted during WW2, those were mostly for combat refusal, etc. but that definition was very flexible in the last year of the war. So that was hanging over the head of any German officer who knowingly ignored orders.
As Voltaire wrote after we had executed Admiral John Byng for his failiure "to do his utmost" at Minorca.
"Dans ce pays-ci, il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres"
"In this country, it is good to kill an admiral from time to time to encourage the others."
I'm sure the same applies to generals. In reality poor old Byng was the scapegoat for the Royal Navy's own lack of preparation and failings and paid with his life. Sound familiar?
Cheers
Steve
"Dans ce pays-ci, il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres"
"In this country, it is good to kill an admiral from time to time to encourage the others."
I'm sure the same applies to generals. In reality poor old Byng was the scapegoat for the Royal Navy's own lack of preparation and failings and paid with his life. Sound familiar?
Cheers
Steve
Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
Interesting points.
It seems to me that 'defeat' can come from within as well as from a superior force.
John
It seems to me that 'defeat' can come from within as well as from a superior force.
John
I think that it is invariably a combination of both. It certainly was in the case of the Luftwaffe. We all bang on about the Luftwaffe's lack of suitable aircraft,pilots,training,fuel,the RLM's production difficulties and poor planning but none of these are relevant without the stresses imposed on the organisation(s) by the various allied air forces.
Cheers
Steve
Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
parsifal
Colonel
Hard to disagree that this discussion has not drifted completely off topic. So i am not defending the discussion per se. in that regard i think you are right. however, in regard to the luftwaffes defeat, it was much more than a narrowly defined material defeat, more than a loss of personnel and material. Its defeat was all encompassing and comprehensive. It was a defeat of its doctrine, a morale and moral defeat, as much psychological and ethereal, a defeat of doctrine and belief as it was a case of nuts and bolts and numbers. moreover, its defeat of the Luftwaffe as a concept and all that it stood for that matters in todays world and retains its relevance to us more than the material defeat that is more relevant today.
So no, you cannot describe or understand the importance of the defeat from just the perpective you are wanting this discussion to progress to. Its more wide ranging than that, though as i said, this discussion that led to your intervention is not where the discussion had to go.
Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
Not to put too fine a point on it, while most countries don't have a Whiter than White past Britiai (and Europe) certainly hasn't got too much of a White future at all. The Welsch actor John RhysJones calls it the "demographic catastrophe happening in Europe that nobody wants to talk about" and that is a result one way or another of WW2 as well. I perceive the endless guilt mongering against Germans as having some unique evil, rather than being a people pushed hard up against the wall, as being a subtextual attack on all Western civilisation and Europeans themselves by folks with various motives. If you read around enough you will find people declaring this outright. And its actually quite effective. It's also extraordinary don't you think that no one seems to or dares to care. This war was a tragedy for Europeans it is an ongoing tragedy today.
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Agreed, and thank you.
Lets just try and stay on topic as much as possible. I do understand that it is far more to it than just a material defeat.
Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
Off topic reply, but needs to be said I think...
Agreed. But, two conflicts within 21 years is bound to have had an effect.
There is an undoubted legacy handed down through the generations...I'm not saying that this is a good thing, but I believe that it is true. Our past time of discussing WW2 is a possible example of this. We get angry at perceived slights on our national honour etc etc.
Having said that I reckon that both WW's will eventually be viewed like the Napoleonic wars...a long time ago and interesting enough but, irrelevant in 100 years time.
As for modern Europe that is a subject in itself Siegfried.
Why do you think emigration to Australia is still so popular?
John
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Mistakes in pilot selection and training
The bomber arm was given preference and received the "better" pilots. Later, fighter pilot leaders were few in numbers as a result of this. As with the late shift to fighter production, the Luftwaffe pilot schools did not give the fighter pilot schools preference soon enough. The Luftwaffe, the OKW argued, was still an offensive weapon, and its primary focus was on producing bomber pilots. This attitude prevailed until the second half of 1943. During the Defence of the Reich campaign in 1943 and 1944, there were not enough commissioned fighter pilots and leaders to meet attrition rates, as the need arose to replace aircrew (as attrition rates increased), the quality of pilot training deteriorated rapidly. Later this was made worse by fuel shortages for pilot training. Overall this meant a fall on training on operational types, formation flying, gunnery training, combat training and a total lack of instrument training.
Mistakes in leadership
At the beginning of the war commanders were replaced with younger commanders too quickly. These younger commanders had to learn "in the field" rather than entering a post fully qualified. Training of formation leaders was not systematical until 1943, which was far too late, with the Luftwaffe already stretched. The Luftwaffe thus lacked a cadre of Staff officers to set up, man, and pass on experience.
Moreover, Luftwaffe leadership from the start poached the training command, which undermined its ability to replace losses, while also planning for "short sharp campaigns", which did not pertain. Moreover, no plans were laid for night fighters. In fact, when protests were raised, Jeschonnek himself said, "First we've got to beat Russia, then we can start training!"
The bomber arm was given preference and received the "better" pilots. Later, fighter pilot leaders were few in numbers as a result of this. As with the late shift to fighter production, the Luftwaffe pilot schools did not give the fighter pilot schools preference soon enough. The Luftwaffe, the OKW argued, was still an offensive weapon, and its primary focus was on producing bomber pilots. This attitude prevailed until the second half of 1943. During the Defence of the Reich campaign in 1943 and 1944, there were not enough commissioned fighter pilots and leaders to meet attrition rates, as the need arose to replace aircrew (as attrition rates increased), the quality of pilot training deteriorated rapidly. Later this was made worse by fuel shortages for pilot training. Overall this meant a fall on training on operational types, formation flying, gunnery training, combat training and a total lack of instrument training.
Mistakes in leadership
At the beginning of the war commanders were replaced with younger commanders too quickly. These younger commanders had to learn "in the field" rather than entering a post fully qualified. Training of formation leaders was not systematical until 1943, which was far too late, with the Luftwaffe already stretched. The Luftwaffe thus lacked a cadre of Staff officers to set up, man, and pass on experience.
Moreover, Luftwaffe leadership from the start poached the training command, which undermined its ability to replace losses, while also planning for "short sharp campaigns", which did not pertain. Moreover, no plans were laid for night fighters. In fact, when protests were raised, Jeschonnek himself said, "First we've got to beat Russia, then we can start training!"
Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
Good post, You make the point that I was trying too...that an organisation can defeat itself almost without outside help.
Is there anything else that we can usefully say on this thread?
I would like to start to discuss the time 1945 - 1955 and see how the countries dealt with the post war period.
Anyone up for that?
John
Thats exactly it, it takes much more then the Allied airforces combined. Take a unit like say JG 52, they didn't follow Oberkommando Der Luftwaffe 'doctrine' as outline, and were very sucessful, even right to the very end. Others, mostly in the west mind you, followed OKL and were much less sucessful.
Now if they had the proper fighter pilot training, and dedicated night fighter force, and enough pilots dedicated to home defence, before the BOB, I shutter to think of what the results may have been.
Even with all that lacking, they did on hell of a job, you must admit.
Cheers.
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