Defeating Bomber Command

stona said:

The AMES Type 7 was introduced in the GCI role particularly because its better aerial had longer range, more accurate height finding and also a gap filling capability. Earlier radars had gaps in their vertical coverage for rather complicated reasons, the maths of which I've struggled to understand for a considerable time

steve

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Steve,

Could the gap coverage be due to beam width gaps at longer ranges?

Cheers,
Biff

57 (assuming 100% serviceability) at a time when Bomber Command was still operating on a small scale compared with a year later.

On 92 nights between July and November 1941 Bomber Command flew a total of 11,991 sorties with a 3.5% loss rate. Could intruder operations with 20 or 30 (at best) operational aircraft have dented this?

Between May and August 1942, at the time of the so called 'thousand bomber raids', Bomber Command would fly a similar number of night time sorties, 11,139, in a mere 60 nights. Losses rose to 4.3%.

I don't think there was anything a few tens of intruders, trying to cover airfields across the east of England, at night, could have done to prevent the build up. It didn't stop there either. By August to December 1944 Bomber Command was flying 43,189 sorties on 115 nights with a loss rate of 1.1%. That's an average of 530 sorties per 24 hours. I only quote these later figures to put the puny Luftwaffe effort into context.

Cheers

Steve

You are ignoring the efforts against British training efforts that forced the RAF to move night training away from the East Coast. Does the loss rate you quote include accidents too? Apparently, just as later with the RAF intruder operations, there was a lot fear and anxiety during landings due to the intruder ops, so accident rates went up. So assuming the historical Geschwader strength of the intruders transferred to the Mediterranean (about ~120 aircraft) thats a doubling of the July 1941 numbers and historically they weren't operating in 1942 when there was double the fighters and more target rich evenings during the 1000 bomber raids, there would a significant chances to divert British resources into countering the intruders while inflicting heavier losses. Obviously its not going to shatter BC, but it would be a drain that would reduce effectiveness until the intruders can command greater resources starting in 1943.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Gisela#Intruder_history

In 1941, the German night fighter intruders began achieving substantial successes. British ground defences, which had taken their toll on the German units in 1940, were now side-stepped by a decision to shift the area of operations to the North Sea, by the English coast. In June German night fighter units claimed 22 RAF aircraft; 18 over the sea. In 19 July British aircraft were claimed for four losses. By October 1941 British loss records list 54 aircraft of all types destroyed and a further 44 damaged in these operations to all causes. German losses amounted to 27 destroyed and 31 damaged to all causes.[20]

While the number of losses incurred against German night fighters was not significantly large the psychological damage was substantial. A high number of crashes owed much to nervous bomber pilots who did not feel safe over their own airfields and consequently landed too hard and fast or refused to go around a second time for fear of enemy intruders. Just as it appeared night intruder sorties were showing promise Adolf Hitler ordered a cessation of operations. For propaganda purposes, he thought that the morale of the German people would be better served by seeing British bombers destroyed and wrecked over German territory. Hitler was also recitent owing the fact there had been no noticeable reduction in British air raids and the RAF had not adopted these methods during The Blitz. This order came into effect on 12 October 1941.[21][22][23] Kammhuber would unsuccessfully lobby to have intruder operations reinstated and his efforts to expand the intruder force beyond a single unit were thwarted by a disinterested High Command[15] which was inundated with requests for reinforcements in other theatres.[24]

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I admit to not understanding why the Beaufighter isn't considered to have the performance to be a serious threat to the Ju88 c fighters when they had a clear advantage in daylight fighting over the Bay of Biscay. I would appreciate it if someone could expand on that theory, particularly as the Beau would have a better radar and be operating over home territory.

edit - the only performance figures I can find for the Ju88c6 are a max speed of 300 mph and a climb of about 1000 ft/min Any more information more than welcome as mine is very sketchy

Glider said:

I admit to not understanding why the Beaufighter isn't considered to have the performance to be a serious threat to the Ju88 c fighters when they had a clear advantage in daylight fighting over the Bay of Biscay. I would appreciate it if someone could expand on that theory, particularly as the Beau would have a better radar and be operating over home territory.

edit - the only performance figures I can find for the Ju88c6 are a max speed of 300 mph and a climb of about 1000 ft/min Any more information more than welcome as mine is very sketchy

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The Ju88C had 300mph with the C4, while the C6 had 313mph:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_88#Ju_88_C-6_.281942.E2.80.931944.29

The Beaufighter was around 1941-42 at 320mph in the night fighter version, so despite being somewhat faster at top speed at night the problems are magnified by being weighed down by radar gear and actually using it to spot the enemy aircraft; it isn't easy; even during daylight SE fighters had a hard time catching up to Mosquitos despite having a higher top speed. The NF has to have a speed significantly higher than the enemy aircraft so that it could close with it, but not be too fast to overshoot it.

The losses are all operational losses which would include accidents whilst on operations.

Bomber Command lost 104 aircraft operationally in June 1944 and there is no way I can match as many as 22 with intruders. Night fighters claimed 5 of the 14 lost on the Bremen raid of 27/28 June but that is not intruder operations.

I don't buy the psychological effect of intruders causing additional accidents at all. There are far too many other factors involved, principally the weather, to make such bold claims. I've not yet read a first hand account in which intruders were mentioned as a serious problem by a Bomber Command airman, though there may be one somewhere.

Bomber Command lost 7,862 aircrew in non operational accidents (plus 244 missing) which would largely be during training. I'm unaware of any falling to intruders.

I've never read that intruder operations forced training to move. the initial training units were spread from Cornwall to Cumbria (you didn't fly here, these were effectively a 10 week selection course) and by 1941 potential pilots would find themselves on their way across the Atlantic for a 20 week (200 hour) flying training course. On returning to the UK a typical pilot in 1941/2 would find himself, and a crew, flying Wellingtons at an OTU for several months before ultimately transferring to an HCU for a four week conversion to the four engine heavies. From initial training/selection to flying a four engine bomber operationally could take 18 months.
These OTUs and HCUs were often away from the east of England which was thick with operational air fields. They were often in the Midlands and the North. The idea that a few intruders somehow inconvenienced, let alone interfered with, Bomber Command training is far fetched to be polite.

Cheers

Steve

it's all a what-if isn't it not, LW and BCses and claims are not all confirmed stats are nonsense to me.............proven already had the NJG's been on board and I mean all of them they would of done much damge US bomber fields would of been chosen deeper into England the stats if you will were surprising in march of 45 when G-1 and G-6's attacked BC fields even though BC sources knew the raids were eminent. back to 41 with only NJg2 the first gruppen involed the success's were staggering for just one small gruppe, had they been enlarged, well whom knows. waiting till 44-45 was fatal for the LW they ahd the means they were not wiped away like many think during that time period, but as noted pin pricks don't work

Erich were the effects of the intruder missions confirmed? I mean both in terms of increased accidents and actual RAF losses.

Erich said:

back to 41 with only NJg2 the first gruppen involed the success's were staggering for just one small gruppe, had they been enlarged, well whom knows.

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How were they staggering? Most Bomber Command narratives don't even mention them. I've struggled to find a reference in the official history but need more time.

The claim for the psychological effect on Bomber Command, repeated on Wikipedia and elsewhere, originates with Theo Boiten. He suggests this was caused by 'I./NJG 2's continuous presence over England' but that is not exactly the case and he offers no other evidence to support his contention.
As for suspending night time training in some areas, this also originates with Boiten and I haven't checked it, so what? There were plenty of other places to do it and by the time a crew was at an OTU they might take part in some 'real' operations, albeit mining or leafleting.

I cannot tally the Luftwaffe claims given in this thread (I don't know the source) with Bomber Command losses for the months in mid 1941 that I've looked at. The three areas covered by I./NJG 2 covered East Anglia, Yorkshire and the Midlands. The heavy losses inflicted on the 'Fernnachtjagd' forced them to operate out over the North Sea rather than over England from June 1941. Between January and October 1941 I./NJG 2 CLAIMED 125 RAF aircraft for the loss of 55 of their own. The claims are definitely optimistic, as evidenced for claims submitted for aircraft that we know in fact survived. The losses are those the Luftwaffe admitted itself.

One of the reasons given for the suspension of operations by the 'Fernnachjagd' in October 1941 was that there had been no noticeable decline in Bomber Command raids on Germany.

The title of the thread was 'Defeating Bomber Command'. This was definitely not the way to do it. It made no difference at all to operations over Europe such as they were in 1941.

'Staggering', I think not.

Cheers

Steve

yes staggering for the I./NJG 2 gruppe - the amount of claims/kills for an inturder unit the only one at the time. Boiten has other info like myself that will be included in his NF volumes 5 to be exact or at least what he told me. as per claim kill totals nothing will be seen as definitive for both sides this is part of much lost information. no I./NJg 2 was pulled from ops not due at all from not enough damge but because of a fools order to send them to the Med, this from Heinz Rökker and several other pilots/crews in I. gruppe.

Stona, so the answer perhaps had to do with other means, perhaps not ordering the Me210 in 1939 phasing out the Bf110 in 1941? Would uninterrupted Bf110 production from 1941-43 have provided the Nachtjäger enough means to hurt BC enough? IIRC starting from 1940 output of Bf110s was about 1000 units, which dropped to ~560 in 1941, ~500 in 1942, and ~650 in 1943. So assuming no other production resources add in and natural increases in output due to experience gained and rationalized production methods on the older airframe, even with upgrades, we could well see 1200 in 1941, 1400 in 1942, and depending on the status of the Me410 some 800-1600 in 1943. That's at least about 1500 extra Bf110s, most of which would end up with the night fighters, starting with the extra 600 or so in 1941, 900 in 1942, and 150-950 in 1943.

I just wanted to put the 125 (January to October 1941) claims (these are definitely not all losses) by I./NJG 2 into perspective. In January 1941 alone, in the worst of winter weather, Bomber Command managed just shy of 1,000 sorties. Over the ten month period in question it managed many thousands though I can't be arsed to go through the records and add them all up

The 'Fernnachtjagd' was simply ineffective at interfering with Bomber Command's campaign, even the limited efforts of 1941.

I believe the comment about a lack of results being one of the reasons for the suspension of the campaign is attributed to Hitler by Kammhuber himself.

Cheers

Steve

Edit: From January to November 1941 Bomber Command flew about 25,000 night time sorties and I./NJG 2 claimed 125.They probably destroyed less than half that number.

wiking85 said:

Stona, so the answer perhaps had to do with other means, perhaps not ordering the Me210 in 1939 phasing out the Bf110 in 1941? Would uninterrupted Bf110 production from 1941-43 have provided the Nachtjäger enough means to hurt BC enough? IIRC starting from 1940 output of Bf110s was about 1000 units, which dropped to ~560 in 1941, ~500 in 1942, and ~650 in 1943. So assuming no other production resources add in and natural increases in output due to experience gained and rationalized production methods on the older airframe, even with upgrades, we could well see 1200 in 1941, 1400 in 1942, and depending on the status of the Me410 some 800-1600 in 1943. That's at least about 1500 extra Bf110s, most of which would end up with the night fighters, starting with the extra 600 or so in 1941, 900 in 1942, and 150-950 in 1943.

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It's really a question of where you apply your limited resources. The Luftwaffe generally was spread too widely and too thinly, particularly after the start of the Russian campaign(s). Should a greater emphasis have been put on the night fighter, including intruders, as a means of countering Bomber Command's night time offensive? Yes, but where would the resources be drawn from?

The night fighter arm was never really defeated it was simply overwhelmed and eventually nullified by British technological advances so that by mid 1944 they were much less effective. Fritz Habicht of 3./NJG 1 summed it up nicely:

"Our adversary jammed our radio communications to a considerable degree and had effectively rendered our SN-2 AI radar useless. The bombers on the other hand could detect us with their warning devices and fiercely defended themselves with their ten to twelve machine guns, and unfortunately frequently with success. The British long range night fighters, the Mosquitos, were faster than we were and tracked us with AI radar with an effective range of 16 Km and were equipped with IFF. Thus we, the successful hunters, had been turned into the hunted."

Cheers

Steve

wiking85 said:

The Ju88C had 300mph with the C4, while the C6 had 313mph:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_88#Ju_88_C-6_.281942.E2.80.931944.29

The Beaufighter was around 1941-42 at 320mph in the night fighter version, so despite being somewhat faster at top speed at night the problems are magnified by being weighed down by radar gear and actually using it to spot the enemy aircraft; it isn't easy; even during daylight SE fighters had a hard time catching up to Mosquitos despite having a higher top speed. The NF has to have a speed significantly higher than the enemy aircraft so that it could close with it, but not be too fast to overshoot it.

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So we have the Beaufighter faster than the Ju88 and with a much better climb. The target Ju88 will be operating at cruising speeds which I am guessing would be approx. 260mph and the Beau when on an intercepts will be able to go at 320 until it got close which as you rightly point out will be more than sufficient, as closing too fast was a real problem in NF. I don't know the impact on the Ju88 performance carrying the radar but it might have been significant with those large aerials. Whatever it's faults the installation on the Beaus was very tidy in comparison. So in brief I feel that the beau had more than sufficient an advantage to combat the Ju88C.

Interestingly I believe that German intruder raids would have had a significant impact beyond any losses incurred. Just flying around making airfields shut down their lights, letting the RAF know that the Luftwaffe were around would have had an impact of morale.

Glider said:

So we have the Beaufighter faster than the Ju88 and with a much better climb. The target Ju88 will be operating at cruising speeds which I am guessing would be approx. 260mph and the Beau when on an intercepts will be able to go at 320 until it got close which as you rightly point out will be more than sufficient, as closing too fast was a real problem in NF. I don't know the impact on the Ju88 performance carrying the radar but it might have been significant with those large aerials. Whatever it's faults the installation on the Beaus was very tidy in comparison. So in brief I feel that the beau had more than sufficient an advantage to combat the Ju88C.

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How long could radial air cooled engines (less fuel efficient than inline liquid cooled engines like the Jumo 211) stay at top speed and how much fuel would it burn when operating well over economical cruise speed? German engines could manage between 5-30 minutes at top speed, not sure about the Beau's engines.

Fuel efficiency has got nothing to do with how long an aircraft engine could run at full/military/combat power.

It might have something to do with how long it could run at max continuous power (which is a name that is not quite accurate itself. Max continuous was often for only 30-60 minutes) but that rather depends on when in the flight the engines are pushed.

The JU 88 bomber was rather notoriously short ranged and required bomb bay tanks and external bomb stowage do get decent range. Of course external bomb stowage does nothing for speed.

When used as a "fighter" or intruder you have several things affecting performance of the Ju 88. One is the drag of the radar equipment which is not usually counted in the specifications on some websites ( not to mention that the the first radar equipped JU 88 may not have flown until late 1942). The other is the performance numbers are often given for a plane carrying 369 imp gallons of fuel (wing tanks) and not carrying the bomb bay tanks. One source (Green so?) says the fighter Bombay tanks were 105 IMP gal and 230 IMP gal which is different than the A-4 bomber tanks( smaller).

Ju 88 performance is going to be all over the place. If they are running light for speed they don't have enough fuel to cruise at high speeds (at least for long) and may not have the range/endurance needed to find some of the bomber fields. Night missions seldom went straight to and from the targets; If the Ju 88s are carrying extra fuel ( and they probably don't need both bomb bay tanks) then they may not have the speed/climb some sources credit them with.

The Beaufighter was supposed to carry 550 imp gallons in the wings. It is operating over home territory unless pursuing over the channel. The Chances of A JU 88 running one out of fuel depend on when in each aircraft's flight the encounter takes place and that has little to do with the actual capacity of the aircraft. A Beaufighter that is several hours into a "patrol" may be run out of fuel much easier than one that is only 30 min into it's patrol.

BTW the Hercules was supposed to be fairly fuel efficient, one of the claims of the sleeve valve. Wither it was or not I don't know.

The Ju88C did not use radar for intruder operations. It used the internal bomb bays for fuel and were a cleaner airframe due to no ventral gondola and an improved nose layout. Ordnance was carried externally. By the time they are over Britain they will be at altitude and speed, which the Beaufighters have to climb to altitude and loiter while searching at multiple altitudes and in all directions looking for the intruders.

Another issue worth considering that the Lw faced with regards to intruder raids was that they had little ability to quantify their results. fresh photographic recon was largely denied to the Germans post Battle of Britain - with exceptions of course, so how the LW expected to assess what damage the intruders had done makes the case for defeating Bomber Command weak. In Lincolnshire, where BC had the majority of its front line bases, there are airfields every mile or so, so many of them that it would be extremely dificult to assess precisely which airfield had been hit by intruders and how much damage had been done without post raid photographic recon. It's not as simple as gathering together a whole lot of night capable intruders and sending them across to attack airfields.

wiking85 said:

How long could radial air cooled engines (less fuel efficient than inline liquid cooled engines like the Jumo 211) stay at top speed and how much fuel would it burn when operating well over economical cruise speed? German engines could manage between 5-30 minutes at top speed, not sure about the Beau's engines.

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Tearing around trhe sky at max speed isn't a viable option, endurance would be hit and unless you think 30 mins is good enough for the mission (it isn't) the fact still remains, the Beaufighter had sufficient performance to better the Ju88. In case you think the weight of the radar on the beau would slow it down the Beau carrying a torpedo still went faster and climbed better than a Ju88c.

To exploit the advantages of speed, the Ju88, or any other aircraft needed to be able to detect enemies or targets. aircraft at night dont just zip around the sky at full tilt. They need some cue to tell them when to open the throttles and go for it. They could rely on visual target acquisition, and was probably the main method pre-1941. it was the method used for night interceptions dating all the way back to 1917, but visual interceptions need assistance usually, in the form, most often of searchlights, starshell or similar. Later, variuous gizmos were available to assist in blind interceptions. the allies developed AI radar to a very high degree, whilst the germans tended to concentrate on passive detection systems....things that homed in on enemy radars.

But regardless of what target acquisition method was used, it wasnt the speedor the manouverability of the aircraft that dictated success in night air combat. it was the ability to acquire and hold the target. Interceptions at night were not the diving, swooping, high speed jinking affairs that characterised daylight operations. generally, aircraft flew no faster than bomber speeds, and tried very hard to keep the target on a constant bearing and that meant flying straight and level at a slower, measured speed.

For the intruders over Britain, where the targets were rich in number, the Germans enjoyed some measure of success, but they suffered heavy losses because the british defences were strong. a Beafighter, or indeed a Defiant was more than enough to deal with a Ju88C because the Ju88 was too busy emulationg the bombers it was trrying to catch, and that meant flying slowly.

Mosquitoes suffered far less from these constraints than just about any other aircraft with the possible exception of the later marks of Ju88 NFs. it was fast, with high accelaration, great manouverability, devastating firepower, and exceptionally high sustained cruising speed. It was fitted with very good airborne interception radars, that after June 1944, when finally released for use over the continent, enabled them to fly rings around all their opposition. The advantages of the radar equipped mossies is just one of those untold, unappreciated stories. Numbering never more than 150 fighters in BC, and mostly a lot less, in 1944 they managed to claim over 600 German aircraft, and I belioeve most of these were real losses. These aircraft really could use boom and zoom tactics, unlike this fantasy argument, and really did scare the bejeezuz out of the opposing german night fighters . it took the British just over four years to achieve that happy state of affairs, but here we are arguing that the germans, being the superhuman masterrace that they are so often claimed to be, could do it with inferior aircraft, using no radar, or inferior radar 4 years before the british could