Follow along with the video below to see how to install our site as a web app on your home screen.
Note: This feature may not be available in some browsers.
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Did BC suffer higher flak losses due to bombing at lower altitudes?
Did BC suffer higher flak losses due to bombing at lower altitudes?
No. Flak accounted for around 40% of Bomber Command operational losses at night compared to over 50% of 8th Air Force operational losses by day.
The night fighter was Bomber Command's worst enemy until close to the end.
Cheers
Steve
This opens a can of worms...
Would the US indeed have been more effective using BC tactics?
What was more important, bombing effectiveness or shooting down Axis day fighters?
I don't think it would have been sensible or even possible for Bomber Command to undertake routine day time bombing in the face of Luftwaffe resistance. In the last months of the war, when the Luftwaffe threat had been virtually eliminated by the Americans, Bomber Command did operate more frequently by day.
This opens a can of worms...
Would the US indeed have been more effective using BC tactics?
What was more important, bombing effectiveness or shooting down Axis day fighters?
Not really like they had a choice.I have nothing but admiration for the men of both air forces who persevered in the face of appalling losses.
Not really like they had a choice.
They could refuse to fly. Some did. In the RAF this resulted in being labelled as LMF (lack of moral fibre). This was very unfair, most people have a limit and some are lower than others, that's not my opinion but the opinion of veterans who saw good men stigmatised in this way. I don't know how the US system worked.
Cheers
Steve
The two objectives are probably complementary in the intermediate term. By attacking the LW interceptors anywhere from takeoff to landing, the escort fighters were able to disrupt the LW organization, and were particularly able to destroy the old hare, alte hasen, experienced LW pilot resource. It has been thought that the bombers were being used as bait –this was the view of the crews. However, Doolittle's experience in the Mediterranean convinced him that escorts were much more effective on the offense. Of course it helped that long range P-47s and P-51s were available at the same time. And Hitler decided to go with FLAK rather than fighters. It was a sea change in the bombing campaign.
Actually the two complimentary elements were the destruction of the Luftwaffe and its pilots by the escort fighters and the oil campaign. The latter complimenting the former by not only reducing the effectiveness of front line Luftwaffe units but also making it impossible to replace the losses of personnel by denying the means to train new pilots. These achievements must be credited to the USAAF.
Hitler's rant or decision (depending whose account you believe) abandoning the fighter arm and placing more emphasis on flak defences came in August 1944 at a time when the Jagdwaffe was already on the verge of defeat and struggling to exert any meaningful pressure on USAAF campaigns. Some would argue that it was already defeated and Hitler clearly felt the same way. In September 1944 the Luftwaffe still had over 1,600 fighters, more than in January of the same year and comparable to the 1,849 of July 1943. Production of single engine fighters continued unabated virtually until the end but there was no fuel or trained pilots to fly them.
In the last two quarters of 1944 the production of flak guns did increase. What the guns lacked was ammunition, partly another result of the oil campaign. In late 1944 batteries were compelled to hold their fire in anything but ideal firing conditions.
Cheers
Steve
The RAF was responsible for many of the attacks that led to these shortages and failures, so to an extent the allied victory in 1944 should be assigned to BCs very tangible efforts