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Stukas accounted for one cruiser and four destroyers sunk off Crete. One cruiser was sunk by ME-109's in the fighter bomber role (HMS Fiji).
HMS Juno was sunk by bombs from a Cant Z.1007 with Imperial damaged beyond repair a week later.
Britain placed large orders for the Swiss 20mm Oerlikon in 1939 after negotiations to have Oerlikon improve the original 1934 weapon. Very few (c100) were delivered by the unexpected fall of France in June 1940. Britain also obtained a licence to produce the 20mm Oerlikon in 1939. But it was late 1941 before various difficulties were overcome and British manufactured Oerlikons began to appear in significant numbers.
The USN had also rejected the 1934 Oerlikon. It decided in late 1940 to produce the modified version. This decision was very much influenced by the RN war experience to that point. The first came off the production line in June 1941 and by the end of the year production totalled 379.
As for the 40mm Bofors, Britain placed its first orders in 1937. It also acquired a licence to manufacture them. But modifications had to be made for mass production and initial production of the air-cooled type went to the Army. The RN received a handful in late 1941 (PoW received one). The water-cooled version was fitted to the stabilised Hazemeyer mounting which entered RN service in late 1942 in destroyers and sloops.
US interest in the Bofors existed pre-war but is was early 1940 before a sample was obtained and June 1941 before a licence was obtained. Many changes were then required before it could enter production. The first water cooled twin Mk.2 mount was produced in Jan 1942 and the first quad in April. The first fitting of a twin on a destroyer was in July 1942.
Someone noted above that RN ships sacrificed a set of torpedo tubes to gain more AA. No one mentioned the USN position regarding its pre-war destroyers, only the big Fletchers.
Setting aside the old four stackers, pre-war USN destroyers were designed to fairly tight limits to get those 5x5"/38 DP guns, big directors and many torpedoes. That only allowed them to carry the 4x0.5" weapons as light AA (6 in the initial Bensons). Only the larger 1,850 ton "Leaders" of the Porter and Somers classes, which only had single purpose main armament, got the quad 1.1". Using the early war RN experience, by early 1941 they realised that to get a more effective light AA armament there would have to be sacrifices. So the weight reductions began. First to go was No.3 5"/38. Ships with 4 sets of TT saw them reduced to 3. Ships with 2 sets of TT saw them reduced to 1 in some cases. This allowed the fitting of Oerlikons and then twin Bofors. But it didn't happen overnight. Come the kamikaze crisis in late 1944 / early 1945 more light AA was required and more sacrifices had to be made. That included removal of all the TT in some classes, to gain more twin Bofors and a reduced number of twin 20mm mounts.
By way of example USS Eberle DD430
As built in 1940
1943 - gone are the searchlight platform and No.3 5"/38. Added 2 twin Bofors and 4 single 20mm. Plus radars of course
1945 - gone are the TT. AA armament is now 2 quad & 2 twin Bofors plus 2 twin 20mm. Lighter Mk.28 radar on the director. Even then she was considered weight critical.
Against ships with tachometric directors and true dual purpose guns, the Stuka was little more than an aerial target.
Fortunately for the Luftwaffe, the RN didn't have either on its Destroyers.
The performance of the Mk37 and Mk30 5" mount as fitted by the USN to some old RN Cruisers they refitted was so much better than anything the RN had in service, the RN placed an order for 142 ships sets to switch it to the RN's standard Destroyer armament, but Pearl Harbor got in the way and it was off the Lend Lease table.
But why no Tachymetric directors on RN Destroyers?
Lessons not learned.
The RAF didn't have dive bombers or torpedo bombers, it's approved method of attacking ships was using medium bombers dropping bombs from altitude. An against such targets, firing box barrages using a 2 axis director was seen as perfectly adequate, they obligingly flew in on a constant bearing and altitude. But dive bombers moved in 3 axes at once. TTP's could minimise the risk of dive bombers to ships, but it needed a cool nerve, sea room, and speed. Against fast moving ships with sea roam, the Stuka was fairly useless, most of its successes was against ships either in or around harbours or tied up alongside.
Even against slow targets at sea, they weren't all that good, see the effort to sink HMS Terror, a slow lumbering Monitor.
Best Destroyers any of the assorted assorted combatants entered the war with for fighting off air attacks? The USN's Fletcher Class proved to be magnificent ships, by 1942, they started acquiring l20mm and 40mm guns too making them formidable adversaries for aircraft.
British pulled a set of torpedo tubes off their ships and mounted an old 3in or 4in gun without any director to at least fire something upward. A few major shell bursts helped the crew think they were at least fighting back.
The US had deliberately sacrificed anti-ship capability with the 5in/38 for AA capability. Of course the long range anti-ship capability that other Navies were obsessed with was largely an illusion. Destroyers (especially before radar) didn't have the ability to spot the fall of shot, good enough range finders or steady enough platforms (less rock and pitch) to effectively fire at long range.
The French and German big destroyers with their 5.5 and 5.9 in guns were really backed into a corner when it came to AA.
So yes, there was a slow trickle of light AA guns sprinkled lightly over the ships of many fleets for several years. But the AA situation of even early/mid 1942 was not the situation of 1940.
| Cause | Number |
|---|---|
| Gunfire | 14.5 |
| Ship Torpedo | 10 |
| Submarine Torpedo | 35 |
| Aircraft Torpedo | 5.5 |
| Mine | 27 |
| Bombs | 48 |
| Accident | 12 |
| Other | 1 |
| Total | 153 |
Yes they did. It was me that filled that gap in your knowledge. 14 squadron which flew its first Marauder mission in Oct 1942 and scored its first torpedo success in Jan 1943. But now we are moving awat from the early part of the war.The British also converted a squadron of B-26 Marauders to use (British) torpedoes, as I learned recently. They were the only B-26 unit in the Med to use them, apparently with some success.
Later US destroyers were built without the restrictions of the various Treaties, or wartime exigencies.The later US destroyers do seem to have been better armed than most other nations, aside from their terrible torpedoes, US was a little ahead on naval warfare in many ways IMO, (certainly in terms of the carrier fleet, and radar on the battleships). But even US ships were still highly vulnerable to Japanese bombers in 1942 as we know, and were still taking losses in 1943. More guns and the proximity fuse really started to make a difference in the later war but by then the tide had already turned.
Later US destroyers were built without the restrictions of the various Treaties, or wartime exigencies.
The 1930 London Treaty imposed a limit of 1,850 tons on a destroyer (Article XV) with a max of 5.1" guns. Article XVI then placed a limit on the overall tonnage, 150,000 tons for the US and Britain and 105,500tons for Japan. And not more than 16% of the tonnage limits could be used for ships over 1,500 tons. That expired on 31 Dec 1936. But for Britain that meant everything up to and including the Tribals were built to these limits. For the US it was all the 1,500 tonners up to the Benhams plus the leaders of the Porter / Somers classes. For both navies that there were then cost v numbers issues in the run up to war. So tonnages grew to the 1,920 tons of the RN L/M classes and 1,620 tons of the Benson/Livermore classes.
In 1940 the US jumped from the 1,620 ton Benson/Livermore to the 2,100 ton Fletcher, carrying the same basic armament i.e. 5x5"/38 plus 2x5 TT. It is no wonder the Fletcher was able to mount a significantly heavier light AA armament as the war went on without the sacrifices of the earlier classes. Out of that came the 2,200 ton Sumner and 2,400 ton Gearing classes. It is amazing what you can do with a few hundred tons of ship!
For the RN the need was for numbers when war broke out, especially in light of the destroyer losses of 1940 & 1941 (60 ships). So it was the 14 flotillas of Emergency/Intermediate destroyers (1,540-1,730 tons) that had to be ordered and that formed the bulk of the RN destroyer forces in the second half of WW2. It was 1942 before it could once again return to look at a fully fledged fleet destroyer. That became the Battle class of 2,315tons, with 2 twin 4.5" DP mounts, 4 twin 40mm Hazemeyer plus a 4" starshell gun and a few Oerlikons (the latter two items rapidly replaced by another 6 single 40mm/2pdr pom pom). Problem was then delays in delivery of new much improved directors, which meant only 1 ship reached the front line in the Pacific before the end of WW2.
For the Japanese, their destroyers topped out around 2,000 tons except for the Akisuki class. These 12 ships of 2,700 tons were planned as AA cruisers before being given a single set of TT. They completed between June 1942 and Aug 1945. But their main armament consisted not of the earlier 5" guns but 4 twin 3.9"/65 DP weapons better suited to the AA role than anti-ship. Japan too however was forced to revert to producing smaller destroyers just to get the numbers in wartime.
As for radars, the RN and USN were fairly evenly matched during WW2. Where they differed was in how the radars of each navy were optimised for the war that they fought.
As for carrier warfare the US only romped away from everyone else from mid-1943 as the vast carrier building programme began to bear fruit with the Essex and Independence classes reaching the Pacific in numbers. At the beginning of the year there was a single operational carrier in the Pacific, Saratoga. That was why there was a request for the services of a British carrier and why HMS Victorious spent a large part of the year there. By the end of the year they could field 6 fleet and 6 light fleet carriers. It was mid-1943 when Nimitz rewrote the Fleet Orders for carrer operations by multi carrier groups, something the USN had only done previously in a very limited way.
The proximity fuse was first used by the cruiser Helena in Jan 1943. But in WW2 it was only available for 3" guns and above.
I've got news for you. The standard British torpedo for the first half of the war was the Mk.XII. Developed from 1935 and introduced to service in 1937, it was used by Swordfish, Albacores, Beauforts, Beaufighters, Wellingtons and even the Marauder and continued in limited use until the end of WW2. They seemed to work perfectly well on virtually every aircraft that used them. Pre-WW2 Britain was developing gear like the Monoplane Air Tail and Drum Control Gear to ensure a tropedo would enter the water just as designed. It was only in 1943 that its successor, the Mk.XV came along, longer with a bigger warhead.To get the most of a much faster plane like a Marauder, a Beaufighter or say, (at the end of the war) a B7N, you need a better torpedo that can hit the water at higher speeds and still work.
I've got news for you. The standard British torpedo for the first half of the war was the Mk.XII. Developed from 1935 and introduced to service in 1937, it was used by Swordfish, Albacores, Beauforts, Beaufighters, Wellingtons and even the Marauder and continued in limited use until the end of WW2. They seemed to work perfectly well on virtually every aircraft that used them. Pre-WW2 Britain was developing gear like the Monoplane Air Tail and Drum Control Gear to ensure a tropedo would enter the water just as designed. It was only in 1943 that its successor, the Mk.XV came along, longer with a bigger warhead.
"In 1931 there was a major review of anti-aircraft defense by the Naval Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Committee. This Committee reaffirmed that the primary method of air attack against ships would be by high level bombers and concluded that destroyers 'are not likely to be the object of high level bombing or torpedo attack' and that dive bombing was not likely to be much of a threat. These conclusions were supported by the RAF, whose thinking in 1931 was that dive-bombing was difficult with any but purpose-built aircraft and concluded that this meant that such single-purpose aircraft were unlikely to be used in large numbers.1"But why no Tachymetric directors on RN Destroyers?
Lessons not learned.
The RAF didn't have dive bombers or torpedo bombers, it's approved method of attacking ships was using medium bombers dropping bombs from altitude. An against such targets, firing box barrages using a 2 axis director was seen as perfectly adequate, they obligingly flew in on a constant bearing and altitude. But dive bombers moved in 3 axes at once.
This doesn't make sense. The Royal Navy operated torpedo bombers continuously from 1917 and it was well aware of threat they posed to warships. What the RAF might do or not do was irrelevant there.But why no Tachymetric directors on RN Destroyers?
Lessons not learned.
The RAF didn't have dive bombers or torpedo bombers, it's approved method of attacking ships was using medium bombers dropping bombs from altitude.
The Swordfish, Albacore, and Skua all met FAA doctrine precisely. Whether or not that doctrine was misguided is a separate debate.There was some kind of problem though, and I suspect it was on the level of specs or requirements more than the manufacturers, but they did not produce the aircraft that they really needed in terms of capabilities and performance.
The RAF didn't have dive bombers or torpedo bombers.