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The relationship between dive angle and height of release is also vitally important.
For bombing angles from 50-90 degrees, up to a release height of about 5,000 feet the accuracy was not markedly different.
I've attached this diagram, a poor picture taken with my phone as I'm not at home but happen to have my copy of 'America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing' with me! It is just about legible.
View attachment 472590
It was the dive bombers, not the torpedo bombers which were decisive at Midway. 42 attacking Devastators failed to score a hit (and many (36?) were lost. However, the USN launched 1,287 aerial torpedoes during the war of which 514 struck their target, a success rate of 40%. Several of those targets were already dead in the water.
The percentage of hits to bombs dropped by the Dauntless dive bombers and Midway makes for better reading.
5 out of 9 hit the Kaga (44.4%), 2 of 3 the Akagi (66.7%), 3 of 8 the Soryu (37.5%) and 4 of 7 the Hiryu (57.1%).
Arnold claimed that the Army dropped 322 bombs in level bombing at Midway, scoring 22 hits and 46 near misses. In fact Japanese records later confirmed that they suffered no hits and no damage from high level bombing. The only major warship confirmed sunt by Army Air Forces during the war was the Japanese light cruiser Abukuma, already disabled by PT boats. She was sunk on 27th October 1944 by 44 B-17s and B-24s of the 5th and 13th Air Forces.
Cheers
Steve
They had the whole ship unmanned and running on radio?As far as I recall, they dropped the practice bombs on the ship and if I'm not mistaken, UTAH was actually radio controlled for the exercises, both bombs and gunnery until she was sunk at Pearl Harbor.
They had the whole ship unmanned and running on radio?
Interesting way to look at it, but when you have a whole bunch of dive-bombers dropping all at once (and possibly from different axes), the odds go up greatly. And if I recall the USN would use multiple aircraft at once.Someone once described attempting to level bomb ships at sea maneuvering as trying to drop a ball bearing on a mouse scurrying around on the floor.
People often carry on about how effective the SBD was, but really in comparison to the various torpedo carrying vehicles, the a/c was small potatoes
Re: the shotgun effect.Comment above was for LEVEL bombing. Ships could and did appraise the fall of bombs and maneuver out of the way. Level bombers could not really follow the maneuvers of a ship and maintain any sort of aiming integrity. A formation might have some better chance just due to the shotgun effect.
Especially in the Med the RN suffered badly from the Stukas.
1942 was the year of Japanese successes asa far as sunk or damaged naval assets were concerned…..two USN CVs sunk outright, one CV heavily damaged (twice)……..USN subs came into their own in 1944. Two subs sank more CV tonnage than more than 1000 USN carrier a/c could manage for the entire year.... IJN was not defeated solely by the USN carrier fleet. With access to less than 2% of the USN resources, the Submarine arm sank more than 0% of Japanese merchant fleet and from memory 60% of the IJN naval tonnages lost.Out of Japanese CVs sunk in crucial year of 1942, SBD sunk perhaps 80%? While subs sunk none?
1942 was the year of Japanese successes asa far as sunk or damaged naval assets were concerned…..two USN CVs sunk outright, one CV heavily damaged (twice)……..USN subs came into their own in 1944. Two subs sank more CV tonnage than more than 1000 USN carrier a/c could manage for the entire year.... IJN was not defeated solely by the USN carrier fleet. With access to less than 2% of the USN resources, the Submarine arm sank more than 0% of Japanese merchant fleet and from memory 60% of the IJN naval tonnages lost.
This is correct, but it was not obvious at the beginning of the war. The Royal Navy's "Air Defence Instructions, 1939" forbade fast avoiding action against dive bombers. Many ships' commanding officers took a different view and the matter was referred to the director of the Naval Air Division in 1940. He conceded that avoiding action might cause a reduction in bombing accuracy because it would cause the pilot to adjust his aim, which was not regarded as easy, but in conclusion reinforced the official view that avoiding action should not be taken at the expense of throwing off the ship's AA fire.
Maneuverable ships, like destroyers, might be better able to 'dodge' bombs than others. It has been suggested that the destroyer Gurkha was lost to air attack in the Norwegian campaign because her Captain was a 'gunnery officer' who believed in the efficacy of AA fire and chose to keep a steady gun platform without weaving, thereby also presenting a steady target.
Later 'dodging' became the norm.
Alec Dennis was on board the destroyer Griffin as part of Force B off Crete when attacked (along with Greyhound, Gloucester and Fiji) by JU 87s. Twenty Ju 87s made the first attack comingdown in,
"groups of three, one after the other, dividing their attention among all four ships. It was a classic attack, technically interesting, physically terrifying and, actually, ineffectual."
Dennis described how all the bombs missed as they weaved about at full speed with the cruisers (Gloucester and Fiji) throwing up large amounts of flak.
Clearly evasive action did work. Fiji would later endure nearly 13 hours of air attack before finally being hit. She had run out of ammunition and was defiantly firing practice ammunition, solid shot, at the attacking aircraft!
The destroyer Kipling was attacked 83 times in one three hour period, but was not hit.
The light cruiser Naiad managed to dodge 36 near misses in one ten minute period before eventually being hit.
It was these stories, and many like them, that led Cunningham to write (in 'A Sailor's Odyssey'):
"The hasty conclusion that ships are impotent in the face of air attack should not be drawn from the Battle of Crete."
His colleagues in the USN would soon find reason to agree.
Cheers
Steve
Nobody said that IJN was solely defeated by USN carrier feet. I've just pointed out that in 1942 SBDs sunk perhaps 80% or IJN carriers, 0% was sunk by subs.