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Then why didn't it happen?
12 bombers per radar station. 120 bombers for 10 radar stations. RAF Bomber Command and/or 8th U.S. Air Force could blow a massive hole in the German radar system using only a fraction of their total strength IF Lancasters and B-17s can bomb accurately enough to destroy a radar station using 12 aircraft.
What board was this?
Any bomber needs air superiority for success. Unless you get lucky and the enemy are caught napping as happened at Pearl Harbor and Bari. However a low level attack improves the chances for achieving surprise.
Cruising across enemy airspace at 20,000+ feet practically guarantees the enemy will know you are coming.
I am tempted to make a comparison with the Mosquito, but this would be slightly unfair, since the Mossie was a slightly later and was more powerful than the Ju88. Perhaps a more reasonable comparison would be the LeO451. The French bomber had the following characteristics. It had a top speed of 317 mph, and a range with 1100 lbs of bombs of 1450 miles and a maximum bombload of 4500 lb, but usually it was 2200 lbs. The powerplant of the french bomber was 2 x 1140 hp radials
That would mean placing 50% of the bombs within a 500 meter circile. I suspect the average dive bomber pilot could do better.
Then why didn't it happen?
12 bombers per radar station. 120 bombers for 10 radar stations. RAF Bomber Command and/or 8th U.S. Air Force could blow a massive hole in the German radar system using only a fraction of their total strength IF Lancasters and B-17s can bomb accurately enough to destroy a radar station using 12 aircraft.
IJN doctrine at the beginning of WWII was dive angle of 65 deg, though Allied observers usually estimated the dive angle of Type 99 Carrier Bombers ('Vals') in combat as less than that. As mentioned above that a/c demonstrated the highest hit rates ever observed in large scale dive bombing attacks v ships, v. the British CA's Dorsetshire and Cornwall April 5 1942, then Hermes and escort, plus transport and escort April 9. Both sides perceived a large %, much more than 1/2, of the bombs to have scored direct hits, though all targets sank quickly and no truly accurate count was possible as in case of a damaged ship. But I know of no other case on that scale (as opposed to some lone divebomber which scored a hit, 100%, on one ship) that showed that kind of hit rate estimated by both sides, none by other than the Japanese anyway. In prewar exercises by operational IJN units v moving target a high % of practice drops were hits, that was the standard.Hello Davebender
in fact 90 deg dives were not common, 70-80 deg were the normal dive-bomber angles.
Aircrew training is the difference. The Luftwaffe did not assume responsibility for aerial maritime attacks until January 1942. Prior to then only a select few Ju-87 and Ju-88 aircrew were trained for naval attack. You cannot expect German aircrew to be good at sinking ships if they have not been trained for that mission. However I suspect they were real good at knocking out bridges, bunkers and artillery emplacements. They had to be as the early war Heer was short of both artillery and artillery ammunition, especially compared to next door France.principal difference between divebombers designed mainly to attack land or marine targets
In January 1942, the Luftwaffe's demands for the centralization and control of all German and Italian torpedo development were finally granted. Colonel Martin Harlinghausen was appointed as the head of all Luftwaffe torpedo development, supply, training and operational organizations, with the TorpedoTraining School established at Grosseto in Italy. During the early months of 1942, I/KG 26 underwent torpedo conversion-courses, lasting between three and four weeks. The Gruppe's He-111H-6's could carry two torpedoes slung on racks beneath the belly; the standard torpedoes used were the German LT F5 and LT F5W, both of 450-mm caliber, with the latter based on the Italian model made by Silurificio Whitehead di Fiume.
While I/KG 26 underwent conversion at Grosseto, its future and the bases from which it would operate had already been decided. Luftflotte V, based in Norway and Finland, needed additional bomber support to interdict Allied convoys on the Murmansk/Archangelsk route. In March, Göring ordered Luftflotte V to collaborate with the aerial reconnaissance units of the Kreigsmarine and to attack the convoys when they came into range, and also to shift bomber forces from the Finnish front to accomplish this task. Within I/KG 26, based at Banak and Bardufoss, there were 12 crews available for torpedo operations with the Heinkel He 111H-6 planes.
The German Navy. Unfortunately (for Germany) Admiral Raeder was not a fan of either aircraft or submarines. So German maritime attack aircraft programs received little funding until after the Luftwaffe assumed control during 1942. By then it was almost too late to matter as the Med and Altantic coastal regions were covered by swarms of British fighter aircraft.who was responsible for aerial maritime attacks before that?