EADS A330/Northrop New US Tanker??

[Arsenal VG-33]

Matt, are you privy to the specifications to both designs, in final product form? I'm not, but the USAF did say that the NG/EADS design offered: "The KC-30 tanker allows for more passengers, cargo, fuel to offload, patients to be carried, "more availability, more flexibility and more dependability". They also stated that the chosen design met their criterions on more points than the one offered by Boeing.

Obviously the two designs were not nearly as identical as you suggest. Basing their tanker design on the 767, most likely the sole motivation to keeping the assembly line on the aging aircraft open, was not a smart move. More than one forum discussing this issue has many members knocking their heads against the walls in disbelief that the 777 design wasn't pushed. Many feel this could have given the edge for Boeing.

The Airbus design won this competition fair and square. No doubt Boeing and even members of congress will push for an invetigation on the decision making and challeng it in the process. I only hope that the USAF digs in their heels and stick to their guns. This should be a warning to companies who previously felt safe under the DoD umbrella. To suggests that buying a foreign design will somehow compromise national security is only age-old attempt to stray from the real issue at hand: if Boeing and others continue down the same old road, offering old designs in the belief they will be accepted in no-competition environments, they may find themselves in the same position as the US auto industry vis-a-vis Toyota, Honda, etc.

 

[Matt308]

"Stoo-pid" comments for stupid arguments.

Hey Pd. A year or so of school does not aviation expert make. That's the second time. Keep your personal attacks in check or take your posts off my thread.

 

[Matt308]

Matt, are you privy to the specifications to both designs, in final product form? I'm not, but the USAF did say that the NG/EADS design offered: "The KC-30 tanker allows for more passengers, cargo, fuel to offload, patients to be carried, "more availability, more flexibility and more dependability". They also stated that the chosen design met their criterions on more points than the one offered by Boeing.

Actually yes I am quite privy to both designs in final product form. All the way to the proprietary level. Structural, mechanical, electrical, avionics, powerplant, and ops specs. What I am not privy of is the mission critical equipment requiring security clearance, but those did not serve as the basis for the bid. All your points Arsenal are valid. With the exception of the "availability, flexibility and dependability" which is pure poppycock and conjecture and whose basis cannot be founded.

Certainly the DoD believes that they can collectively argue in favor of their decision. My point is that the rankings are so close as to be meaningless. And the areas that they do differ are an artifact of the procurement spec that has been rewritten based upon congressional inquiry whose reach into the procurement process was hugely overrstated. Sure it can carry more cargo and has more internal space. However, it also is more expensive, thus fewer tankers can be purchased. It also cannot operate from some of the shorter fields thus requiring a greater operational range and less fuel to offload at point of station. And the refueling system on the A330 is new, novel, and unproven. That's kinda mission critical me thinks.

But all in all, I think Airbus has a solid product. The question is if one ranks a 91-out-of-100 and the other a 93-out-of-100, do you choose the 93 at the expense of losing an indigenous manufacturing base critical to national security? Perhaps not the Air Forces job, since that was not a weighted parameter in the procurement, but certainly rationale that must be discussed.

So how's that for a stoo-pid argument Pd. Please.

 

[Glider]

I do not know or pretend to know the details beyond those published. However the DOD are not fools, they would have known the response to the decision and would make sure that they could support the decision against scrutiny. Both aircraft are very capable but if as it seems Boeing based their offer on a smaller aircraft and the airforce preferred a bigger one, then that was their mistake.
I also do not believe that this is the end. The USAF have a huge requirement and a lot more aircraft will need to be replaced. They have used the KC135 with the KC10 for some years, there is time for Boeing to learn the lessons and go for the rest of the requirement.
I was always suprised that they didn't build a lot more KC 10's its a very capable aircraft and the 135's were getting long in the tooth in the 1980's

 

[Matt308]

I do not know or pretend to know the details beyond those published. However the DOD are not fools, they would have known the response to the decision and would make sure that they could support the decision against scrutiny.

That is the telling statement, Glider. There are politics at play here and I suspect with both airplanes being virtually equally mission capable, there might also be some play involved in the animosity the Pentagon and Congress continually display. And especially in this procurement. So throwing aside the Boeing scandal for a minute...

* Pentagon is pissed that Congress (and especially McCain) got in their knickers and introduced such a long postponement to such a mission critical system replacement.

* The scandal fallout resulted in a rewriting of the procurement specs. Some claim that the rewriting introduced new parameters that emphasized and more heavily weighed the A330 strengths. This being claimed to be much beyond the correction needed for the scandal and some even claim as punishment for same.

* Pentagon recognizes that no matter who is chosen, both sides have intimated that a challenge would result, putting yet a further third delay into the ability to field such a mission critical system. And this was known before the latest request for proposal was intitiated.

* Pentagon's primary directive is to ensure the war fighter has the best capable system. Since both are virtually ranked equivalent in performance based upon procurement spec, they choose A330.

* While pure conjecture, I suspect that choosing the A330 will certainly satisfy the Pentagon's needs, but also sends Congress a message to stay out of the Pentagon's business. Because now, if there is going to be any change in the proposal selection, the USAF/DoD can wash their hands of it and smile knowing they justed pissed in Congress' coffee.

 

[pbfoot]

according to something I believe I heard (I had just woke up 530hrs) on the dreaded NPR a lot of the airfield infrastructure will have to be changed to accomodate the Airbus
They have a few good articles here
NPR: Examining Airbus' U.S. Military Coup

 

[Matt308]

Christ, Pb. Don't use NPR to back up my argument.

 

[pbfoot]

Christ, Pb. Don't use NPR to back up my argument. [/QUOTlisten to the broadcast on the link , I heard it this am so I don't know if its included yet, .
Do you think I want to wake up to the ranting oxy boy.

 

[Matt308]

Well certainly its a mess. Perhaps our Canadian brethren can remember the CF-105 and the analogies that might present with respect to the ultimate choice of the CF-101. Certainly not the same by any stretch, but the results were equally disasterous for the indigenous Canadian fighter plane manufacturing. Like those few CF-18s Canada? I wouldn't.

 

[plan_D]

Someone's certainly got a little ferret burying itself inside his ass. Matt, it's not YOUR thread - if you wanted to keep the discussion private you shouldn't have placed it on the world wide web; or maybe just kept it to e-mails.

Since you were the first to use "stoo-pid" in this 'discussion' (rather a rant of yours) then I feel obliged to continue to use the childish spelling for your benefit - we have to stay on the same level here.

You continually rant about how they're both so similar that it makes no difference but have yet to provide those special numbers that back that up. Your argument seems to be that the U.S should be buying an inferior design for a cheaper price instead of the foreign, superior, design.

If you want to lay down the basis of your argument in facts (i.e. your statement that the superiority of the Airbus is irrelevant could be back up because maybe the Airbus can travel an extra 20 miles) then maybe your argument that it's all politics could be brought to light with greater ease.

I have to say though I almost lost interest when someone who claims to be the know all of the subject refered to Airbus as being solely French...

 

[Matt308]

Pathetic. You win, pD. I bow to your superior intellect.

 

[plan_D]

I have to ask, is there something wrong in your private life? Seriously, I'm not even coming close to using personal attacks on you. My last post centered around you offering to us the information that both the Boeing and Airbus designs are similar to a point that any superiority is irrelevant. And you have stated that the Boeing model will be cheaper but without a price tag on either.

If you came on here and said;

Airbus is only "superior" because it's got an extra 20 miles range, and the Boeing is $1 million cheaper per unit - there's no reason to select the Airbus on technical ability; it's all politics. Then that'd be fine but you haven't handed any cold hard facts to drive your point home.

Going by what VG-33 says it seems that the Airbus is comfortably superior and it seems to me that the US were wise to choose it over Boeing. If you want to prove that the Airbus superiority is irrelevant in it's potential operation - then please do so; don't get upset over nothing.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Actually folks - the contract was a "best overall value" contract. When the contractor's selling points were looked at the government looked at costs, quality, past performance, innovations and cost savings incentives for the government. Some may say it was politics; it may be a matter of who put the best proposal together and was able to prove to the government who is going to give the best value for the money.

 

[Eco-81]

From the beginning, the Air Force demanded a full and fair selection
process for the new tanker, their top acquisition priority. By all
measures, this one has been as fair and transparent as any in Pentagon
history. Northrop Grumman entered the competition with confidence that the Air Force would select the proposal that provided the best value to the
warfighter and the American taxpayer-and they did. The Air Force made its
selection based on its conviction that Northrop Grummans offering best supports our country's needs.

Supporters of Boeings are understandably disappointed at their
loss and have made a number of statements in the press and in the halls
of Congress claiming that the selection process was unfair. Furthermore,
some have stated that it is somehow unpatriotic to award the contract
to the Northrop Grumman KC-45A team because they have a foreign
subcontractor. These arguments are designed to sway public opinion away
from the facts of the procurement. The differences between the Northrop Grumman and Boeing tankers are not as close as some people would have you beleive. In the debreifings of the two companies, Boing did not score a single score above NG in any catagory, it was not even close. Both airplanes are not virtually equally mission capable. The 767 that Boeing has put out there can do no more than the old KC-130. The Boeing plane would have to be specific mission configured, the NG KC-45 would not:

The KC-45 is able to simultaneously refuel multiple receiver aircraft. Its mix of boom and hose drogue refueling systems ensures that U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and allied aircraft can be accommodated on the same mission without the need for on-ground tanker reconfiguration.The KC-45's size, greater fuel off-load capability and increased range also are key operational advantages, as fewer tankers are required to support critical refueling missions.

In addition, the ability to perform refueling missions over longer ranges allows KC-45s to stage from more distant support bases, thereby freeing up limited airfield ramp space near the combat area. KC-45 deployments also will benefit from the existing infrastructure at civilian airports worldwide that supports more than 570 A330s now in service or on order by commercial airlines.

The KC-45's superior performance characteristics ensure the tanker will be able to deploy from the largest number of airfields and airports possible. The aircraft's excellent takeoff performance allows it to depart from a 7,000-ft. runway fully loaded.

The KC-45's standard ground turning radius enables the tanker to operate from hundreds of airfields around the world - including all of the runways utilized by tankers during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The KC-45 can directly support a fighter squadron's deployment by carrying its operational personnel and equipment while also performing refueling escort for the squadron's aircraft to an overseas base. This allows the fighter squadron to deploy as a unit, then quickly ramp up to a combat-level sortie rate after arrival - a key capability when force must rapidly be brought to bear without a sustained buildup.

In addition, the KC-45 is perfectly suited to undertake additional missions for current and future U.S. Air Force requirements. The large cabin provides volume for additional mission equipment, and the onboard power system can accommodate add-on loads such as Scalable, Multifunction, Automated Relay Terminals (SMART). Northrop Grumman performed pioneering development for the Air Force on ROBE (Roll-on Beyond Line-of-sight Enhancement) and SMART tankers.

The KC-45 can carry up to 226 passengers/troops on the main deck, with additional volume for accompanying gear and material in lower deck cargo bays.

As many as 26 463L pallets can be accommodated on the KC-45's main deck, with loading/unloading facilitated through the 141-in. X 100.6-in cargo door. An additional 6 pallets can be carried in the lower deck.

As a Total Air Mobility solution for the Air Force, the KC-45 has the volume and power margins to support add-on C2ISR (Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) systems.

The KC-45's true widebody fuselage cross-section accommodates intensive care systems and approximately 120 litters in medevac applications. A typical mixed configuration would combine 70 litters with six intensive care units and 113 passengers/medical staff on the main deck.

Much has been said about the economic benifit to the US that the Boeing aircraft would have, but even thought the airframe is from Airbus, the KC-45 will directly benefit the American economy. It will be a U.S. product, creating thousands of new domestic jobs. At least 58 percent of the aircraft's content - from engines to avionics and systems - will come from American companies, further expanding the U.S. industrial base. The aircraft will be assembled in the US, and the final military conversion to the tanker configuration will be done in the US as well, only the first 3 will be assembled over seas and flown to the US for military conversion to the tanker configuration. NG was in fact producing much of Boeings parts in the US until they were outsorced to places like Italy to Japan.

 

[Matt308]

Congress will never let it progress. Mark my words.

GAO favors Boeing in tanker protest
The Government Accountability Office favors Boeing in their protest of the $35 billion Air Force tanker contract awarded to Northrop/Airbus.
For the latest on this story, go to The Seattle Times | Seattle Times Newspaper

 

[Matt308]

From GAO finding:

Specifically, we sustained the protest for the following reasons:
1. The Air Force, in making the award decision, did not assess the relative merits of the proposals in accordance with the evaluation criteria identified in the solicitation, which provided for a relative order of importance for the various technical requirements. The agency also did not take into account the fact that Boeing offered to satisfy more non-mandatory technical "requirements" than Northrop Grumman, even though the solicitation expressly requested offerors to satisfy as many of these technical "requirements" as possible.
2. The Air Force's use as a key discriminator that Northrop Grumman proposed to exceed a key performance parameter objective relating to aerial refueling to a greater degree than Boeing violated the solicitation's evaluation provision that "no consideration will be provided for exceeding [key performance parameter] objectives."
3. The protest record did not demonstrate the reasonableness of the Air Force's determination that Northrop Grumman's proposed aerial refueling tanker could refuel all current Air Force fixed-wing tanker-compatible receiver aircraft in accordance with current Air Force procedures, as required by the solicitation.
4. The Air Force conducted misleading and unequal discussions with Boeing, by informing Boeing that it had fully satisfied a key performance parameter objective relating to operational utility, but later determined that Boeing had only partially met this objective, without advising Boeing of this change in the agency's assessment and while continuing to conduct discussions with Northrop Grumman relating to its satisfaction of the same key performance parameter objective.
5. The Air Force unreasonably determined that Northrop Grumman's refusal to agree to a specific solicitation requirement that it plan and support the agency to achieve initial organic depot-level maintenance within 2 years after delivery of the first full-rate production aircraft was an "administrative oversight," and improperly made award, despite this clear exception to a material solicitation requirement.
Page 2
6. The Air Force's evaluation of military construction costs in calculating the offerors' most probable life cycle costs for their proposed aircraft was unreasonable, where the agency during the protest conceded that it made a number of errors in evaluation that, when corrected, result in Boeing displacing Northrop Grumman as the offeror with the lowest most probable life cycle cost; where the evaluation did not account for the offerors' specific proposals; and where the calculation of military construction costs based on a notional (hypothetical) plan was not reasonably supported.
7. The Air Force improperly increased Boeing's estimated non-recurring engineering costs in calculating that firm's most probable life cycle costs to account for risk associated with Boeing's failure to satisfactorily explain the basis for how it priced this cost element, where the agency had not found that the proposed costs for that element were unrealistically low. In addition, the Air Force's use of a simulation model to determine Boeing's probable non-recurring engineering costs was unreasonable, because the Air Force used as data inputs in the model the percentage of cost growth associated with weapons systems at an overall program level and there was no indication that these inputs would be a reliable predictor of anticipated growth in Boeing's non-recurring engineering costs.
We recommended that the Air Force reopen discussions with the offerors, obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised proposals, and make a new source selection decision, consistent with our decision. We further recommended that, if the Air Force believed that the solicitation, as reasonably interpreted, does not adequately state its needs, the agency should amend the solicitation prior to conducting further discussions with the offerors. We also recommended that if Boeing's proposal is ultimately selected for award, the Air Force should terminate the contract awarded to Northrop Grumman. We also recommended that the Air Force reimburse Boeing the costs of filing and pursuing the protest, including reasonable attorneys' fees. By statute, the Air Force is given 60 days to inform our Office of the Air Force's actions in response to our recommendations.

 

[Glider]

As you would expect from this side of the pond I only see things from a distance. What I find interesting is that the GOA finding doesn't seem to disagree with the performance advantages as posted by Eco.

Is this a fair observation?

Looking at the GOA points

1 - The first half of this seems to be a general comment but the second would be a valid complaint
2 - This may be right in a legal sense but the Airforce would be foolish to ignore a key parameter being exceeded by a significant amount. Personally I would consider this to be at least as important as meeting non mandatory technical statements.
3 - This I don't understand at all. The equipent used to refuel the aircraft is designed for the job.
4 - This would be a fair comment but we don't know the detail of by how much the position changed, but a fair complaint
5 - The question here is was it an oversight or not? If it was then how soon was it addressed
6 - Fair point but it does look as if the costs are close
7 - As Boeing didn't properly explain the basis for how it priced the non-recurring engineering cost element I would have thought that the Airforce were right to increase the numbers to allow for the risk. Thats normal practice. The bit about the data inputs would only be an issue if they used a different approach for different teams.

The summery will only add months probably years, to the selection process, which will only count against Boeing with the 767 being replaced on the production line. To turn this around will need a quick decision and it would be a brave man who bet on that.

 

[Matt308]

I'm not betting on a reversing of the decision, but I will bet that the USAF will rebid with VERY CLEAR requirements. And having to compare such diverse airframe capabilities will either be subject to performance rankings or will be rebid with capabilities implying a more common airframe comparison (i.e., B777 vs A330).

My two cents is that Boeing will not bid the 777 and USAF will not spec the bid forcing Boeing to do same. Rather, there will be a better specification of the rankings/priorities of a bidder's capabilities.

1 - The first half of this seems to be a general comment but the second would be a valid complaint

You kidding? That was the primary driver of the Boeing complaint that the evaluation did not take into account the merits/priorities/rankings of the solicitation.

2 - This may be right in a legal sense but the Airforce would be foolish to ignore a key parameter being exceeded by a significant amount. Personally I would consider this to be at least as important as meeting non mandatory technical statements.

Agreed, but again the solicitation did not account for such capabilities, ability to rank them amongst other capabilities, nor allow for Boeing to respond.

3 - This I don't understand at all. The equipent used to refuel the aircraft is designed for the job.

I don't know how this could be more clear. Certainly makes sense that USAF requires an interoperability test with all USAF aircraft makes/models before procurement. Period. EADS refueling boom is a new development and did not demonstrate interoperability amongst all USAF fleet. It's a USAF requirement in the solicitation.

4 - This would be a fair comment but we don't know the detail of by how much the position changed, but a fair complaint

Yep. We don't know the specifics of the change in the rankings, but yet there was change which disallowed a bidder to respond to the solicitation.

5 - The question here is was it an oversight or not? If it was then how soon was it addressed

No that's not the question. The question is whether those recurring costs were properly amortized into the overall EADS lifecycle model. That's the question and the GAO found that not to be the case.

6 - Fair point but it does look as if the costs are close

Perhaps close, but EADS overall lifecycle costs were not fully accounted for in infrastructure needs amortized over the life of the procurement. GAO found that Boeing had lower overall lifecycle costs once these were included. So we ignore the lower cost solution?

7 - As Boeing didn't properly explain the basis for how it priced the non-recurring engineering cost element I would have thought that the Airforce were right to increase the numbers to allow for the risk. Thats normal practice.

Without knowing the specifics, I have to agree with you. But the GAO notes that USAF did not claim that the non-recurring costs were abnormally low. Only that there was risk without supporting evidence of such a claim. Nevertheless, good point.

The bit about the data inputs would only be an issue if they used a different approach for different teams.

Agreed. That one is rather weak. If equally applied, then a crappy predition model is a crappy prediction model.

 

[AVRoe]

Was there a lot of S**t when the US Navy replaced the T-2 buckeye with BAe hawk (Goshawk T-45A).Boeing built them under licence.

 

[Matt308]

FlyBoyJ might remember. I'm sure there were some grumblings, like any acquisition that goes out of country. But then again the T-45 procurement was not of the same strategic importance.