Earlier and better RAF Attack on the German Navy at Wilhelmshaven, 1939

[Admiral Beez]

On 18 December, 1939, the RAF attacked the German Navy at Wilhelmshaven. The raid was a failure.

Good, non-Wikipedia background info here Airraid on the German Navy at Wilhelmshaven, 18 December, 1939 - TracesOfWar.com Planning didn't begin until a few days earlier....

"On 14 December, headquarters of 3 Group was planning already a new mission to Wilhelmshaven. The order said: "to attack enemy warships in the Schillig Roads or Wilhelmshaven. Great care is to be taken that no bombs fall on shore, and no merchant ships are to be attacked."

Let's change this up, and have Bomber Command begin planning for this raid in Sept 1938 after Munich. Also, targets are expanded to hitting Tirpitz, Bismarck and Graf Zeppelin then afloat and building at the yards at Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel respectively.

The challenges include bombs, accuracy and how to cripple a ship under construction (without ammunition or fuel to ignite). We need dive bombers or other improvements to accuracy. We also need heavy AP bombs to kill enemy warships - I suggest an air drop variant of the RN's 2,000 lb. 15" AP shell. Date of the attack is set for the day after war is declared, whenever that it, but expected in 1939.

No hindsight or alien intervention, just foresight and interdepartmental/service cooperation is allowed. What can we do to get the RAF onto target and sinking ships?

 

[tomo pauk]

Do it with RN carriers' aircraft during the night. Basically a 'Chad Taranto'. RAF BC follows up with 'level bombing' later in the night.

 

[SaparotRob]

If port infrastructure can be damaged as well, the effects would be multiplied. I'm thinking of the third strike on Pearl Harbor. The outfitting of those ships would be delayed, especially if damaged.

 

[muskeg13]

1. Dismiss immediately the insane policy of leaflet drops that accomplished nothing except to alert the enemy so he could better prepare his air defenses and subject the delivering aircraft to risk of loss. A declaration of war is sufficient warning that any target of military value and surrounding areas in the immediate vicinity may be attacked at any time.
2. Planning/mission instructions should be that merchant shipping should not be deliberately targeted, as very soon after commencement of hostilities there may be a large number of neutral ships in the harbors, but a degree of "collateral damage" is accepted. Neutrals continuing to conduct business as usual with belligerents must accept some responsibility if harm becomes them. Official notice should be given in worldwide maritime channels that after a certain reasonable timeframe, any shipping found in the waters of a belligerent will be considered to either be enemy vessels or giving assistance to the enemy and will be subject to immediate attack without further warning.
3. Based on the Billy Mitchell demonstrations in 1921 that concluded that lightweight bombs produced insignificant damage to warships, despite numerous solid hits and near misses against unmanned stationary ships incapable of any damage control, attack planning will dictate that only bombs of 500 pounds or larger will be used, with semi-armor piercing bombs of 1000 pounds or more strongly preferred.

 

[Airframes]

A major point is being missed here, which should affect any judgement/ retrospective opinions on what should have been done.
The policy at the time, both of RAF Bomber Command, and the British Government, was that non-military targets should not be attacked / destroyed/ damaged..
Therefore, the orders for the attack on Wilhemshaven specifically targeted enemy shipping, with strict orders not to hit shore installations, military or otherwise, in order to avoid civilian casualties.
This policy continued even into late 1940 at least.

 

[Admiral Beez]

3. Based on the Billy Mitchell demonstrations in 1921 that concluded that lightweight bombs produced insignificant damage to warships, despite numerous solid hits and near misses against unmanned stationary ships incapable of any damage control, attack planning will dictate that only bombs of 500 pounds or larger will be used, with semi-armor piercing bombs of 1000 pounds or more strongly preferred.

I agree with everything you've posted. And here's what I want the Whitleys to carry.

On this last point, how do we get 1,000 lb AP bombs onto target? Presumably our raid is during the daylight, ideally on Sept 3, 1939 when much of the Luftwaffe is in Poland. But still, we need accuracy. With a year to plan this strike, can we modify Wellingtons, Blenheims, etc. to conduct shallow dive bombing attacks?

 

[Shortround6]

Well, in 1939, for this to work, the RAF actually needs to have 1000lb bombs of any sort.

They only built 159 1000gp bombs in 1940.
No 1000lb SAP bombs existed at the time, no 1000lb AP bombs and no 1000lb medium case bombs.

anything bigger than a 500lb bomb was just about non existent and/or undergoing trials

If somebody wants to do "what ifs" about improving the RAF effectiveness in 1939-40 they could start with better bombs and better navigation and better bomb sights/techniques.

AP bombs (or semi AP) are kinetic energy weapons. They require a certain striking velocity to successful penetrate armor. This comes from being dropped from a certain height or being dropped from a certain height (lower) at a certain speed by a plane in a dive. The greater the impact angle on hitting the armor the less armor is penetrated and the more likely the bomb is to break up on impact.

 

[muskeg13]

have Bomber Command begin planning for this raid in Sept 1938 after Munich.

Given the basis for this thread, I don't care what the stupid British policy was in 1938-40. The whole point of this "what if" is what should have occurred that didn't occur. The biggest step needed to be get your head out of your ass and begin taking steps to protect Britain. So, from Sep38 to Sep40, the national political mindset needed to abandon the appeasement go along, get along, don't make waves, "Oh why can't we all just be friends" mentality. Hitler needed to recognized for the dire threat he had been allowed to become, and the political leaders needed to either step aside or adopt a much more bellicose defensive/protective attitude, because the threat was only going to get worse. The League of Nations was a complete failure to provide collective defense, so the UK and France needed to shake off their post WW1 stupor and get to work to save themselves, collectively if possible, but each on their own if necessary. Wake up! The Boche has returned.

British Foreign Service and military intelligence needed to send multiple teams of "strangely military looking" tourists on odd cultural excursions to the continent that would include shipbuilding cities. Good maps make for good targeting. The Germans were doing this, so why not the Brits too?

2 years is plenty of time to develop and begin stockpiling better bombs and other materiel, and this isn't hindsight. The Nazi threat was growing right before their eyes. The main problem in the UK and France (and the isolationist US) from Sep38-Sep40 wasn't that they didn't know what needed to be done to prepare, but they refused to accept that only 20 years after the end of the First World War they were having to probably do it again.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Well, in 1939, for this to work, the RAF actually needs to have 1000lb bombs of any sort.

Yes, BC has over a year to develop a strategy to hit the KM at its bases. It will need to use this time to develop and produce the necessary AP bombs and the means to accurately deliver them.

I think this latter point is the great challenge, you can't easily dive bomb a Wellington or Whitley with internally stowed and stacked bombs, and besides these bombs are too small. Perhaps underwing bomb racks and low angle dives, but watch the prop clearance?

If we can get this 4,000 lb. killer developed and produced earlier, and the Wellington modified we might have a winner. Put just one of these into the recently launched and fitting out Tirpitz and (at Kiel) Bismarck and the operational ships present. IIRC both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were at either Wilhelmshaven or Kiel. This strike needs to hit both ports.

Imagine the impact if this strike goes well. If Bismarck and Tirpitz are wrecked at their builders, and Scharnhorst and Gneisenau damaged or sunk, we'll see both HMS Hood and Glorious survive, and the entire Norway campaign impacted. And with this show of British strength and resolve, Mussolini may be a little reluctant to declare war in 1940.

 

[Shortround6]

Unfortunately this scenario requires way too much effort to be put into planning, equipping and training, to point where very little else would have gotten done. Not that a lot was going on in some areas.

The 4000lb cookie was first deployed operationally in the spring of 1941 so we need to change it's timeline by over a year and half.
The first squadron to get the Wellington got them in Oct 1938 (No 99 squadron) and I man not sure how long it took to get a full complement. By the beginning of Sept 1939 eight operational squadrons had Wellingtons (full compliments?) and one training squadron. None of these squadrons were rated as operational by night at this time. It took two squadrons to muster up 14 planes for the raid on Brunsbuttel on Sept 4th 1939.
However most or all of these planes were the MK I with 1000hp Pegasus engines and Vickers design gun turrets/mounts. The raids that were conducted in Dec of 1939 that were shot to pieces used Wellington IA's that were equipped with Frazer Nash turrets.
It wasn't until the MK IC showed up in 1940 that the bomb bay was modified to carry two 2000lb bombs and two 250lb bombs.
The first version to carry the 4000lb bomb was the MK III which didn't show up until early 1941, First version with the 1500hp Hercules XI engines. The prototype MK III flew with Hercules III engines in May of 1939 but it seems the Hercules III was not quite up to par and production had to wait for the MK XI

Please note (as per other threads) that in order to carry the 4000lb bomb the bomb bay doors had to be removed. Fabric panels were fitted for and aft and on both sides of the bomb to restore some semblance of streamlining. The original MK Is were rated at 235mph top speed with their bomb doors intact. The MK III with regular bomb doors was rated at 255mph.

So you have a raid using slow planes with inadequate gun armament (even for 1939) flown by crews who were barely trained (little or no night flying) using a bomb (or bombs) that don't exist yet.

What are you willing to give up to try to make this happen?

 

[Admiral Beez]

What are you willing to give up to try to make this happen?

Perhaps the only change needed is timing and ROE. Don't wait until Dec 1939, war's been declared for months already. Day 1, Sept 3, 1939 launch the strike. And hit everything at Wilhelmshaven and Kiel, all ships, all shore installations. Neutrals have themselves to blame.

 

[Shortround6]

Well, you will be using 500lb GP bombs,
The early Wellingtons with the Vickers gun mounts,
The Sept 4 raid didn't go well, few losses but little or no damage, Bad weather and AA fire limited German damage. You are not going to catch the Germans napping.
Germans had also not stripped the entire western front of aircraft while attacking Poland. They did leave some forces to react to any French or British moves. May have been 109C &D
aircraft or even some left over biplanes but there would have been some fighter coverage if you are trying to attack multiple german cities.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Sept 4 raid didn't go well

That's what we have a year or more to prepare for. Short, you're a star at telling us why something couldn't, wouldn't or shouldn't have occurred, it's clearly your purpose on the forum, to keep us honest and realistic. But if you had a year to plan, and wanted to knock out Tirpitz and Bismarck at their builders and damage or destroy other heavy ships at Wilhelmshaven and Kiel with Bomber Command raids on Sept 3rd, what is your proposal?

 

[MikeMeech]

Given the basis for this thread, I don't care what the stupid British policy was in 1938-40. The whole point of this "what if" is what should have occurred that didn't occur. The biggest step needed to be get your head out of your ass and begin taking steps to protect Britain. So, from Sep38 to Sep40, the national political mindset needed to abandon the appeasement go along, get along, don't make waves, "Oh why can't we all just be friends" mentality. Hitler needed to recognized for the dire threat he had been allowed to become, and the political leaders needed to either step aside or adopt a much more bellicose defensive/protective attitude, because the threat was only going to get worse. The League of Nations was a complete failure to provide collective defense, so the UK and France needed to shake off their post WW1 stupor and get to work to save themselves, collectively if possible, but each on their own if necessary. Wake up! The Boche has returned.

British Foreign Service and military intelligence needed to send multiple teams of "strangely military looking" tourists on odd cultural excursions to the continent that would include shipbuilding cities. Good maps make for good targeting. The Germans were doing this, so why not the Brits too?

2 years is plenty of time to develop and begin stockpiling better bombs and other materiel, and this isn't hindsight. The Nazi threat was growing right before their eyes. The main problem in the UK and France (and the isolationist US) from Sep38-Sep40 wasn't that they didn't know what needed to be done to prepare, but they refused to accept that only 20 years after the end of the First World War they were having to probably do it again.

Hi

The British were gathering intelligence before the outbreak of war. There are the famous flights over German and Italian installations through 1939 to the outbreak of war by Sidney Cotton and his team for SIS (MI6) and also joint operations for the French Intelligence Service. On the ground SIS agents were gathering information and taking photos of installations, including Agent TR/16, two of whose photos appear in 'MI6, The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949' by Keith Jeffery, one of which is of the Germania shipyard showing two destroyers fitting out dated 30 June 1937. In 1939 with the German takeover of Czechoslovakia, SIS got 11 senior Czech Intelligence officers out of the country before the invasion and also got much of the important Czech intelligence archive to Britain over a two week period using diplomatic bags and the King's Messengers. The Czech officers then set up their office in London. There was also the co-operation with Poland and France on SIGINT, much else was also was done so it is untrue to say nothing was being done.

British re-armament started in 1935 and priorities kept changing from then until the outbreak of war, war industries being enlarged, including the 'shadow' factories, within the financial limitations. During 1940 the British were out producing the Germans in aircraft, that didn't happen overnight. The Radar defence system started to come partially operational by the end of 1938, it still had to iron out the bugs and the system was extending around the coast of Britain, again that was not done overnight. Again a lot was being done and there is lots of information available about this period (Official History of the Second World War 'Grand Strategy' Volume 1 by N H Gibbs, covers this in great detail, but plenty of other publications are available). Re-armament had to be balanced with finance and they did not know the start date of any war, the British also had to take into account possible war, not only with Germany but Italy and Japan. I can only suggest more reading about the problems involved in the pre-war period.

Mike

 

[Shortround6]

That's what we have a year or more to prepare for. Short, you're a star at telling us why something couldn't, wouldn't or shouldn't have occurred, it's clearly your purpose on the forum, to keep us honest and realistic. But if you had a year to plan, and wanted to knock out Tirpitz and Bismarck at their builders and damage or destroy other heavy ships at Wilhelmshaven and Kiel with Bomber Command raids on Sept 3rd, what is your proposal?

Re-engine the Short Singapore flying boats with Merlins, fasten wooden fins to back of leftover 12in Naval shells from WW I. Refuel the Flying boats from converted minelaying submarines and have at it. The Crews can die gloriously, win VCs and accomplish next to nothing.

Makes as much sense as trying to plan an attack using planes that only go into production after the planning starts, using bombs that have to be designed, tested and produced in the year from Sept 1938 to Sept 1939. Trying to use the majority of RAFs supply of medium and heavy bombers on this enterprise is also a bit unrealistic.

Starting planning early (Like in Sept 1938) might not get you as far as you think.
As noted above No 99 Squadron got their first Wellingtons in Oct 1938, they replace Heyfords.

2nd squadron to get them was No 38 Squadron In Nov which was flying Hendons

Now in addition to the Wellingtons of which there were only eight squadrons in No 3 Group, most of which had been declared operational by Sept 3rd 1939 (but not all?)

The British had ten squadrons of HP Hamdens, however only 5 of them were rated as operational with the rest doing pilot/crew training. First Hampden squadron (No 49) got their planes in Sept 1938 so planning might start them? No 49 Squadron had been reformed in Feb 1936 (after being disbanded in 1919) and flew hawker Hinds until requieping with Hampdens.
Hind bomber

Whitleys in Sept of 1939 were in service with 5 squadrons and two more were getting initial deliveries.
However 4 of the squadrons were Flying Whitley IIIs with Tiger engines and were pretty much banned from over water flights. The only Squadron fully equipped with Merlin powered Whitleys was No 10 using MK IV Whitleys which used single speed Merlins. All Whitley Is and IIs had been withdrawn from operational squadrons before Sept of 1939.

That is pretty much the extent of the RAF heavy bomber force at the beginning of Sept 1939. Any other strike aircraft involved in attacking german port cities or naval bases would be Blenheims or possibly Battles.

Excluding the Blenheims you had 14 heavy bomber squadrons in total that were declared "operational" as of the beginning of Sept 1939 and the plan is to spread them out attacking multiple cities/ports and bases?

Now at what point in the year of planning do the planners even know how many squadrons they will have at X months in the future using what kind of bombs?
Which planes will carry which bombs?

None of this even gets into the likelihood of the RAF trying to counter the German Surface fleet, which the Royal Navy was supposed to do, and taking away from what some commanders thought was the RAFs real job of bombing Germany. Heck, The RAF only begrudgingly gave coastal command a few squadrons of anything but the most basic of aircraft because hunting subs was the Navy's job.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Crews can die gloriously, win VCs and accomplish next to nothing....Makes as much sense as...this enterprise is also a bit unrealistic....None of this even gets into the likelihood.....

Well, to quote Cuba Gooding, Jr's Rod Tidwell, "that's an answer".

 

[nuuumannn]

Well, to quote Cuba Gooding, Jr's Rod Tidwell, "that's an answer".

Hate to say it, man, especially since you don't like naysayers, but to quote Robert Downey Jr's Tony Stark, "Not a great plan..."

Do it with RN carriers' aircraft during the night.

This is quite possibly the most sensible answer, and one that everyone here except our friend Tomo has ignored. The Admiralty had planned for such a raid in 1917 to be enacted in 1919 at the earliest. The German 'Copenhagen' would have seen the High Seas Fleet torpedoed in is own anchorage by aircraft carrier based torpedoplanes - go to the Admiralty files and dust off Richmond and Rutland's 1917 paper. Why not do this using Swordfish in late 1939? They did it in late 1940.

 

[Shortround6]

With the year specified get some more torpedoes made, put more Swordfish on the fast carriers, forget about the nonsense of using fast carriers with skimpy numbers of attached destroyers as sub hunters and hit the Germans with several dozen torpedo bombers.
Forget about the ships under construction that are 1-2 years away from completion. They can wait for plan #2 (like when the RAF has real bombs and has learned to navigate) )

 

[Admiral Beez]

The German 'Copenhagen' would have seen the High Seas Fleet torpedoed in is own anchorage by aircraft carrier based torpedoplanes - go to the Admiralty files and dust off Richmond and Rutland's 1917 paper. Why not do this using Swordfish in late 1939?

Perhaps the loss of HMS Courageous in Sept 1939 made the Admiralty worried about risking their carriers. Then again, perhaps the Admiralty didn't care about CV risk exposure, since shoddy command decisions on transit speed, boiler status and CAP/Recce aside, the dolts at Whitehall sent HMS Glorious out to her demise with only five TSRs in April 1940.

So, yes, a late night Sept 3, 1939 combined strike of full strength CAGs from HMS Ark Royal, Courageous, Glorious and Furious putting over sixty Swordfish on target might do the trick. What about the Skuas? Can there be any role for a dive bomber in this late night strike? A couple of 500 lb. SAP bombs would do some damage to Bismarck and Tirpitz, then fitting out at their builders. But dive bombing at night? Anyone read this book?

Then, with HMS Illustrious joining the British Kido Butai, do the same to Taranto on June 10, 1940 when Italy invades France. Hit them hard, hit them early, not with a single carrier in Nov.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Given the basis for this thread, I don't care what the stupid British policy was in 1938-40. The whole point of this "what if" is what should have occurred that didn't occur. The biggest step needed to be get your head out of your ass and begin taking steps to protect Britain. So, from Sep38 to Sep40, the national political mindset needed to abandon the appeasement go along, get along, don't make waves, "Oh why can't we all just be friends" mentality.

Agreed. I've always thought it was odd how between the Sept 1939 invasion of Poland and the DoW and the May 1940 invasion of France, the RAF took very little offensive action against the Germans. What did the British think the Germans were going to do after Britain declared war, just sit nice?

That's my premise for this thread. In 1938, Bomber Command is tasking with preparing to hit the German fleet at anchor in the Heligoland Bight as soon as/if war is declared, call it Operational Shipwreck if we like. With this in mind, necessary bombs are designed and produced, and squadrons of Wellingtons and Whitleys are put to training against target ships in Scotland or perhaps further afield for secrecy.

Sept 1, 1939 Germany invades Poland.
Sept 2, 1939 Bomber Command is ordered to arm and ready at least one hundred bombers.
Sept 3, 1939, 11.15am Britain declares war. Noon, the bombers take off from RAF fields.

Much of the Luftwaffe fighter strength is in Poland, and a naval air strike won't be expected. The bombers get through to their targets, finding Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, plus cruisers at anchor, and recently launched Tirpitz and Bismarck both afloat and fitting out.