Earlier and better RAF Attack on the German Navy at Wilhelmshaven, 1939

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Shortround6 said:
Well, Neutrality had worked for the Dutch since 1830.
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Right, but there was no Hitler then. Comparing 1830 and 1939 seems, as a result, to be fairly useless.

If after the Anschluss, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the digestion of Memel, and the aggressive claims upon Danzig leading to the invasion of Poland, one is still willing to put one's eggs in the neutrality basket because it worked 110 years ago, what's to say? The writing was on the wall for three years, essentially, but yeah, let's not look at things in a different light?

It strikes me as foolish. Hitler with his amoral character and disregard for international norms changed the facts on the ground. Appealing to 1830s strategy to address a 1930s problem wouldn't seem prudent.

 
1. The Nazi's were stretched thin and could only allocate very limited assets to conquer the Neutrals. If the Neutrals had 1/2 of an ounce of fortitude (as was eventually shown by Churchill and is being shown by Zelensky now) the penny packets sent to capture these countries could have been defeated even by small countries with a decidedly inferior military capability than 1940-41 Germany, because (initially) they weren't facing the whole might of the German military. Locally, in most cases, they were facing maybe company sized elements at most who lacked any heavy weapon support, and in the case of Norway no air support much north of Oslo (located in the southern part of a very long country far from April 1940 German airfields). If the German "pathfinder" forces were defeated, maybe just not by peasants with pitchforks, but with alert local reservists and militia assisted by their small conscript armies, the follow-on heavier equipped German forces would have no place to land, and the defenders would be better organized to repel the invasion, IF they had any will to fight.

2. Neutrals cease to be neutrals when they are attacked. Once the first shots are fired, the Neutrals should have mounted an appeal to the allied belligerents to join in with them in a common cause to defeat the Nazis, and then they could go back to being neutrals, if that's what they want to do.

3. I'm not blaming the Neutrals while letting the UK and France off of the hook. No nation outside of the fascist camp had anything to brag about 39-41, and the conduct of France was the worse of any country in Europe. France had the capability to repel the Germans, or at least to fight on a long time more, but their leaders just gave up, and in doing so almost surrendered 300,000 soldiers of the BEF who were sent to assist in France's defense as well. Fortunately, the UK was able to get their act together and grow a backbone due to the miracle of Dunkirk and the English Channel. If the US had a land connection to Europe we'd have had a serious problem, but due to the geographic protection of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, we had the time needed to get our heads out of our isolationist asses to organize and join in defeating the Axis powers.

4. I do blame the Neutrals previously discussed for giving up almost before any fighting started. They displayed very little will to defend their own sovereignty when challenged or to prepare for their own defenses beforehand. This is a historical fact, but in the U.S. anyway, we don't teach history anymore.

5. There are two glaring omissions from this discussion of Neutrals when it comes to talking about WW2 era Neutrals, Switzerland and Sweden. It was not by happenchance that the Nazis avoided invading these two. I know the history of economic and diplomatic cooperation between them and Germany, and have heard the argument that since Germany got what they wanted from them, why invade? However, the most important reason the Germans didn't invade is that it wasn't worth the cost. It was apparent to Hitler that both these very proud nationalistic (in a good sense) economically and industrially rich nations revered their sovereignty and freedom to the point that they would fight, they had prepared for their defense, they were organized and were well equipped and most importantly, were most definitely, even eager, to defend their territory. It just wasn't worth it. So, he left them alone.
 
Whilst one can reasonably criticise the neutrals for weaknesses in their organisation, mobilisation (at which the Belgians were excellent) and kit one, should also look at it with the eyes of the time not our perfect hindsight. 'Fighting to the death' includes the minor matter of 'death'. Easily said when one is an ocean away from the naughty people but it has a wholly different emphasis when the naughty people are thirty metres away with just a wire fence between you and them.

The Great War was both terrible and recent. All the neutrals and the allies rightly feared it happening again and wanted to avoid anything triggering actual conflict. Neutrals knew that they could not withstand any sort of major attack but also did not want to be seen to take either side and provoke one. So neutrality was the only chance of avoiding being in the war. It had worked for the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland in the Great War.

Going all 'horrid nasty Germans, we are joining the Franco British allies' was not going to put off the Germans but rather add themselves to the list of targets. Now, more than eighty years later, we can see that they would be in line anyway and coordination with the Franco British plus preemptive mobilisation would have served them better but, at the time, it was not so obvious. Personally I tend to think that a fully mobilised Norwegian defence with all the parts in order and manned plus a pre planned allied support could have stalled the German invasion and made Hitler choose between Norway or France. A joint Belgian Netherlands plan, again with a mobilisation and liaison with the allies, would have made a Belgian foray a more chancy and slower thing for the Germans. The end result might be closer to the Franco British strategy of dragging the Germans into a stalemate allowing the superior allied industrial capacity to give them superiority by 1941. Plus being able to import from elsewhere in the world and a joint navy capable of keeping that going, enforcing a German blockade and deterring Italy. But that is all for some other AH thread.

In short, the neutrality of smaller European nations was founded upon reason, even if we now know it would have failed. At the least an armed mobilised neutrality would have been a step forward and one can look to the Swiss for an example, helped by not being in the way.

But we stray far from the OP.
 
On 3rd September Bomber Command began operations. 18 Hampdens and 9 Wellingtons (and a Blenheim reconnaissance aircraft) went looking for German warships. That Blenheim photographed ships north of Wilhelmshaven and was the first British aircraft to cross the German coast in WW2. The bombers failed to make contact with the ships. This was day one.

Shipping at Wilhelmshaven and Brunsbuttel were attacked the following day (4 September). A problem that would dog Bomber Command for years was demonstrated when two bombs from an unknown aircraft (or aircraft (plural)) fell on the Danish town of Esbjerg, missing the target by 110 miles.
Other problems were also demonstrated. Admiral Scheer was hit by three bombs none of which exploded.
Of the 30 sorties flown, 7 aircraft (23.3%) were lost.

It was after this that Bomber Command flew principally night time leaflet raids. It had demonstrated that it was not the cutting edge tool its proponents had claimed. It struggled to find targets, and when it did it suffered unsustainable casualties.

Nonetheless, after a 25 day interval, on 29 September, attacks on German shipping were resumed with a raid on shipping at and around Heligoland. One formation reported bombing two destroyers with no results. Another formation of 5 aircraft was destroyed, all the aircraft were lost along with 18 of the 24 aircrew.

Through October and into November Bomber Command flew continued 'North Sea Sweeps' looking for German shipping, but with no success.

It's worth mentioning one more raid, on 3 December, by 24 Wellingtons, on Heligoland and the surrounding sea area. A hit was claimed on a cruiser. A No. 115 Squadron Wellington had a bomb hang up on it's bombing run, a bomb which was subsequently dropped accidentally on the island of Heligoland. It was the first bomb to fall on German soil.

I think that the premise of the question, given that we are asked to stick with what was historically possible, hugely underestimates the capability of Bomber Command in 1939.
 
stona said:
I think that the premise of the question, given that we are asked to stick with what was historically possible, hugely underestimates the capability of Bomber Command in 1939.
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That's on me as the originator of the question. There's a lot of knee jerk contrarianism here, where a few jump to tell you why something wouldn't, couldn't or shouldn't be possible. So, when an idea of changing the kit, circumstances and results come to me, I tread carefully.

I believe that with sufficient interwar preparation Bomber Command could have pulled off good results in those first maritime strikes of Sept 1939.
 
Admiral Beez said:
I believe that with sufficient interwar preparation Bomber Command could have pulled off good results in those first maritime strikes of Sept 1939.
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Yep, if they had started preparations in about 1932

See http://www.wwiiequipment.com/index....category&id=43:bombs&Itemid=60&layout=default

for some accounts of British bomb development.
Like them starting work on the 1000lb GP bomb in Nov 1924, it took until July of 1927 to order 10 test bombs but it took until 1930 to actually conduct the fragmentation trials. In Juneof 1932 they were going to order trials of 5 bombs but in Aug it was decided to would be easier for the aircraft designers if nothing bigger than 500lb would be carried so the 1000lb bpmb parts were put into storage and not dug out until 1938 and the much delayed trials were not carried out until Nov of 1939. which is rather late for your planned operation. Orders for mass production was not placed until Dec 1939.
Some of the other bombs have similar stories.

If you are going after the big ships you need very different bombs than going after the Destroyers and Cruisers.
 
Admiral Beez said:
I believe that with sufficient interwar preparation Bomber Command could have pulled off good results in those first maritime strikes of Sept 1939.
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What sort of preparation?

The principle problem for Bomber Command at the outbreak of war was that expectation far outweighed capability.

I'd be interested to know what you believe it could have done better. The Command had a clear set of objectives, as set out in the Western Air Plans, it simply couldn't achieve them. It had one 'heavy' bomber (by its definition) in the Whitley which was obsolescent in 1939, just three years after it first flew. It was an almost exact contemporary of the Wellington. And yet the Whitley was a modern aircraft in 1936. This was at a time when retractable undercarriage was a novelty in the RAF and the Gloster Gladiator biplane with fixed undercarriage was just entering squadron service. The first of the 'modern' high speed fighters, the Hawker Hurricane, would not reach No.111 Squadron for more than eighteen months (officially on 1 January 1938, though four actually arrived just in time for Christmas 1937).

This is the sort of context into which British bomber development and capabilities must be put.

There were many issues constraining Bomber Command (or strictly its predecessor) from government policy (no war for ten years) to money to treaty obligations to confused doctrine, requirements and specifications.

There were also issues with ordnance, arguably a result of confused bombing doctrine. In the post WW1 years the Air Staff concentrated its requirements on a 250lb-500lb range of general bombardment bombs, in the belief that a lot of small bombs was better than a few big ones. GP bombs had CWR's of less than 30%, the early Marks just 23%. It was 1932 before a design for a 1,000lb bomb proceeded, 1938 for the 2,000lb version. None of these larger GP bombs were available to the RAF in the early stages of the war. They were stuck with various Marks of the suspect and unproven 250/500lb GP range, supplemented by 20lb(F) and 40b GP bombs suitable for use against troops and vehicles. The Blenheims and Battles of the Advanced Air Striking Force in France attempted exactly this, with horrendous losses. The 1,000lb and 1,900lb GP bombs (the latter proved almost useless) arrived in 1941, the 4000lb version in 1943.

Beware the retro-telescope

All these issues would have to be addressed to 'do something different'.
 
stona said:
All these issues would have to be addressed to 'do something different'.
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to add to this it takes a lot longer to design and build even a "simple" bomb than many people think.

Especially in peace time. The RAF had no production facilities or even experimental shops. Even with ideas and drawings the bomb bodies have to be contracted out to suppliers and if you are looking at forged bomb bodies instead of cast that really restricts the suppliers.
Once you have a supply of bomb bodies to test you can start dropping them to see if they are going to behave the way the models suggest. You can fire a couple out of a cannon against a target to see if they do what you want on impact (like not split open like rotten fruit) and explode a few to see if it does give you the fragment pattern you want if/when it does explode. The RAF had a lot of trouble with the last part. A lot of air forces had troubles with dud bombs. The RAF may have more trouble than some others.

And once you have a satisfactory bomb or bombs you have to get them made in quantity and here you may be running into production problems as most of the companies that can do that kind of work are making shells for the RN or the Army. The RAF had already decided to use a cheap explosive mixture so filling the bombs with high performance explosives for special missions gets a bit harder.
 
Shortround6 said:
to add to this it takes a lot longer to design and build even a "simple" bomb than many people think.
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Absolutely.

In 1918, just twenty years before Bomber Command was supposed to be capable of implementing the Western Air Plans, a big bomb looked like this 1,650 lb SN. It looks, quite literally, like something from a Jules Verne novel.



And I think that's a HP 0/400 behind, which could lift and drop it.

It took three years, between 1922 and 1925 to develop a small number of inert 250 lb and 500 lb bombs whose stability and trajectory in flight was superior to the WW1 era bombs.

The resulting production bombs were tested at Shoeburyness (on the Essex coast) in 1927, a facility more familiar with the testing of artillery shells. They were not dropped, but fired from a test gun into a series of vertical walls designed to represent building floors. The trials did not go well. The first 500 lb bomb broke up in flight, but the largest portion penetrated four 'floors' which indicated to the optimistic testers 'the improbability of such a target resisting a bomb of such type and weight'. In 1928 further trials were carried out, with angled walls/floors to simulate bombs arriving from 10,000 and 20,000 feet. One bomb was damaged on impacting a wooden floor strut. No live drops were carried out.

It was not until 1935 that the British, who do love a committee, formed the Aircraft Bomb Sub-Committee to determine whether the necessary and appropriate bombs and components existed for efficient attacks on potential enemy targets.

At the risk of repetition, it was not until June 1938 that the need for a 1,000 lb GP bomb was resurrected, principally because of the heavier bombers now coming into service or on order. It was fairly straightforward, requiring the altering of the 1928 design in line with the latest GP bomb modifications. For example the Mk IV 250 and 500 b GP bombs now featured detachable, 'clip-on' tails. This bomb still didn't arrive in numbers until 1941

The RAF went to war with the bombs designed in the 1920s.
 
I would note that for attacking armored ships you have two different conflicting requirements.

In order to penetrate armor you need to drop from certain altitudes. for a given size bomb you need to drop from higher altitudes to penetrate more armor.
In order to get a high percentage of hits you have to drop from low altitude.

Now in order to actually pull this plan off, you not only need a bunch of the stuff we have mentioned but you need a bomb sight that will work at under 3,000ft which the existing bomb sight does not.
We could do what the British historically did which was to ignore the bomb sight and trust to the pilots judgment.

"Use the force, Nigel, use the force"
 
stona said:
What sort of preparation?
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What do you propose? It's easy for us to list off why something wouldn't, shouldn't or couldn't have occurred. Heck, we have a host of contrarians that all they do is skip from thread to thread telling us just so.

You've brought forth some obstacles. Now, how do you suggest the government and the RAF overcome them?
 
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I don't think they could have been overcome before the war.

The real problem is not what the British (or anyone else) did or didn't do, it is the limited possibilities available in the mid 1930s, just 15-20 years after the end of WW1 and only 30 years after the Wright brothers staggered into the air at Kitty Hawk. This is the perspective that needs to be maintained.

Think what you were doing thirty years ago. It's really not that long back to 1992.

The technology to make the aircraft that carried out effective strategic and tactical campaigns didn't exist in the early/mid 1930s.

If the government made unlimited funds available, and the Air Staff threw limitless money at a bomber project they would still have ended up with something like the Short Stirling or, worse, the Supermarine bomber with its severely limited bomb size.

You won't have bigger and better bombs unless you think you need them, and the British didn't realise the need for bigger bombs until shortly before the war. With hindsight a 1,000lb GP bomb might have been available in 1939, but it wouldn't have made any difference when the bombers rarely found a target, and when they did they were shot down in numbers.

They could not have developed the navigational aids to avoid missing the target by over a hundred miles, because the technology didn't exist.

They might have designed a better bombsight, but something like the Mk XIV (let alone the SABS) was unlikely to be available in 1939.

Etc., etc,. etc.
 
stona said:
I don't think they could have been overcome before the war.
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Let's start with the raids of early Sept 1939. I expect that the mission was thought up and units assigned the day or so before. Instead if Bomber Command was told in 1938 to begin planning to hit German ports sometime in 1939 we'd have better results. Same planes, same bombs, but the RAF crews will be trained for this mission, trained to hit ships, etc.

My point, preparation and training will make a difference. Look at the Japanese preparation for Pearl Harbour, where for months before Dec 7th aircrew trained and exercised on mock targets. I'm proposing that after Munich in 1938, Bomber Command is told to begin preparing for a mission to eliminate the surface fleet found in German ports. The RAF will select crews and spend half a year preparing.
 
I believe the first 4000 lb bomb was dropped by a Merlin powered Wellington Mk II
 
Admiral Beez said:
You've brought forth some obstacles. Now how do you suggest the RAF overcome them?
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It might help to have clearer defined objectives.

It would also help if you actually read some of the objections instead of writing off the contrarians as simply contrarians.

Back in post #15 the number of squadrons of heavy bombers as of the beginning of sept were given.

Eight Wellington squadrons. Not all declared operational.
10 Hampden squadrons, only 5 operational.
1 operational squadron of Whitleys that are allowed to fly over water.
Whatever Blenheims you can scrounge up.

That was the total for all long range operations.
OK throw in some Battles.

Now you don't have anything bigger than a 500lb bomb.

when you started planning a year earlier you only had a few squadrons of any sort of large (bigger than a Blenheim) bombers.

So your goal is to increase actual production over what was done.
Increase the numbers of crews.
Get better navigation equipment.
Get the bigger bombs into production or change the type of attack.

Wanting AP or SAP bombs for Cruisers and for battleships means two different bombs.
Are you going for mission kills or heavy damage to knock ships out for months or sunk ships on the bottom?
Different bombs.

And you need a change in policy that does not depend on hindsight.

The prohibition of not bombing the docks and shipyards seems silly in hindsight but the British and more strongly the French did not want to be the ones who started that avenue of warfare again. Even after the bombing of Warsaw the French did not want to stir up the Germans to attack them by air.

There is an awful lot that has to be changed, not just a few things.
 

Yeah, they should have thought that. But between the political messaging of "peace in our time", and a budget largely devoted to upgrading out of obsolete types, that training is going to need a patron saint. None seem really present in 1938-39, and though Churchill was vociferous throughout the 30s regarding the dangers of Naziism, he was on the outside. I have no doubt he would approve all the same, and I'm not being sarcastic, bud. It's a good thing to take a leg up.

It's true that Japan started planning PH less than a year before they executed it, so sure, it's possible, but that really requires a change in political outlook at the highest levels in the UK in order to first order and then supply the training and eventual capability. Japan was obviously wiling to entertain -- and execute -- aggression. The Brits in 1936? That really requires them to see the crap in East Africa or the Ruhr reoccupation differently.

Further --

What sort of bomber do you imagine would be needed? The Wellington was their premier platform, but it was small in numbers and early in development. They did have the Hampdens (which might prove useful here?) and Blenheims -- but the latter two showed their obsolescence fairly quickly. So you'll need to supplement the Wimpy ... the question is with what?

What would you cancel and what would you build, to make this raid happen? How might that affect the other defense decisions that are pulling up into view?
 
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Thumpalumpacus said:
What sort of bomber do you imagine would be needed?
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Wellington or Whitley I imagine.

Earlier and better RAF Attack on the German Navy at Wilhelmshaven, 1939

On 18 December, 1939, the RAF attacked the German Navy at Wilhelmshaven. The raid was a failure. Good, non-Wikipedia background info here Airraid on the German Navy at Wilhelmshaven, 18 December, 1939 - TracesOfWar.com Planning didn’t begin until a few days earlier.... “On 14 December...
ww2aircraft.net
 
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