Earlier/better/more of Hooked Spitfires/Seafires: benefits, shortcomings?

[RCAFson]

everything i am reading still calls it an F4F...modified to different ( approved for export ) specs but still a wildcat.

British Aircraft--Martlet and Wildcat fighters

From the above:

A modified version of the U.S. Navy's F4F, the Grumman Model G-36A provided the Royal Navy with its first high-performance single-seat monoplane carrier fighter. Named "Martlet I" in British service, these 81 aircraft had originally been ordered by France and were taken over by the British after France surrendered. Powered by 1,240 horsepower Wright "Cyclone" radial engines, the first "Martlets" entered service in September 1940, and achieved the first "kill" for any American-built fighter in British service on Christmas day of that year, when a German Ju-88 was forced down near Scapa Flow.

But I'm pretty sure that the Martlet was not "carrier rated" in the RN until after the Sea Hurricane, which entered carrier service in the Spring of 1941 verus the Fall of 1941 for the Martlet. In any event the Martlet was not exactly a high performance fighter:
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[wuzak]

Didn't the MAP ask Fairey to work with Supermarines to develop a Seafire before the war?

And Fairey rejected it, developing the Firefly instead.

Would the Seafire have been better had it been co-developed by Fairey from the start (~1938/39) than it ended up being?

Also, would the Seafire I have been better being based on the III (ie, with Merlin XX) than the V?

 

[pattle]

Look Bobbysocks. your point of what aircraft was what is perfectly valid and I'm not disputing that, but let's look at some differences between what the British called American aircraft and what the Americans called them and naming systems.

The bottom line is, although it seems like nit picking, nomenclature does carry some importance in people's minds and one thing I've learned is that you will always come across someone who will correct you on this point, whether on the net or in person or writing articles etc. Its unavoidable and the British are quite particular about names.

You are right, but personally I prefer to keep things as simple as possible, for example I know the British called the Superfortress the Washington in RAF service but I will always call it the B29 Superfortress because for me that it was it was.
This has nothing much to do with the above and maybe sounds petty but it does annoy me when manufacturers rebrand products and give them different names, I still call opal fruits opal fruits and not starburst, the same goes for marathon and snickers and I don't care if people call me set in my ways.

 

[RCAFson]

Didn't the MAP ask Fairey to work with Supermarines to develop a Seafire before the war?

And Fairey rejected it, developing the Firefly instead.

Would the Seafire have been better had it been co-developed by Fairey from the start (~1938/39) than it ended up being?

Also, would the Seafire I have been better being based on the III (ie, with Merlin XX) than the V?

Fairey wasn't running the MAP or the Admiralty so they couldn't force either body to do anything.

The III with it's reduced wingspan would have been problematic operating from a carrier.

 

[stona]

The problems with the Seafire result mainly from the Spitfire having been designed for grass field operations, crosswinds would be negligible and touch downs would be done with very low vertical velocities. The Spitfire was designed with a light undercarriage and a maximum vertical velocity on landing of only 7 feet per second, quite unsuitable for landing on a deck.

Due to the seating position of the pilot, behind the engine in an anti-g posture (yes, Mitchell did think of that) the view over the nose was terrible, restricted to four degrees below the flight line. Crossley described the view on the airfield or flight deck as consisting of either tree tops or ships' masts.

RAF pilots could make their final approach in a semi-glide, well above stalling speeds, and retained their view forward by doing "wheeler landings" (tail up). This allowed a view forward, good directional control after landing and placed the landing loads vertically up the undercarriage legs, where Mitchell intended them to be.

None of this was possible for a FAA pilot. He was expected to make a three point landing at just 3 knots above the power on stalling speed (1.05 Vse). The three point landing was at about 15 degrees incidence, equivalent to the stalling incidence under these conditions of flight. There was also obviously a bending force on the undercarriage legs which tended to wrench them from their attachments on the main spar.

A Seafire accelerated well but was very difficult to slow down. A Seafire could lose speed at a rate of about 2 knots per second when the pilot cut the throttle. The distance over the wires on a British carrier was about 200 feet or two seconds flying time, pilots were obliged to make a slow approach at about 1.05 Vse which is not easy. The problem was exacerbated by the poor positioning of the ASI and unsuitable scale. The needle vibrated over a scale where 1/8 inch represented about 10 knots of air speed. Pilots tended to fly by the seat of the pants, trusting to their knowledge of the aircraft's relatively benign stall warnings whilst adding a few knots "for the sake of the wife and kids".

Extra speed meant that the aircraft would not be in the correct three point attitude when it hit the deck on its 31/2 degree angle of descent. The main wheels touched down first and being forward of the CoG pushed the nose up whilst the tail was still descending. This increased the wings incidence and thus lift at precisely the moment when this was least needed. The aircraft would remain airborne and float into the barrier.
A Seafire or anything other than a Mk I Spitfire suffered from some instability effects that made the problem worse. A stable aircraft like the MkI had negative lift across the tail surfaces. When a pilot cut the throttle of a Seafire and the slipstream speed reduced the extra lift given by the positive angle of the elevator also reduced. The tail then lost a lot of lift and fell. This was equivalent to the pilot pulling back on the stick and many were accused of just that, despite having done nothing of the sort. Again main plane lift and therefore "float" were increased.
The good old V squared law (why swans don't take off at 400 mph) is causing a much larger reduction in lift on the tail plane than main plane.

Aircraft designed for carrier operations, particularly US aircraft were intrinsically much stronger. They were designed to land at a 12 feet per second rate of descent, nearly double that of a Seafire. The large margin of positive stability in the landing configuration allowed much larger tolerance in both speed and angle of approach. The speed was typically 1.2 Vse. This is one of the reasons that a US deck landing officer's signals were advisory whereas his British equivalent's were mandatory.

There were many other problems with the Seafire. The crabbed approach used by Brown (until he destroyed an aircraft using it) was not only appalling airmanship it could result in the aircraft engaging a hook whilst still moving sideways. The consequences of this could lead to the aeroplane becoming written off.
Flying a curved approach was the least worst method adopted. With the hood locked open (by half unlatching the side door as on a Spitfire), the seat raised and the head cocked to one side it was possible to see part of the deck and the batsman through the haze of the port exhaust. In rain the pilot had to put his head into the slipstream, hoping that his goggles stayed on and remained fairly transparent. The Seafire had no wiper or blower system to clear the windscreen as modern aircraft do.

To me the mystery is not in the high accident rate but rather that so many actually got onto the deck in more or less one piece!

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Thanks for the overview, Steve.
I'll say again: would and earlier introduction meant that some of the problems would be also earlier adressed?

 

[stona]

Thanks for the overview, Steve.
I'll say again: would and earlier introduction meant that some of the problems would be also earlier adressed?

I think some of the problems, that is those not directly related to the Spitfire's lack of strength, could have been addressed. Neither Boscombe Down, Farnborough, nor the Deck Landing Unit had time to address the issues or even make a proper investigation of some of the causes.

The Seafire, certainly in it's early versions, was more or less a stop gap solution. It is a good demonstration of an aircraft being superb, arguably the best of WW2, in the role for which it was designed (a short range, high performance, interceptor fighter) and not so good at one forced on it by circumstance (naval fleet protection and strike fighter).

Later versions, something like the Mark 47, had overcome most of the problems and where proper navalised aircraft.

Cheers

Steve