The problems with the Seafire result mainly from the Spitfire having been designed for grass field operations, crosswinds would be negligible and touch downs would be done with very low vertical velocities. The Spitfire was designed with a light undercarriage and a maximum vertical velocity on landing of only 7 feet per second, quite unsuitable for landing on a deck.
Due to the seating position of the pilot, behind the engine in an anti-g posture (yes, Mitchell did think of that) the view over the nose was terrible, restricted to four degrees below the flight line. Crossley described the view on the airfield or flight deck as consisting of either tree tops or ships' masts.
RAF pilots could make their final approach in a semi-glide, well above stalling speeds, and retained their view forward by doing "wheeler landings" (tail up). This allowed a view forward, good directional control after landing and placed the landing loads vertically up the undercarriage legs, where Mitchell intended them to be.
None of this was possible for a FAA pilot. He was expected to make a three point landing at just 3 knots above the power on stalling speed (1.05 Vse). The three point landing was at about 15 degrees incidence, equivalent to the stalling incidence under these conditions of flight. There was also obviously a bending force on the undercarriage legs which tended to wrench them from their attachments on the main spar.
A Seafire accelerated well but was very difficult to slow down. A Seafire could lose speed at a rate of about 2 knots per second when the pilot cut the throttle. The distance over the wires on a British carrier was about 200 feet or two seconds flying time, pilots were obliged to make a slow approach at about 1.05 Vse which is not easy. The problem was exacerbated by the poor positioning of the ASI and unsuitable scale. The needle vibrated over a scale where 1/8 inch represented about 10 knots of air speed. Pilots tended to fly by the seat of the pants, trusting to their knowledge of the aircraft's relatively benign stall warnings whilst adding a few knots "for the sake of the wife and kids".
Extra speed meant that the aircraft would not be in the correct three point attitude when it hit the deck on its 31/2 degree angle of descent. The main wheels touched down first and being forward of the CoG pushed the nose up whilst the tail was still descending. This increased the wings incidence and thus lift at precisely the moment when this was least needed. The aircraft would remain airborne and float into the barrier.
A Seafire or anything other than a Mk I Spitfire suffered from some instability effects that made the problem worse. A stable aircraft like the MkI had negative lift across the tail surfaces. When a pilot cut the throttle of a Seafire and the slipstream speed reduced the extra lift given by the positive angle of the elevator also reduced. The tail then lost a lot of lift and fell. This was equivalent to the pilot pulling back on the stick and many were accused of just that, despite having done nothing of the sort. Again main plane lift and therefore "float" were increased.
The good old V squared law (why swans don't take off at 400 mph) is causing a much larger reduction in lift on the tail plane than main plane.
Aircraft designed for carrier operations, particularly US aircraft were intrinsically much stronger. They were designed to land at a 12 feet per second rate of descent, nearly double that of a Seafire. The large margin of positive stability in the landing configuration allowed much larger tolerance in both speed and angle of approach. The speed was typically 1.2 Vse. This is one of the reasons that a US deck landing officer's signals were advisory whereas his British equivalent's were mandatory.
There were many other problems with the Seafire. The crabbed approach used by Brown (until he destroyed an aircraft using it) was not only appalling airmanship it could result in the aircraft engaging a hook whilst still moving sideways. The consequences of this could lead to the aeroplane becoming written off.
Flying a curved approach was the least worst method adopted. With the hood locked open (by half unlatching the side door as on a Spitfire), the seat raised and the head cocked to one side it was possible to see part of the deck and the batsman through the haze of the port exhaust. In rain the pilot had to put his head into the slipstream, hoping that his goggles stayed on and remained fairly transparent. The Seafire had no wiper or blower system to clear the windscreen as modern aircraft do.
To me the mystery is not in the high accident rate but rather that so many actually got onto the deck in more or less one piece!
Cheers
Steve