Earlier employment of merchant aircraft carriers

muskeg13 said:

A post in another forum about a hypothetical matchup between Blackburn Roc and an FW-200 got me to thinking. Scary.

In 1941, prior to the availability of sufficient numbers of purpose built escort carriers, Catapult Aircraft Merchant (CAM) ships were hastily rigged to provide some measure of convoy air defense, primarily from the antishipping attacks of FW-200 Condors. CAM ships would launch a single older model Hurricane fighter on a one-way mission, with the pilot trying to make his way to land or ditch once fuel and ammo were expended. I believe they were only marginally successful, but they gave merchant sailors some hope for survival other than a Lewis Gun or two.

A year or so later, a better idea was developed, the Merchant Aircraft Carrier (MAC) ship. Large bulk grain carriers or tankers had a flight deck attached that would accommodate 3-4 Fairey Swordfish. These MAC ships were primarily to provide antisubmarine protection, and allow for take offs and landings, so the aircraft could be recovered and used again. The ships still retained their cargo carrying capability. Historically, only Swordfish were used because of their low speed take off and landing, suitable endurance and weapons load-out options.

What if, CAM ships were never used, going straight to MAC employment even earlier than June 1941, and
What if MAC ships carried a composite group of two Swordfish and two suitable biplane fighters, giving them both an anti-air and anti-sub (and maybe anti-raider) capability? By suitable biplane fighter, I mean one able to be used from a MAC flight deck and have sufficient speed and weapons to be able to engage and shoot down Condors. Would the Gloster Gladiator or Grumman F3F work?

Merchant aircraft carrier - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

CAM ship - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Gloster Gladiator - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Grumman F3F - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

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I think that some of this post is misleading. CAM ships were as successful as they could be, with brave crews and a record of victories against the long range air threat, far, far better than doing nothing.
The building and deployment of the mini-carrier, in any form, was pursued as fast as could be done, both in build time and political judgement.
There was no "what-if" about it, CAM ships were the very best that could be done, as were the MAC ships.
Well done to all, the UK was starving.

Eng

The Condor had two periods of operation in the Atlantic.
Condors supported the Invasion of Norway and then operated from Norway out past Iceland/Scotland.
After the Fall of France (a few months later) Condors flew out over the Bay of Biscay to hit the Gibraltar convoys.

It was these activities that the CAM ships and the first escort carriers were supposed to stop. After the HMS Audacity claimed 7 Condors in just four voyages (end of 1941) the Germans started changing tactics. FW 200 production was very low and this rate of loss exceeded production (unknown to the British at the time?) and the Condors changed tactics/mission.
A lot less direct attacks and more recon/spotting for the U boats.
Germans started the with 56 U-boats, many of which could not operated west of the British Isles due to lack of range (the Type IIs), They commissioned about 50 in 1940 but 199 in 1941 and 238 in 1942.
The need for better recon for the increasing number of U-boats was more important than direct attacks and merchant ships and escorts were getting better (slightly) AA in 1941 making low level attacks more dangerous.

Condors also flew loops around the British Isles. Plane would leave Norway, fly between Iceland and Scotland then down the west side of Ireland (actually several hundred miles off shore) and then turn and fly to France avoiding land based air from SW England. And then fly back a day or two later. Exact schedule depended on weather and available aircraft.

The CAM ships were used to combat the late 1940/early 1941 operations of the Condor.
The very early escort carriers, like the Audacity, were also intended to fight the Condor (Audacity had no hanger and 8 fighters on the deck).
The British needed fighter protection in 1941, not 1942. In 1942 they needed more ASW protection and less fighter protection. Not saying that the Condors went away (they did sort of 1942) but double the number of U-boats at sea the main threat had changed.
Radar could also pick up Condors at dozen of miles once radar became more common.
U-boats on the surface didn't show up on ship radar until they were much, much closer.

The MAC's were ASW ships. Maybe they could have been built/converted earlier but trying to combine the Air Defense and Anti-sub roles into one ship with only 4 (or 5/6?) aircraft might have been asking too much. You need command and control facilities on either the carrier or the convoy commanders flagship and if command is not on the carrier you need good communications between the two ships (and all the surface escorts). The MACs did very good work as ASW ships. Trying to turn them into even limited Air- Defense ships might have been too much or sacrificed too much ASW capability. Fewer ASW airframes for 1-2 Gladiators or F3F's?

In 1942-43 the Allies had better shore based radar In Iceland, Scotland, Northern Ireland, SW England and better/longer ranged shore based aircraft pushing the Condors into longer, more difficult flights.

I've been digging around for a breakdown of Fw200 Condor production figures, service entry dates etc. Best I can come up with for the maritime variants is as follows.

C-0 - Just 10 built (4 as transports) in late 1939. The 6 maritime aircraft formed the initial equipment of I./KG 40 during the Norwegian Campaign

C-1 / C-2 - 16 built Dec 1939 to Aug 1940 (other sources have production of the C-2 beginning in 1941) I.KG 40 was withdrawn from the front line in June 1940 to equip with the C-1. In July it spent 12 nights laying mines, and losing 2 aircraft in the process. August saw it flying night bombing missions over Britain, including Liverpool/Birkenhead as well as anti-shipping operations.

C-3 - main early version. 52 built between Sept 1940 & March 1942 (again other sources suggest production of this model began in summer 1941). In early 1941 Hitler ordered I./KG 40 to be brought up to a strength of 12 aircraft. In March, aircraft numbers were having to be made up with He 111 & Do 217 due to a lack of Condors. While in July 1941 I./KG 40 had a nominal strength of 29 aircraft, it could only maintain 6-8 in an operational state. Add to that the loss rate was quite high. On 15 June 1941 3 Fw200 were dispatched againg convoy HG65 but onlt 1 returned. Summer 1941 6 Fw200 were directed to the Med to form Kommando Petersen for operations over Suez / Red Sea area. It was short lived but 2 Fw 200 were lost. By the end of 1941 sufficient aircraft were available to allow III./KG 40 to begin re-equipment. That allowed I./KG 40 to be transferred to Norway in early 1942.

On 31st May 1942 2./KG 40 was at Rechilin / Mecklenberg with 6 Fw200 (3 operational).
I./KG 40 continued to operate from Norway but was switched to the transport role and renamed during the Stalingrad siege. It reformed on the He 177.
III./KG 40 (less 7./KG 40) was at Bordeaux Merignac with 19 Fw200 (8 operational). By Jan 1943 that was down to 10 (5 operational)

There were a few operating with other units late 1942 / early 1943 but not in any significant numbers.

I find tracking these units around in this period difficult, with shifts of bases, roles, unit designations as well as transfers back and from between theatres. But the above were the core units operating the Fw200.

C-4 - 107 built March 1942 to May 1943
C-5 / C-6 - 39 built March - Sept 1943 also some conversions from earlier models. Some upgraded to carry Hs 293
C-8 - 9 factory built + 16 upgrades from earlier models. Hs 293 carrier.

That only adds to 229 plus 15 prototype / A / B / C-0 transports = 244. That leaves 32 unaccounted for.

Yes, the Germans always struggled with large WW2 aircraft, IMO. Considering the airliner background, the Fw 200 did quite well as a long range maritime bomber/recce, but it absolutely required a safe environment to operate.
The minelaying ops in UK waters was taken over by the Ju 88.
Overall, German U-Boat operations in the Atlantic developed rapidly, I doubt that the role of the Fw 200 in the U-Boat war was foreseen and planned, it was made-up as it went along!

Eng

Engineman said:

I think that some of this post is misleading. CAM ships were as successful as they could be, with brave crews and a record of victories against the long range air threat, far, far better than doing nothing.
The building and deployment of the mini-carrier, in any form, was pursued as fast as could be done, both in build time and political judgement.
There was no "what-if" about it, CAM ships were the very best that could be done, as were the MAC ships.
Well done to all, the UK was starving.

Eng

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Not so much misleading as being uninformed. Trying to postulate by connecting the Wikepedia dots may lead incorrect conclusions and 80+ year removed 20/20 hindsight. Many thanks to others, particularly EwenS and Shortround6 for setting the record straight.
Last night, I began reading the Malby dissertation EwenS posted. Easy reading and informative.

Bomber Units of the Luftwaffe 1933 to 1945 by de Zeng IV, Stankey and Creek.

Stab KG40, June to December 1940, seems to have used Ju88, disbanded

Stab KG40, April 1941 to February 1945, seems to have had the odd Fw200 at times

I/KG40, 1 staffel formed in September 1939, Fw200C-0 replaced He111E, used in Norway, 2 staffel formed in May 1940, 3 staffel in June
Received Fw200C-1 May/June 1940, to Bordeaux July 1940, Gruppe had 9/3 Fw200C on 13 August, 9/7 on the 17th, 7/4 on 13 September. End 1940 usually had less than 8 serviceable aircraft. Placed under C-in-C U-boats 6 January 1941. To Flieger Fuhrer Atlantik 15 March, still having trouble maintaining 8 serviceable aircraft out of the 25 to 30 on hand, 25/3 on 26 July, detachment to Greece August/September, 26/9 Fw200 on 14 February 1942, 26 Fw200 on 1 March. 1 and 3 staffel to Norway for arctic convoy watch in March, 2 and 7 staffel swapped numbers in June (Alfred Price has II Gruppe having 20/11 and IV Gruppe 17/13 Fw200 on 27 July.)

1 Staffel to Germany for He177 in September, Gruppe had 4 Fw200C-3, 14 C-4 and 7 He177A-1 on 1 December 1942, most Fw200 transferred to transport units in December 1942, 2 staffel stayed in Norway, Gruppe reunited in Germany in February 1943 to acquire He177 but also kept Fw200, while 2 and 8 staffel swapped numbers, (17 May Alfred Price says I, III and IV Gruppe had 6/1, 11/2, 5/4 Fw200) I Gruppe had 11 He177A-1, 2 Fw200C-3, 11 Fw200 C-4 on 1 July. On 30 November 1943, 2 staffel had 16 Fw200, 1 and 3 staffels 31 He177A-3. Moving between Norway, France and Germany, with an increasing use of He177, 1 July 1944 had 2 He177A-3, 11 A-5, 3 Fw200 C-3, 6 C-4, 1 C-6, 5 C-8. Condors to transport units in second half of 1944.

II/KG40 mostly used Do217 before conversion to Me410 July 1941 to June 1943, reformed September 1943 with He177.

III/KG40 from I/KG1 in March 1941 with He111, duty in France and Mediterranean, 8 staffel began receiving Fw200 in December followed by 7 and 9 staffels, on 30 April 1942 8 and 9 Staffels had 20/6 Fw200 with 7 staffel in Norway which swapped numbers with 2 staffel in France, mid 1942 picked up I Gruppe Fw200 as I Gruppe converted to He177, 9 Staffel supply duty in Mediterranean and 1942/early 1943, Gruppe rather scattered in 1942, 8 staffel to Germany in early 1943, rest of Gruppe had 35/18 Fw200C on South West France on 31 March. He177 conversion cancelled in October, 8 and 2 staffel swapped numbers in November 1943. To Germany March 1944 had 38/8 Fw200 on 20 March, most of Gruppe back to France, then back to Germany in July except for some sent to Norway which became transports

IV/KG40 meant for training, formed April 1941, 10 staffel Fw200A, 11 staffel Do217, 12 staffel He111. Condors to 11 staffel when 10 staffel became He177 in January 1942, all sorts of movements and redesignations followed, reported 7 Fw200 and 19 He177 on 2 July 1944.

Kampfgeschwader 40 gives organisations from the start and strengths from March 1942 on.

The USSBS reports Fw200 production 1939 to 1944 as 6, 36, 58, 85, 76, 7, total 268. More detailed production reports often do not have the sub type, first mention of C-3 in December 1940, first mention of C-4 in April 1943 (after 5 months of "Fw200"), change to C-5 in June 1943 until end production, no mention of C-6 or C-8, which implies they were conversions.

Everyone seems to agree 10 C-0 of which 4 were transports, if the USSBS figures are followed that is production until mid April 1940, if there were 16 C-1 and -2, that takes production to end September 1940, then follows 146 either plain Fw200 or C-3 to end October 1942, 30 "Fw200" over the next 5 months, then 13 C-4 production, then 52 C-5. If C-0, 1/2, 3 production actually totalled 10+16+52 = 78, that is everything to early March 1942.

The C-4 is reported as entering production in February/March 1942, yet the five times the 1942 monthly production reports have a sub type it is C-3, against that strength reports from April 1942 mention C-4, the major difference between the C-3 and C-4 being the C-4 was fitted with search radar, which could be added post production. All up around 190 C-3/4 built.

Fw200 later losses, Luftflotte 3 from September 1943, Reich from June 1943, 7 MIA, 8 air combat, 14 bombed, 8 strafed, 4 on operations, not enemy action, 12 not on operations, total 53 losses. Units in Norway lost another 7 Fw200, including 5 not due to enemy action.

(The 8th Air Force raids of 31 December 1943 and 5 February 1944 destroyed 9 Fw200 and damaged another 5, out of 26 aircraft destroyed and 5 damaged on 31 December and 16 destroyed and 20 damaged on 5 February.

Engineman said:

Yes, the Germans always struggled with large WW2 aircraft, IMO. Considering the airliner background, the Fw 200 did quite well as a long range maritime bomber/recce, but it absolutely required a safe environment to operate.
The minelaying ops in UK waters was taken over by the Ju 88.
Overall, German U-Boat operations in the Atlantic developed rapidly, I doubt that the role of the Fw 200 in the U-Boat war was foreseen and planned, it was made-up as it went along!

Eng

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Would any WWII four-engined aircraft have functioned safely unescorted around enemy fighters? Again, read Eric Brown. On his first encounter with Fw200s, their gunners killed his squadron leader. Big aircraft can absorb lots of punishment from conventional rear attacks. You are closing slowly on the defense guns. Brown worked out the same tactics Egon Mayer and Georg-Peter Eder would later develop for the Luftwaffe for B17s and B24s. Attack from the front. The flight crew, the fuel tanks and bomb load are at the front of the aircraft, where they can be hit in frontal attacks. Getting in front of an Fw200 probably would have been a challenge for a Gloster Gladiator, but not for a Sea Hurricane or a Martlet.

FAGr 5 operated Ju290s in the maritime role, too.

muskeg13 said:

What if, CAM ships were never used, going straight to MAC employment even earlier than June 1941, and
What if MAC ships carried a composite group of two Swordfish and two suitable biplane fighters, giving them both an anti-air and anti-sub (and maybe anti-raider) capability? By suitable biplane fighter, I mean one able to be used from a MAC flight deck and have sufficient speed and weapons to be able to engage and shoot down Condors. Would the Gloster Gladiator or Grumman F3F work?

Merchant aircraft carrier - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Click to expand...

What we've danced around (on both Allied and Axis side) is the continental war:

If low countries don't fall, then the fighting is in Norway. If Allies can hold Norway north of Bergen, they can re-lay the North Sea Mine Barrage.
But muskeg13 has read the tea leaves and knows that Heer will overrun continent. Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine will be able to base aircraft/U-boats respectively in France/Norway.

So, the 1st thing - he commissions the construction of 6 - Banana boats - 512' long (~100' more than the MACs; what FAA felt was required for fighters), with ~10k hp = 18 knots.

ASW airplane is obviously the Fairey Swordfish. For the fighters, I see 2 choices:


The Gloster Gladiator's fixed wings won't fit down the 20' x 45' elevators; UK isn't buying Grumman planes when there are indigenous aircraft available. (And I'm not sure if F3F wings fold..) The F4F-4 Wildcat is really late to arrive.

I'm trying to be somewhat accommodating to maintenance personnel during winter in North Atlantic - it's preferable to do some repairs out of the weather.

Grumman F3F was a fixed wing biplane.

Length - 23ft
Wingspan - 32ft

Wasn't the Fiesler Fi167 one of the few Biplanes with folding wings?

GrauGeist said:

Wasn't the Fiesler Fi167 one of the few Biplanes with folding wings?

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Plenty of biplane had folding wings going all the way back to before WW1.

Short Brothers patented a folding mechanism for their biplane designs in 1913 and modified their S.41 design with them that same year. Other types followed.

In 1915 they began production of over 900 Short Type 184 Folder aircraft. Later that year it became the first aircraft type to sink a ship with an air launched torpedo.

The big Handley Page O/100 and O/400 bombers of the late WW1 period were given folding wings for ease of storage in hangars.

Inter war most of the FAA biplane torpedo bomber / spotter types had folding wings, all the way through to the Sea Otter. Even the two seat fighter, the Hawker Osprey received folding wings.