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I was going on what nuuumann posted about a dorsal turret being considered for the night fighter version of the Mossie. I would have just left that stellar aircraft alone and thank The Great Aviator Above for receiving such a great plane unasked for.
Once it was realised that radar could guide to within visual range the need for a turret disappeared IMO. A turret version of the Beaufighter was slower and more lightly armed same for a turret armed Mosquito. How does the radar operator use the turret? Or does it have a three man crew that makes it even slower and more cramped for electronics space?Yup, of course, but radar has nothing to do with what we are discussing. We're talking about power turrets, not radar. F.18/40 was amended after these events to incorporate a power turret. This is why the Beaufighter Mk.V was built with a Boulton Paul turret. The performance and capability of the fixed gun night fighter Mosquito negated the need for a turret-armed night fighter, radar or not. The Mossie turret fighter was to be fitted with radar.
Adding a turret to a Mosquito is like adding a pickup-truck bed to a Ferrari; it negates the design advantages in order to provide a utility not asked-for.
Once it was realised that radar could guide to within visual range the need for a turret disappeared IMO. A turret version of the Beaufighter was slower and more lightly armed same for a turret armed Mosquito. How does the radar operator use the turret? Or does it have a three man crew that makes it even slower and more cramped for electronics space?
It would have been as odd as the rear turret version of the Lysander, immediately after the bomb bay a Mosquito is extremely small, going to a point like a javelin, putting a turret at the rear is designing a completely new plane, that is not a Mosquito in any way.Pretty much. Problem was that the Air Ministry didn't believe de Havilland's figures in 1939 when he first proposed the aircraft. Although the C-in-C Bomber Command Ludlow-Hewitt was enthusiastic about the aircraft, William Sholto Douglas wanted it to be fitted with a tail turret and moves were put in place for the production of a tail-turret armed prototype (not the same as the night fighters we've been talking about) as well as the unarmed prototype, which was to serve as a technology demonstrator, but Wilfred Freeman gambled on the performance of the unarmed prototype being so good that a turret armed one wasn't necessary, and so it was. He and de Havilland thought the duplication of effort was wasteful, so once the unarmed prototype demonstrated its excellent performance in late 1940/early 1941 the tail turret-armed prototype was quietly shelved. I'd love to see a drawing, can't imagine how hideous a Mosquito would have been with a Nash & Thomson tail turret.
Pretty much. Problem was that the Air Ministry didn't believe de Havilland's figures in 1939 when he first proposed the aircraft. Although the C-in-C Bomber Command Ludlow-Hewitt was enthusiastic about the aircraft, William Sholto Douglas wanted it to be fitted with a tail turret and moves were put in place for the production of a tail-turret armed prototype (not the same as the night fighters we've been talking about) as well as the unarmed prototype, which was to serve as a technology demonstrator, but Wilfred Freeman gambled on the performance of the unarmed prototype being so good that a turret armed one wasn't necessary, and so it was. He and de Havilland thought the duplication of effort was wasteful, so once the unarmed prototype demonstrated its excellent performance in late 1940/early 1941 the tail turret-armed prototype was quietly shelved. I'd love to see a drawing, can't imagine how hideous a Mosquito would have been with a Nash & Thomson tail turret.
That is because it is only a gift in hind sight, it went against all known and accepted doctrines and schools of thought at the time, as did the P-51 which needed some wise and powerful friends to keep it in production when the doctrine and schools of thought said a long range escort fighter was not possible and actually not needed.I've gotten the impression over the years that the Air Ministry really didn't know what to do with this DeHavilland gift for a year or so. You or someone else, please correct me if I'm wrong. It just seems like they read the plane wrong, through the lens of their own doctrine, rather than asking what the plane could do for them, until 1942 or so.
Of course they eventually ironed out the discrepancy between doctrine and the plane's performance, and put it to great use.
I've gotten the impression over the years that the Air Ministry really didn't know what to do with this DeHavilland gift for a year or so. You or someone else, please correct me if I'm wrong. It just seems like they read the plane wrong, through the lens of their own doctrine, rather than asking what the plane could do for them, until 1942 or so.
Of course they eventually ironed out the discrepancy between doctrine and the plane's performance, and put it to great use.
That is because it is only a gift in hind sight, it went against all known and accepted doctrines and schools of thought at the time, as did the P-51 which needed some wise and powerful friends to keep it in production when the doctrine and schools of thought said a long range escort fighter was not possible and actually not needed.
Nightfighting was a technical challenge and Dowding had the seeds of the answer. Already he knew that some raids between levels of cloud in the BoB were intercepted which is pretty much what you have to do with night fighting. That is to guide the interceptors close enough to the target such that their eyes or the very short range radar they carry can take over. The developments of "nightfighters" as planes went hand in hand with the "Ground Controlled Intercept" RADAR which was fully operational by June 1941 Ground Controlled Interception The range and abilities of airborne RADAR improved but the principle is the same. All of these RADAR developments straddle the development of the Beaufighter and Mosquito as airplanes and changed what they became.Yeah, pretty much, as pbehn says, it was a gift in hindsight. The problem was doctrine, tactics and getting over previously held perspectives. The night fighter issue was an example, night fighting and especially as pbehn mentioned, the introduction of radar, was evolved on a nightly basis and radar gave a huge advantage, but since kills were few and far between, but increased as the months wore on in 1941, the guys in charge were learning as they went along. Sure they made missteps, like turrets, but interim Defiants with two sets of eyes and a trainable turret against steadily trundling bombers flying straight and level semed like a good idea, but as pbehn said, radar changed tactics because it meant that aircraft didn't have to spend hours searching for bombers, although they still needed to visually acquire the bomber once they had detected it on radar to fire on it.
The addition of fast, precise planes added pathfinding to the doctrine of BC, did it not? How much pathfinding did BC practice before the Mosquito became available? That was exactly why I thought it changed doctrine a bit.[...] and the Mosquito was an aberration, but it found its niche because of its excellent performance, not really because of ay real change in doctrine.
Again, this is hindsight, not only did the British not have pathfinders in 1940-41 or consider them needed, they also didnt have heavies, no one did. Mosquitos were only a part of pathfinding, behind them were elite bombing squadrons that bombed the TIs to make a large target for the bomb taxis behind to hit.The addition of fast, precise planes added pathfinding to the doctrine of BC, did it not? How much pathfinding did BC practice before the Mosquito became available? That was exactly why I thought it changed doctrine a bit.
If I'm missing something here I'm all ears. But I think the Mossies did sterling work (if you'll pardon the pun) putting the heavies in on target, a capability BC didn't really have in 40-41. Am I missing something?
Again, this is hindsight, not only did the British not have pathfinders in 1940-41 or consider them needed, they also didnt have heavies, no one did.
While the first squadron to get Stirlings (No 7) got it's first ones in August 1940 they only flew their first operational mission in Feb 1941. By the end of 1941 only two more squadrons had been equipped with Stirlings (in part because both factories had been bombed.)That is exactly my point: perhaps the plane's capabilities helped RAF leadership think differently. Sometimes new technology and new capabilities can drive doctrine.
By the way, Stirlings were in service in 1941, just so you know. B-17s were entering service too, so that's pretty much a clod you're throwing against the wall there. Heavies in 1941 were a fact.
While the first squadron to get Stirlings (No 7) got it's first ones in August 1940 they only flew their first operational mission in Feb 1941. By the end of 1941 only two more squadrons had been equipped with Stirlings (in part because both factories had been bombed.)
heavies in 1941 were a fact but in practical terms that means you can win a bar bet. 3 squadrons of Stirlings, while useful, didn't change BC thinking much. Same with the early B-17s and B-24s.
I wasn't saying they were doing all the lifting. I was pointing out that, your claim aside, heavy bombers were indeed operational in 1941. Thanks for acknowledging as much.