Effectiveness Of British Flak In The Battle Of Britain

[Boom]

Am curious as to the effectiveness of British flak against German bombers in the BoB. It rarely gets a mention in bomber crew stories/bios's.

Unlike Bomber Command and 8th Air Force crews, who were obsessed with its effectiveness (as much on morale as in losses) over Europe. As were German bomber crews who flew over both Malta and Moscow.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Using the all causes listings in Battle Of Britain Then and Now, 1,986 Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed and 926 damaged, which of course have a number of unknown cause losses. AA fire is considered responsible for 69 destroyed and 33 damaged, plus 21 destroyed and 7 damaged jointly with RAF fighters. Collisions cost the Luftwaffe 63 and take off accidents 66 aircraft. Barrage Balloons 3 aircraft

The lack of modern guns and the overall number of guns meant AA fire was not a big cause of loss or worry as far as the Luftwaffe was concerned unless for low level operations.

AIR 2/7772 German losses from captured Luftwaffe documents again plenty of unknown and enemy action causes, where AA is the cause, destroyed unless noted
1 fighter on 10 July, 1 bomber on 14 July, 1 fighter unspecified damage 14 July, 1 bomber unspecified damage 14 July, 1 bomber by infantry fire on 22 July, 1 bomber on 25 July, 1 bomber on 9 August, 1 bomber on 12 August, 2 fighters on 14 August. 2 bombers damaged on 15 August, 1 bomber on 16 August plus 1 bomber and 1 fighter unspecified damage, 6 bombers on 24 August, 1 bomber unspecified damage 26 August, 1 fighter on 2 September, 1 bomber damaged on 6 September, 1 bomber, 1 fighter destroyed, 2 bombers damaged, 3 bombers unspecified damage on 7 September, 2 bombers on 8 September, 1 bomber destroyed plus 2 damaged on 7 September, 2 bombers destroyed and 1 bomber unspecified damage on 11 September, 1 bomber destroyed, 1 damaged on 15 September, 1 bomber damaged 17 September, 1 fighter on 21 September, 1 fighter on 24 September, 1 bomber damaged on 1 October, 1 bomber and 1 fighter on 2 October, 1 bomber unspecified damage on 4 October, 3 bombers damaged on 8 October, 1 bomber on 17 October, 1 bomber unspecified damage 27 October, 1 fighter 29 October.

It seems clear only London had the AA defences that could start to worry the Luftwaffe. The Germans were reporting their AA was shooting down more RAF aircraft than the other way around.

"from 10th July to 31st October 1940. The Germans assessed their losses as 2,376 aircraft destroyed or damaged, of which 1,543 were assessed as destroyed by enemy action, 190 destroyed by other causes and 643 damaged but repairable. The claim we made at the time was that 2,637 German aircraft had been destroyed." Note dated 19 December 1945.

 

[Greyman]

From Dowding's Despatch on the Battle of Britain, 20 Aug 1941

re: Anti-Aircraft Defences
Lessons Learnt

1. The outstanding lesson learnt from this intensive air attack was undoubtedly the soundness and suitability of the organisation and arrangements of the control and direction of the anti-aircraft defences. These measures devised in peace time and perfected during the earlier and quieter period of hostilities, stood the severe test with amazing resilience and adaptability. No major alterations in the system were indicated or, indeed, were made subsequent to these operations*. The way in which the activities of the anti-aircraft linked in and were capable of co-ordination with the other partners in the venture—R.A.F. Fighter Command, No. 11 Fighter Group, and sector commands—is perhaps worthy of special note.
   * This statement applies only to the Bofors situation, and must not be taken to mean that no improvements were made in the control and direction of A.A. gunnery.
   
   
2. Other lessons learnt are by comparison of minor import. Chief among these was the great vulnerability of aircraft if caught by accurate H.A.A. fire when in close formation. A good instance of this occurred on the night of the 8th September, when a geschwader of 15 Do. 17s, flying in formation at 9,000 feet, approached a gun site South of River Thames. The opening salvo from the four 3.7-inch guns brought down the three leading aircraft, the remaining machines turning back in disorder, scattering their bombs on the countryside in their flight to the coast.
   
   The value of H.A.A. fire as a means of breaking up bomber squadrons to enable them to be more easily dealt with by our fighters was demonstrated on numerous occasions on the Thames Estuary.
   
   The importance of A.A. shell bursts as a "pointer" to fighters, even though the guns cannot themselves effectively engage the enemy, was also frequently demonstrated.
   
   
3. A somewhat negative lesson was the inability of A.A. guns, however well served, to completely deny an area to penetration by determined air attack. Evidence, however, was overwhelming that accurate fire, apart from causing casualties, did impair the enemy's aim, and thus avoid, or at least mitigate, the damage to precise targets.
   
   
4. A rather unexpected result was the high proportion (about 10 per cent.) of planes brought down by A.A.M.G. fire. It is doubtful, however, whether with the increased armour now carried by enemy aircraft this lesson still obtains.
   
   
5. The value of training in recognition was repeatedly emphasised throughout these operations. Fortunately, very few instances of friendly aircraft being engaged occurred. Apart from the accuracy of the information, the movement of aircraft furnished to gun sites, this was no doubt due to a reasonable standard in recognition having been attained.
   
   It was, and still is, continually brought home to the A.A. gunner that, before he fires, he must not engage a friendly aircraft. With this precept firmly impressed on the G.L., some instances of late engagement or failure to engage occurred. In these cases the result was a standard of training being higher. To enable the target presentation of a gunner to be put beyond reasonable doubt, the number of machines engaged would have been increased.

 

[fubar57]

Somewhere is mentioned the number of rounds expended to bring down one aircraft. I can't remember which side but it was an incredible amount

 

[Greyman]

From a more detailed analysis than Dowding's paper:

AWAS, 12 December 1940
Rounds per casualty, June 26 - Sep 30

40 mm (w/ predictor)​	40 mm (w/o predictor)​	2 pdr​	SAA​
120​	285​	1810​	2685​

Heavy AA​	3"​	3.7"​	4.5"​
Day - Target Seen - Direct Fire​	255​	317​	145​
Day - Target Seen - Barrage Fire​	1160​	282​	148​
Night - Target Seen - Direct Fire​	662​	502​	272​
Night - Target Unseen - Direct Fire​	--​	1532​	1510​
Night - Target Unseen - Barrage Fire​	--​	8488​	15195​

 

[Nick Beale]

I'd need to check but weren't the first GL (gunlaying) radars for the AA introduced during the BoB/Blitz period? Of course they might not have had much immediate impact.

 

[muskeg13]

Am curious as to the effectiveness of British flak against German bombers in the BoB. It rarely gets a mention in bomber crew stories/bios's.

As were German bomber crews who flew over both Malta and Moscow.

Unlike Bomber Command and 8th Air Force crews, who were obsessed with its effectiveness (as much on morale as in losses) over Europe.

I feel the statement above is an very unfair and out of context slur against RAF and USAAF bomber crews who were subjected to horrendously effective German air defense measures over Germany and other occupied countries. Of course Bomber Command and the 8th USAAF were "obsessed" with the effectiveness of Nazi air defenses. Losing 10, 20 percent or more each major raid causes you to "obsess".

What does the poster seek to achieve by this post? An acknowledgement that Nazi air defenses were effective?

 

[Engineman]

I'd need to check but weren't the first GL (gunlaying) radars for the AA introduced during the BoB/Blitz period? Of course they might not have had much immediate impact.

Absolutely right that the UK GL radars were ineffective, until about mid 1941. The usefulness for searchlight or gun laying was minimal until mid 1941, despite huge resources sunk into them.
Visual AA gun-laying (with targets at night illuminated by searchlights) seems to have achieved hit in about every 10,000 shots.
Despite the ability of R V Jones' scientific intelligence that also gave the Air Ministry the almost exact knowledge of the time, place, height and target of German radar beam raids during the night Blitz, RAF Air to Air interceptions were almost fruitless until functional AI radar became operationally available in the Beaufighter in early 1941.
The little known RAF night single-engined Hurricane fighters working patrols and visually attacking bombers lit by searchlights, were partly effective in early 1941, until the AI radar became more effective, by mid 1941.

Eng

 

[EwenS]

I'd need to check but weren't the first GL (gunlaying) radars for the AA introduced during the BoB/Blitz period? Of course they might not have had much immediate impact.

There is quite a well referenced article on Wiki. GL radar development began along with development of CH pre-war. Some Mk.I sets went to France with the BEF in 1939/40 and were lost there. But the Mk.I had its problems leading to the Mk.I* and then the Mk.II in 1941.

Radar, Gun Laying, Mk. I and Mk. II - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[andy1967]

According to Google during the Blitz it could take upto 20,000 shells per aircraft destroyed.I also came across this controversial article .I watched the article on his official YouTube channel and there's alot of questioning his claims regarding the killing of civilians by land based Naval guns

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
Some extracts that may be of use for this subject, these from the OH series 'The Defence of the United Kingdom' by Basil Collier:

The next extracts are from 'Anti-Aircraft Artillery 1914-55' by Brigadier N W Routledge:

For those interested in G.L. Radar used by the British then the books 'Army Radar' compiled by Brigadier A P Sayer, OH reprint by N&M Press (original 1950), and 'Army Radar - The story of its Development and Employment in World War II' by David Wilcox, Reveille Press 2014, may be useful.
I hope that is of use.

Mike

 

[EwenS]

According to Google during the Blitz it could take upto 20,000 shells per aircraft destroyed.I also came across this controversial article .I watched the article on his official YouTube channel and there's alot of questioning his claims regarding the killing of civilians by land based Naval guns View attachment 879836View attachment 879837

Old news I'm afraid. There was a long discussion debunking much of what he claimed over on Axis History Forum that started over 3 years ago.

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=114&t=269545&p=2456130&hilit=British+civilians+killed+by+own+aa+fire#p2456130

It included a comment from someone who had dug out records from the National Archives and read as follows (post # 32).

"The UK National Archives has a document titled Air Raids On London, September-November 1940, produced by the Research and Experiments Department of the Ministry of Home Security, presented to the war cabinet 5 May 1941. Table 4 analyses casualties by where and how they occured.

Dwelling houses and other buildings
2,671 "cards", 777 killed
Of which AA Barrage 13 cards, 3 killed

Street or open
899 cards, 90 killed
Of which AA Barrage 77 cards, 2 killed

Anderson shelters
443 cards, 220 killed
Of which AA barrage 1 card, 3 killed

Other shelters
459 cards, 233 killed
Of which AA barrage 2 cards, 0 killed

Total 1,320 killed, 8 by AA barrage, 0.6% of total sample"

 

[andy1967]

Old news I'm afraid. There was a long discussion debunking much of what he claimed over on Axis History Forum that started over 3 years ago.

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=114&t=269545&p=2456130&hilit=British+civilians+killed+by+own+aa+fire#p2456130

It included a comment from someone who had dug out records from the National Archives and read as follows (post # 32).

"The UK National Archives has a document titled Air Raids On London, September-November 1940, produced by the Research and Experiments Department of the Ministry of Home Security, presented to the war cabinet 5 May 1941. Table 4 analyses casualties by where and how they occured.

Dwelling houses and other buildings
2,671 "cards", 777 killed
Of which AA Barrage 13 cards, 3 killed

Street or open
899 cards, 90 killed
Of which AA Barrage 77 cards, 2 killed

Anderson shelters
443 cards, 220 killed
Of which AA barrage 1 card, 3 killed

Other shelters
459 cards, 233 killed
Of which AA barrage 2 cards, 0 killed

Total 1,320 killed, 8 by AA barrage, 0.6% of total sample"

Thanks for your reply, yes the story was 6 years old. I wasn't aware that it had been debunked. Ironically his channel is called "History Debunked "

 

[Engineman]

The WIKI GL Radar entry seems to be very good.

Eng

 

[yulzari]

The British were well aware of their limitations even before the BoB and were determined, amongst other things, to give anti aircraft gunners meaningful training. Hence the efforts put into diverting front line capable aeroplanes into the task of high speed target tugs even at the cost of losing these to potential operational work. Skuas, Rocs, Battles, Henleys, Defiants etc. The RAF pre war had invested heavily in the planning to train aircrew and anti aircraft gunners which paid off as the war progressed. Those target tugs were also a reserve anti invasion strike force which helped justify retaining their pilots when fighter squadrons were so short of new pilots in 1940.

 

[pinehilljoe]

Before the proximity fuze, anti-aircraft artillery was notoriously inefficient. Gunners of the era openly acknowledged that hitting a small, fast, high-altitude aircraft was largely a matter of luck — period studies found that on average only about one out of every 1,200 AA shells fired scored a direct hit. Time-fuzed shells (set to explode after a calculated time of flight, requiring gunners to predict the target's future position) needed enormous volumes of fire to bring down a single plane: US Navy figures from 1943 put it at roughly 508 rounds of 5-inch time-fuzed ammunition per kill. Source: The Allies' Billion-dollar Secret: The Proximity Fuze of World War II

 

[pinehilljoe]

Before the proximity fuze, anti-aircraft artillery was notoriously inefficient. Gunners of the era openly acknowledged that hitting a small, fast, high-altitude aircraft was largely a matter of luck — period studies found that on average only about one out of every 1,200 AA shells fired scored a direct hit. Time-fuzed shells (set to explode after a calculated time of flight, requiring gunners to predict the target's future position) needed enormous volumes of fire to bring down a single plane: US Navy figures from 1943 put it at roughly 508 rounds of 5-inch time-fuzed ammunition per kill. Source: The Allies' Billion-dollar Secret: The Proximity Fuze of World War II

I have a little edge, I worked at JHU/APL for 8 year.