Effectiveness of the P-38

[Shortround6]

To hell with Wikipedia and their use of the books older than me as a reference
It was supposed to do 431 km/h at 4500m (top speed; 268 mph), and 425 at 5000m. At 6km, it is perhaps 415 km/h/256 mph?

LWS Protection DDoS - Vérification en cours

Thank you, I have some of the old books and having a peak speed at 20,000ft when the engine peaked out at 12,500ft (?) is more than a little suspect

The point was that whatever the capabilities of the CR 42 as a dog fighter. It was a lousy bomber interceptor unless the Allies (British Commonwealth) were trying to use old/very slow bombers. Having a 10-25mph speed advantage over Hampdens or Wellingtons was going to be a problem.
A long (8-12 minute) tail chase was going to very hard on the engines of both the fighters and bombers if they tried for max speed and short range fighters doing long tail chases are also in danger.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

I don't know at what strength, but USAAF 23rd (in China) and 51st FG (China and India) apparently got some B and C model P-51s, and 311 FBG in India which went into combat in all three units apparently by May of 1944.

14th Air Force - World War II - Fourteenth AF - Army Air Force

14th Air Force in World War II. Roster of Personnel and History in the China, Burma, India (CBI) Theater.

www.14af.org

23rd FG First missing P-51B on 6 May 1944, last missing P-40N 7 November 1944.
33rd FG No P-51 reported missing
51st FG First missing P-51B on 30 May 1944, last missing P-40N 20 January 1945.
81st FG No P-51 reported missing
311th FG First missing P-51B on 25 August 1944, also last P-51A loss.

It is clear there were few clean change overs, more it seems a squadron that could be used as top cover for the others. I am unsure how complete the MACR lists are.

One source I have says they were in Theater by Sept 1943 but there may have been a training period before they went into combat.

As described the source does not know A from B or C. CBI was where the vast majority of USAAF Allison Mustang exports were sent, first arrivals in August 1943. In late 1943/early 1944 it was all P-51 to Europe.

I don't think any type of P-51s were in Theater in large numbers. The Sqn publication on the Mustang says that there were never more than 500 in the CBI and usually about 250 at any one time, and that includes both the Allison and Merling engined versions.

But the only Allied fighter types which seemed to be in really large numbers were the Hurricanes and later the P-47s / Thunderbolts.

USAAF Statistical Digest. Aircraft and Equipment section Table 94 Aircraft on hand, China Burma India. 1st line fighters.

Month	Total	P-38	P-40	P-47	P-51	Night
Mar-42​	8​	0​	8​
Apr-42​	5​	0​	5​
May-42​	44​	0​	44​
Jun-42​	55​	0​	55​
Jul-42​	94​	0​	94​
Aug-42​	112​	0​	112​
Sep-42​	129​	0​	129​
Oct-42​	129​	0​	129​
Nov-42​	131​	0​	131​
Dec-42​	180​	0​	180​
Jan-43​	197​	0​	197​
Feb-43​	192​	0​	192​
Mar-43​	283​	0​	283​
Apr-43​	250​	0​	250​
May-43​	206​	0​	206​
Jun-43​	175​	0​	175​
Jul-43​	224​	23​	201​
Aug-43​	365​	19​	276​	0​	70​
Sep-43​	394​	21​	296​	0​	77​
Oct-43​	417​	58​	277​	0​	82​
Nov-43​	462​	52​	315​	0​	95​
Dec-43​	422​	42​	280​	0​	100​
Jan-44​	473​	41​	325​	0​	107​
Feb-44​	524​	62​	360​	0​	102​
Mar-44​	737​	64​	384​	100​	189​
Apr-44​	827​	60​	366​	208​	193​
May-44​	857​	56​	351​	247​	203​
Jun-44​	950​	58​	334​	354​	204​
Jul-44​	993​	70​	292​	429​	202​
Aug-44​	1,024​	78​	273​	464​	209​
Sep-44​	1,094​	80​	204​	458​	330​	22​
Oct-44​	1,024​	95​	165​	442​	295​	27​
Nov-44​	1,018​	94​	97​	429​	365​	33​
Dec-44​	982​	94​	75​	397​	383​	33​
Jan-45​	1,039​	113​	50​	377​	467​	32​
Feb-45​	1,057​	175​	49​	380​	421​	32​
Mar-45​	1,099​	200​	31​	367​	465​	36​
Apr-45​	1,051​	193​	22​	342​	458​	36​
May-45​	1,041​	232​	22​	327​	422​	38​
Jun-45​	1,149​	290​	16​	317​	472​	54​
Jul-45​	1,220​	229​	11​	284​	641​	55​
Aug-45​	1,168​	218​	10​	270​	621​	49​
Sep-45​	1,126​	213​	10​	252​	604​	47​
Oct-45​	954​	92​	17​	211​	609​	25​
Nov-45​	861​	28​	17​	189​	604​	23​
Dec-45​	396​	3​	0​	108​	284​	1​

There are no light bombers mentioned, which raises where the A-36 are counted. The P-51 figure passed 250 in September 1944, and was ahead of the P-47 figure in 1945. USAAF Official History Volume 5 page 192 has all the P-51 with the 14th Air Force for most of 1945

Meantime the RAF only had two overseas single seat/single engine fighters, Hurricane and Spitfire

End June 1944, SEAAC Hurricane, 112 I, 7 IIA, 346 IIB, 1,177 IIC, 99 IID, 101 IV, Spitfire 56 VC, 413 VIII

The decisions to concentrate US built fighters operated by the RAF, P-40 Mediterranean, P-51 Europe, P-47 India. So 314 P-47 in India end June 1944, first RAF Mustang arrive in March 1945

I would suggest that this was due to the rather severe range limitation of the Mk V, which was otherwise fairly good and certainly a major improvement over the Hurricanes which were in the breach far too long.

Try the way CBI was well down the priority list in 1942/43 when the Spitfire was in big demand, by the time the CBI became eligible mark V production was on the way out, from over 250 per month in Q1/43 to under 100 in June, with Castle Bromwich stopping V production in August and Westland in October 1943, with 58 built in those three months. It also made little sense to create another part of the world that needed Merlin 40 or 50 series engines, the mark VIII was clearly superior, available and able to be supplemented by mark IX in Italy at least making more available for the fight against Japan.

I haven't been able to find actual range statistics for the P-51A but this is helpful. Might have something to do with the external tanks too, P-51 carried two on the wings while the P-40 usually carried just the one on the centerline.

America's Hundred Thousand by Francis Dean, "yardstick range" P-51A 1,000 miles with 180 gallons, P-40N 750 miles with 161 gallons.

In real life deduct the fixed take off and climb, the combat allowance, the reserves allowance and the 20 extra gallons makes a big difference to fuel available for cruise, then as noted the P-51 had better air miles per gallon.

What I mean is that when they were engaged, which was not continuously, they typically lost a large percentage of the aircraft on the mission. More on that in a second.

I'm referring to the pretty frequent appearances of the C-47s in Shores book, by later 1943 and into 1944 and later. The JAAF seemed to move in a few times of the year to disrupt regular transport flights over 'The Hump' and then on other occasions during the ground offensives on either side, near battlefields where troops or supplies were being brought in by the transport planes. These would only last for a week or two and usually seemed to inflict fairly serious damage.

Looking at the total number of transports available including reserves indicates how small the average mission was, it is easy to inflict high percentage casualties on small formations. The Airlift to China did not normally use formations.

During these periods the transport planes took heavy losses (again I'm thinking in terms of a handful lost out of a dozen or two flying), but this only happeend periodically, not continuously.

Right, to put it another way something like 50% of all Lancaster built in WWII were lost during the war, or you can go with an overall loss rate on operations of under 2.5%. 50% losses, obviously a massacre, 2.5% losses, obviously well within acceptable rates.

8th Air Force, bombers,
03-Mar-44 Misc. targets, Germany, 13 attacking, 8 missing.
25-Apr-44 Mannheim, 7 attacking, 5 missing.
29-Apr-44 Magdeburg, 25 attacking, 18 missing.
12-May-44 Zwickau, 14 attacking, 10 missing.
12-May-44 Gera, 16 attacking, 12 missing.
27-Sep-44 Gottengen, 35 attacking, 25 missing.
I guess this qualifies as "getting shot down in large numbers"

I do not think things are being made up, but inaccurate anecdotes often adrift in time are being built into pretty pictures, complete with unicorns and other cute creatures.

 

[Shortround6]

In real life deduct the fixed take off and climb, the combat allowance, the reserves allowance and the 20 extra gallons makes a big difference to fuel available for cruise, then as noted the P-51 had better air miles per gallon.

For P-40 it could be about
30 gallons (give or take 3-4) to get to 10,000ft.
30-35 gallons for 15 minutes at military power (WEP could be more)
12 gallons (?) for 20 minutes at max cruise (under 200mph at low altitude for reserve)
or roughly 70-80 gallons not available for cruise out of 161 gallons. an extra 20 gallons means an extra 25%+ range on internal fuel alone not counting the more miles per gallon.

 

[EwenS]

Also using Mustangs in the CBI were

1st Air Commando Group (its last of 5 designations). As 5318th Provisional Unit (Air), it arrived at Karachi, India in Nov/Dec 1943. The fighter section brought its own P-51A aircraft from the USA, two batches of which were damaged by salt water corrosion and storm damage and had to be replaced. It entered combat over Burma on 3rd Feb 1944. Its original purpose was to support the Chindits during Operation Thursday that kicked off on 5th March 1944. Unit strength was initially 30 P-51A. Some P-51B were issued as replacements from late April.

All the Mustangs were withdrawn from about the start of the 1944 SW monsoon season in May 1944. The 1st ACG was then reorganised in Aug/Sept by which time it incorporated two fighter squadrons (5th & 6th FS (Commando)) each equipped with the P-47D and entering combat again from mid-Oct.

1st ACG returned to India following the fall of Rangoon at the beginning of May 1945. Its fighter squadrons then traded their worn P-47D for brand new P-51D/K, but the war ended before those squadrons saw any further combat.

2nd Air Commando Group (incorporating the 1st & 2nd FS (Commando)). These arrived in India in Dec 1944, collecting new P-51D Mustangs and a few F-6D in January 1945. They became operational over the Arakan in mid-Feb supporting the Allied advance south through Burma. From 5th March they began fighter sweep operations and heavy bomber escorts.over Burma and as far afield as Don Muang in southern Cambodia and other airfields in the north of the country.the The objective of these sweeps was the destruction in the air and on the ground of the remnants of the Japanese air forces in the area. Operations continued until 9th May at which point it, like other 10th Air Force units, was withdrawn from supporting British operations.

10th AF units then set about preparing to move to China to operate alongside the 14th AF. 10th AF HQ moved in July but none of the subsidiary units made the move before the war ended.

The plan was that another reorganisation of these fighter squadrons would have seen all four squadrons reallocated to a new fighter group in late 1945 / early 1946.

There was also the squadrons of the Chinese American Composite Wing to consider. These and the Chinese Air Force itself received hand me down aircraft from the USAAF units in 1945 including P-51B/C/D and P-47D, as USAAF received more modern models.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Thanks gentlemen, interesting data. The thing about the US fighter breakdown by type, most of the P-40 units (all of the 23rd FG and at half to all of the 51st FG, at various times) were based in China most of the time, whereas Shores 3rd book focuses mainly on Western Burma and India. The only time he deals with China is when the Burmese based JAAF fighter units like 64th Sentai flew raids against the Chinese bases. The only P-40 units in India were the 80th FG, the TACR group, and sometimes one or two squadrons of the 51st FG.

The British did have a couple of other fighter types - the Mohawk was pretty important fighter from 1942 and until early 1944, flying in two squadrons IIRC I think 155 and 5 RAF, one of the two (I forget which) took over the last of the available fighters some time in 1943 so it ended up being on Squadron. But they saw a lot of combat and did fairly well against the Ki-43. The Buffalo was also a major type very early during the initial "Bloody Shambles" phase, then the Beaufighter became available, and the US made Thunderbolt came in quite larger numbers starting in 1944. They also got a few FB Mosquitos in addition to the PR types.

Regarding the Spit V, what I mean is that when they were sent to the Theater, it was realized fairly quickly that the short range was a problem there. The vokes filter didn't help either. So the urgency to replace them with Spit VIII was keenly felt, shall we say. The Spit VIII was much better suited and gave the RAF their first real advantage over the Ki-43, just not quite as much as some might assume.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

This is a pretty good estimate in my opinion. But that 1/4-1/3 gap can make a difference in the long run (months) and that extends to the air war in general. For instance in NA it wasn't just fighter to fighter but fighter protected own force bombers and trying to shoot down enemy bombers/close support aircraft and/recon. If you are losing even by a small margin the fighter vs fighter combats over a number of months then you are also losing the bomber campaigns (for and against) unless there are other things going on.
The Fiat CR 42 did OK in fighter to fighter if the British/allied fighters slowed down and tried to turn with it. Against fast bombers in North Africa it had problems. Fast being Blenheim's as strange as that sounds. CR 42 is supposed to do 274mph at 20,000ft but most of the bombers were not flying at 20,000ft. It was rated at 248mph at 10,000ft and at only 213mph at sea level. Granted if attacking from above the CR 42s could use speed from dive to catch bombers but long stern chases are going to give poor results and the low speed difference means difficulty just getting into position. CR 42 climb was just OK. 4 min 15 seconds to 10,000ft and 9 min to 20,000ft (and not in African heat).
The actual goal for a fighter force is to deny the enemies bombers and recon aircraft access to the battle zone/s and to ensure their own bombers and recon aircraft access to the battle zones. Destruction of the enemy fighter force is just part of the goal, an important one, but not the ultimate goal.
It is not enough to shoot down just a few of the attacking airplanes (bombers), you have to shoot down enough of them so the enemy gives up, or changes to different targets.
If your enemy can build planes 50% faster than you can you have real problem, he can afford higher losses.

interesting points, though a few comments:

The CR.42 was basically retired for use as a fighter as soon as the Tomahawk showed up in Theater in mid 1941. It was already suffering at the hands of the Hurricane. They kept them around however as what you might call 'light (fighter) bombers', in a kind of similar role as the Hs 123 for the Germans (in Russia), the Soviet I-153 and I-16, and some obsolete Japanese bombers like the Ki-30 and Ki-32 (both used in China until the Americans got into the war) and the Mitsubishi Ki-51 which saw a fair bit of use fairly late in Burma, benefiting from heavy fighter escort by the ubiquitous Ki-43s. The Germans also used the older Bf 109Es this way as "Jabos" in the Med.

Another point worth noting is that while you are correct about bombers being the real point of all fighter combat - and this could be where the more agile fighters had an advantage, incidentally - in the Med the Allies were really relying heavily on fighters as their bombing force for a while. The Blenheim proved too vulnerable, and it took a while to build up numbers of the Maryland, Baltimore, and Boston, and after Torch, B-25, B-26 and B-24 etc. A lot of the fighter 'kills', especially by the Germans, was against other fighters.

The Germans themselves relied very heavily on the excellent Ju 87. But the Ju 87 hit a wall around mid 1942 when enough Allied fighters were in Theater, and they started frequently having to jettison their bombs amidst escape attempts. There was then a gap for a while where the German bomber attacks grew rare, and were limited mainly to Ju 88s and Bf 109 Jabos (along with a few sorties by CR 42 fighter-bombers), but in both cases these could only be used very carefully and not on a regular basis. Gradually these were replaced by Fw 190 Jabos which had a much better survival rate and could push through and make their strikes even in the face of strong fighter resistance.

Also worth pointing out, none of the German bombers, even the Fw 190s once they showed up, could really escape the DAF fighters in theater. When they were used they took steady losses. Even the Do 217 with the guided bombs and missiles they were using around Sicily. They were deadly but they lost so many on every mission, their heyday was brief.

Finally, in the case of the Ki-43, they did not have a big problem shooting down most American let alone British bombers. They fairly well wrecked a few B-24 raids. B-29s would have been another matter I'm sure but they weren't being used in the Theater that I can remember.

 

[EwenS]

Between spring 1944 and June 1945 six RAF squadrons in the India / Burma theatre re-equipped with Mosquito FB.VI. They replaced Vengeance dive bombers in 4 squadrons and Beaufighters in the other 2.

The four B-29 Bomb Groups of the 58th Bombardment Wing arrived on bases near Calcutta in April 1944 and remained there until March 1945. They undertook operations throughout the SEAC area as far south as the Singapore area. Their first operation was from their Indian bases to Bangkok on 5th June 1944.

For operations against targets in eastern China or Japan they used forward bases in western China that had to be stocked in advance with all the necessary fuel. Singapore operations used forward bases on Ceylon to extend the range.

A massive effort went into building the B-29 bases in India and Ceylon as well as the forward bases in China.

It had been planned to send the second B-29 BW to India as well but the difficulties encountered in using Chinese forward bases to reach Japan as well as the early capture of the Marianas meant it went to the Marianas instead.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Between spring 1944 and June 1945 six RAF squadrons in the India / Burma theatre re-equipped with Mosquito FB.VI. They replaced Vengeance dive bombers in 4 squadrons and Beaufighters in the other 2.

The four B-29 Bomb Groups of the 58th Bombardment Wing arrived on bases near Calcutta in April 1944 and remained there until March 1945. They undertook operations throughout the SEAC area as far south as the Singapore area. Their first operation was from their Indian bases to Bangkok on 5th June 1944.

For operations against targets in eastern China or Japan they used forward bases in western China that had to be stocked in advance with all the necessary fuel. Singapore operations used forward bases on Ceylon to extend the range.

A massive effort went into building the B-29 bases in India and Ceylon as well as the forward bases in China.

It had been planned to send the second B-29 BW to India as well but the difficulties encountered in using Chinese forward bases to reach Japan as well as the early capture of the Marianas meant it went to the Marianas instead.

Interesting! I knew about the B-29 bases in China but I thought that was a short lived project and aimed at Strategic targets e.g. in Japan. I'll have to go back through the book and see if I can find any Ki-43 vs B-29 combat in there.

 

[BarnOwlLover]

Biggest problem that the Ki-43 would've had against the B-29, aside from weak armament, would be just intercepting them. The B-29's cruising speed was a very high percentage of the Ki-43's top speed. And that's not factoring in height. B-29s on early daylight raids cruised at about 30,000 feet--high enough that the jet stream played havoc with navigation. The Ki-43's Sakae engines (basically the same as what the Zero used) had only single stage superchargers, which would've (as with many Japanese fighters) limited their chances for a successful interception due to deteriorating high alt. performance.

Granted, the aforementioned navigation/bombing accuracy issues lead to a switch to nighttime, usually low alt. raids until I think Iwo Jima was taken by the USMC, from which time the USAAF started flying P-51s out of there (and later Okinawa along with P-38s and P-47Ns) and the daylight raids resumed. Which the Mustangs and other fighters caused issues for the IJA/IJN, namely that the USAAF started using tactics that proved useful in Europe. Namely send fighters out ahead of the bomber streams to intercept and attack Japanese interceptors and their bases, as well as other Japanese infrastructure. And as with Germany, this ultimately proved fatal for their air defenses.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Biggest problem that the Ki-43 would've had against the B-29, aside from weak armament, would be just intercepting them. The B-29's cruising speed was a very high percentage of the Ki-43's top speed. And that's not factoring in height. B-29s on early daylight raids cruised at about 30,000 feet--high enough that the jet stream played havoc with navigation. The Ki-43's Sakae engines (basically the same as what the Zero used) had only single stage superchargers, which would've (as with many Japanese fighters) limited their chances for a successful interception due to deteriorating high alt. performance.

Yes totally agree with this. I'm going to check through the book soon to see if I can find any examples of combat to see if the operational histories bear this out.

Granted, the aforementioned navigation/bombing accuracy issues lead to a switch to nighttime, usually low alt. raids until I think Iwo Jima was taken by the USMC, from which time the USAAF started flying P-51s out of there (and later Okinawa along with P-38s and P-47Ns) and the daylight raids resumed. Which the Mustangs and other fighters caused issues for the IJA/IJN, namely that the USAAF started using tactics that proved useful in Europe. Namely send fighters out ahead of the bomber streams to intercept and attack Japanese interceptors and their bases, as well as other Japanese infrastructure. And as with Germany, this ultimately proved fatal for their air defenses.

Yeah I think most here are familiar with the strategic bombing campaign against Japan, I guess my remaining question (hopefully answered soon) would be did they use B-29s in tactical / operational raids like maybe against ports or factories in mainland SE Asia.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I don't see B-29s in the book so far, it's not in the Order of Battle for Dec 44 or Jun 45. Can't find them in the index either though that doesn't mean too much. If anyone knows the squadron numbers I could look on that basis.

 

[Shortround6]

From start of the Dessert war to end was just under 3 years. So very few planes lasted from first to last.

The Marylander gets a lot of press, actual effect may have been less. The ones that were in the Dessert may have been very effective but there just weren't that many. Only 450 Marylanders built and and the French would up with about 215 (?). So about 235 wound up in British hands. 4 South African squadrons used them and 4 RAF squadrons and one Fleet Air Arm squadron. This may not be complete as some of these units only a few planes with other types making up the majority of their numbers. The FAA squadron famously found that the Bismark had sailed for instance but that aircraft was only Maryland that the squadron had. Marylanders were used a lot for recon due to speed and range.
There was sort of gap before the Baltimores show up, These do not get into combat until early 1942, leaving the Blenheim and Bostons as pretty much the standard light bombers during 1941. British still did not have their act together for CS for the army as even in the Spring of 1942 the early Baltimore missions suffered heavy losses because they were not escorted. Almost two years and they still had not figured it out yet?

The FW 190 didn't show up until Nov 1942. Very effective when it did show up.

Finally, in the case of the Ki-43, they did not have a big problem shooting down most American let alone British bombers. They fairly well wrecked a few B-24 raids.

This is certainly subject to interpretation. A lot depends on statistics in the bad sense, as in " lies damn lies and statistics". I have an Osprey book, which I am not claiming as the last word on anything "B-24 Liberator VS Ki-43 Oscar: China and Burma 1943"
At one point the author lists a number of raids that sound horrendous for the B-24s like the Sept 15th raid on Hiaphong where the B-24s lost 80%. Then you look in a chart for losses on certain dates the the 308th BG lost 4 planes on Sept 15th. There were only 5 planes that flew the mission out of 7 that were initially dispatched. Two got stuck in the mud on take-off.
The 308th records say 3 planes lost (60%) and that they were attacked by 50+ fighters (over-estimate by Americans?). Searching though other sources one of the two remaining B-24s crashed on approach to Kunming when returning. The Osprey book claims about 35 Ki-43s took part in the attack. The Pacific wrecks site says the bomb run was done at 12,000ft.
Much like unescorted raids over Germany small raids of 4-9 aircraft without escorts were not going to work well, in fact worse. The Ki-43s success rate swung back and forth. Early raids (March through Aug 21) never lost more than 2 aircraft. Any raid that lost more than 3 plane during 1943 needed two or more Sentais to cause such loses and there were only 3 such occasions. Dec 1943 saw the introduction of escorts capably of deep penetration and the Ki-43 success rate plummeted.
Perhaps they did better in a different theater?
Some of the battles described in the book lasted 50 minutes to an hour.
There were only 22 (?) engagements list in the book from March 13th to Dec 24th of 1943. The Americans lost 30-31 B-24s and the Japanese lost 20 Ki-43s. A lot things changed in 1944 with the B-24s attacking different targets and getting escorts. Some of the Ki-43 Sentais were assigned to different areas decreasing the numbers available. A few were reequipped with Ki-84s in late 1944. Ki-43s only shot down one B-24 in China/Burma theater in 1944.

30 bombers and 20 fighters was one day's fighting in the BoB.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

From start of the Dessert war to end was just under 3 years. So very few planes lasted from first to last.

The Marylander gets a lot of press, actual effect may have been less. The ones that were in the Dessert may have been very effective but there just weren't that many. Only 450 Marylanders built and and the French would up with about 215 (?). So about 235 wound up in British hands. 4 South African squadrons used them and 4 RAF squadrons and one Fleet Air Arm squadron. This may not be complete as some of these units only a few planes with other types making up the majority of their numbers. The FAA squadron famously found that the Bismark had sailed for instance but that aircraft was only Maryland that the squadron had. Marylanders were used a lot for recon due to speed and range.
There was sort of gap before the Baltimores show up, These do not get into combat until early 1942, leaving the Blenheim and Bostons as pretty much the standard light bombers during 1941. British still did not have their act together for CS for the army as even in the Spring of 1942 the early Baltimore missions suffered heavy losses because they were not escorted. Almost two years and they still had not figured it out yet?

The Bostons were effective, though limited in range. The Marylands were indeed only used by SA units (unless you count some recon planes at Malta), but they were one of the main bombers in the mix for a while. All of the DAF bombers in this period had a pretty light bomb load. Fairly early in 1942 they were already using Hurricanes and Kittyhawks as fighter bombers. The unescorted missions for the Baltimores were a fairly brief episode.

The FW 190 didn't show up until Nov 1942. Very effective when it did show up.

They were very effective, partly because they weren't recognized as such, but they (I think it was JG 2?) didn't stay in Theater that long. And they weren't being used as fighter bombers that early IIRC. They were being used a lot around the time of Sicily and Italy.

This is certainly subject to interpretation. A lot depends on statistics in the bad sense, as in " lies damn lies and statistics". I have an Osprey book, which I am not claiming as the last word on anything "B-24 Liberator VS Ki-43 Oscar: China and Burma 1943"
At one point the author lists a number of raids that sound horrendous for the B-24s like the Sept 15th raid on Hiaphong where the B-24s lost 80%. Then you look in a chart for losses on certain dates the the 308th BG lost 4 planes on Sept 15th. There were only 5 planes that flew the mission out of 7 that were initially dispatched. Two got stuck in the mud on take-off.
The 308th records say 3 planes lost (60%) and that they were attacked by 50+ fighters (over-estimate by Americans?). Searching though other sources one of the two remaining B-24s crashed on approach to Kunming when returning. The Osprey book claims about 35 Ki-43s took part in the attack. The Pacific wrecks site says the bomb run was done at 12,000ft.
Much like unescorted raids over Germany small raids of 4-9 aircraft without escorts were not going to work well, in fact worse. The Ki-43s success rate swung back and forth. Early raids (March through Aug 21) never lost more than 2 aircraft. Any raid that lost more than 3 plane during 1943 needed two or more Sentais to cause such loses and there were only 3 such occasions. Dec 1943 saw the introduction of escorts capably of deep penetration and the Ki-43 success rate plummeted.
Perhaps they did better in a different theater?
Some of the battles described in the book lasted 50 minutes to an hour.
There were only 22 (?) engagements list in the book from March 13th to Dec 24th of 1943. The Americans lost 30-31 B-24s and the Japanese lost 20 Ki-43s. A lot things changed in 1944 with the B-24s attacking different targets and getting escorts. Some of the Ki-43 Sentais were assigned to different areas decreasing the numbers available. A few were reequipped with Ki-84s in late 1944. Ki-43s only shot down one B-24 in China/Burma theater in 1944.

30 bombers and 20 fighters was one day's fighting in the BoB.

The scale of the fighting in the CBI was small in terms of numbers of aircraft involved. It was a big place at the end of a very long supply line. But the losses in Bloody Shambles were on a larger scale than that, and some of the raids were a good bit larger than the ones you are describing, though I don't remember the dates. I do remember one in which 6 or 7 B-24s were shot down with several pilots killed including the commander of the bomber group. I can post a few examples maybe later tonight or tomorrow if you need to see it. I think I may have posted some of these already somewhere in here... ?

 

[Frog]

Yes totally agree with this. I'm going to check through the book soon to see if I can find any examples of combat to see if the operational histories bear this out.



Yeah I think most here are familiar with the strategic bombing campaign against Japan, I guess my remaining question (hopefully answered soon) would be did they use B-29s in tactical / operational raids like maybe against ports or factories in mainland SE Asia.

Notably after the capture of Okinawa and Ryukyu Islands , B-24s from the 5th and 7th Air Forces as well as B-25s and A-26s could reach targets in Japan.
B-29s could then concentrate on strategic bombing and anti-shipping mine laying.

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DRk7H9fzECYo&ved=2ahUKEwi6oPymgf2RAxX1UaQEHVYpK_o4ChC3AnoECCkQAg&usg=AOvVaw1yUE7qNGqapWTGIUMnbbtj

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Yes totally agree with this. I'm going to check through the book soon to see if I can find any examples of combat to see if the operational histories bear this out.



Yeah I think most here are familiar with the strategic bombing campaign against Japan, I guess my remaining question (hopefully answered soon) would be did they use B-29s in tactical / operational raids like maybe against ports or factories in mainland SE Asia.

Yes, from Sri Lanka iirc, in 1944? I had thought they launched from Calcutta to Palembang but double-checking showed my memory faulty. Anyway, there were two or three raids from India to NEI oil facilities in the last year of the war, and there was at least one mining mission by B-29s flown against the approaches to Singapore.

Outside of the oil targets, then, no other "traditional" strategic bombing targets were attacked.

I can't vouch for every word of this essay, but it seems to cohere with my recollections of past readings:

Oil Refineries and Storage Centers under IJA Control, Bob Hackett

 

[EwenS]

58th BW and its B-29s was controlled by XX Bomber Command in India which was itself controlled by 20th AF in Washington DC. It wasn't part of any of the air forces based in the CBI nor controlled by SEAC.

Targets were all seen as strategic in nature. Like the oil refineries in Sumatra and other oil facilities in the Singapore area which were amongst the targets.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Month	Blenheim	Maryland	Maryland	Boston	Baltimore
Jan-41​	66​	17​
Feb-41​	26​	25​	20​
Mar-41​	47​	6​
Apr-41​	67​	7​	15​
May-41​	64​	3​	30​
Jun-41​	85​	2​	5​
Jul-41​	108​		5​
Aug-41​	57​	3​
Sep-41​	139​			24​
Oct-41​	58​	2​		32​
Nov-41​	106​	1​	1​	14​	3​
Dec-41​	103​	1​		41​	14​
Jan-42​	26​	1​		5​	15​
Feb-42​	15​				30​
Mar-42​	15​				46​
Apr-42​	39​	1​			50​
May-42​	54​				42​
Jun-42​	158​	1​			36​
Jul-42​	99​				24​
Aug-42​	57​				29​
Sep-42​	19​				23​
Oct-42​	9​
Nov-42​	21​				10​
Dec-42​	40​				2​
Total	1478​	70​	76​	116​	324​

Blenheims are exports from UK, which will take a while to arrive.
Maryland first column exports from UK (January 1941 includes 1940 exports), second column imports from US (first 35 via Takoradi, rest via Cape)
Bostons, Baltmores are arrivals in Middle East = Egypt or Takoradi
Total Boston imports, all destinations, February to September 1942 were 20, hence the diversions from USSR orders passing through the Middle East in 1942

Maryland, 115+100+130 French orders, 88 from third order to UK, added to 150 UK order aircraft, 87 aircraft ended up in UK, 76 of these exported (16 by Air to Middle east, 54 Middle east, 6 South Africa) of which 14 were lost in transit.
75 Maryland direct to South Africa plus 6 from UK, some of these ended up in the Middle East via the SAAF operations in East Africa.

8 squadron Maryland, July to December 1940, Arabian Peninsula
39 squadron Maryland, January 1941 to January 1942 (Beaufort from August 1941)
69 Squadron, ex 431 flight, Malta, PR, various types including Maryland January 1941 to April 1942
223 squadron Maryland May 1941 to April 1942 but acting as training unit until January 1942

12 SAAF squadron, Maryland, Middle East July 1941, Boston January 1942
21 SAAF squadron, Maryland, Middle East August 1941, Baltimore February 1942 (but training until early July)
24 SAAF squadron, Maryland, Middle East April 1941, Boston November 1941
60 SAAF squadron, Maryland, Middle East October 1941, PR, various types

14 squadron Baltimore replaced Blenheim July/August 1942
55 squadron Baltimore May 1942
203 squadron Baltimore replacing Blenheim/Maryland August /December 1942.
223 squadron Baltimore replaced Blenheim/Boston January 1942, Maryland removed in April

As noted before the Luftwaffe in North Africa found picking off escort fighters far safer then trying for the bombers and so flying below the escorts.

The 20th Air Force was effectively a day bomber force until March 1945, when it became day and night., up until march 1945 incendiaries had been a minor part of loads, March and May to August 1945 incendiary well outnumbered HE tonnage. The USAAF thinks 13 B-39 were lost to enemy fighters in April 1945 as a peak while B-29 claimed 202 enemy aircraft shot down in April 1945, 131 in May, 136 in June, 3 in July and 2 in August 1945. After the failure to defend Okinawa the Japanese largely gave up trying to intercept USAAF raids, holding the aircraft to use against the expected invasion of Japan. The 20th Air Force fighters began operations in July 1945.

20th Bomber Command operated from June 1944 to March 1945, dropping 11,691 out of a wartime total of 171,060 short tons of bombs (7%), 213 out of 1,145 enemy aircraft shot down (19%), losing 80 out of 414 B-29 lost on combat missions (19%)

There were occasional B-29 "tactical" raids, like the airfields being used by the Japanese to launch air raids against the USN off Okinawa.

In 1941 the RAF rated the clean Hurricane IIc range at 500 miles, the clean Spitfire V range at 480 miles.

Fairly early in 1942 they were already using Hurricanes and Kittyhawks as fighter bombers.

so we are back to square one.

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you for the information and work.

Basically the Blenheims were by far the bulk of the light bomber forces in NA until after Dec 1942. And Bostons were just a small blip. Perhaps an important one but 116 planes minus combat/operational losses leaves not many in 1942. Same for the Marylanders. Only 11 planes delivered or enroute after July 1941?

Fairly early in 1942 they were already using Hurricanes and Kittyhawks as fighter bombers.

as Mr Sinclair said, we back to this?
Kittyhawks could do ground attacks by staffing. There are photos of them with 3-4 small bombs under each wing. There are photos with a single 250lb bomb under the fuselage. Dating these photos is a bit difficult.
Photos of larger bombs or multiple 250lb bombs are somewhat later. It took while for fighter bombers with single 250lb bombs to replace bombers that could carry four 250lb bombs.
Using the fighters as escorts might have worked better? Close Support took a while to sort out. Bombing enemy airfields close the front may have been considered close support? From the army's point of view, if the front-line troops could not see the bombs falling it was not close support. This led to a lot of arguing between the RAF and the Army.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Thank you for the information and work.

Basically the Blenheims were by far the bulk of the light bomber forces in NA until after Dec 1942. And Bostons were just a small blip. Perhaps an important one but 116 planes minus combat/operational losses leaves not many in 1942. Same for the Marylanders. Only 11 planes delivered or enroute after July 1941?

as Mr Sinclair said, we back to this?

Yep, I think it was May 42 right? I really don't get why y'all were so excited about it. Hurricanes were carrying bombs a few months earlier than that I believe, carrying two 250 lb bombs.

Kittyhawks could do ground attacks by staffing. There are photos of them with 3-4 small bombs under each wing. There are photos with a single 250lb bomb under the fuselage. Dating these photos is a bit difficult.
Photos of larger bombs or multiple 250lb bombs are somewhat later. It took while for fighter bombers with single 250lb bombs to replace bombers that could carry four 250lb bombs.

The issue is whether you could hit anything with said bombs. One bomb which hits on or close to the target is better than four which hit too far away The fighters could also do fairly effective strafing after they dropped the bombs.

and there was also an issue of bombers were taking unacceptable losses, though in the first half of 1942 DAF losses were rather appalling for all types.

Using the fighters as escorts might have worked better? Close Support took a while to sort out. Bombing enemy airfields close the front may have been considered close support? From the army's point of view, if the front-line troops could not see the bombs falling it was not close support. This led to a lot of arguing between the RAF and the Army.

Using the fighters as escorts for the Blenheims was considered very hazardous for the fighters, partly because the Blenheims flew at such a low cruising speed, and often seemed to get shot down anyway. This is why the Australian Ace Clive Caldwell first suggested (rather forcefully) they try using the fighters. Though this too turned out to be very hazardous.

The advantage of the Maryland and Boston, and later especially the Baltimore, from the point of view of the DAF commanders, is that they had a high cruising speed and could go into an even higher 'sprint' speed over the target area, notably during egress, depending on the range of the mission. This meant they were over the target area for a shorter time and could leave it much more quickly. Which meant, in turn, that with fighter escort, these types had quite a low loss rate. This is particularly true for the Baltimore which could reach a particularly high speed in a dive, and often left the battle area in a high speed dive after dropping their ordinance.

 

[EwenS]

The 58th BW flew 49 missions from India between 5 June 1944 and the night of 29/30 March 1945. 23 were flown in 1944 with only 8 to targets in the westernmost part of Japan (Yawata, Omura & Nagasaki) Japan, the only parts reachable by B-29s flying from forward bases in China. Other targets were in Manchuria (Anshan (steel works) & Mukden), Bangkok (Thailand), Palembang (Southern Sumatra), Formosa, Rangoon (Burma), Singapore, Hankow (China).

The other 26 were flown in 1945 with only one to Japan (Omura) but including 7 that involved mining operations around Singapore, Saigon, Shanghai & the Yangtze River. Bombing targets included Singapore, Bangkok, Formosa, Saigon, southern Burma (Rangoon & Mingaladon), Kuala Lumpur (Malaya), & Rangoon. In total only 6 missions in 1945 used the forward bases in China.

Quite a number of these missions involved night bombing of targets with radar assistance.

The above does not include the tremendous effort put in by the B-29s to move supplies for their operations from India into China especially in April / May and Sept / Oct 1944 which were augmented by ATC aircraft already flying the Hump route.