Effectiveness of the P-38 (1 Viewer)

[Steamed_Banana]

If you don't use the criteria at the time, you are left with claims submitted to one standard and a reviewed by someone with less than full understanding of the claims at the end, sometimes over 80 years later.

If you think that has any validity at all, then please don't do any research that draws conclusions from historic data since you apparently don't understand that historic data, as far as numbers go, is collected to very specific criteria. Any data NOT meeting the criteria for a victory is classified as they classified it at that time.

Sometimes a true victory was called "probable" or "damaged" because the action met the criteria used at that time for those categories. Later, if the criteria changed which, in the case of the U.S.A., they did, there was no effort expended to go back and correct earlier scores to match the new criteria. So, any victories were victories at the time they were awarded, not necessarily later or even after the war was over. Later still, in the 1960s and beyond, people bagan getting almost stupid about what they wanted to call a victory or not, depending on what their objective at the time was.

Case in point was the tremendous effort to discredit Greg Boyington just so Joe Foss could have a good South Dakota Governor's campaign, It seems to have worked since most texts now quote Boyinbgton as having fewer victories because they only count his victories in the service of the U.S.A. (as if the AVG weren't stood up and operated with US equipment), but somehow don't apply that to US citizens who fought for the RAF, RCAF, or RAAF.

Using the data without knowing what it stands for is a basic error.

I really feel like we are talking past each other, but I'm just going to say this.

• I'm not trying to change the official score of any particular pilot (the case about Boyington is interesting and worth discussing, but not for the reasons you seem to assign to me) or any particular unit, or necessarily to any particular aircraft type. Or any particular nation or branch of service. That is pointless.
• I do understand how to use primary sources and what a primary source is. I've published historical papers in peer reviewed academic journals.
• I also do not believe that people like Christopher Shores were failing to respect or understand the primary sources either.
• You seem to take the position that reviewing the losses of one side vs the claims of the other is inherently morally wrong and / or impossible. I don't think that is even remotely true.
• It is actually worth knowing that when a particular unit in a particular battle claimed 14 enemy aircraft destroyed, that only 3 were actually lost by the other side on that day and in that part of the world. This can in fact be determined, it's valuable historical data that many people are clearly interested in and it sheds valuable light on understanding what actually happened during the war.
• It does in fact reinvigorate the history of WW2 and many other conflicts, bringing life into old discussions which were based on propaganda and mythology for many generations.

 

[Shortround6]

You kind of glossed over 1943 but I think that was the big year.

In late 1942 there were a handful of very skilled P-38 pilots in two or three squadrons in the Pacific who were able to accomplish substantial gains for the Allied cause. But the overall effect was limited. The average P-38 pilot was not necessarily doing better than pilots of older types, but they could still fly missions that other types couldn't do (or do as well).

Yes, 1943 was big year for the P-38 but the planning had to done in 1942 and if the P-38 had not worked in 1943 there would have been big trouble. Only in Med in Nov/Dec were the P-38s showing up in fighter groups. In the Pacific they were showing up in squadrons or even partial squadrons.

In 1943 is the long tipping point of the war. Initially you still have a lot of P-38F and G

Quite true and much of the initial successes of the P-38 were done with P-38F and G aircraft.

In the Med the P-38 had trouble initially but they were not an utter catastrophe. All of the Allied units in that Theater had some trouble in early 1943, but P-38s were still in action all year and by the middle to the end of the year the Allies were becoming ascendant in the Theater with the invasion of Sicily in July and mainland Italy in September, coinciding with Italy's first surrender.

the Average height of combat in the med was lower than anticipated before operation Torch but the P-38s offered a useful gain in height over the P-40Fs. They also offered a large increase in operational range for bomber escort and not just B-17 raids.
However the US air command was outdated and faulty. Not much advanced over what the British had been doing in 1940 or 1941. Ground troops/command wanted 'air umbrellas" to keep German ground support aircraft off of them and there were not enough allied aircraft to do both. That is stop the German attacks on the American troops in view of the American troops and attack the German airfields were the attacks were coming from. Providing constant fighter patrols as part of the "air umbrellas" used up fuel, flying hours, spare parts and indeed aircraft for little gain. Things did get better. P-38s at Sicily may not have used their altitude capabilities a lot but they could provide cover/support from bases in Tunisia which P-40s and P-39s could not due effectively. At Salerno the P-38s can stay over the beaches for an hour with a 10 minute combat allowance. The P-39s and P-40s could not do this.

In the CBI P-38 units were a minor presence starting only late in the year (November with the 459th FS as far as I can determine). They had a minimal impact in 1943 but they were as in other Theaters extending the effective strike range of Allied forces, and augmented by the arrival of the Spitfire Mk VIII with British forces, were starting to be a headache for the JAAF.

The P-38 unit in the India was, as you say, the 459th fighter Squadron. The 449th FS went into action Nov 26th 1943 with the 14th air force in China and these two squadrons may (?) have been the only P-39 squadrons in the CBI theater for most of the war.
Both squadrons did very well in 1944.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Case in point was the tremendous effort to discredit Greg Boyington just so Joe Foss could have a good South Dakota Governor's campaign, It seems to have worked since most texts now quote Boyinbgton as having fewer victories because they only count his victories in the service of the U.S.A. (as if the AVG weren't stood up and operated with US equipment), but somehow don't apply that to US citizens who fought for the RAF, RCAF, or RAAF.

I think at least some of the objections to Boyington's AVG claims was not about claim-standards for the AVG, but because Boyington wasn't really honest in laying his claims in the first place.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Yes, 1943 was big year for the P-38 but the planning had to done in 1942 and if the P-38 had not worked in 1943 there would have been big trouble. Only in Med in Nov/Dec were the P-38s showing up in fighter groups. In the Pacific they were showing up in squadrons or even partial squadrons.

Quite true and much of the initial successes of the P-38 were done with P-38F and G aircraft.

True, but like I said, it seemed to be only a few pilots that had the knack, so to speak.

the Average height of combat in the med was lower than anticipated before operation Torch but the P-38s offered a useful gain in height over the P-40Fs. They also offered a large increase in operational range for bomber escort and not just B-17 raids.

No argument here

However the US air command was outdated and faulty. Not much advanced over what the British had been doing in 1940 or 1941. Ground troops/command wanted 'air umbrellas" to keep German ground support aircraft off of them and there were not enough allied aircraft to do both. That is stop the German attacks on the American troops in view of the American troops and attack the German airfields were the attacks were coming from. Providing constant fighter patrols as part of the "air umbrellas" used up fuel, flying hours, spare parts and indeed aircraft for little gain.

This is also very true. There was a serious problem with the US Army in the first several weeks of 1943 relearning some old lessons and a kind of power struggle between the nascent service branches which was finally resolved (I think by Eisenhower?) in favor of the Army Air Force over the ground force commanders. And I think this was at the advice of the exasperated British who were watching this all unfold.

The "air umbrella" thing seemed like it made sense where the US forces were very hard pressed at Kasserine etc. (and were getting hit hard by the Luftwaffe in what was one of their last really great achievements in Theater) but as you say it didn't work. By the end of that battle US units were rallying, albeit under very heavy pressure, and you started seeing some very effective low-level bombing and strafing of German ground forces (including by A-20s), effective attacks on German air bases, and better fighter cover for the troops too. But there was no such thing as 24/7 air cover like the ground commanders wanted.

P-38 units were not doing too well at this point but over the spring and summer they worked out better tactics and training and found their niche, which then gradually expanded.

Things did get better. P-38s at Sicily may not have used their altitude capabilities a lot but they could provide cover/support from bases in Tunisia which P-40s and P-39s could not due effectively. At Salerno the P-38s can stay over the beaches for an hour with a 10 minute combat allowance. The P-39s and P-40s could not do this.

P-39s weren't involved at that point in any significant way, they were basically doing things like maritime patrol.

But aside from P-40Fs and Ls the USAF was also flying 'reverse lend-lease' Spitfires (six squadrons, in the 31st and 52nd FGs), as were the British, and they had the good ones by that point. P-38s could escort medium and heavy bombers to distant Axis bases and by late 1943, were doing a lot better in combat and could hold their own. The Spitfires, P-40s, and other Allied fighters (US and Royal Navy etc.) couldn't really do that. By the end of the year P-47s were arriving (taking over from P-40s in 325th and 57th FG) which could also expand the role and operational capabilities of the USAAF.

The P-38 unit in the India was, as you say, the 459th fighter Squadron. The 449th FS went into action Nov 26th 1943 with the 14th air force in China and these two squadrons may (?) have been the only P-39 squadrons in the CBI theater for most of the war.

You mean P-38 I think

Both squadrons did very well in 1944.

Agreed

 

[GregP]

I really feel like we are talking past each other, but I'm just going to say this.

• I'm not trying to change the official score of any particular pilot (the case about Boyington is interesting and worth discussing, but not for the reasons you seem to assign to me) or any particular unit, or necessarily to any particular aircraft type. Or any particular nation or branch of service. That is pointless.
• I do understand how to use primary sources and what a primary source is. I've published historical papers in peer reviewed academic journals.
• I also do not believe that people like Christopher Shores were failing to respect or understand the primary sources either.
• You seem to take the position that reviewing the losses of one side vs the claims of the other is inherently morally wrong and / or impossible. I don't think that is even remotely true.
• It is actually worth knowing that when a particular unit in a particular battle claimed 14 enemy aircraft destroyed, that only 3 were actually lost by the other side on that day and in that part of the world. This can in fact be determined, it's valuable historical data that many people are clearly interested in and it sheds valuable light on understanding what actually happened during the war.
• It does in fact reinvigorate the history of WW2 and many other conflicts, bringing life into old discussions which were based on propaganda and mythology for many generations.

Reviewing the losses on one side is not wrong, and is interesting to boot. What in the world makes you think records from one side for claims are wildly inaccurate but the loss records from the other side for losses are all absolutely correct? Both sets of data went through war attacks and suffered losses from same coupled with losses over time from mishandling. Why do YOU believe the loss data are more accurate? Any objective proof?

You don't actually KNOW how many airplanes were lost. You can't even tell me how many Bf 109s were built or how many were accepted within many thousand, but you think you know how many were lost? And you think you know the losses down to the aircraft? I think likely not, and I am not alone in that.

We don't even have a known really good set of data for claims. much less vetted victories.

Yes, you can find many tables with exact numbers in several places, very few of which agree with one another, even for things like how many were delivered and how many were accepted. And we know a LOT more about deliveries and acceptancers than we do about losses.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Reviewing the losses on one side is not wrong, and is interesting to boot. What in the world makes you think records from one side for claims are wildly inaccurate but the loss records from the other side for losses are all absolutely correct? Both sets of data went through war attacks and suffered losses from same coupled with losses over time from midhandling. Why do YOU believe the loss data are more accurate? Any objective proof?

This is really easy to understand. It's just much, much, much, much harder to know how many enemy were killed (or how many of their machines destroyed) than it is to know how many of your own were lost. This is a constant going back to the first recorded histories in the Bronze Age.

You don't actually KNOW how many airplanes were lost. You can't even tell me how many Bf 109s were built or how many were accepted within many thousand, but you think you know how many were lost?

Yes, on a particular day, yes you absolutely can know this Greg. It's not the face of God. You are acting as if WW2 happened in another universe. There are records for these things. Serial numbers for each aircraft, when they were written off or lost. All kinds of records for each pilot. Their pay, their billeting, their medical treatment when they receive it. And when they were reported KiA, MiA, "Failed to Return" and so on.

And you think you know the losses down to the aircraft? I think likely not, and I am not alone in that.

I mean, I'm not the one who has published books of this, but Chris Shores, Christer Bergström, Michael Claringbould etc. have in fact done so and they do list their sources.

We don't even have a known really good set of data for claims. much less vetted victories.

You are talking about a single unified set of data (for the whole war?), which is not necessarily the same as a unit history or the data of a single battle or a single day in the war.

Yes, you can find many tables with exact numbers in several places, very few of which agree with one another, even for things like how many were delivered and how many were accepted. And we know a LOT more about deliveries and acceptancers than we do about losses.

I think you are overstating and exaggerating this to an ridiculous degree. I suspect maybe because you just don't like the idea of challenging wartime claim records. But the cat is already out of the bag brother. The ship has sailed. Shores has six volumes out just on the Mediterranean Air War, and he does this for every single day.

There may always be some fuzzy Fog of War aspects to absolute numbers, we may never know the last 1 or 2%. But you can defintiely get a much clearer idea of what really happened than in the days when we still believed blatant propaganda about things like 11-1 and 14-1 kill ratios and such nonsense. Maybe that bothers you, personally, for me the fun in learning history is just that, learning. It's not about reinforcing fantasies or nationalist tropes.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Always interesting to be told writings are deeply offensive and funny at the same time. Says more about the critic.

In 1943 is the long tipping point of the war. Initially you still have a lot of P-38F and G, but by the second half of the year better model P-38s (H in May and then J by August) are coming out,

In the US, not in the front line.

An idea of time delays, P-38F production ended October 1942, P-38G production was from June 1942 to April 1943, P-38H from May to August 1943, P-38J from August 1943 to June 1944, P-38L from June 44 to August 1945,

MTO 1 August 1943, all 3 groups mostly P-38G, only 2 P-38F, 25 September there were 17 P-38F, hinting at shortages,, nominal strength of 3 groups 225 aircraft.

table is date, number of F, G, H, J, L models,
31-Oct-43 \\ 20 \\ 189 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0
28-Nov-43 \\ 14 \\ 179 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0
26-Dec-43 \\ 19 \\ 143 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0
30-Jan-44 \\ 14 \\ 95 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0
6-Feb-44 \\ 10 \\ 94 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0
27-Feb-44 \\ 7 \\ 85 \\ 38 \\ 0 \\ 0 1st FG has the H models
1-Apr-44 \\ 8 \\ 85 \\ 25 \\ 38 \\ 0, 1st has the H, 14th and 82nd the J
29-Apr-44 \\ 7 \\ 73 \\ 24 \\ 159 \\ 0
3-Jun-44 \\ 2 \\ 44 \\ 4 \\ 211 \\ 0
24-Jun-44 \\ 2 \\ 42 \\ 3 \\ 222 \\ 0
1-Jul-44 \\ 2 \\ 41 \\ 4 \\ 228 \\ 0
27-Jul-44 \\ 0 \\ 36 \\ 3 \\ 191 \\ 0
2-Sep-44 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 119 \\ 5
30-Sep-44 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 167 \\ 73 All groups have J and L models.
21-Oct-44 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 116 \\ 119
20-Nov-44 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 110 \\ 144
10-Dec-44 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 106 \\ 165
10-Jan-45 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 102 \\ 158
10-Feb-45 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 80 \\ 156
10-Mar-45 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 78 \\ 187
31-Mar-45 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 69 \\ 194
30-Apr-45 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 58 \\ 201

So some 10 months between H model production start and the first models in the groups, then around 8 months between production start and the arrival of J models but only 3 months for the L models to arrive, partly due to the decision to use the P-51 instead of the P-38 in the 8th Air Force. The groups were almost always equipped with at least 2 different P-38 models.

I don't know enough about the 8th AF experiences to opine on that. I gather they were flying missions from October and that there were many problems? Maybe y'all can fill that part in.

It is there the P-38 high altitude issues became stark, an issue given over a year's combat experience, with around 1 enemy aircraft claimed per P-38 lost. An incomplete 8th AF loss list, around 259 losses, only H models lost in 1943, J models from January 1944

By early 1944, the major problems with the P-38 seemed to have been largely addressed.

No.

But the politics of the moment and certain specific performance metrics dictated that the P-51 was chosen to be the main escort fighter.

So what were the politics? The P-51 had superior performance across the board and the numbers while the 8th Air Force was reporting lots of P-38 problems and the ETO was supposed to be where the best USAAF fighters were to initially go.

The USAAF Statistical Digest take on MTO fighter operations in 1943.

Fighter

Sortie

Sortie

Non Eff

Non Eff

Non Eff

Combat

Bombs

Lost to

Lost to

Lost to

Enemy a/c

Enemy a/c

bombs

Lost to a/c

Air claim

Month

Airborne

Effective

Weather

Mechanical

Other

hours

HE

Aircraft

Flak

Other

In Air

Ground

per sortie

per sortie

to loss

Jan-43​

2,700​

2,452​

6,360​

41​

78​

6​

4​

56​

1​

33.44​

3.18​

0.72​

Feb-43​

2,021​

1,755​

3,760​

10​

40​

10​

2​

57​

11.40​

2.28​

1.43​

Mar-43​

4,509​

4,079​

342​

213​

389​

7,567​

54​

55​

7​

6​

103​

26.48​

1.35​

1.87​

Apr-43​

8,973​

8,372​

14,090​

341​

109​

4​

3​

319​

81.46​

1.30​

2.93​

May-43​

8,289​

7,653​

20,163​

656​

89​

16​

11​

132​

33​

171.44​

1.16​

1.48​

Jun-43​

8,527​

7,974​

268​

201​

1,321​

21,599​

834​

58​

3​

20​

115​

12​

209.18​

0.73​

1.98​

Jul-43​

16,344​

15,660​

36,292​

1,283​

112​

12​

29​

125​

163.86​

0.72​

1.12​

Aug-43​

14,671​

14,074​

33,552​

1,589​

113​

17​

27​

117​

63​

225.81​

0.80​

1.04​

Sep-43​

12,321​

11,771​

175​

927​

729​

28,855​

1,488​

56​

5​

27​

102​

37​

252.82​

0.48​

1.82​

Oct-43​

8,860​

8,146​

17,211​

1,078​

32​

6​

12​

81​

25​

264.67​

0.39​

2.53​

Nov-43​

10,713​

9,717​

20,091​

1,167​

18​

15​

6​

21​

6​

240.20​

0.19​

1.17​

Dec-43​

14,265​

13,041​

1,344​

826​

764​

24,153​

1,917​

56​

14​

10​

42​

12​

294.00​

0.43​

0.75​

112,193​

104,694​

2,129​

2,167​

3,203​

233,693​

10,458​

816​

115​

157​

1,270​

189​

199.78​

0.78​

1.56​

1 ton of incendiary bombs dropped in May 1943. Non effective sorties are quarterly figures, bombs are in short tons, effective sorties used for averages, sortie bombs in pounds.

The fighters were not going a lot of ground strike in North Africa, that really started as part of the moves into Sicily, based on their claims they were half long term average in January, and around average February, March and May, with the ability to intercept Luftwaffe transports obvious in April.

In the first 6 months of 1943 the fighters logged a shoot down claim every 41 effective sorties, for the rest of the year every 148 sorties. The Luftwaffe was hard to shoot down in early 1943, fighting hard in mid 1943 then largely absent in the final quarter.

From a listing that gives claims by group, A-36 and miscellaneous units excluded, as expected different totals

No. Gps	3​	3​	5​	2​	13​
Type	P-38	P-39	P-40	Spit	Total
Jan-43​	51​	0​	28​	7​	86​
Feb-43​	48​	2​	9​	12​	71​
Mar-43​	61​	2​	43.5​	30​	136.5​
Apr-43​	143​	0​	116.5​	71​	330.5​
May-43​	83​	0​	37​	16​	136​
Jun-43​	60​	9​	56​	36​	161​
Jul-43​	52​	2​	91​	19​	164​
Aug-43​	80​	2​	17​	11​	110​
Sep-43​	47​	3​	13​	7​	70​
Oct-43​	38​	1​	5​	0​	44​
Nov-43​	13​	0​	4​	3​	20​
Dec-43​	41​	2​	13​	12​	68​
Total	717​	23​	433​	224​	1,397​
Per Gp	239.0​	7.7​	86.6​	112.0​	107.5​

The Spitfire groups benefited from a steady number of VIII and IX being part of their inventory, unfortunately the USAAF does not always give marks, 1 August 1943, the 52nd had 10 IX, the 31st just Spitfire. As expected the more fighter bomber orientated P-40 units saw fewer enemy aircraft on average, the heavy bomber escort was the most. Yes in early 1943 the P-38 were in trouble and not living up to the glowing reports coming from the Pacific, in trouble along with the rest of the allied air forces in the area, but from the claims being made they were the most likely USAAF type to encounter enemy aircraft, not surprising their failures were being highlighted. As noted before the emphasis on ground support in early 1943 was trading air force casualties for a slightly more effective army given the tactics in use.

As usual average altitudes went down when the army or navy was involved, went up when the air forces were fighting each other, the supply situation made it hard to mount heavy bomber raids. The 12th Air force, heavy bomber sorties credited with attacking
Jan-43 279
Feb-43 305
Mar-43 546
Apr-43 815
May-43 1,352
20 bombers lost

9th Air Force, which did not have any P-38
Jan-43 220
Feb-43 138
Mar-43 98
Apr-43 332
May-43 443

15 bombers lost, Richard Davis figures.

The "air umbrella" thing seemed like it made sense where the US forces were very hard pressed at Kasserine etc. (and were getting hit hard by the Luftwaffe in what was one of their last really great achievements in Theater) but as you say it didn't work. By the end of that battle US units were rallying, albeit under very heavy pressure, and you started seeing some very effective low-level bombing and strafing of German ground forces (including by A-20s), effective attacks on German air bases, and better fighter cover for the troops too. But there was no such thing as 24/7 air cover like the ground commanders wanted.

The Germans had a split army command, the attack was not as strong as Rommel had intended and the result was it ran out of steam. The allies had air umbrellas in Italy and in France, it was possible, but it required a much larger air force than pre war ideas and/or an absence of enemy aircraft.

P-38 units were not doing too well at this point but over the spring and summer they worked out better tactics and training and found their niche, which then gradually expanded.

So please provide sortie (including type) and loss details for the P-38 over say the first 6 months of 1943, otherwise it is just opinion.

 

[drgondog]

One thing seems obvious to me, the P-38 would have been a better candidate for the defense of Darwin than either P-40E or Spit V, due to loiter time, speed at altitude, climb rate at higher altitude, concentration of firepower etc.

All the composed and P-38 trained FGs were first dispatched to ETO for Bolero, then 3 (1, 14, 82) were sent to Torch and the 78th FG P-38Fs were sent as spares for the other 3. The 78th was forced to adapt to the P-47. P-38s were dribbled out in very late 1942 in squadron level. The order of priority was MTO, ETO and then SWPA in late 1942 through mid 1943. Then the crisis building up in ETO led to Arnold refusing Eisenhower two more P-38FG, four more B-17 BG, all B-26 BG from 8th AF on behalf of the upcoming invasion of Italy. He already had the entire 2BD B-24s dispatched to 9th AF for Tidal Wave.

Both the 20th and 55th FG were ordered to ETO in July, arriving just after Schweinfurt-Regensburg missions.

For Q4, ETO had priority 1 for P-51B and P-38J and P-47D-11, then -15.

 

[drgondog]

You kind of glossed over 1943 but I think that was the big year.

In late 1942 there were a handful of very skilled P-38 pilots in two or three squadrons in the Pacific who were able to accomplish substantial gains for the Allied cause. But the overall effect was limited. The average P-38 pilot was not necessarily doing better than pilots of older types, but they could still fly missions that other types couldn't do (or do as well).

The 'skilled P-38 pilots' were transitioning P-39 and P-40 combat experienced, they didn't arrive from US Training Command twin engine pilot training. Of course they were pressed into any task requiring range.

In 1943 is the long tipping point of the war. Initially you still have a lot of P-38F and G, but by the second half of the year better model P-38s (H in May and then J by August) are coming out, more squadrons are flying them (I think from 3 in 1942 to 6 and then maybe ten or more by the end of the year?), tactics have been improved, more pilots know how to make better use of their advantages. They are still probably close to parity on average vs Japanese planes, but they can fight in places where the older US fighter types could not, and they can intercept bombers better. In the Pacific the P-38 was joined by other new fighters - first the USMC F4U squadrons, and in November, Hellcats are showing up in raids on Tarawa and Rabaul. By the end of the year the Japanese are starting to take serious losses in air combat.

The VERY buggy P-38J-5 and early block J-10s arrived beginning November 1943 at BAD1 and lingered due to many in-country mods as well as the early supply of 55gal LE fuel tank kits. The number of complete FGs in-theatre (but not all in Ops) in August 1943 were 20th, 55th, 1st, 14th and 82nd in ETO/MTO, and 475th in SWPA. The 49th FG converted to P-38Js in mid-1944.

In the Med the P-38 had trouble initially but they were not an utter catastrophe. All of the Allied units in that Theater had some trouble in early 1943, but P-38s were still in action all year and by the middle to the end of the year the Allies were becoming ascendant in the Theater with the invasion of Sicily in July and mainland Italy in September, coinciding with Italy's first surrender.

The 14th FG began ops in Africa but withdrawn in January until May 1943 because they were badly mauled and had to refit and re-train due to losses vs LW. That is a very good definition for 'had some trouble'. That said, the steep learning curve enabled all three MTO P-38 FGs to execute escort and fighter missions very well.

In the CBI P-38 units were a minor presence starting only late in the year (November with the 459th FS as far as I can determine). They had a minimal impact in 1943 but they were as in other Theaters extending the effective strike range of Allied forces, and augmented by the arrival of the Spitfire Mk VIII with British forces, were starting to be a headache for the JAAF.

They remained a minor presence in CBI. The P-51B availability intercepted the deployment of future P-38 concentration in CBI.

I don't know enough about the 8th AF experiences to opine on that. I gather they were flying missions from October and that there were many problems? Maybe y'all can fill that part in.

They were flying missions in September thru October 1942, then the 55th FG re-started P-38 ops on Oct 15, 1943. Issues of dive compressibility and high altitude cold on both engine and supercharger and cockpit comfort were immediate and lingered through the P-38J-10 block. Additionally, cockpit procedures ranging from Optimal RPM/Turbo speed based on boost, and also on hazards arising from raising throttle to combat MP ratings when being attacked from low cruise settings existing in 1943 through early 1944.

By early 1944, the major problems with the P-38 seemed to have been largely addressed. But the politics of the moment and certain specific performance metrics dictated that the P-51 was chosen to be the main escort fighter. Where the P-38 was still in action at this point, (Italy / Southern Europe and the Pacific and in the CBI) it was now typically effective, I would say. It offered some capabilities that other Allied fighters didn't have and it's issues were ironed out.

Can you name any performance metrics in which the P-38J-10/-15 excelled over the P-51B? ROC remained higher for fully functioning V-1710-79/-81 - which wasn't all that frequent due to a variety of reasons, but every other metric including maneuverability, dive speed, top speed, range, maintenance labor time/costs, fuel costs, airframe cost, training cost, ease of flying, even visibility. Politics, if anything favored the P-38 over the P-51B/D until mid-1944 when it became obvious how much it outperformed the P-38 in the air superiority role.

The Mustang remained 'a RAF idea' to many at Mat.Cmd. and AAF Hq until a few champions like Generals Giles and Fairchild and Sec'y War Lovett were excited enough about the Merlin version potential to break entrenched barriers in 1943.

 

[SaparotRob]

I think we're being trolled.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I think we're being trolled.

I think you are a troll

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Always interesting to be told writings are deeply offensive and funny at the same time. Says more about the critic.

You can easily accomplish this, with or without trying. The word tragicomic comes to mind.

In the US, not in the front line.

An idea of time delays, P-38F production ended October 1942, P-38G production was from June 1942 to April 1943, P-38H from May to August 1943, P-38J from August 1943 to June 1944, P-38L from June 44 to August 1945,

MTO 1 August 1943, all 3 groups mostly P-38G, only 2 P-38F, 25 September there were 17 P-38F, hinting at shortages,, nominal strength of 3 groups 225 aircraft.

Seems like my timeline for P-38s is considerably off, there was much more of a lag than I realized getting the J into combat. I'm not a P-38 expert, but maybe it would be a good idea to summarize all the capabilities and flaws of each significant variant.

I'll take a guess, then maybe other people here can correct me. This is all from 'historyofwar.org'

P-38F top speed 395 mph at 25,000 ft. 1325 hp engines, climb 8.8 minutes to 20,000 ft.
P-38G top speed 400 mph at 25,000 ft. 1325 hp engines. Better radios, max bomb load two 1,000 lb. Better engine controls (?)
P-38H top speed 402 mph at 25,000 ft. 1425 / 1240 hp (due to intercooler problem). Climb 6.5 minutes to 20,000 ft.
P-38J (early) speed 404 mph at 25,000 ft. 1425 / 1240 hp (cooling).
P-38J (later) speed 414 mph at 25,000 ft. 1425 hp. Climb (?) improved intercooler. Compressibility flaps. Boosted ailerons. Improved windscreen.
P-38L speed 414 mph (420 mph short duration). 1425 HP with 1600 hp for WEP. "Christmas tree" mounting for 5" rockets.

It's still not clear to me

• Which version first got maneuvering flaps
• Which version the front wing fuel tanks came in.
• Which version got the second electrical generator
• Which version got the improved pilot heating system

Same site has combat history summaries for North Africa, Sicily and Italy, CBI, and the Pacific.

So some 10 months between H model production start and the first models in the groups, then around 8 months between production start and the arrival of J models but only 3 months for the L models to arrive, partly due to the decision to use the P-51 instead of the P-38 in the 8th Air Force. The groups were almost always equipped with at least 2 different P-38 models.


It is there the P-38 high altitude issues became stark, an issue given over a year's combat experience, with around 1 enemy aircraft claimed per P-38 lost. An incomplete 8th AF loss list, around 259 losses, only H models lost in 1943, J models from January 1944


No.

So what were the politics? The P-51 had superior performance across the board and the numbers while the 8th Air Force was reporting lots of P-38 problems and the ETO was supposed to be where the best USAAF fighters were to initially go.

The USAAF Statistical Digest take on MTO fighter operations in 1943.

The fighters were not going a lot of ground strike in North Africa, that really started as part of the moves into Sicily, based on their claims they were half long term average in January, and around average February, March and May, with the ability to intercept Luftwaffe transports obvious in April.

I don't see where you get that, some of the P-40 units were already flying strike missions in North Africa.

In the first 6 months of 1943 the fighters logged a shoot down claim every 41 effective sorties, for the rest of the year every 148 sorties. The Luftwaffe was hard to shoot down in early 1943, fighting hard in mid 1943 then largely absent in the final quarter.

From a listing that gives claims by group, A-36 and miscellaneous units excluded, as expected different totals

No. Gps	3​	3​	5​	2​	13​
Type	P-38	P-39	P-40	Spit	Total
Jan-43​	51​	0​	28​	7​	86​
Feb-43​	48​	2​	9​	12​	71​
Mar-43​	61​	2​	43.5​	30​	136.5​
Apr-43​	143​	0​	116.5​	71​	330.5​
May-43​	83​	0​	37​	16​	136​
Jun-43​	60​	9​	56​	36​	161​
Jul-43​	52​	2​	91​	19​	164​
Aug-43​	80​	2​	17​	11​	110​
Sep-43​	47​	3​	13​	7​	70​
Oct-43​	38​	1​	5​	0​	44​
Nov-43​	13​	0​	4​	3​	20​
Dec-43​	41​	2​	13​	12​	68​
Total	717​	23​	433​	224​	1,397​
Per Gp	239.0​	7.7​	86.6​	112.0​	107.5​

The Spitfire groups benefited from a steady number of VIII and IX being part of their inventory, unfortunately the USAAF does not always give marks, 1 August 1943, the 52nd had 10 IX, the 31st just Spitfire. As expected the more fighter bomber orientated P-40 units saw fewer enemy aircraft on average, the heavy bomber escort was the most. Yes in early 1943 the P-38 were in trouble and not living up to the glowing reports coming from the Pacific, in trouble along with the rest of the allied air forces in the area, but from the claims being made they were the most likely USAAF type to encounter enemy aircraft, not surprising their failures were being highlighted. As noted before the emphasis on ground support in early 1943 was trading air force casualties for a slightly more effective army given the tactics in use.

My impression is that all of the Allied and DAF units in North Africa were pretty hard pressed in early 1943. I'll post some examples later when I have a little more time. The Germans rotated out the exhausted JG 27 and brought in new and extra units JG 77, JG 2, and elements of JG 51, and the Italians increased the number of MC 202s to two "Gruppo" (6° and 16°) with three squadrons each and 3° Stormo with six squadrons. and started augmenting some squadrons with MC 205. One of the P-40 Fighter Groups (33rd FG) was also taken out of combat for a few weeks after a couple of particularly bad days in combat against Fw 190s from JG 2.

The Germans had a split army command, the attack was not as strong as Rommel had intended and the result was it ran out of steam.

Are you referring to the air attack or the ground attack or both?

The allies had air umbrellas in Italy and in France, it was possible, but it required a much larger air force than pre war ideas and/or an absence of enemy aircraft.


So please provide sortie (including type) and loss details for the P-38 over say the first 6 months of 1943, otherwise it is just opinion.

Lets just be real, nobody here in this forum is doing anything other than sharing an opinion backed up by whatever data they have available to them, which many of us also do share. My main sources are the day to day operational histories and some operational and strategic histories of the air war, and a few pilot memoirs. I can crack open MAW vol III and IV and find a few examples of what I am referring to vis a vis loss rates for units flying different fighter types in winter, spring and summer 1943. But you'll have to give me a minute, and no I'm not going to transcribe 6 months of combat. Or go through and total up all the losses for every day, I don't have the luxury of that much time to devote to discussing this.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The 'skilled P-38 pilots' were transitioning P-39 and P-40 combat experienced, they didn't arrive from US Training Command twin engine pilot training. Of course they were pressed into any task requiring range.

They did have some conversion training in special transitional units but I don't think there was enough multi-engine training

The VERY buggy P-38J-5 and early block J-10s arrived beginning November 1943 at BAD1 and lingered due to many in-country mods as well as the early supply of 55gal LE fuel tank kits. The number of complete FGs in-theatre (but not all in Ops) in August 1943 were 20th, 55th, 1st, 14th and 82nd in ETO/MTO, and 475th in SWPA. The 49th FG converted to P-38Js in mid-1944.

49th FG, I think 9th FS, was already flying P-38s though a good bit earlier, right? And wasn't there also the 347th FG which transitioned from P-39s to P-38s?

The 14th FG began ops in Africa but withdrawn in January until May 1943 because they were badly mauled and had to refit and re-train due to losses vs LW. That is a very good definition for 'had some trouble'. That said, the steep learning curve enabled all three MTO P-38 FGs to execute escort and fighter missions very well.

I'm going to post some examples of "bad days" for the US and DAF fighter groups in 1943. As I had noted before, it seemed like the P-38s were being assigned to the long range escort of B-24 strikes for a while.

They remained a minor presence in CBI. The P-51B availability intercepted the deployment of future P-38 concentration in CBI.

Both seem to have arrived late in Theater.

They were flying missions in September thru October 1942, then the 55th FG re-started P-38 ops on Oct 15, 1943. Issues of dive compressibility and high altitude cold on both engine and supercharger and cockpit comfort were immediate and lingered through the P-38J-10 block. Additionally, cockpit procedures ranging from Optimal RPM/Turbo speed based on boost, and also on hazards arising from raising throttle to combat MP ratings when being attacked from low cruise settings existing in 1943 through early 1944.

I'll take your word for that

Can you name any performance metrics in which the P-38J-10/-15 excelled over the P-51B?

I think P-38 had a bit better climb rate especially at lower altitude, and a faster climb speed. With the boosted ailerons the P-38 may have actually turned tighter at some speeds than the P-51B as well. The P-51B (and C) generally had superior overall performance. But these early Merlin P-51s still had a few issues, notably with guns jamming, which I don't think the P-38 had. The P-38 also had the second engine which coudl be advantageous on long flights back to base, with or without battle damage. There is also the cockpit view, I think the P-38 did have better visibility than the P-51B or C with the turtledeck. Maybe equivalent with the Malcom hood. Both aircraft had some issues with emergency egress.

To be clear though I don't have a dog in the race. I can certainly understand why P-51 was chosen instead of the P-38. I'm not alleging any kind of conspiracy theory against the P-38, just that the decision was made at a high level, which I'd call 'political' but you could also call 'administrative', that the P-51 was going to become the only escort fighter for the 8th AF. There wasn't a situation where you had several of each type competing for outcomes in the Theater by the time the latest versions were deployed.

ROC remained higher for fully functioning V-1710-79/-81 - which wasn't all that frequent due to a variety of reasons, but every other metric including maneuverability, dive speed, top speed, range, maintenance labor time/costs, fuel costs, airframe cost, training cost, ease of flying, even visibility. Politics, if anything favored the P-38 over the P-51B/D until mid-1944 when it became obvious how much it outperformed the P-38 in the air superiority role.

The Mustang remained 'a RAF idea' to many at Mat.Cmd. and AAF Hq until a few champions like Generals Giles and Fairchild and Sec'y War Lovett were excited enough about the Merlin version potential to break entrenched barriers in 1943.

P-51B and later variants had very good combat outcomes in all Theaters, no argument there. P-38 could carry more bombs in fighter bomber mode but was also a considerably bigger target. But the later model P-38L was probably pretty close to equivalent in overal merits as a fighter, IMO. That is just my opinion, and debatable, needless to say. I think the P-38 suffered from it's long teething process, and it's also a matter of maintaining two engines (with two turbos) instead of one (without a turbo).

 

[GregP]

I think you are a troll

SparotRob has been a much better-mannered poster than you have been. Think about it before casting stones from within a glass house.

Instead, how about some friendly discourse?

We can disagree, but we don't have to get internet-rude about it.

Let's agree to disagree here and let it go at that.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

SparotRob has been a much better-mannered poster than you have been. Think about it before casting stones from within a glass house.

Instead, how about some friendly discourse?

We can disagree, but we don't have to get internet-rude about it.

Let's agree to disagree here and let it go at that.

I've been very well mannered especially considering some of the gratuitous insults that have been thrown my way.

I've been particularly patient with you, Greg, even though you seem to be trying to make the claim that half of the books on my bookshelves are invalid for reasons that ... just really aren't clear in spite of going round and round with you about it a dozen or so times by now. But you seem to be sincere in your reasons for making the argument you are making, whatever it is exactly. So I keep trying to make sense of it.

I'm not trying to be rude, y'all just have a little clique in here and I'm not really trying to part of that either. If y'all are polite, you can expect me to be the same, if not, expect that too. It's really just that simple.

 

[Shortround6]

Seems like my timeline for P-38s is considerably off, there was much more of a lag than I realized getting the J into combat. I'm not a P-38 expert, but maybe it would be a good idea to summarize all the capabilities and flaws of each significant variant.

I'll take a guess, then maybe other people here can correct me. This is all from 'historyofwar.org'

P-38F top speed 395 mph at 25,000 ft. 1325 hp engines, climb 8.8 minutes to 20,000 ft.
P-38G top speed 400 mph at 25,000 ft. 1325 hp engines. Better radios, max bomb load two 1,000 lb. Better engine controls (?)
P-38H top speed 402 mph at 25,000 ft. 1425 / 1240 hp (due to intercooler problem). Climb 6.5 minutes to 20,000 ft.
P-38J (early) speed 404 mph at 25,000 ft. 1425 / 1240 hp (cooling).
P-38J (later) speed 414 mph at 25,000 ft. 1425 hp. Climb (?) improved intercooler. Compressibility flaps. Boosted ailerons. Improved windscreen.
P-38L speed 414 mph (420 mph short duration). 1425 HP with 1600 hp for WEP. "Christmas tree" mounting for 5" rockets.

It's still not clear to me

• Which version first got maneuvering flaps
• Which version the front wing fuel tanks came in.
• Which version got the second electrical generator
• Which version got the improved pilot heating system

This can be a real can worms. Much like the P-40 WEP was not approved until late 1942 and there was work done in the Summer of 1942 in England by the 8th Air force to use higher power settings. But this was 8th Air Force and not the entire air force. The 8th issued guide lines on 8-15-1942. The Air Force in general did not issue WEP settings until Nov 1942.
Some sources will contradict each other.
There is also a problem with later manuals (pilot's flight operating instructions) being updated. Like an Oct 1942 manual being updated to Sept 1944 with several revisions in-between. I don't know if any revisions on the early P-38s were in the downward direction over time. Any P-38Fs or Gs flying in Sept 1944 would have been in the training role.
Allison recommendations were not always followed by the Air Force.
The P-38s that went to NA were ex 8th air force planes and crews, both pilots and ground crew. I have no idea which limits they may have used.
I will note that while measuring speeds at 25,000ft is a nice benchmark the P-38s rarely achieved their best speeds at 25,000ft. Depending on permitted boost best speed could be higher or lower.

Using the manual (pilot's flight operating instructions) from Oct 1942 revised to Sept 1944 the power levels were,
P-38E 1150hp at 25,000ft
P-38F 1325 hp at 15,000ft (with RAM) and 1240hp at 21,000ft. Sometimes the manuals put the altitudes in the wrong column (RAM or no RAM)
The Maneuver flaps showed up somewhere in the P-38F production run (F-15 ?) as did the ability to use drop tanks and bombs. The P-38F-1-LO could use 150 gallon tanks, The F-5-LO could use 300 gallon tanks. This may have been retroactive as a different source says the 300 gallon tanks did not show up until the Gs.
However the Manual says the early planes could use them in the charts. Of course the Manual also says they could use 1100lbs bombs and gives cruise speeds for the 1100lb bombs (same as 75 or 150 gallon tanks). Few, if any, 1100lbs were used in combat after the fall of the Philippines.
P-38G 1425 hp (?) at 15,000ft engines. 1240hp at 21,000ft. Better radios, max bomb load up to two 1,600 lb. (AHT source) bombs on the G-10s Better engine controls (?)
P-38H 1425 / 1240 hp (cooling). A real can of worms. Late manual says 1425hp to 24,900 (ram) and 1600hp at 7,000ft no ram WEP.
P-38J 1425 hp at 29,000ft with RAM and 1600hp at 28,700ft with RAM
P-38L the same as the J.

However "Vees for Victory" gives different altitudes for Military power and WEP .

The Fs used the B-2 turbo, the G and H used the B-13 turbo and the J and L used the B-33 turbo.

In actual use the Gs and Hs were restricted by the cooling to less than book/manual figures.
In some cases it was not only the intercooler but the actual cooling radiators.

 

[GregP]

I've been very well mannered especially considering some of the gratuitous insults that have been thrown my way.

I've been particularly patient with you, Greg, even though you seem to be trying to make the claim that half of the books on my bookshelves are invalid for reasons that ... just really aren't clear in spite of going round and round with you about it a dozen or so times by now. But you seem to be sincere in your reasons for making the argument you are making, whatever it is exactly. So I keep trying to make sense of it.

I'm not trying to be rude, y'all just have a little clique in here and I'm not really trying to part of that either. If y'all are polite, you can expect me to be the same, if not, expect that too. It's really just that simple.

Gottcha.

For clarity, I think understanding the aerial victory rules in place at any particular time for claiming an aerial vcitory was basic to submitting a claim for one. That is , the pilot at the time KNEW what the criteria were and submitted accordingly.

And the rules changed during the war, on both sides. Sometimes officially and sometimes by verbal agreement only.

Sometimes they counted the ground kills, sometimes not. Sometimes they tracked and counted victories over V-1s, sometimes not (since it was unmanned). Sometimes the victim had to be destroyed and sometimes it didn't. Sometimes an unarmed victom was counted as a bomber (by dint of being multi-engined) and sometimes not. If you shot it down and pilot bailed out, and then the aircraft righted itself and landed, and was later used for spare parts, some people say that wasn't a kill. Others say it was.

And, when they changed the rules, nobody went back and adjusted the awarded scores to fit the new rules.

All that makes it VERY difficult to figure out whether an encounter was a victory or not 80+ years later, unless you can uncover the combat report and unless you know what rules were being followed at the time.

So, what I'm saying, and I have difficulty seeing how it isn't clear, is the aerial victory scores should be left as awarded during the war and not be subjected to later reevaluation. History causes us to see theings through a different filter than they saw through at the time, and we should not be revising awarded victories or war decorations.

If they want to award more decorations or victories, no problem. But I am against removing them because we think our analysis is better than theirs was at the time. I reject that entirely. Nobody who wasn't there sould be able to do that.

Just my take on it. So, my file on WWII aerial vcitories is basically what was awarded during the war and will stay that way.

As the EPA says, your mileage may vary.

Cheers.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

In message #346 Steamed Banana promised not to "engage" with me any more, something later edited out. The world would be better if people kept their promises, in fact I strongly recommend the deleted promise be restored and followed.

On using the funny emoji

You can easily accomplish this, with or without trying. The word tragicomic comes to mind.

Except it is well understood here a Steamed Banana funny is an attempt at insult.

Seems like my timeline for P-38s is considerably off, there was much more of a lag than I realized getting the J into combat. I'm not a P-38 expert, but maybe it would be a good idea to summarize all the capabilities and flaws of each significant variant.

I'll take a guess, then maybe other people here can correct me. This is all from 'historyofwar.org'

No, the effort is a waste.

USAAF Fighter Bomber activities,

I don't see where you get that, some of the P-40 units were already flying strike missions in North Africa.

There is a correlation between the average bomb load per sortie and the number of sorties carrying bombs.

My impression is that all of the Allied and DAF units in North Africa were pretty hard pressed in early 1943. I'll post some examples later when I have a little more time.

Firstly everyone has been telling about the North West Africa Air Force problems in early 1943, secondly I have lost count of the number of promises to post data remaining unfilled.

Are you referring to the air attack or the ground attack or both?

The ground attack, Arnim and Rommel had split command.

Lets just be real, nobody here in this forum is doing anything other than sharing an opinion backed up by whatever data they have available to them, which many of us also do share.

Thanks for being so gracious to have us as your equals, someone how reads books, secondary sources, gaining impressions, and equates that to people who have read the original documents, sometimes thousands of pages of them.

I'm not going to transcribe 6 months of combat. Or go through and total up all the losses for every day, I don't have the luxury of that much time to devote to discussing this.

Instead the energy will be used to belittle those who have.

I can certainly understand why P-51 was chosen instead of the P-38. I'm not alleging any kind of conspiracy theory against the P-38, just that the decision was made at a high level, which I'd call 'political' but you could also call 'administrative', that the P-51 was going to become the only escort fighter for the 8th AF. There wasn't a situation where you had several of each type competing for outcomes in the Theater by the time the latest versions were deployed.

So how many generals or other senior managers must be present to qualify as political? Most people decide decisions made in the best interests of the decision makers and/or vested interests to be political, rather than merit. The politics of the P-51 are more about keeping it out of USAAF inventory, for those who bemoan the Spitfire range consider how many Merlin P-51 the RAF was promised in 1942/43. Meantime during 1942/43 Lockheed had modified the P-38 to have the sort of escort range the 8th Air Force wanted, Republic was finally delivering in numbers and finally allowing large external fuel loads but needed major engineering changes to increase the all important internal load. If nothing else the range of the P-51 promised reduced bomber losses even if, like the P-38, it was not shooting down many interceptors, performance wise the P-51 promised to be a world beater, whether it was or not would be shown in the first quarter of 1944. The 8th Air Force initially converted P-47 units to P-51, it wanted the range, the P-38 units converted post D-Day then all but 1 of the P-47 units. The 8th Air Force was running P-38, P-47 and P-51 units through mid 1944, it was also calling on 9th Air Force units, which were mostly P-47. The benefits of defeating the Luftwaffe day fighter force in the first 5 months of 1944 had a sting, it cut back on the training time for army support operations pre D-day, which showed up in Normandy.

Using Mighty Eighth War Diary,

First escort mission, 20 October, 39 P-38, no kill claims, 321 P-47 6 kill claims. No USAAF fighters MIA.

table is date / number of P-38 / P-38 kill claims / P-38 MIA // number of P-47 / number of P-47 kill claims / P-47 MIA. Bomber escort missions only

3 November / 45 / 3 / 0 // 333 / 11 / 2
5 November / 47 / 5 / 0 // 336 / 13 / 4
7 November / 0 / 0 / 0 // 283 / 1 / 0
11 November / 59 / 0 / 0 // 342 / 8 / 2
13 November / 45 / 7 / 7 // 345 / 3 / 3
19 November / 0 / 0 /0 // 288 / 0 / 0
26 November / 28 / 0 / 0 // 353 / 36 / 4
29 November / 38 / 2 / 7 // 314 / 13 / 9
30 November / 20 / 0 / 1 // 327 / 0 / 5
1 December / 42 / 0 / 5 // 374 / 20 / 2

The third set of figures is for P-51

5 December / 34 / 0 / 0 // 266 / 0 / 1 // 36 / 0 / 0
11 December / 31 / 0 / 0 // 313 / 20 / 3 // 44 / 0 / 1
13 December / 31 / 1 / 0 // 322 / 0 / 1 // 41 / 0 / 1
16 December / 31 / 0 / 0 // 131 / 1 / 1 // 39 / 1 / 0
20 December / 26 / 0 / 0 // 418 / 16 / 2 // 47 / 3 / 4
22 December / 40 / 0 / 2 // 448 / 9 / 2 // 28 / 6 / 0
24 December / 40 / 0 / 0 // 459 / 0 / 0 // 42 / 0 / 0
30 December / 79 / 0 / 0 // 463 / 8 / 11 // 41 / 0 / 2
31 December / 74 / 3 / 1 // 441 / 4 / 2 // 33 / 2 / 1

Totals, P-38 749 sorties, 21 kill claims, 23 MIA, P-47 6,877 sorties, 169 kill claims, 54 MIA, P-51 351 sorties, 12 kill claims, 9 MIA.

Not quite clear yet the P-51 was the way to go. From an online listing,

8th AF P-38 units,
The 20th FG claimed 76 kills November 1943 to June 1944,
the 55th FG claimed 79 kills November 1943 to June 1944,
the 364th 35.5 kills March to June 1944,
the 479th 70 kills June to October 1944.

So around 260 kill claims. USAAF ETO fighters made 2,706 kill claims November 1943 to June 1944.

I'm not trying to be rude, y'all just have a little clique in here and I'm not really trying to part of that either.

Much easier to announce problems with everyone else

If y'all are polite, you can expect me to be the same, if not, expect that too. It's really just that simple.

Insults are one thing, ignoring what does not fit is another form of being rude, circling back to the original claims as if they were still valid, as is failures to keep promises

The Maneuver flaps showed up somewhere in the P-38F production run (F-15 ?) as did the ability to use drop tanks and bombs. The P-38F-1-LO could use 150 gallon tanks, The F-5-LO could use 300 gallon tanks. This may have been retroactive as a different source says the 300 gallon tanks did not show up until the Gs.

F-5 were produced in parallel with the P-38G.

Early P-38 cooling issues put limits on the amount of power available at altitude, the J models initially over fixed that, 300 gallon tanks were rather extravagant for combat missions.

The following from Model Designation Army Aircraft, 11th Edition January 1945, published by Commanding General, Army Air forces.

XP-38A engines V1710-15 Left Hand, V1710-11 Right Hand. Single place low wing interceptor monoplane with twin boom tail, inclosed [sic] cockpit, retractable tricycle landing gear, Type B-1 turbo supercharged engines and one 25mm and four 0.50 cal guns mounted in the nose of fuselage. Crashed at Mitchell Field 11 February 1938.

YP-38 V1710-27 and -29 engines, service test model of XP-38 with one 37mm cannon, two 0.50 cal and two 0.30 cal guns mounted in nose of fuselage.

RP-38 similar to the YP-38 except for the following: Four 0.50 cal machine guns and one 37mm cannon; armor plate for pilot; bulletproof glass windshield, camouflage finish (36 converted to P-38D) (restricted class 22 October 1942; reclassified ZRP-38)

XP-38A P-38 modified with pressure cabin.
P-38B Designation not assigned.
P-38C Designation not assigned.
RP-38D Similar to the P-38 except for leak proof fuel tanks, camouflage, retractable landing light and no provisions for landing flares. (restricted class 22 October 1942)
RP-38E Similar to the P-38D except for a 20mm cannon in place of 37mm. On later airplanes radio consists of command set SCR-274N, filter equipment RC-32, microphone T-30-A. (40 converted to F-4 type for photographic use) (restricted class 22 October 1942)

P-38F same as the P-38E except engines V1710-49 and -53.
P-38F-1 same as P-38F except for SCR-535 and SCR-522 radio in lieu of SCR-274 and two 150 gallon droppable fuel tanks with alternative provisions for carrying bombs.
P-38F-5 Same as P-38F-1 except for minor specification changes and type A-12 oxygen equipment.
P-38F-10 Designation not assigned.
P-38F-13 Same as P-38F-5 except commercial instruments and designed to British approved Spec. No 2338, including modifications covered by contract AC-31707 to adapt the airplane for AAF use. (Contract BR-A-242/AC-31707, for P-38F-13, F-15 and G-15, all other P-38 on AC contracts.)

P-38F-15 Same as P-38F-13 except for maneuvering flaps.
P-38G-1 Same as P-38F-5 except engines V-1710-51 and -55, provisions for alternative installation of SCR-274 radio, Type A-9 oxygen and autosyn instruments.
P-38G-3 Same as P-38F-5 except engines V-1710-51 and -55, B-13 supercharger provisions for alternative installation of SCR-274 radio, Type A-9 oxygen equipment.
P-38G-5 Same as P-38G-1 except for Type B-13 turbine supercharger in lieu of Type B-2 and resistance instruments.
P-38G-10 Same as P-38G-5 except G-5 and G-6 starters in lieu of F-1 and F-2 starters and A-12 oxygen equipment. (140 redesignated F-5A-10 for photographic use)
P-38G-15 Same as P-38F-15 except engines V1710-51 and -55.
P-38H-1 Change to V1710-89 and -91 engines. Provision for carrying larger bombs and fuel tank on H-1 or H-5 model.
P-38H-5 Same as P-38H-1 except for Type B-33 turbo superchargers in lieu of Type B-13, giving better altitude performance.
P-38J Same as P-38H except for a new core type intercooler.
P-38J-1 Same as the P-38J. These 10 airplanes are prototypes and were built in the contractor's experimental shops.
P-38J-5 Similar to the prototype P-38J-1 except that these are regular production models. Essential difference consists of several equipment changes and substitutions
P-38J-10 Similar to the P-38J-5 except has a flat bullet proof windshield and a removal aft canopy.
P-38J-15 Same as the P-38J-10 except that the electrical system has been revised.
P-38J-20 Similar to the P-38J-15 except equipped with electric Type C-2 turbo regulator controls.
P-38J-25 Similar to the P-38J-20 except equipped with a hydraulic aileron booster system.

The J of course introduced the deeper "chin" openings under the engine making things quite obvious. The J-15 had the wing leading edge fuel tanks as standard, with kits available for earlier J models, the J-25 had the dive recovery flap, which again could be retrofitted.

P-38K-1 Prototype only, similar to the P-38J-1 except V1710-75 and -77 engines, 12 feet 6 inch propellers in place of 11 feet 6 inches.
P-38L-1 Similar to the P-38J-25 except V1710-111 and -113 engines
P-38L-5 Similar to the P-38L-1 except that tank mounted fuel booster pumps and pressurized droppable fuel tank system are installed.

Wing: full cantilever design with center section built around a double web box spar at 35% MAC, an outer panel around a modified single web "Wagner" type spar. A rear beam is installed to complete the wing torsion structure. Covering of butt jointed flush riveted aluminum.

Fuselage: Pilot gondola of stiffened monococque design fabricated from aluminum alloy. Forward booms of semi monocoque design of aluminum alloy construction except in area of turbos where stainless steel is employed to resist heat. Aft booms of semi monocoque aluminum construction.

Empennage: Horizontal tail consists of two aluminum alloy sheer beams supported, as partially fixed ended beams, from tail booms. Vertical fin is a full cantilever multiple sheer web structure rigidly attached to tail booms. Empennage covered with flush riveted aluminum alloy.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Gottcha.

For clarity, I think understanding the aerial victory rules in place at any particular time for claiming an aerial vcitory was basic to submitting a claim for one. That is , the pilota at the time KNEW what the criteria were and submitted accordingly.

And the rules changed during the war, on both sides. Sometimes officially and sometimes by verbal agreement only.

Sometimes they counted the ground kills, sometimes not. Sometimes they tracked and counted victories over V-1s, sometimes not (since it was unmanned). Sometimes the victim had to be destroyed and sometimes it didn't. Sometimes an unarmed victom was counted as a bomber (by dint of being multi-engined) and sometimes not. If you shot it down and pilot bailed out, and then the aircraft righted itself and landed, and was later used for spare parts, some people say that wasn't a kill. Others say it was.

And, when they changed the rules, nobody went back and adjusted the awarded scores to fit the new rules.

All that makes it VERY difficult to figure out whether an encounter was a victory or not 80+ years later, unless you can uncover the combat report and unless you know what rules were being followed at the time.

So, what I'm saying, and I have difficulty seeing how it isn't clear, is the aerial victory scores should be left as awarded during the war and not be subjected to later reevaluation. History causes us to see theings through a different filter than they saw through at the time, and we should not be revising awarded victories or war decorations.

If they want to award more decorations or victories, no problem. But I am against removing them because we think our analysis is better than theirs was at the time. I reject that entirely. Nobody who wasn't there sould be able to do that.

I believe I've pointed out before, I think these are separate, albeit overlapping issues. To be clear, I do not advocate revising victory claims totals for pilots, units, branches of service etc., and I don't think that is what Christopher Shores et al have actually done. And even though nations and branches of service etc. themselves revise such totals.

What I am saying is that as a modern researchers can and if so inclined certainly should add up the claims (by whichever criteria they want to measure them) and actual losses on both sides of a given engagement, and you can indeed (with enough effort) calculate these numbers for an entire battle or campaign area, even entire regions given enough time and effort (as Christopher Shores clearly did for the Mediterranean Theater across 5 years, for example) and what this can in fact provide is much more accurate insights into what really actually happened during the war, which is of interest for those of us interested in historical military aviation.

How you then draw conclusions from or aggregate these numbers is another matter.

So for example, I would not argue against the notion that Joe Foss was awarded 26 confirmed victories by the USMC / USN during WW2. I can however look at engagements he was involved in and see that the Japanese losses make it pretty clear that he actually shot down 7 or 8 Japanese warplanes (to be clear, this is just a guess, I haven't actually looked into Joe Foss's combat history).

I can also see that clearly an 11-1 victory to loss ratio for the Corsair is basically a fantasy. I may not be able to determine precisely what the real number is in terms of losses, (and once again, I have not systematically done that yet, so this is just another guess) but may ultimately settle on a number like 2-1 or 3-1, and probably more like 1-1 or 1.5-1 during 1943. I am personally interested to know what the reality actually was, that's why I study history, not to confirm fantasies or propaganda, but to cut through the Fog of War and find out the truth, as close as we can get to it. I don't think I'm alone in that, though there are certainly many advocates for sticking with the fantasy.

Just my take on it. So, my file on WWII aerial vcitories is basically what was awarded during the war and will stay that way.

As the EPA says, your mileage may vary.

Cheers.

Keep your file as it is, though I think there are some errors in that too!

 

[Steamed_Banana]

In message #346 Steamed Banana promised not to "engage" with me any more, something later edited out. The world would be better if people kept their promises, in fact I strongly recommend the deleted promise be restored and followed.

On using the funny emoji

Except it is well understood here a Steamed Banana funny is an attempt at insult.

I'm hereby fulfilling my promise - no more engagement with you old turgid, cranky fart.