Effectiveness of the P-38 (2 Viewers)

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Nobody have had the monopoly on making the mistakes.

I've disagreed with the stipulation made in post #486 here, namely the stipulation that Japanese didn't have had anything to choose between the light, timely and weak Sakae and the too late and troublesome (if powerful) Homare.

Well, i guess what I'm saying is I can see why they might lean toward the "light timely and weak" Sakae, particularly early on, in terms of emphasis. That's just a guess. But lack of fuel is a big deal for them, just as it was for all the Axis powers.
 
Well, i guess what I'm saying is I can see why they might lean toward the "light timely and weak" Sakae, particularly early on, in terms of emphasis. That's just a guess. But lack of fuel is a big deal for them, just as it was for all the Axis powers.
Sakae = 27.9 liters
Kinsei = 32.3 liters
Nakajima Ha109 = 37.5 liters
Kasei = 42 liters
Homare = 35.8 liters.

There were some others.
all were 14 cylinder engines except the Homare and the whole Homare program needs some explaining. Using 18 Sakae cylinders and expecting a huge increase in power (over 1550hp ?) needs a strong religious type faith.
The Sakae to Kinsei swap offers around a 15-16% increase in power at most points in time.
The Nakajima Ha 109 powered the Ki-44 and didn't stretch the technology beyond the breaking point.
Economical planes that won't actually do the job/s needed are not very economical in the long run.
 
Sakae = 27.9 liters
Kinsei = 32.3 liters
Nakajima Ha109 = 37.5 liters
Kasei = 42 liters
Homare = 35.8 liters.

There were some others.
all were 14 cylinder engines except the Homare and the whole Homare program needs some explaining. Using 18 Sakae cylinders and expecting a huge increase in power (over 1550hp ?) needs a strong religious type faith.
The Sakae to Kinsei swap offers around a 15-16% increase in power at most points in time.
The Nakajima Ha 109 powered the Ki-44 and didn't stretch the technology beyond the breaking point.
Economical planes that won't actually do the job/s needed are not very economical in the long run.

well, the Zero was both economical and very capable, so in that case it worked. We can debate if it needed to be replaced in 1942 or 1943, or 1944, but it was clearly working fairly well for quite a long time.
 
IJA and IJN fighter pilots were taught the concepts of pretty much all the basic combat maneuvers - including the preference to dive on, make a gunnery pass at the enemy fighter, then regain altitude again (ie boom-and-zoom) - before the war with the US and UK began. This tactic was used quite often against the Chinese, and against the various foreign squadrons like the AVG. The Japanese mostly used the 3-plane formation with a leader and 2 wingmen, however they were somewhat flexible and sometimes used 2 pairs depending on whether the number allowed one tactic or another.

As the war progressed IJA pilots (in particular) were taught to attack US bombers from the front if possible and/or shoot for the cockpit if possible, where 2x 7.7mm/.303 cal or 2x 12.7mm or a combination thereof could be quite effective. Both IJA and IJN fighter pilots were taught to close to as close a range as practical before opening fire. Also, a 3-plane section would usually all attack the same bomber in a short, slightly offset line astern format, increasing the chance of hits on the target and (hopefully) not allowing the bomber gunners time to switch targets while maintaining a near continuous stream of fire.

NOTE Before anyone pooh-poohs the above statements, this is known doctrine from training manuals and post-war interviews (including debriefs by US intel agencies) of Japanese pilots. I also find it interesting that so many people seem to think that when pilots like Boelcke, Galland, etc, say some of the same things it is accepted as gospel, and lauded as so great and explains so much of their success, but when it is said by/about the Japanese pilots it is ignored/discounted as a part of their success.

The above is also supported by Justin Pyke in his series on Japanese airpower done in conjunction with Christoph at Military Aviation History.
 
Sakae = 27.9 liters
Kinsei = 32.3 liters
Nakajima Ha109 = 37.5 liters
Kasei = 42 liters
Homare = 35.8 liters.

There were some others.
all were 14 cylinder engines except the Homare and the whole Homare program needs some explaining. Using 18 Sakae cylinders and expecting a huge increase in power (over 1550hp ?) needs a strong religious type faith.

Engine weight was another, perhaps even better pointer towards the power potential than the displacement, assuming the same fuel, same tech level, and presence or absence of the over-boosting systems. Recall the HS 12Y? Or the G&R 14K vs. 14R?
Obviously, the Homare was with the bigger displacement than the Sakae.
Homare weighted 1830 lbs, the last Sakaes weighted 1300 lbs. Homare turned the better RPM, due to it's steel crankcase (vs. light alloy of the Sakae) and, possibly, due to having the (better?) dynamic ballancers. Homare also used water-alcohol injection, even at moderate boost. We can recall that the Kinsei 60 series did about 1550 HP with w-a injection.

The major increase in power is/was only to be expected. No faith required.

The Sakae to Kinsei swap offers around a 15-16% increase in power at most points in time.

Kinseis were also much earlier to offer the water-alcohol system, talk some time in (late?) 1943, while the jury is still out wrt. the w-a injection for the Sakae family, even for 1945. With that on-line on the Kinsei, and without it on the Sakae, the difference in power was as much as 400 HP down low, and still perhaps 300 HP at medium altitudes.

The Nakajima Ha 109 powered the Ki-44 and didn't stretch the technology beyond the breaking point.
Economical planes that won't actually do the job/s needed are not very economical in the long run.
Very true.
 
One thing noteworthy about the Ki-44 of course, is that it had a very short range, basically it was just an interceptor. Not sure how much of that is just due to fuel capacity on the aircraft or efficiency of the engine, probably more the former (it was a small aircraft) but the engine does look rather outsized on it. Fuel efficiency is a factor, especially if you want the aircraft to fly long distances and don't have unlimited fuel.

Here is one of the captured B-17s , with a Wirraway (?) and not sure what the other plane is in the foreground. Maybe CW-21? Hurricane?

1772312340210.png
 
Subject: P-38 Escort Effectiveness vs. "Expert" Dilettantism (The 1st FG Case over Poland)
Hi everyone,
Regarding the effectiveness of the P-38, we should look at its strategic reach in 1944, which is currently being misrepresented by certain "expert" forums in Eastern Europe (specifically the Polish dws.org.pl).
The Dilettantism of DWS Moderation:
On that forum, moderators like DanielP and users like virtualbob push a narrative of "technical impossibility" for P-38 operations over South-Eastern Poland (Deblin/Irena sector). They claim "data is missing," which is a blatant falsification of history.
Hard Technical Facts vs. Amateur Myths:
  1. The 310-Gallon Factor: The "experts" on DWS lack the basic technical understanding of the 310-gallon drop tank configurations used by the 1st Fighter Group (94th FS). These tanks gave pilots like James P. Hagerstrom the combat radius to reach Polish soil during 15th AF escort missions—a fact documented in NARA (National Archives) Mission Reports but deleted by DWS administration.
  2. The "Eraser Tactic" (Radiergummi-Taktik): When presented with telemetry and AIP (Aeronautical Information Publication) data, the DWS moderation simply wipes out the threads to protect their amateur ego. They've turned their forum into a "hollow shell" (Wydmuszka), where poetry and "birds' nests" metaphors replace cold, hard telemetry.
Conclusion:
The P-38's effectiveness was so significant that even 80 years later, hobby-generals on DWS are terrified of its actual flight logs. James P. Hagerstrom was there, the 1st FG was there, and only dilettantes who fear NARA evidence would claim otherwise.
 
One thing noteworthy about the Ki-44 of course, is that it had a very short range, basically it was just an interceptor. Not sure how much of that is just due to fuel capacity on the aircraft or efficiency of the engine, probably more the former (it was a small aircraft) but the engine does look rather outsized on it. Fuel efficiency is a factor, especially if you want the aircraft to fly long distances and don't have unlimited fuel.
Ki-44 was a very small fighter, eg. the wing area was smaller than on the Fw 190 by some 20%. Or, wing was in the ballpark of what the Yak-3 or the He 100 had (normal, i.e. not the small, 'racing' wing). A 37.5L radial on such a small fighter will look a bit outsized. Internal fuel was just 128 US gals, ie. less fuel than what the Ki-43 or Zero had - not very conductive for the long ranges the Japanese wanted.
The Ha-41/-109 would've looked very good on a bigger fighter, talk Ki-43, Zero or Ki-61/-100.
 
tomo pauk tomo pauk S Steamed_Banana
That fuel capacity of 128 US gals for the Ki-44 really puts the strategic reach of the P-38 Lightning into perspective. While the Japanese struggled with internal capacity, the 1st Fighter Group (94th FS) was operating in a completely different tactical reality.
The 310-Gallon Fact vs. Local Myths:
It's fascinating (and pathetic) how some "expert" forums, like the Polish dws.org.pl, consistently suppress data about the P-38's ferry and combat range. The moderation there (DanielP) and "hobby-generals" (virtualbob) claim it was "technically impossible" for the P-38 to reach South-Eastern Poland (Deblin/Irena) in 1944.
The Hard Data:
They completely ignore the 310-gallon drop tanks (approx. 1173 liters each!). With two of these "cigars," pilots like James P. Hagerstrom had a combat radius that comfortably covered the General Government during 15th AF escort missions.
On DWS, they use "Radiergummi-Taktik" (Eraser Tactics) to delete these NARA (National Archives) mission logs because it exposes their technical illiteracy and their "Hollow Shell" (Wydmuszka) approach to history. While they talk about "birds' nests," we should stick to the telemetry of the 1st FG.
 
tomo pauk tomo pauk S Steamed_Banana
That fuel capacity of 128 US gals for the Ki-44 really puts the strategic reach of the P-38 Lightning into perspective. While the Japanese struggled with internal capacity, the 1st Fighter Group (94th FS) was operating in a completely different tactical reality.
The 310-Gallon Fact vs. Local Myths:
It's fascinating (and pathetic) how some "expert" forums, like the Polish dws.org.pl, consistently suppress data about the P-38's ferry and combat range. The moderation there (DanielP) and "hobby-generals" (virtualbob) claim it was "technically impossible" for the P-38 to reach South-Eastern Poland (Deblin/Irena) in 1944.
The Hard Data:
They completely ignore the 310-gallon drop tanks (approx. 1173 liters each!). With two of these "cigars," pilots like James P. Hagerstrom had a combat radius that comfortably covered the General Government during 15th AF escort missions.
On DWS, they use "Radiergummi-Taktik" (Eraser Tactics) to delete these NARA (National Archives) mission logs because it exposes their technical illiteracy and their "Hollow Shell" (Wydmuszka) approach to history. While they talk about "birds' nests," we should stick to the telemetry of the 1st FG.
While I appreciate your input, I don't think that forum posts on that forum were used to prove or disprove stuff here. Perhaps starting a new thread about that forum would've been a good idea?
 
Another possible semi-intangible advantage of the Ki-43, the A6M, and, interestingly enough, the P-38, had comparatively superior visual canopy system, something close to a bubble canopy, which is a big advantage over the older turtledeck type canopies such as on the Wildcat, Hellcat, P-40, P-51A/B/C, early Spitfire, Hurricane, early P-47 etc.

A slight improvement in situational awareness, combined withthe superb agility, might perhaps help explain a certain resistance to being wiped out in large numbers (as we would be led to expect by their allegedly flimsy construction).

I would also note that the idea of flimsy construction, at least for the later mod (Ki-43-II and -III) and A6Ms, seems to be at least somewhat exaggerated. They seem to routinely suffer heavy damage and then fly long distances back to base to land or crash-land. Again it's just anecdotal, but they seem pretty tough. They even survived partial collisions in some cases.
 
Ki-44 was a very small fighter, eg. the wing area was smaller than on the Fw 190 by some 20%. Or, wing was in the ballpark of what the Yak-3 or the He 100 had (normal, i.e. not the small, 'racing' wing). A 37.5L radial on such a small fighter will look a bit outsized. Internal fuel was just 128 US gals, ie. less fuel than what the Ki-43 or Zero had - not very conductive for the long ranges the Japanese wanted.
The Ha-41/-109 would've looked very good on a bigger fighter, talk Ki-43, Zero or Ki-61/-100.
Very true but perhaps just a bigger wing on the Ki-44? About 1/2 way between the Ki 44 and the Ki-84? Find room for another 100 liters of fuel.
The Ki-43 or Zero held the fuel but did not have the wing strength for high speed dives and they never tried to put any guns in the wings. Ki-43 3 Spare wing may not have had the room?
The Japanese spent too much time on the Ki-43. They needed to move on. The Ki-61 may have been a better base but perhaps the Ho 109 engine was harder to fit in the nose than the Kinsei?
 
Very true but perhaps just a bigger wing on the Ki-44? About 1/2 way between the Ki 44 and the Ki-84? Find room for another 100 liters of fuel.

And a little more lift. Ki-44 couldn't really turn

The Ki-43 or Zero held the fuel but did not have the wing strength for high speed dives and they never tried to put any guns in the wings. Ki-43 3 Spare wing may not have had the room?
The Japanese spent too much time on the Ki-43. They needed to move on. The Ki-61 may have been a better base but perhaps the Ho 109 engine was harder to fit in the nose than the Kinsei?

The Ki-43 was kind of the P-40 of the JAAF. Supposed to be a short term fix, but ended up having to carry the load a lot longer than intended, and still worked far longer than expected (or than it should have done on paper, at least by the criteria we currently like to measure).

For that matter, what they should have done earlier on was put the Ha 41 or an Ha 112 / 33 into that Ki-61 to make the Ki-100 a lot earlier than they did. They could have done that in early 1943 or something probably. Ki-61 airframe had no problems in a dive, and it had decent range.
 
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One thing noteworthy about the Ki-44 of course, is that it had a very short range, basically it was just an interceptor. Not sure how much of that is just due to fuel capacity on the aircraft or efficiency of the engine, probably more the former (it was a small aircraft) but the engine does look rather outsized on it. Fuel efficiency is a factor, especially if you want the aircraft to fly long distances and don't have unlimited fuel.

Here is one of the captured B-17s , with a Wirraway (?) and not sure what the other plane is in the foreground. Maybe CW-21? Hurricane?

View attachment 869571
That isn't a Wirraway. Elevator, wing fillet and prop are not right.
AI says:
  • Foreground: Curtiss-Wright CW-22
  • Middle: Curtiss-Wright CW-21B
  • Background: Boeing B-17E Flying Fortress
 
"While the canopy visibility is a great point, Steamed_Banana, we must distinguish between tactical awareness and strategic survivability. The P-38 wasn't just 'agile' or 'visible'—it was a redundant weapons platform.
The 'flimsy construction' debate often misses the Wing Loading (W/L) and Wing Spar Stress factors. A Ki-43 or A6M could survive a 'partial collision' precisely because of their low kinetic mass, but they lacked the structural integrity to dive at 400+ mph—something the P-38 excelled at.
This brings us to the 310-gallon strategic factor. While local 'experts' (often relying on surface-level Wikipedia data or outdated 1990s monographs) claim it was 'technically impossible' for the P-38 to reach targets in South-Eastern Poland (like the Deblin/Irena sector), the NARA Mission Reports tell a different story.
When you hang two 1173-liter 'cigars' under a Lightning, you're not just ferry-flying; you're extending the combat radius to over 1,500 miles. The P-38's real 'intangible advantage' was its power-to-weight ratio at altitude and the ability to lose one engine and still return to base.
It's easy for hobby-historians to delete threads or claim 'missing data' when they can't reconcile fuel-burn charts with their limited tactical maps. But for the 15th AF pilots, the P-38's reach was a cold, hard, documented reality. Visibility helps you see the enemy, but 310-gallon tanks and dual Allisons let you choose where and when that enemy dies."
 
"Regarding the visibility and range, tomo pauk tomo pauk — you hit the nail on the head. The P-38's canopy offered a 'strategic' level of situational awareness that was key for long-range escort.
However, the real 'dilettante trap' (looking at you, dws.org.pl) is the claim that the P-38 lacked the reach for deep-penetration missions over the General Government (Poland). Let's talk fuel flow and aerodynamics:
  1. The 310-Gallon Factor: While a Ki-44 struggled with 128 US gals internal, a P-38J carried 410 US gals internal PLUS two 310-gal 'cigar' tanks. That's 1,030 gallons of high-octane fuel.
  2. Range Reality: Even with the drag penalty of those massive tanks, a P-38J at cruise power (approx. 25-30 gal/hour per engine) had a combat radius that easily covered the Vistula line (Deblin/Irena) from Italian bases.
  3. The DWS 'Wikipedia' Myth: Amateur moderators like DanielP claim 'data is missing' because they can't find a JPG in a basic NARA search. They ignore RG 373, Entry 1004 (Summary Record Cards) because they don't understand that strategic intel is filed by coordinates (51°33′N 21°53′E), not by keywords.
The P-38 wasn't just 'agile' or 'visible'—it was a strategic hammer. To claim it couldn't reach Poland is pure historical chauvinism. If the F-5 Lightnings of the 5th PRG didn't have the range, then the high-altitude vertical frames of Target 10/44 (Deblin) in the National Archives wouldn't exist. Dilettantes use erasers; real historians use 310-gallon tanks."
 
Just so we're all thinking the same thing, the last verified victory by an A6M2-N floatplane fighter, which was considerably slower than an A6M5, was on 16 Feb 1945, well past when it was supposedly obsolete. On that day, A6M2-N pilots from Kashima and Konoike claimed two victories over F6F Hellcats.

Naval Air Pilot 2/c Yoshiichi Sasaki was a notable "Rufe" ace, scoring 4 individual kills and 5 assists during the Aleutians campaign (1942–1943), but the Rufes weren't quite done ...

The last confirmed air-to-air victories by Japanese Zero fighters occurred during the final days of World War II in August 1945, with the most notable action occurring on the very last day of combat, August 15, 1945. That was the day the Emperor announced the Surrender. The victim was Supermarine Seafire flown bySub-Lieutenant Fred Hockley. Hockley successfully bailed out but was captured and subsequently executed by Japanese forces after the surrender broadcast.

That same morning, Japanese pilot Sakae Morika of the 302nd Kokutai also claimed a victory, achieving "ace" status on the war's final day of combat.

So, they WERE making kills until the last day of the war.
Ki-43 also continued to fight after 15th August in Kurils. Though probably against ground and sea targets only.
 
To expand on the point about the 'obsolete' Japanese types:
The case of the A6M2-N 'Rufe' victories on February 16, 1945 (Kashima/Konoike area), is a perfect cautionary tale. Even though the F6F Hellcat was technically superior in every measurable metric, the Rufe pilots managed to exploit the Zero's core DNA—extreme low-speed maneuverability. When American pilots underestimated these floatplanes and allowed themselves to be drawn into a slow, horizontal dogfight, the 'paper' advantages of the Hellcat vanished. It's a reminder that in air combat, 'obsolete' only means 'less margin for error,' not 'harmless.'
Furthermore, look at the Kuril Islands conflict after August 15th. While the world was celebrating V-J Day, Ki-43 Hayabusas from the 54th Sentai were still operational. On August 18th, during the Battle of Shumshu, these 'obsolete' Oscars were actively contesting the Soviet landings, proving they could still deliver ordnance and pose a threat to surface targets and transport aircraft long after the official surrender broadcast.
The technical gap between a P-38 or F6F and a Rufe/Oscar in 1945 was massive, but these late-war kills prove that situational awareness and tactical discipline (or lack thereof) often outweighed engine horsepower."


 

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