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People are probably aware that British up-engining of the handful of Mustang Is 'produced' high-performance fighters, that were generally named the Mustang X. So let's have British convert all of the surviving Mustang Is and IAs (4-cannon version, very similar to the P-51) into a Mustang X configuration, featuring also the drop-tank installation under the wings (something not being done on the Mk.X historically) for the good measure. Squadron service by April 1943, with 200+- fighters in service by July 1943.
How this changes the WAllied air war and their aircraft of 1943? In 1st half of 1944?
German response?
It is impossible in your timescale.
Idea floated 30 April 1942. Authorised 12 August. Prototypes first flew Oct-Dec 1942. Then it would have needed productionised (there were variations between the various conversions), facilities and resources found to do the conversions etc etc in wartime Britain workingbto the max. It would be lucky if it could even have been started production by mid 1943 when you want 200+ in service. And you have a non standard aircraft type with a mix of US and British parts.
I realised you were not talking about production from scratch. For the numbers you envisage in the timescale you proposed some kind of production line needs set up to carry out the conversions. It would be the only efficient way of doing it.I haven't suggested production, but conversion. 2-stage Merlins are very standard, so is the Mustang I airframe.
But again, it is probably much better that, for example, Hawker continues making Hurricanes in 1943.
But a productionised and standardised version still needs designed and agreed on, not some hand built prototypes. There is a clue to the effort involved in the 100 early Spitfire IX conversions from Spitfire V. That resulted in variations between those converted by Supermarine and Rolls Royce. Incidentally that exercise involved 168 modifications. And it took 3 months. You are planning a far bigger programme for the Mustang and have the headache of marrying US and British parts.
If you plan on using an existing manufacturer you then have a hiatus while the changeover occurs. Production of some other type is then lost. Or are you planning to do it at an MU somewhere? But these units are not idle.
OK the Hawker Hurricane was out of date by 1943, but it was still fulfilling a useful fighter bomber role in the Far East until the end of the war, and with a couple of squadrons in the Med. What are you proposing to plug those gaps? And what are you going to replace those Tac/R Mustang I/IA in Britain with in 1943/44?
That is the problem with what ifs. No one wants to think of the butterfly effect.
Edit - and one other thing. Do you have the 200+ Merlin 60 series engines available or will you have to sacrifice 200+ Spitfire VIII/IX to get your Mustang X?
Maybe make more Spitfire XIIs in place of IXs?
Means fewer Fireflies, or a later introduction of the Firefly.
The Merlin Mustangs had the wing leading edge extensions to accomodate the larger wheels associated with the greater weight, and adding that would have been difficult. The 2 stage Merlin weighed quite a bit more than the V-1710 and the radiator had to be larger as well.
A more reasonable scenario would be why not put the V-1650-1 of the P-40F in the Mustang starting with the Mk IA. The two speed supercharger alone would improve the Mustang a great deal and give us a 1000 mile range 400 MPH fighter, unlike the P-40, where it did not do that much good.
Agreed but even if the scope were limited to just existing Mustang I and IA airframes, the questions and solutions are too complex to justify that project.It is impossible in your timescale.
Idea floated 30 April 1942. Authorised 12 August. Prototypes first flew Oct-Dec 1942. Then it would have needed productionised (there were variations between the various conversions), facilities and resources found to do the conversions etc etc in wartime Britain workingbto the max. It would be lucky if it could even have been started production by mid 1943 when you want 200+ in service. And you have a non standard aircraft type with a mix of US and British parts.
Ewan - the 'keel' for the P-51B-1-NA was set in December and production parts/assemblies were in process in January, 1943. The first P-51B-1-NA 43-12093 was complete last week of March, 1943, save installed 1650-3 which was still being 'fixed' at Packard. Approximately 20 P-51Bs were complete when the first flight of P-51B-1-NA #1 occurred in first week of May.Meanwhile US attache in London advised of possibility in May. 25 July conversion of 2 aircraft by North American authorised by USAAF. Order for 400 placed August based on performance estimates. Prototype P-51B flies 30 Nov. Production starts May 1943 and say usual 4-5 months from factory door to front line. RAF equips its first squadron in Dec 1943 the month after the first US P-51B unit arrives in Britain.
NAA was parallel producing A-36, P-51A and P-51B in 1st qtr 1943, into June 1943.I really don't see it as being worth the effort when the aircwar in the early part of 1944 is over northern France. By late 1944 when Bomber Command begins daylight raids there are enough P-51B/C/D/K available to allow conversion of many RAF squadrons.
Edit N.A. production is on a line that was already up and running and as a follow on to the A-36.
I guess the fundamental questions (for me) are:
1. Why re-invent a lesser version of Merlin Mustang already in production just months after first flight of AL-975G?
2. Why invest in a Mustang version with no discernable performance advantage, other than range, over the Spit IX with same engine?
3. For Army Co-op role, is Mustang X range potential (Mission footprint) with Merlin and modified wing (labor/time) enough to justify half of the existing Mustang I fleet non-operational?
4. The 1650-1 equipped Mustang I makes even less sense, than 1650-3. The performance envelope versus Spit IX is truncated at 18-20K, requires nearly the same effort to re-design cooling and powerplant installations, loses much commonality in spare parts -
My take:I'll take a stab:
1. Could you reformulate?
2. Range is not just a nice-to-have thing, but the key feature, and was lacking from WAllied fighters in the ETO in 1943. Thus Mustang.
3. Defeating Germany requires defeating Luftwaffe. Army co-op assets can't do it, not in 1943. My goall is that all surviving Mustang RAF has is turned into Mustang X.
4. V-1650-1 is second best choice (together with other 1-stage Merlins). Advantage is that there is far more of V-1650-1s available, than the 2-stage Merlins.
Mustang I and Lightning were ready to go in quantity for 1943. One was superior under 15K, the other to 40K. But, before May 1942 the AAF had ACCEPTED only the two XP-51 and had just finally contracted for A-36 and just started the experimental XP-51B. There were no more orders for Mustang I and IA so the logistics pipeline for spares and parts had a very finite life.
Through mid 1943, the Mustang (A-36, P-51A and P-51B) was Not contemplated by any senior AAF officer for anything but tactical recon and fast low level attack.
The P-51A, B and A-36 were in serial production March 1943.
Next is question of 'time to combat' for new "Mustang XI". Assuming decision made at end of 1942 to start conversion. Knowing that first P-51B is also starting in production, and P-51A with built in combat tank/pylon and better engine is also in serial production, isn't a better approach to contract for either or both (which RAF did)? Suspect that RAF squadron level deployment of achieved wing and powerplant modified Mustang XI was about that of P-51B-1.
The proposed problem to be solved by RAF/R-R conversion of Mustang I/IA by converting to Merlin 61 would be to achieve same high altitude performance of Spit IX but with greater range - but why? There was no pressing RAF mission in late 1942 to propel a decision to rotate portions of the Mustang I fleet out of combat ops and draw on Merlin 61s at the expense of Spit IX which was very important 'solution' to Fw 190.
Last, but not least - after conversion at great expense and share of critical engine resources (Spit IX Merlins), is RAF giving US the resulting product? Equally questionable, is AAF going to replace P-47C/D with the new ship (now Hybrid NAA/Brit) with questionable logistics for training and replacement and engineering to respond to change requests?
Agreed - which is why I made the distinction between high altitude escort not feasible - but everything else on the table for Brit and US medium to low altitude long range strikes.Having a better engine than it was the V-1710-39 does not solve the problems of fighting above 20000 ft.
Yes, in CBI along with A-36. A-36 in ops July but less desirable as ecort (still used as such in CBI). I question the combination of basically hand fitting changes to Mustang I to Mustang X, then combine to retrofit with kits or obtain P-51A spares for wings to deliver combat pylons - to deliver capable but substandard (vs P-51B) high altitude ops in ETO by winter 1943/44. If the judgment is that four squadrons of Mustang XI is tactically suitable for ops by RAF in support of 8th AF, is there a higher value mission for it? The crucial window for 8th AF fortunes was between July and October - then a re-start in January 1944.The P-51A is also very late, 1st combat being in September of 1943.
I would marginally hold out hope for a squadron of Mustang X by May/June, but a.) absent field trials and inevitable changes and mods, and b.) absent wing pylon/fuel plumbing modifications to every wing intended for medium range escort. The plus for this approach is engine availability which caused a Minimum of 2-3mo delay on P-51B operationsP-51A's engine is 3rd best Allied V12, after the 2-stage Merlin and 1-stage Merlin (disregarding the turboed V-1710).
P-51B is not starting production by late 1942, not even the P-51A is in production yet. There are no 2-stage Merlins in series production at Packard yet, grand total of 9 V-1650-3s was produced before May of 1943.
I'd suspect the RAF deploying the 1st squadron of Mustang X by Spring of 1943 for the RAF.
Agreed, but absent a national commitment for long range daylight support of 8th AF, why devote precious resources and talents to parallel develop a substandard version of the production P-51B-1 scheduled for ops only a couple of months after earliest possible Mustang "XI".Better high-altitude performance than the Spitfire XI, not the same. 20-30 mph extra is not a small thing back in 1943.
Granted, RAF has no doctrine of really long-range escort in 1942, even if they will be aware of usability of having long-range fighters now that N. Africa and SE Asia are in a major war.
I have the same question.No, RAF does not give the AAF the resulting product.
The product is used to escort the US bombers to the much greater distances than it was the case with Spitfire XIs in 1943.
Yes, in CBI along with A-36. A-36 in ops July but less desirable as ecort (still used as such in CBI). I question the combination of basically hand fitting changes to Mustang I to Mustang X, then combine to retrofit with kits or obtain P-51A spares for wings to deliver combat pylons - to deliver capable but substandard (vs P-51B) high altitude ops in ETO by winter 1943/44. If the judgment is that four squadrons of Mustang XI is tactically suitable for ops by RAF in support of 8th AF, is there a higher value mission for it? The crucial window for 8th AF fortunes was between July and October - then a re-start in January 1944.
Agreed, but absent a national commitment for long range daylight support of 8th AF, why devote precious resources and talents to parallel develop a substandard version of the production P-51B-1 scheduled for ops only a couple of months after earliest possible Mustang "XI".
That said, it seems intuitive that a.) RAF very much liked its bastard stepchild, and b.) wished to build them in England, and c.) went to the trouble of formally requesting from NAA a plan to build the Merlin Mustang in England - where presumably engine supply would not be an issue.
It seems equally intuitive that the final solution selected was the best - let NAA produce high quality/hi-volume/high performance models and buy them?