Effects of converting of all surviving Mustang Is into LR Mustang X?

[ColFord]

Which if the RAF goes down the path of converting all their surviving Mustang Mk.I & Mk.IA, what do the poor b****y Tac/R pilots use to fly all the reconnaissance tasks placed upon them in 1943 and 1944?

ACC and then later 2TAF went down this path in trying to identify potential replacement aircraft types looking forward to the point where the remaining numbers of Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IA would be reduced due to losses from all causes and the numbers of aircraft they needed to conduct all the required task was greater than what they had, with no direct replacements coming.

Up to early 1945, repeated RAF studies on the best low level Tactical Reconnaissance aircraft for the role came to the conclusion that what they wanted was more Allison engine Mustangs - essentially equivalent to the P-51A, but with the 4 x 20mm Hispano armament of the Mk.IA, and with a Malcolm Hood. But they couldn't get them so had to resort to major overhauls and major rebuilds of the existing airframes to keep them going as long as they could. Aircraft that would have previously been written off, wherever possible were repaired, rebuilt and put back into service - which leads to some interesting entries and following of aircraft histories on some of the RAF Aircraft Record Cards. Even required massive pressure by the RAF on the USAAF to get a shipment of new build Allison engines to the specification required by the RAF and engine overhaul kits in late 1943 into early 1944 to keep the RAF's Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IA operational until at least the final quarter of 1944 in order to support the Tac/R requirements for the Invasion. As it was, no more Allison engine Mustangs would be forthcoming in the numbers required by the RAF (the 50 Mustang Mk.IIs were a belated backfill for the aircraft taken from the earlier Mustang Mk.IA order) as by the time all this realistically played out the production line at NAA had already been turned over to Merlin engine Mustang production.

As it was, the additional efforts and demands placed on the Tac/R squadrons in providing reconnaissance on the German V weapons sites in northern France from late 1943 into early 1944 on top of all the invasion related reconnaissance demands, accelerated the reduction in available aircraft to the point where they were considering re-equipping front line RAF Tac/R Squadrons with Hurricane IIc aircraft as a stop gap for the invasion period if the numbers dropped too low. When the pilots in the RAF Tac/R Mustangs squadrons heard that, you can barely begin to imagine the reaction and comments made.

The potential and actual replacements for the Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IA in the RAF Tac/R Squadron all came with a reduction in capability (range, low altitude speed, visibility, camera installations, increased risk) that when the replacements did arrive, led to the RAF Reconnaissance Wings having to 'triage' the reconnaissance demands to match the demand to the capability of the available aircraft. As a result, quite a few demands had to be declined and that in turn led to negative comments from some within the Army about the level of reconnaissance support they were receiving - and they made sure those comments were echoed all the way up the chain of command.

So you 'solve' one problem, but create another with potentially dire consequences to getting the required reconnaissance coverage to support the campaign against the German V weapons, the Invasion and support of the Army in the field following the Invasion. The RAF Tac/R squadrons were not called "The Eyes of the Army" for nothing.

 

[tomo pauk]

Which if the RAF goes down the path of converting all their surviving Mustang Mk.I & Mk.IA, what do the poor b****y Tac/R pilots use to fly all the reconnaissance tasks placed upon them in 1943 and 1944?

<snip>

The potential and actual replacements for the Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IA in the RAF Tac/R Squadron all came with a reduction in capability (range, low altitude speed, visibility, camera installations, increased risk) that when the replacements did arrive, led to the RAF Reconnaissance Wings having to 'triage' the reconnaissance demands to match the demand to the capability of the available aircraft. As a result, quite a few demands had to be declined and that in turn led to negative comments from some within the Army about the level of reconnaissance support they were receiving - and they made sure those comments were echoed all the way up the chain of command.

So you 'solve' one problem, but create another with potentially dire consequences to getting the required reconnaissance coverage to support the campaign against the German V weapons, the Invasion and support of the Army in the field following the Invasion. The RAF Tac/R squadrons were not called "The Eyes of the Army" for nothing.

What is the priority in 1943 in the greater scheme of things - defeating Luftwaffe while bombing the German war-making assets, or pin-pointing a 105mm howitzer battery in France (that can be gone the other day)?
There is no Army across the channel in 1943 that will need eyes in form of a Tac-R aircraft based in the UK, either.
By winter of 1943/44, there is abundance of aircraft that can do the Tac-R.

 

[ColFord]

You miss the point entirely. The work of the RAF Tac/R squadrons from early 1943 until D-Day was all preparatory work for the Invasion, getting the reconnaissance coverage the high flying PRU units couldn't get, getting the low level coverage of ports, bridges, railway marshalling yards and junctions, enemy installations of all kinds, repeated runs over potential invasion beaches and the exit areas behind the invasion beaches, monitoring erection of anti-parachutist and anti-glider obstacles and the list goes on. Multiple sorties to cover radar installations, coastal defensive emplacements, potential airborne landing sites, status of enemy airfields, Many of the things identified from these sorties became targets of varying priority from late 1943 onwards for the bomber campaign and were essential in building up the picture of what lay ahead of the Allied armies when they did invade. So you then leave yourself open to another Dieppe because of poor planning and faulty intelligence due to lack of proper reconnaissance coverage?

Take them out of the equation and you don't get the low level coverage of the German V weapon sites, especially the ones hidden in the forests and with good overhead camouflage that had evaded the high flying PRU coverage. They identified the target for the bombers and then did the low level post bombing BDA coverage runs.

And what abundance of SUITABLE aircraft in late 1943 into 1944? ACC and 2TAF did detailed studies into the best types of aircraft for the various roles and they did not identify a suitable replacement for the Allison engine Mustangs - all the proposed and actual replacements provided lesser capability and performance, so you then get into the spiral of reduced capability versus how to make up for the shortfall in reduced low level reconnaissance capability. You don't cover a proposed reconnaissance target because you don't have the capability and you leave your forces walking into the unknown with all the risk that entails.

Whilst the Army is preparing, and training and getting ready to take to the field across the channel, who do they exercise with, who do they work with to understand what the RAF can and cannot do for them when they do get onto the continent in mid 1944? And remember, even as late as mid-1943, the Allies were still planning for the outside possibility of a German military collapse of some kind that could open the door for a 'Roundup' hurried invasion in France at short notice, so they still had to maintain a 'balanced force' in the UK to meet that possible contingency.

 

[drgondog]

IIRC the A-36s were used as escort for B-25s in MTO, too.
The higher-value missions might be providing the long-range escort for the heavies in second half of 1943.



Resources and talent will be devoted by the British companies, not by NAA. British already have prototypes flying in Autumn of 1942, unfortunately, there was no follow-up by them.



P-51B - excellent as it was - was not a solution for 1943. Thus it does not check the box for question #1 asked to a weapon of war: 'is it actually available?'.
A non-ideal Mustang X is still a far better asset than the Spitfire XI for the needs of ETO in 1943, at it can be had for operations in that year.

Tomo - the P-51B-1 was 60+ on the first Dec 1 1943 Op with 354th FG, the P-51C was about 20 +, and the were about 20 Mustang III transferred from RAF to 9th AF on December 30-31. Probably Way more than projected "Mustang XI" with wing mods.

 

[Shortround6]

You have 3-4 different Allison engined Mustangs.

The A-36s and the P-51As would have been the easiest to convert what with their four .50s in the wings and the bomb racks/drop tank mounts already on the wings. And a Higher gross weight.
However they are late to party and don't show up much before the P-51B and if you have to take them apart in England before you can put the new engines in then the date of introduction really doesn't show much Improvement.
The P-51 with four 20mm cannon may be the best bet but they didn't make many of them.

The Mustang I was built in some numbers but it has the most problems.

Not only no bombs/drop tanks as built but a gross weight way under what is needed for this project.
Will the landing gear/brakes/tires stand up?
What other modifications are needed?
The two .50s in cowl are going to go away leaving one .50 and two .30s in each wing. Yes this can be changed with more parts/labor but the changes are adding up. You may need a broader fin or leading edge fin to counter the 4 bladed prop ( at least 2 of the prototypes had modified tail fins).


Finally, if fighting Germany 1st had been such a great priority that this scheme needed to be started, the US could have had 3 fighter groups of P-38s in England in the Fall of 1942 instead of sending them to NA/Med and just sent the replacements/reinforcements there, skipping the Pacific.

 

[MIflyer]

Note that the P-51A were all built in the space of a month, when the decision had already been made to build the two stage Merlin equipped P-51B. If they could not put V-1650 in the A models I doubt there was spare effort available to convert the existing Mustang I and IA airframes.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

As I understand it the allies drop the 8th Air Force self defending bomber is and the RAF long range fighter isn't possible approach, plus decide an invasion of France in 1943 is not on, even if things are going so well in the west or so badly in the east, meaning no pressing immediate need for the tactical reconnaissance P-51. As well they would know the delivery schedules for the P-51 in 1943 were too optimistic, 2,269 for the US, 600 for Britain, versus 1,216 and 437 actually delivered. By end June the deliveries for the US were 415 behind the schedule, and 150 behind for Britain, remembering early P-51B production was held up by Packard Merlin production. Officially Packard built the first 2 stage Merlins in November 1942, production to June 1943, was 4, 1, 0, 0, 3, 1, 16, 56. Official acceptances of A-36 finished in March 1943, while 70 P-51A were accepted that month, 120 P-51A and 1 P-51B accepted in both April and May 1943, then 20 P-51B in June.

The big trouble with a strategy of providing long range escorts in 1943 is 8th air force was not in a position to inflict heavy losses, it lacked the strength, including the ability to drop large numbers of bombs. In the first 9 months of 1943 it dropped around 22,050 short tons of bombs, in the last 3 months 22,900 short tons. In February 1944 it dropped 21,050 short tons. Until end July 1943 the Germans concentrated on the Kursk offensive and the defence of Sicily, only after those failures, plus the Hamburg firestorm and then the August raids, did priority become the west and Reich.

If you want to do the conversion, then,

The Allison Mustangs carried 180 US gallons of fuel, versus the 269 of the Merlin ones, the range of the Mustang X is that of the early P-51B and C, without the rear fuselage tanks P-51 Mustang Specifications - MustangsMustangs.com claims this is 755 miles "combat range", the Allison versions empty weight was about 550 pounds lighter than the P-51B and C, about 250 pounds of that being for the engine, showing the extra airframe changes, the plus the Mustang I at least would need modification to carry drop tanks. The Mustang X conversions were proof of concept, not ready for combat upgrades and there were some early concerns about the strength of the P-51B engine mountings.

Castle Bromwich started Spitfire mark IX production in February 1943 and ended mark V in August, with 657 mark V built March to August. If there were plenty of spare Merlin 60 series engines you would expect fewer mark V.

Merlin 60 series production began in November 1941, with 169 built to end June 1942 when the first mark IX were officially built. By the end of 1942 886 two stage Merlins to 420 two stage Merlin Spitfires (VII, VIII, IX, XI), not counting the conversions, then add 53 Wellington VI. By end August 1943, 3,005 Merlins (60 to 67, 72 and 73) to 1,865 Spitfires. Apart from the Spitfires, to end 1943 there were 64 Wellington VI, 5 Welkin, 54 Mosquito IX and 8 Mosquito XVI. You need more engines than airframes, for example the RCAF order for Merlin 29 for its Hurricanes had 20% spare engines, 400 Hurricanes, 480 engines.

As of end February 1943 the RAF reports it had 510 Mustang mark I and 93 mark IA remaining out of 713 (620 I + 93 IA), with 22 of the losses in transit to Britain. By end May it was 454 I and 93 IA, by end August 403 I, 89 IA, 50 II. Mustang imports effectively ceased in January 1943, there was 1 in February, then 16 in June and 35 in July, then resuming from September onwards. In the US deliveries of Mustangs for Britain had ended in September 1942, then 50 mark II in May 1943, then P-51B from July 1943 on. It means what Mustangs you have in Britain February 1943 is effectively it, the strength will diminish throughout most of 1943.

The scope of any Mustang X force would be to stay at a viable strength until around the final quarter of 1943, when the US fighters can take over and the RAF units can switch to Mustang mark III. Even with the relatively limited Mustang operations done by the RAF in the 6 months March to August 1943 the RAF lost 111 to all causes, unless the plan is to cancel the historical operations completely then the long range force will be adding to that casualty figure. The USAAF says in 1943 it lost 178 fighters on operations in the ETO from 24,501 effective sorties, 0.7%, while claiming 451 kills, using the USAAF Statistical Digest.

Given around 9 months of operations, whatever the front line strength of the Mustang X force is meant to be you will need 2 to 3 times that converted to handle losses, maintenance, training etc. But you do not really have a bomber force that worries the Germans enough, until probably August for the USAAF. The fact the 8th Air Force flew no B-24 sorties late June to early September 1943 did help disguise the effective bomber strength.

My summary it is a lot of work for little return, the Germans will do their best to ignore the raids until late July, as of mid October the USAAF will stay within P-47 escort range, with the number of fighter groups operational going from 3 in April to 4 in August to 6 in September and 7 in October while the oncoming winter is reducing the amount of daylight and so ability to hit longer range targets.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Was going to comment about what would replace the Allison Mustangs but ColFord beat me to it, so I'll just second his analysis.

So... how hard was it to slap a two stage two speed supercharger on the Mustang's Allison, I'm sure someone thought of that at the time and had good reason to nix the idea?

 

[tomo pauk]

Note that the P-51A were all built in the space of a month, when the decision had already been made to build the two stage Merlin equipped P-51B. If they could not put V-1650 in the A models I doubt there was spare effort available to convert the existing Mustang I and IA airframes.

Not sure who are 'they'. If you mean NAA - this is not their show. If you mean the British - they have certainly installed a 2-stage Merlin on the Mustangs, 5 times in 1942.

Tomo - the P-51B-1 was 60+ on the first Dec 1 1943 Op with 354th FG, the P-51C was about 20 +, and the were about 20 Mustang III transferred from RAF to 9th AF on December 30-31. Probably Way more than projected "Mustang XI" with wing mods.

What projection of Mustang Xs numbers do you have in mind?

As of end February 1943 the RAF reports it had 510 Mustang mark I and 93 mark IA remaining out of 713 (620 I + 93 IA), with 22 of the losses in transit to Britain. By end May it was 454 I and 93 IA, by end August 403 I, 89 IA, 50 II. Mustang imports effectively ceased in January 1943, there was 1 in February, then 16 in June and 35 in July, then resuming from September onwards. In the US deliveries of Mustangs for Britain had ended in September 1942, then 50 mark II in May 1943, then P-51B from July 1943 on. It means what Mustangs you have in Britain February 1943 is effectively it, the strength will diminish throughout most of 1943.

Idea behind Mustang X in few hundreds by Summer of 1943 was not that they still roam the French countryside between SL and 15000 ft, but to do the escort at 25000 ft, and from position of superior performance hit Luftwaffe. The ~540 Mustangs available for conversion is a fine number, way better than my 200 of converted airframes for Summer or 1943.
Strength of Luftwaffe will be also diminishing from July-November of 1943 in an even greater rate.

The scope of any Mustang X force would be to stay at a viable strength until around the final quarter of 1943, when the US fighters can take over and the RAF units can switch to Mustang mark III.

Bingo - I'm not asking anything above that, just that a long range performer is in service in good numbers in August, September, October and November of 1943.

My summary it is a lot of work for little return, the Germans will do their best to ignore the raids until late July, as of mid October the USAAF will stay within P-47 escort range, with the number of fighter groups operational going from 3 in April to 4 in August to 6 in September and 7 in October while the oncoming winter is reducing the amount of daylight and so ability to hit longer range targets.

Work will return assets invested in a major fashion. Like the survival and greater experience of the 8th AF bombers' crews (and their A/C), enabling them to do more damage, all while inflicting an even greater casualty list for the Luftwaffe.

 

[drgondog]

Was going to comment about what would replace the Allison Mustangs but ColFord beat me to it, so I'll just second his analysis.

So... how hard was it to slap a two stage two speed supercharger on the Mustang's Allison, I'm sure someone thought of that at the time and had good reason to nix the idea?

Impossible in the existing airframe. The Aux 2nd stage from firewall forward pushed the cg 20" forward - with corresponding relocation of wing forward. Additional issues arise from change of static margin.

 

[drgondog]

Tomo - too much to respond to. I will offer my opinions about the Major questions to be asked when R-R proposes to BAM and RAF concerning the project to convert Mustang I to a much larger fleet of Mustang XI (you must also include effort to make design changes to NA-73/83 and 91 wing).
1.) Will the effort diminish the rate of introduction of the Spitfire IX? (the answer is yes)
2.) Will 8th AF demand operational control? (the answer is yes).
3.) Will TAC relinquish an entire portion of pre-D Day recon fleet to 8th AF in fall 1943? (the answer is NO, particularly with Leigh Mallory in control)
4.) What is the rate of conversion, given full priority over Merlin 61 series engines? (fantasy approval from BAM)
5.) When is nominal projection for four operational squadrons (equivalent to 55th FG Oct 17 or 354FG (P-51B) Dec 1?)
6.) What is the allocation of future Mustang XI to spares/replacements? (at least 20%)
7.) Which competing projects are delayed if this priority applied to Mustang XI (for sure Spit IX) and how does that diminish RAF tactical doctrine leading up to D-Day?

I don't have all the facts necessary to deliver the pitch R-R might have made, but we do know that the final outcome was for BAM to ask NAA to deliver P-51B airframes and wings to England for assembly with R-R Merlins and support in UK - and the attendant schedule was silly considering the NAA production forecast for P-51B/C into 1944. There was never a tactical or strategic need for RAF long-range/high altitude support of 8th AF daylight strategic mission - particularly when Churchill and RAF were waiting in the wings in 1943 after saying "I told you so". Churchill was never totally convinced that 8th AF daylight mission would succeed until April/May 1944.

Last but not least - Eaker was finally convinced that the 8th AF might Not prevail by attrition versus the LW until July 1943. What impetus compels R-R to suggest siphoning Merlin 61 engines for a Hybrid Mustang project before 8th AF ninety days of Reckoning between July 28 and October 14th, 1943? Secondly, why would RAF try to provide long range deep escort when US already had P-38J and P-51B/C in serial production - awaiting AAF-Hq priority to support their own 'most cherished mission'? Arnold stepped in and took control of flawed allocation process from Air Defense Directorate, placed P-51B and P-38J at 8th AF/ETO at the top in July/August 1943, and began looking to replace Eaker and Hunter. Arnold also secured Portal's support to quash Leigh-Mallory strenuous objections to both Operation Argument as an excuse to suborn the 9th AF Mustangs, and losing control of 9th FC to 8th AF operational control. Portal also agree to send all Mustang III to 9th AF in December.

IMO - There was zero compelling event which would have triggered a high priority conversion of Mustang I to Mustang "XI".

 

[tomo pauk]

1.) Will the effort diminish the rate of introduction of the Spitfire IX? (the answer is yes)
2.) Will 8th AF demand operational control? (the answer is yes).
3.) Will TAC relinquish an entire portion of pre-D Day recon fleet to 8th AF in fall 1943? (the answer is NO, particularly with Leigh Mallory in control)
4.) What is the rate of conversion, given full priority over Merlin 61 series engines? (fantasy approval from BAM)
5.) When is nominal projection for four operational squadrons (equivalent to 55th FG Oct 17 or 354FG (P-51B) Dec 1?)
6.) What is the allocation of future Mustang XI to spares/replacements? (at least 20%)
7.) Which competing projects are delayed if this priority applied to Mustang XI (for sure Spit IX) and how does that diminish RAF tactical doctrine leading up to D-Day?

1 - Obviously 'yes'.
2 - They might.
3 - TAC might use Spitfire XII and/or Typhoon in 1943 for Tac-R. Both have the drop tanks to match the fuel load of Mustang I. In 1944, the choice is Tac-R version of Spitfires (many marks), Typhoon, Tempest, Merlin Mustang, P-38.
4 - Probably faster than the Ki-100 conversion from the Ki-61 (275 airframes were waiting for engines in winter of 1944/45 - eventually almost 400 were made from Feb to July of 1945; conditions being ... unfavorable, to say at least vs. conditions in the UK in 1942/43; 1st flight was in February of 1945).
5 - American Fighter group was ~50 A/C? I've stated before that 200 A/C will hopefully be available by July 1943.
6 - As large as what was the doctrine back in the day.
7 - Spitfire IX numbers are smaller in 1943. RAF tactical doctrine has less problems with Luftwaffe in 1944, since LW has greater losses in 1943 and worse experten/novices ratio in 1944.

I don't have all the facts necessary to deliver the pitch R-R might have made, but we do know that the final outcome was for BAM to ask NAA to deliver P-51B airframes and wings to England for assembly with R-R Merlins and support in UK - and the attendant schedule was silly considering the NAA production forecast for P-51B/C into 1944. There was never a tactical or strategic need for RAF long-range/high altitude support of 8th AF daylight strategic mission - particularly when Churchill and RAF were waiting in the wings in 1943 after saying "I told you so". Churchill was never totally convinced that 8th AF daylight mission would succeed until April/May 1944.

There was certainly both tactical and strategic need for anyone to provide an effective LR-HA support for the 8th AF. What was not there was the RAF and AAF capability of providing that until too late in 1943 - penny-packets of P-38 notwithstanding.
I'm not suggesting the Mustang X for the kicks and giggle, but for it's capability to provide hat was needed on a timely manner.

Last but not least - Eaker was finally convinced that the 8th AF might Not prevail by attrition versus the LW until July 1943. What impetus compels R-R to suggest siphoning Merlin 61 engines for a Hybrid Mustang project before 8th AF ninety days of Reckoning between July 28 and October 14th, 1943?

RR might like the good press emenating from of providing the Allies with an over-performer vs. anything the Luftwaffe can throw.

Secondly, why would RAF try to provide long range deep escort when US already had P-38J and P-51B/C in serial production - awaiting AAF-Hq priority to support their own 'most cherished mission'? Arnold stepped in and took control of flawed allocation process from Air Defense Directorate, placed P-51B and P-38J at 8th AF/ETO at the top in July/August 1943, and began looking to replace Eaker and Hunter.

RAF was already providing the escort with Spitfires, as far as the internal and external fuel was allowing it.
Having something in serial production in California does not equate as having the same thing in service. It took 6 weeks to ship stuff from California to the UK? That's six 'Big weeks' worth.

IMO - There was zero compelling event which would have triggered a high priority conversion of Mustang I to Mustang "XI".

Unfortunately, this is the main shortcoming of my suggestion.

 

[drgondog]

1 - Obviously 'yes'.
2 - They might.
3 - TAC might use Spitfire XII and/or Typhoon in 1943 for Tac-R. Both have the drop tanks to match the fuel load of Mustang I. In 1944, the choice is Tac-R version of Spitfires (many marks), Typhoon, Tempest, Merlin Mustang, P-38.
4 - Probably faster than the Ki-100 conversion from the Ki-61 (275 airframes were waiting for engines in winter of 1944/45 - eventually almost 400 were made from Feb to July of 1945; conditions being ... unfavorable, to say at least vs. conditions in the UK in 1942/43; 1st flight was in February of 1945).
5 - American Fighter group was ~50 A/C? I've stated before that 200 A/C will hopefully be available by July 1943.
6 - As large as what was the doctrine back in the day.
7 - Spitfire IX numbers are smaller in 1943. RAF tactical doctrine has less problems with Luftwaffe in 1944, since LW has greater losses in 1943 and worse experten/novices ratio in 1944.



There was certainly both tactical and strategic need for anyone to provide an effective LR-HA support for the 8th AF. What was not there was the RAF and AAF capability of providing that until too late in 1943 - penny-packets of P-38 notwithstanding.
I'm not suggesting the Mustang X for the kicks and giggle, but for it's capability to provide hat was needed on a timely manner.



RR might like the good press emenating from of providing the Allies with an over-performer vs. anything the Luftwaffe can throw.



RAF was already providing the escort with Spitfires, as far as the internal and external fuel was allowing it.
Having something in serial production in California does not equate as having the same thing in service. It took 6 weeks to ship stuff from California to the UK? That's six 'Big weeks' worth.



Unfortunately, this is the main shortcoming of my suggestion.

I think the production schedule to include the internal wing modification for combat tank loads and plumbing is a serious bottleneck not considered in your speculation. The Depot based mod for P-47D prior to delivery of the production D-15 was extensive and only deployed in part squadron level before April. They began in early December.

 

[MIflyer]

Here is basic question for you. How many RAF Mustang I, IA, II, or III were ever used for escort? The first Mustang III went into service with 19 Sqdrn in Feb 1943. The Mustang was purchased for Army Co-operation missions and replaced Tomahawks, Whirlwinds, and Kittyhawks for those missions. In the ETO they were heavily used for fighter bomber duties in the run-up to 6 Jun 1944. They were far better for that than any oither RAF type. So what good would Mustang Mk X have done given the type of missions on which they were being employed. whcih was not high altitude? And if you think the mission of the squadron does not matter, you have never been in the military.

 

[tomo pauk]

Here is basic question for you. How many RAF Mustang I, IA, II, or III were ever used for escort? The first Mustang III went into service with 19 Sqdrn in Feb 1943.

For me?
Mustang III was the British name for P-51B. In service by November/December of 1943.
Mustang I and IA were not much of escort fighters, due to performance at altitude being bad. Hence my suggestion to up-engine them with 2-stage Merlins in the UK.
Mustang II was supplied in small numbers, in service from September of 1943 both by RAF at Med, and by USAAF at CBI.

RAF was using Spitfires for escort, fuel tankage permitting. Started in 1941.

The Mustang was purchased for Army Co-operation missions and replaced Tomahawks, Whirlwinds, and Kittyhawks for those missions. In the ETO they were heavily used for fighter bomber duties in the run-up to 6 Jun 1944.

Can you please show a picture of RAF's Mustang I or IA carrying bombs, so it can be actually named as 'fighter bomber'?

So what good would Mustang Mk X have done given the type of missions on which they were being employed. whcih was not high altitude?

Please remind me where I've suggested that Mk.X is supposed to do the Army co-op/Tac-R jobs.

And if you think the mission of the squadron does not matter, you have never been in the military.

Please refer to my posts above where I've noted the mission for the Mk.X: high-altitude escort.
Yes, I was in the military, 20 months, 10 of them in an actual, shooting war.

 

[EwenS]

Here is basic question for you. How many RAF Mustang I, IA, II, or III were ever used for escort? The first Mustang III went into service with 19 Sqdrn in Feb 1943. The Mustang was purchased for Army Co-operation missions and replaced Tomahawks, Whirlwinds, and Kittyhawks for those missions. In the ETO they were heavily used for fighter bomber duties in the run-up to 6 Jun 1944. They were far better for that than any oither RAF type. So what good would Mustang Mk X have done given the type of missions on which they were being employed. whcih was not high altitude? And if you think the mission of the squadron does not matter, you have never been in the military.

Here is the list of squadrons in North West Europe that operated Mustang III/IV in 1944/5 and the dates they received them

65 Dec 1943 Mk.IV from March 1945
19 Feb 1944 Mk.IV from April 1945
122 Feb 1944 Mk.IV from May 1945
306 March 1944
315 March 1944
129 April 1944
316 April 1944
234 Sept 1944 Mk.IV from March 1945
309 Oct 1944 some MK.IV from Jan 1945
64 Nov 1944
126 De 1944
118 Jan 1945
611 Jan 1945 with Mk.IV
165 Feb 1945
154 Feb 1945 with Mk.IV disbanded 31/3/45
442 March 1945
303 April 1945
441 May 1945 along with Mk.IV
541 June 1944. Only a few as this was a PR squadron,

65 squadron flew its first mission, a bomber escort, on 22/12/43. Between then and mid-April 1944 it was joined by 19 and 122 flying bomber escort to USAAF heavies, RAF Bostons & Mitchells from 2 Group and Coastal Command Strike Wings operating off the Dutch coast. It went as far as Berlin. After that all three switched to fighter / fighter bomber sweeps across France as far south as Lyons being joined by the next 3 squadrons. They were all part of 2nd TAF at this point.

In early July 1944, 306, 315 & 129 went to ADGB to join 316 to fly against the V1 to be followed by 65, 19 & 122 at the end of Sept. At that point all 7 squadrons were switched to flying escort missions out of East Anglia being joined by additional squadrons as time went on. Most of the squadrons were based at Andrews Field and Bentwaters with Hunsdon being added from March 1945.

On 1 Nov 1944 one squadron was detached to Peterhead to fly escort to the Coastal Command Strike Wings operating out of Banff and Dallachy against shipping targets on the Norwegian coast due to the increased fighter activity that they were encountering. That increased to two squadrons in Feb 1945. Squadrons were rotated through this move every 2-3 months. The East Anglian squadrons also providedd escort for the North Coates Beaufighter Strike Wing.

 

[ColFord]

Can you please show a picture of RAF's Mustang I or IA carrying bombs, so it can be actually named as 'fighter bomber'?

North American Mustang Mk.I (NA-83) AM106/G at A&AEE UK for trials of the "Low Attack Wing" conversion of the Mustang Mk.I to allow it to carry underwing stores, including long range drop tanks, stores containers, bombs and SCI cannisters. Also trials for 40mm 'S' gun pods and four rocket rails mounted under each wing.

 

[ColFord]

Mustang I and IA were not much of escort fighters, due to performance at altitude being bad.

Hence why in the instances when the RAF Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IA were used for bomber escort duties, they were primarily used for the escort of 2Group Bostons, Mitchells and Venturas on low level bombing operations.

3 - TAC might use Spitfire XII and/or Typhoon in 1943 for Tac-R. Both have the drop tanks to match the fuel load of Mustang I. In 1944, the choice is Tac-R version of Spitfires (many marks), Typhoon, Tempest, Merlin Mustang, P-38.

2TAF and RAF Tac/R tactical doctrine was not to use drop tanks on Tac/R aircraft when conducting low level Tac/R operations due to the excessive risk and danger to the aircraft if the drop tank were to be hit by light or medium flak whilst still on the aircraft. Tac/R versions of the Spitfire did not have the range and did not perform as well at the lower altitudes required in the Tac/R role; Typhoon was tried and proved wanting in both range and quality of photos obtained due to issues with isolating the camera from engine vibration; Tempest too high a demand for the 'pure' fighter role; Merlin engine Mustangs again too high a demand for the 'pure' fighter role and suitability of the Merlin when operating at lower altitudes - could have been overcome by fitting Merlin variants more suited to low altitude operation. The FR versions of the Spitfire also had more limited camera fitment options, basically a single sideways oblique, unless fitted with additional camera(s) by such means as cameras mounted in modified drop tanks or similar. Whereas, the Tac/R Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IA were initially single oblique, then upgraded to oblique plus vertical, then dual oblique with vertical and a later modification implemented onto a number of Mustang Mk.II of four oblique and one vertical - all mounted within the available space in the Mustang airframe without negative impact on fuel able to be carried or performance.

 

[MIflyer]

Of course MkI and MkIA were not built to carry bombs or drop tanks as built at the factory. First to carry underwing stores was the A-36, but the RAF only had about two of those.

So RAF Mustangs did escort bomber missions, although it was Boston, Mitchell, and Marauder and not he+avies. The only RAF Mustangs I have ever read about doing escort were those that escorted the attack on Shell house in 1945. I have even read of Mossies being used to escort Lancs in daylight raids, but not RAF Mustangs doing that. The book D-Day Fighters mentions RAF fighter bomber strikes with Mustang III quite a bit, and of course they were not above shooting down enemy aircraft if they found them, either, even knocking down a couple of LEO45 in German markings.

 

[ColFord]

Mlflyer,

RAF received one A-36 which was flown for trials in the UK, it did not see operational use with the RAF. As a result of the trials, the RAF decided it was not interested in the A-36 as it had other domestically produced aircraft - primarily the Typhoon - that fitted its CAS tactical doctrine and by the time they made their minds up production at NAA had switched to Merlin Mustangs. The RAF were 'loaned'/'borrowed' six A-36s in the MTO under a local arrangement with the USAAF, which were used initially to provide long range Tac/R in that theatre when the RAF did not have any equivalent types with the neccessary range and performance in theatre. The survivors of the six were then used to provide familiarisation to RAF units in the process of preparing to convert from the P-40 to the Mustang III in the MTO - eventually written off or 'handed back' to USAAF.

First operational long range fighter escort by Allison engine Mustangs was on 16 September 1942 when Mustang Mk.I of No.268 Squadron RAF escorted Bostons of No.88 Squadron RAF on an attack on German shipping at Den Helder in the Netherlands. (See attached photos from that operation.) ACC Mustang Mk.I from various Squadrons also provided fighter escort and support in late 1942 and early 1943 for a number of low level operations conducted by 2 Group, including the raid on the Philips factory and first raids using RAF Mitchells against targets in Belgium. In many instances in the after action reports from the raids where they were escorted by a mix of ACC Mustang Mk.I and FC Spitfires (some annotated as being of the LR version) it notes the need for the withdrawal of the Spitfires at a critical stage of the exit from the target area due to fuel constraints and the exit cover force of Spitfires not arriving, leaving a limited number of Mustangs to provide cover for as long as their ammunition held out (most reporting on return that they had stayed with the exiting bombers for as long as they had ammunition to fight off enemy fighters, plus providing cover for the widely dispersed bombers as they made their exit from the enemy coast was difficult as the bombers were coming out ovar a much wider area than planned in ones and twos. A number of the Mustangs also remained on station for some time to provide DF homing on the location of bombers which had ditched to facilitate SAR response.) The comments in those reports did not go down well with the higher ups in FC and as a result the ACC Mustangs were subsequently 'ignored' by FC for their capabilities to support 2 Group operations. The ACC Mustangs also provided support to Coastal Command, providing patrols into the Bay of Biscay in support of CC operations, including INSTEP patrols to interdict Luftwaffe Ju-88s that were attempting to intercept CC Sunderlands and Beaufighters. There were also some limited number of sorties early on in providing escorts to CC attacks on German convoys off the Dutch Coast - the ACC Mustangs at that time were also flying regular 'Jim Crow' and 'Lagoon' reconnaissance sorties covering from the northern tip of the Netherlands down to the Channel looking for German coastal shipping for attack by CC units. On occasions the ACC Mustangs also flew late afternoon/early evening and dawn/early morning low escort sorties for RN MTB and MGBs returning from attacks against German E Boats, Minesweepers and other shipping off the Dutch Coast and around the Channel Islands.

When FC got their Mustang IIIs, they started to use them for a range of long range escort operations, including escorting pairs and fours of Moquitos conducting 'Ranger' operations as far away as Denmark from early 1944 - late January. They then gained some experience in providing escort cover on insertion and extraction from the enemy coast for USAAF heavy bomber operations and early morning escort for 'stragglers' of RAF night time heavy bomber operations out over the North Sea. They also did escort on RAF and USAF medium and heavy bomber daylight sorties against the German V weapon sites in northern France. In the lead up to D-Day they were switched to 2TAF for the fighter bomber role as they could haul a heavier bomb load a longer distance than the Spitfires. In that time they also provided escorts to the RAF heavy bombers doing the daylight bombing operations in support of the beachhead and the various major Army attacks in and around Caen. That lasted until around September 1944, when with the availability of more ALG in France, they swapped the Spitfire Squadrons in the UK for the Mustangs and the Mustangs then took on more long range escort duties to both RAF and USAF medium and heavy bombers.

Ewen S gives a good summary above of when the RAF squadrons got their Merlin Mustangs and the types of operations they were doing.