Effects of converting of all surviving Mustang Is into LR Mustang X?

[drgondog]

The 85 gal fuselage fuel tank modifications, were extensive. Given the fabricated parts and the detailed instructions provided by NAA Field Services in NA FSB 73-95, the kits installations were 500 man hours for each in the P-51B and not available for ANY Mustang before September 1943. The first Depot mod was performed at Buffalo in late October through late November. As more design features (Radio shelf, long range oxygen tank arrangement, installed fuel lines, 5 stop fuel switch, etc) the installation time for the kit reduced to 150 man hours in January 1944.

 

[Peter Gunn]

The P-47N additional fuel tanks in the wings were located at the leading edges, aft the wheel bays, and between the wheel bays and fuselage. The LE tanks and the ones located aft the wheel bay were probably not requiring the wing 'plugs' (as featured on P-47N) like the ones next to the fuselage did.
(attached is the diagram of fuel system of the P-47N)

View attachment 661312

Looking at the Thunderbolt graphic for the fuel system my reaction is "ye gods and little fishes"... 990 gallons! Plus the ability to carry the 300 gallon wing tanks instead of 165's, yikes!

So how far would the average squadron service P-51B/C manage on 1,000 gallons?

I AM impressed with the amount of fuel the P-47 could carry.

I AM NOT impressed with its fuel consumption, especially wrt P-51. I was always impressed with how far a Mustang could go on a gallon of gas.

 

[drgondog]

Tomo - I pulled the wing drawings for P-51D (don't have access to NA-83/91) to look at internal pylon support structure. The internal installation is comprised of two castings (fwd and aft) nestled between two channel section extrusions - which are in turn supported by two (each) vertically mounted fittings on main and leading edge spars.

I've reached out to Pacific Fighters John Musula II to ask him if access from pylon to Keel can be done by combination of gun bay doors and removal of main tank door. John told me that the spars did not change in any P-51 wing (save the inboard 'crank' for the D), although many changes were made out board of WS 75 for landing lights, ammo feeds, etc.Alternatively, perhaps enough room is available to simply attach feed to outboard of main tank. If so, a.) RAF design of same assy for pylon support, b.) Feed system from lower wing leading edge area, c.) through gun bay, d.) into main tank area and thence to switch in cockpit. Recall that all Mustang I's were dispatched from NAA with the 27gal auxiliary tanks and fittings to feed into the main tank after wing armament removed.

If so, NAA designs for A-36 and subsequent would be re-producible by RAF and could be installed as kits far easier than P-47C/D kits. I will follow up when either John or Evan Fagen gets back to me on the second question.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The Spitfire VIII was the export model, dust filters fitted as standard.

Looking at the Mustang X going through the British test process.

3 conversions ordered on 15 June 1942, first flight in October, 10 foot 9 inch propeller, considered too small, flush under cowl, sealed radiator scoop, more intercooling but frequent engine cutting between 20,000 and 24,000 feet. 11 November, prototype using bigger propeller, another conversion was soon to fly, a third conversion complete, 2 more conversions planned to be done in early 1943. Conference 2 February 1943, prototype unacceptable in current form, insufficient directional stability, large change in directional trim with power, objectionable due to heavy rudder forces involved. The aircraft easily slipped sideways while manoeuvering. A fin fillet helped the stability.

Seems in early 1943 the British were to receive 500 Merlin Mustangs plus 1,000 airframes to use British built engines.

The US production standard for the P-51B, including 2 inch deeper fuselage, made the British conversions non standard. Further mark X development largely dropped. The what if assumes continued development, so say a smooth set of tests means by end February there is an agreed standard, March is spent letting contracts, first conversions in April, first squadron receives a few in May, squadron goes operational in June. And I know I am being optimistic and this assumes
no capability for external loads. So the RAF cancels probably Spitfire VIII to convert Mustangs to have the same combat radius as the Spitfire VIII already had, and the P-47 will acquire in around mid 1943.

Want a wing that can carry drop tanks and it will arrive around the same time or later as the P-51B. Apart from the wing changes a tank has to be designed and tested that will safely separate.

'500' is a bigger number than '100'. Five times as big.

If you look at the original strength figures note the decline of Mustang I numbers in 1943, and there will not be 500 in squadrons at any one time. In terms of combat effectiveness and strength.

The 9th Air Force December 1943 to May 1945 reports on average around 70% to 75% of its fighters were serviceable and had an available pilot, it did this by usually having over twice as many pilots on strength as the number of fighters with pilots. Peak month of June 1944 saw 28 sorties per serviceable aircraft with pilot for the month, non peak months were around half that.

The 56th Fighter Group was operatonal from April 1943 so around 25 months of combat, a reported 19,391 sorties, with about 1 air to air kill claim every 29 sorties. Using that ratio 900 sorties would result in around 30 claims. The group was a P-47 one and the P-51 record is a higher number of kill claims per sortie but in 1943 no allied pilot had a G-suit or gyro gunsight and the average Luftwaffe pilot has more experience, versus the second half of 1944 and later.

Luftwaffe's 'West' and 'Reich defence' lost 2100+ fighters from Sept 1943 to Dec 1943 (another 454 in Italy & Balkans).

Where does this figure come from?

Williamson Murray in Luftwaffe reports Luftwaffe fighter losses in the west were 276, 284, 281 September to November 1943. The RAF copies of the Luftwaffe Quartermaster loss reports, September to December 1943, Luftflotte Reich lost 245 Bf109 and 103 Fw190 to enemy action out of 433 Bf109 and 161 Fw190 losses. Enemy action caused 79 out of 148 twin engined fighter losses. There is the complication some of the single engined fighter losses would be on night fighter sorties while some of the 45 Bf110 night fighter losses to enemy action would be in day sorties. Luftflotte 3 reports 114 out of 234 Bf109 losses and 111 out of 173 Fw190 losses to enemy action from the single engine fighter units. Put the two Luftflottes together and it is 573 Bf109 and Fw190 combat losses out of 1,001 total losses.

Going by this graph, the monthly loss rate average was a bit greater than 20% from May to October of 1943 (~640 A/C total). Providing a decent escort and thus cutting the loss rate to 15% from July to October (when the 8th AF lost ~550 bombers) saves ~140 bombers.

If you keep going into 1944 the monthly percentage loss of 8th Air Force Bombers, January to April was 19.5%, 20.2%, 23.3% and 24.4%, given the larger numbers on strength that meant 211+299+349+409 = 1,268 from all causes. The 1944 raids certainly had escorts, and over twice the number of bombers had to be lost to have the same percentage effect as a loss in 1943, so why are the losses still in the region of 20% or more if 100 to 200 fighters could cut the losses to 15% in 1943?

The July to October 1943 8th AF Bomber losses are 128+124+101+198 = 551, again all causes, USAAF Statistical Digest says 519 losses on operations, Bomber Loss List 553, including 3 on non operational flights and ignoring B-24 losses in the Mediterranean. Of the 550 losses, 338 due to fighters or flak and fighters. And the idea is 100 to 200 extra escorts will save around 140 of these, over 40%. Of the 338 losses, 111 happened on 2 raids, the proof of pre war doctrine deep penetration ones. If the Mustang X do not have drop tanks it will not be able to do much on these raids, so the 140 saved out of 227.

I'm all for the Spitfire VIII with the aft tank, ditto for the P-47 with wing drop tanks. Combine these with several hundreds of Mustang X in 1943 and Luftwaffe will not just be in bad shape hardware-wise, but also with the question of whom to seat in a fighter that is just delivered from a factory. Longer range escorts enable the bomb runs against the German fuel infrastructure - another weak link for the Nazis.

There cannot be several hundred Mustang X in the front line in 1943, dropping the idea and using the engineering effort elsewhere, like the rear fuselage tank on a Spitfire VIII, or quicker fitting of larger tanks to the P-47 will provide a much better return. As for the oil campaign the allied bombers are in no real position to systematically attack the refineries in 1943, they lack the bomb lift for a start, plus the defences are too strong.

With the flight profiles of the 8th AF bombers the 8th actually does not need a 1944 defined long range fighter in 1943, only one that ranges out 300 or so miles, until sometime in the second half of 1943 when the size of the force hits the 300 mark considered strong enough to start long range unescorted strikes plus enough of the shorter range B-17 are replaced and the B-24 units are available.

With that said, we've discussed the long-range fighter options as were the suitably modified Spitfire and P-47 ad nauseam in this forum for the last 15 years. Hence this thread.

Understood, but the Allison engine conversion to Merlin is not a viable solution.

Sinclair misses two key points with a suggestion that 'efforts to increase combat tank capacity for P-47 and internal fuel for Spitfire would be better than up-engining the Mustang X. Combat tanks were already a high priority in February 1942 following the Arnold Hosted Fighter Convention and the Fairchild led FAREP to expedite production features to extend escort fighter combat range, including adding internal fuel and external combat tanks. Despite the priorities set in 1942, Materiel Command dragged its feet until General Barney Giles lit a fire under Echols in June-July 1943.

As I noted above, installing additional wing fuel capability ranged from zero (P-47D and P-51B) to good (P-38J). Republic was reduced to designing and producing pylon/fuel feed kits while awaiting the production P-47D-15 (added pylon/fuel feed) and the far future P-47N (added wing fuel). The 150 gal 'flat' tank for C/L didn't arrive until early 1944.

The Mustang X on internal fuel only would not have been as capable - range wise - as the P-47C/D with 75 gal C/L tank.

Is point 1 the 1942 start for the US external tank program and 2 the additional internal fuel? Thanks for the Mustang X range estimate.

Two things Marshall misses, the first is I have read texts like Boylen, Development of the Long-Range Escort Fighter but chose not to include that sort of information, given the mid 1943 time requirement. Secondly the what if has not made clear whether the Mustang X is a purely British effort, a major reversal of policy the USAAF stays clear of, remaining on the USAAF historical external tank time line. Or whether the USAAF is actively encouraging the development and so can be expected to accelerate its own external tank procurement and use, no foot dragging in the US.

Wilfrid Freeman's reply to Eaker's 14 October 1943 letter noted approval for the drop tank fittings made in Britain had not been received until October, while the orders for large numbers of tanks had been placed in June, the summary of the letter implies orders were discussed in February 1943 or at least Freeman warned Eaker then of how stretched British industry was and so could not produce a rushed order for tanks. The Ministry of Aircraft Production first reports on New Jettison Tank Deliveries and Programme in the December 1943 monthly report. Types made in the month, Spitfire 30 gallon Metal, 30 gallon Wood, 30 gallon Fibre, 90 gallon metal, Seafire 30 gallon metal, Mosquito 45 gallon Wood, 45 gallon Metal, Typhoon 45 gallon Metal. American Types Thunderbolt, 90 gallon paper (5,943 made in month), 90 gallon Metal (3,095 made), against a programme of 5,000 and 2,000 for the month respectively.

I am running a book on my messages, the moaning of the message, whether the complaint is too little or too much information plus option 3, the whole message is ignored.

 

[wuzak]

The Spitfire VIII was the export model, dust filters fitted as standard.

The IX was the "interim" Spitfire with 2 stage Merlin, adapted from an earlier model (the V).

The VII/VIII was the definitive 2 stage Merlin Spitfire. It had refinements in the airframe, such as retracting tail gear and additional fuel.

Because the changes for the VII/VIII were more extensive than the IX it took longer to get into production.

The VIII then formed the basis for the "interim" Griffon Spitfire - the XIV. The definitive version being the 21.

That the VIII was used in overseas command may have been because of the extra fuel allowing for a (slightly) better range and endurance, and thus was better for those theatres than the IX.

 

[drgondog]

The Spitfire VIII was the export model, dust filters fitted as standard.

Looking at the Mustang X going through the British test process.

3 conversions ordered on 15 June 1942, first flight in October, 10 foot 9 inch propeller, considered too small, flush under cowl, sealed radiator scoop, more intercooling but frequent engine cutting between 20,000 and 24,000 feet. 11 November, prototype using bigger propeller, another conversion was soon to fly, a third conversion complete, 2 more conversions planned to be done in early 1943. Conference 2 February 1943, prototype unacceptable in current form, insufficient directional stability, large change in directional trim with power, objectionable due to heavy rudder forces involved. The aircraft easily slipped sideways while manoeuvering. A fin fillet helped the stability.

'Can not accept the aircraft as a one hundred percent success' is a far cry from 'prototype unacceptable in current form'. pg 46 "Rolls-Royce and The Mustang" David Birch.

The discussed improvements included dorsal fin, adding chord/area to vertical stab, adding a booster tab and/or spring tab to rudder, The dorsal fin improved the directional stability 'somewhat'. pg 47 ibid

The Brits were delighted with the results as well as the future potential. They were also concerned that their arrangement of the intercooler and the associated air intake under the nose imposed a significant drag penalty. In any case, the ultimate decisions were predicated on a.) NAA design and delivery of Merlin Mustang differed too much from NA-73/83 prototype Mustang X, b.) The NAA Production deliveries, with P-51B Mustangs enjoying the benefits of dropping the wing three inches for better plumbing and centralized Intercooler/Glycol and oil cooler cooling were superior to the Mustang X mods, c.) The existing P-51B features including external bomb/fuel tank, near future increase to internal fuel, etc, and d.) a production delivery capability that 'probably exceeded' the ability of A.S.T. to match in fall of 1943.

There was never a practical concept around NAA delivering 1000 airframes for a R-R Merlin installation in England. The documented account of Sir Wilfred Freeman on pg 71 carefully parses the considerations and barriers to that concept. Consider how long it took NAA to deliver 100 kits to Australia under NA 110.

I am running a book on my messages, the moaning of the message, whether the complaint is too little or too much information plus option 3, the whole message is ignored.

 

[yulzari]

Following up the earlier posts on the insatiable demands for Allison engined Mustangs for tactical reconnaissance, could the USA A-36s in Italy have been replaced by Spitfires or Merlin Mustangs and back shipped to the UK, if only as a source of spares if not actual conversions to the role? Their operational tasks were within the ability of other types.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Not sure about that, the A-36 was a pretty valuable CAS asset in the Med from what I've read. I doubt the Spitfire could take over the A-36's job anymore than the reverse would be true. As for Merlin Mustangs, I'd expect they'd get there according to the historical timeline.

 

[pbehn]

Not sure about that, the A-36 was a pretty valuable CAS asset in the Med from what I've read. I doubt the Spitfire could take over the A-36's job anymore than the reverse would be true. As for Merlin Mustangs, I'd expect they'd get there according to the historical timeline.

From a recent thread on US operated Spitfires, Mk IXs and Mk VIIIs were still being issued to US squadrons in late 1943. US Spitfires

 

[drgondog]

31st and 52FG flew Spits from late 42 into spring 44.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Something found going through the files, Air Marshall Richard Williams, RAAF representative in Washington, in a letter dated 20 July 1942 to RAAF Australia notes "The improved Mustang with Merlin 61 engine will not be in production until 1943." The first Merlin Mustang flew in Britain on 13 October 1942. It was part of a section discussing the need for fighters with performance at altitude to counter the Zero. Apparently the local USAAF had asked for P-47 and were being sent P-38 "reported everywhere as being heavy in maintenance."

'Can not accept the aircraft as a one hundred percent success' is a far cry from 'prototype unacceptable in current form'. pg 46 "Rolls-Royce and The Mustang" David Birch.

I was quoting from Interceptor Fighters for the Royal Air Force 1935-45 by Michael J.F. Bowyer, it would seem some of the test pilots had a different way of expressing the problems. The early 1943 Australian mission to decide what aircraft to build next report notes (MP450/1 58) the handling difficulties "lack of directional stability and adequate rudder control" in the British experimental version, and that these defects were reported by the British as not present in US version. The report also notes the idea of 1,000 sets of components to Britain which was the genesis for the similar Australian proposal.

Since Bowyer only has a summary, I went looking for any other data I had. Nothing on the performance trials, his statement of 1,000 engineless airframes to Britain seems to be a misunderstanding of 1,000 made in Britain from components proposal. In early 1943 North American was probably happy to offload P-51B airframes but Britain would have similar trouble supplying engines.

Seems after the early tests the Ministry of Aircraft Production people in Washington on 5 November 1942 proposed 400 Mustangs sent to Britain for rapid conversion, despite a lack of Merlin 61, Rolls Royce noted a big engine order was needed soon for the plan to work, or US engines installed, with a lack of fuel pumps given for holding up Merlin 61 production. MAP went and sourced US pumps, which needed modification, when asked to expedite things Rolls Royce asked how given no airframes. MAP decided not even a good report would persuade Rolls Royce large orders would be placed. Then Rolls Royce laid out a conversion using Merlin 28. As noted in early 1943 the reports from North American indicated the US version had fewer problems and of course was assumed to be arriving "soon".

In early 1943 the British recommended Australia build Mustang instead of Spitfire 8, including by the Managing director of Armstrong Vickers.

Consider how long it took NAA to deliver 100 kits to Australia under NA 110.

It was not the timing of the kits according the locals.

Australian Archives series A5954 control symbol 809/1, pages 64 and 65 (online copy at Australian Archives web page) Australian War Cabinet Agenda 177/43 minute 2777 15 April 1943, order for 350 Mustang from Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation plus spare parts amounting to 70 additional airframes, order placed overseas for 408 Merlin series 61 engines and associated propellers, including spares. Plus appendix A equipment and associated spares, either locally or overseas. To be equipment for 1 Operational Training Unit plus six squadrons and reserves by October 1945.

Plus an additional 396 Merlin series 61 engines and associated propellers and spares for the additional 340 Mustang airframes plus spare parts equivalent to 68 airframes, making a total of 690 aircraft plus spare parts equivalent to 138 additional aircraft. Authority given for Commonwealth Government to negotiate with North American Aviation Company for a license to manufacture of Mustang aircraft in Australia. Funds 14,804,600 Australian pounds, including 785,000 pounds for buildings, jigs, tools, fixtures and license fees. (MP450/1 58 says 250,000 for additional buildings, 500,000 for jigs, tools and fixtures, 35,000 for license fees). General MacArthur is to be asked for his endorsement and allotment of the highest possible priority practicable. Apparently General Kenny made a submission in favour of the P-47 but that was turned down in July.

Production schedule as of 1 May 1943 (from MP450/1 58) First Mustang production in June 1944, with 40 built by end 1944, monthly output to reach 35 per month in March 1945 and stay there, so that by end 1945 a total 445 Mustangs would be built, the order for 690 to be completed July 1946. This would enable a force of 10 squadrons, output of 40 per month required for a 12 squadron force. Merlin engines from US under Lend Lease. The OTU to be formed in September 1944, the first squadron in January 1945.

100 complete sets of P-51D airframes from North American Inglewood, order under J the program which was approved June 1943, The December 1943 RC-301 report notes 100 complete sets of P-51D airframes in program, none accepted, by April 1944, 83 complete sets of P-51D airframes accepted to end of month for Australia, rest expected in May. April can be considered the first month of major P-51D production. So by specifying the D version it delayed things into mid 1944 at least, then North American supplied them quite early in D model production, however there were problems, so by the time the first Australian aircraft flew North American Inglewood were about to start P-51D-30 production. I do not have the details of the associated machine tools etc. that also had to be sent which also caused delays. The policy of 20% airframe spares meant 80 of the kits supplied were assembled and 20 used for spares.

MP450/1 178, monthly production reports, notes on local Mustang order
February 1944, Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation reports receipt of sample parts and templates.
April 1944, large number of sample parts arrived.
June 1944, sample aircraft available, engineer on way to US to follow up on supply deficiencies in technical data and drawings, 25% of factory workforce now on Mustang project.

July 1944, tooling one third complete with completion expected by end of year. Assembly of first kit about to commence.
August 1944, a great deal of additional engineering work is needed as a large number of drawings and templates supplied were obsolete or had been superceded, large quantities of the parts supplied also require alterations.

September 1944, The 100 sets of components are full of errors.
October 1944, pilot assembly of the first aircraft from supplied parts has commenced.
November 1944, latest reported modifications from the US incorporated into drawings, 10% of the parts supplied from the US will need to be replaced and others modified.

December 1944, some sub assemblies being slowed by non delivery of a small proportion of components. Delivery schedule from March 1944 says first production now expected in February 1945.

January 1945, Special conference held, first production now expected in May 1945. Over the last 12 months modifications reported from North American amount to 3,000 drawings and 12,000 changes. Add the previously reported parts problems plus delays in supply of machine tools etc. The latter means coolant and oil pipes and some other items will need to come from the US, not local manufacture.

March 1945, project now limited by manpower.
April 1945, assembly time for first 80 aircraft dependent on manpower, engineering resources now devoted to production of aircraft from wholly local components.

RAAF Chiefs of Staff report to Australian War Cabinet, for week ending, Mustang order which stayed at 350 until the post war reduction, entries mentioned here are only where a change was made, from first entry to end August 1945. I suspect the February 1944 start date is an error for 1945.

16-Jul-43, Delivery expected to commence June 1944
17-Sep-43, Delivery expected to commence February 1944
1-Nov-43, Delivery not expected to commence before February 1944
5-Nov-43, Delivery expected to commence February 1944
19-Nov-43, Delivery expected to commence late 1944
28-Apr-44, Delivery expected to commence late 1944. CA-17,18 Manufacture and assembly of tooling proceeding.
23-Jun-44, Delivery expected to commence late 1944 or early 1945
21-Jul-44, Delivery expected to commence late 1944 or early 1945. Detail parts and tooling being received from USA
1-Nov-44, 20 Aircraft are scheduled for delivery by end July 1945
24-Nov-44, 20 Aircraft are scheduled for delivery by end July 1945. Deliveries of detail parts and components from US received. Manufacture and assembly of tooling and production of sub assemblies in wing, engine bearer and empennage proceeding.

29-Dec-44, Deliveries expected to commence in May, 1945.
29-Mar-45, Deliveries expected to commence in May 1945. First of each assembly nearing completion.
13-Apr-45, A68-1 on final assembly line, completion anticipated by 30 April.
4-May-45, A68-1 undergoing flight trials, A68-2 on final assembly line.
18-May-45, First aircraft A68-1 still undergoing flight trials. A68-2, 3 on final assembly line
25-May-45, A68-1, 2 undergoing flight trials, A68-3, 4 on final assembly line
1-Jun-45, A68-1, 2 flight trials completed, A68-3 undergoing flight trials, A68-4, 5, on final assembly line
8-Jun-45, A68-1, 2 delivered, A68-3, 4 undergoing flight trials, A68-5, 6 on final assembly line
15-Jun-45, A68-3 delivered, A68-4, 5 undergoing flight trials, A68-6, 7 on final assembly line
22-Jun-45, A68-4, 5, 6 undergoing flight trials, A68-7, 8 on final assembly line
29-Jun-45, A68-4 delivered, A68-5, 6, 7 undergoing flight trials, A68-8, 9 on final assembly line
6-Jul-45, A68-5, 6, 7, 8 undergoing flight trials, A68-9, 10 on final assembly line
13-Jul-45, A68-5, 6, 7 delivered.
27-Jul-45, A68-8 to 10 delivered.
3-Aug-45, A68-11 delivered.
10-Aug-45, A68-12, 13, 15 delivered.
17-Aug-45, A68-14, 16 delivered.
31-Aug-45, A68-17, 18 delivered.

To compete Mustang things as part of the 1945 allocation of lend lease aircraft the RAAF was allocated 285 from US production to make up for the delays in setting up the local production line.

RAAF Chiefs of Staff first mention the order week ending 29 December 1944, for 285 aircraft, week ending 2 March 1945 order reduced to 284 as 1 lost in transit (crashed in US), week ending 13 April 1945 first arrivals, week ending 6 July 1945 order increased by 215 to 499 aircraft.

The USAAF Statistical Digest notes first P-51 in the Pacific Ocean Areas were in November 1944, in the Far East Air Forces in October 1944. The Mustang was a late arrival in the Pacific.

And while looking for Mustangs, NA.33 license agreement with CAC, $30,000 plus $1,000 per aircraft for the first 25, $800 per aircraft for the second 25, $600 per aircraft for the next 50, then no further payments.

 

[ColFord]

Best book for the RAAF and RNZAF Mustang story, that utilises the full range of information from sources worldwide (including lots of files not yet digitised by Australian Archives) along with those held in private collections, I can commend the following:

Southern Cross Mustangs by David Muir
Published 2009 by Red Roo, Australia

464 pages, A4 size

Aimed squarely at the enthusiast, modeller and historian, Southern Cross Mustangs is without question the most thorough examination that has as yet been made of the history, technology, camouflage and markings of the Australian and New Zealand Mustangs.


Southern Cross Mustangs is divided into 17 chapters covering different aspects of the story.
BACKGROUND - provides brief overview of the type and its service.
MODELS & VARIANTS - examines the differences between and modifications made to the NAA built Mk III (P-51 B/C), Mk IV and IVA (P-51D and K) and the CAC built CA-17 Mk 20 and CA-18 Mk21, Mk 22 and Mk 23.
OVERALL SCHEMES - looks at the colours and finishes of the military and civilian liveries.
NATIONAL INSIGNIA - charts the evolution of The RAAF and RNZAF insignia.
SQUADRON CODES - identifies the style, size and placement of code letters for each unit.
SERIALS - explores the background, fonts and placement of the aircraft's serials.
SECONDARY MARKINGS - illustrates the stenciling for each variant and service.
OTHER UNIT MARKINGS - describes the designs, logos and badges used by each unit.
SPINNER COLOURS - looks at the designs used on spinners in service.
PERSONAL MARKINGS - covers nose art, rank pennants and non-regulation markings.
INTERNAL FINISHES - describes finishes in the cockpits, wheel wells, engine and gun bays.
SHIPPING AND HANDLING - examines the protection methods used before and after delivery.
THINGS UNDER WINGS - examines and illustrates all the stores, weapons and equipment hung off the Mustangs in service including US bombs, rockets, fuel tanks, napalm tanks, smoke generators and cine camera tanks; British bombs, smoke generators, CLE and Storepedo containers and rockets and the Australian developed fuel tanks, DDT spray rig, Geletrol rockets and bombs, baggage tanks, fire extinguishing bombs, defoliant tanks, cable layer, target towing equipment, high speed releases for bombs, light series bomb carrier and test/trials equipment.
PROFILES - includes 600 profiles in four chapters covering the RAAF Squadrons in the MTO, NAA and CAC built aircraft in Australia, the Pacific, Japan and Korea, the RNZAF aircraft and the civilian operated aircraft of both countries.
The body of the text is supported by eight Appendices
Appendix 1 outlines the history of each unit that operated the type
Appendix 2 lists the RAAF Mustang Orders and Instructions for modifications and updates
Appendix 3 does the same for the RNZAF modifications and updates
Appendix 4 illustrates the RAAF A.5524 painting and marking diagrams
Appendix 5 cross references the serials, registrations and names of the civilian Mustangs
Appendix 6 cross references the RAAF, RNZAF, ML-KNIL & RAF serials and codes
Appendix 7 examines and lists the official colours used in service
Appendix 8 provides a list of selected further reading

 

[ColFord]

Following up the earlier posts on the insatiable demands for Allison engined Mustangs for tactical reconnaissance, could the USA A-36s in Italy have been replaced by Spitfires or Merlin Mustangs and back shipped to the UK, if only as a source of spares if not actual conversions to the role? Their operational tasks were within the ability of other types.

In the timeframe in question, there was no other aircraft with the same capabilities as the USAAF A-36s in the MTO to directly replace it without some loss of capability. Hence why the RAF in the MTO on a number of occasions borrowed P-51 and A-36 aircraft from the USAAF to provide the capabilities the type could give that was not present in RAF aircraft in theatre. By the time the USAAF had other types available in the MTO, the A-36s that were there had already been well used with a number of losses due to various reasons. By the time the USAAF retired the A-36s from operations in the MTO they were having real problems maintaining them due to the lack of spares coming from the USA as the NAA lines had converted over to the Merlin engine Mustangs and the higher priority was attached to supporting them in the ETO. They were combining major components from A-36 airframes to keep aircraft flying. What few A-36s that did remain airworthy were used for a while to assist in pilot transition training for units converting from other types to the first of the Merlin engine Mustangs arriving in the MTO. Some of the borrowed USAAF A-36s that the RAF had in the MTO (about four in total by that stage), were also used to assist in conversion of units from the P-40 to the Mustang III.

 

[drgondog]

Best book for the RAAF and RNZAF Mustang story, that utilises the full range of information from sources worldwide (including lots of files not yet digitised by Australian Archives) along with those held in private collections, I can commend the following:

Southern Cross Mustangs by David Muir
Published 2009 by Red Roo, Australia

464 pages, A4 size

Aimed squarely at the enthusiast, modeller and historian, Southern Cross Mustangs is without question the most thorough examination that has as yet been made of the history, technology, camouflage and markings of the Australian and New Zealand Mustangs.


Southern Cross Mustangs is divided into 17 chapters covering different aspects of the story.
BACKGROUND - provides brief overview of the type and its service.
MODELS & VARIANTS - examines the differences between and modifications made to the NAA built Mk III (P-51 B/C), Mk IV and IVA (P-51D and K) and the CAC built CA-17 Mk 20 and CA-18 Mk21, Mk 22 and Mk 23.
OVERALL SCHEMES - looks at the colours and finishes of the military and civilian liveries.
NATIONAL INSIGNIA - charts the evolution of The RAAF and RNZAF insignia.
SQUADRON CODES - identifies the style, size and placement of code letters for each unit.
SERIALS - explores the background, fonts and placement of the aircraft's serials.
SECONDARY MARKINGS - illustrates the stenciling for each variant and service.
OTHER UNIT MARKINGS - describes the designs, logos and badges used by each unit.
SPINNER COLOURS - looks at the designs used on spinners in service.
PERSONAL MARKINGS - covers nose art, rank pennants and non-regulation markings.
INTERNAL FINISHES - describes finishes in the cockpits, wheel wells, engine and gun bays.
SHIPPING AND HANDLING - examines the protection methods used before and after delivery.
THINGS UNDER WINGS - examines and illustrates all the stores, weapons and equipment hung off the Mustangs in service including US bombs, rockets, fuel tanks, napalm tanks, smoke generators and cine camera tanks; British bombs, smoke generators, CLE and Storepedo containers and rockets and the Australian developed fuel tanks, DDT spray rig, Geletrol rockets and bombs, baggage tanks, fire extinguishing bombs, defoliant tanks, cable layer, target towing equipment, high speed releases for bombs, light series bomb carrier and test/trials equipment.
PROFILES - includes 600 profiles in four chapters covering the RAAF Squadrons in the MTO, NAA and CAC built aircraft in Australia, the Pacific, Japan and Korea, the RNZAF aircraft and the civilian operated aircraft of both countries.
The body of the text is supported by eight Appendices
Appendix 1 outlines the history of each unit that operated the type
Appendix 2 lists the RAAF Mustang Orders and Instructions for modifications and updates
Appendix 3 does the same for the RNZAF modifications and updates
Appendix 4 illustrates the RAAF A.5524 painting and marking diagrams
Appendix 5 cross references the serials, registrations and names of the civilian Mustangs
Appendix 6 cross references the RAAF, RNZAF, ML-KNIL & RAF serials and codes
Appendix 7 examines and lists the official colours used in service
Appendix 8 provides a list of selected further reading


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David was instrumental in helping me sort out content and timeline for NA-110 Kit and License agreement for P-51D-5 to Oz. Like you, Colin the Aussie content contribution was very important to the "Bastard Stepchild".