Effects of converting of all surviving Mustang Is into LR Mustang X?

[wuzak]

The only RAF Mustangs I have ever read about doing escort were those that escorted the attack on Shell house in 1945.

Mustang IIIs were used on the Shelhouse raid.

Operation Carthage - The Shell House Raid - 21st March 1945 - The People's Mosquito

By the end of 1944 the Danish resistance movement in Copenhagen was in danger of being wiped out by the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo). Many of their leaders were arrested and a lot of material was filed in the Gestapo archives in the Shell House (Shellhus in Danish) which was located in...

www.peoplesmosquito.org.uk

20 Mosquitoes from RAF 2nd TAF (Tactical Air Force) escorted by 28 Mustang Mk. IIIs from the 11th Group

 

[EwenS]

Of course MkI and MkIA were not built to carry bombs or drop tanks as built at the factory. First to carry underwing stores was the A-36, but the RAF only had about two of those.

So RAF Mustangs did escort bomber missions, although it was Boston, Mitchell, and Marauder and not he+avies. The only RAF Mustangs I have ever read about doing escort were those that escorted the attack on Shell house in 1945. I have even read of Mossies being used to escort Lancs in daylight raids, but not RAF Mustangs doing that. The book D-Day Fighters mentions RAF fighter bomber strikes with Mustang III quite a bit, and of course they were not above shooting down enemy aircraft if they found them, either, even knocking down a couple of LEO45 in German markings.

From 27th Aug 1944 to 24th April 1945 Bomber Command heavies flew 153 daylight raids, sometimes putting over 1,000 bombers over a target, that all required escort.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1433&context=cmh

From late 1943, 2 Group, which contained the Bostons, Mitchells and 2 (later 3) Wings of fighter bomber Mosquito FB.VI was part of 2nd Tactical Air Force, not Bomber Command. 2 Group moved to the continent in Autumn 1944 in support of the various field armies. Missions like Shell House attract a lot of attention but were a rarity.

Col
At the end of Sept 1944 there was a swap of fighter squadrons between Air Defence of Great Britain (the old, and also later, Fighter Command) and 2nd TAF. The latter had a need for better performing fighters to tackle the Luftwaffe opposition, including jets, that it was then encountering. As a result 5 squadrons of Tempests and 2 squadrons of Spitfire XIV no longer required for countering the V1 menace, flew to the Continent to join 2nd TAF while the 3 remaining Mustang III squadrons in 2nd TAF, needed for Bomber Command escort, plus 4 Spitfire IX squadrons moved the other way.

 

[tomo pauk]

North American Mustang Mk.I (NA-83) AM106/G at A&AEE UK for trials of the "Low Attack Wing" conversion of the Mustang Mk.I to allow it to carry underwing stores, including long range drop tanks, stores containers, bombs and SCI cannisters. Also trials for 40mm 'S' gun pods and four rocket rails mounted under each wing.

Thank you for the pictures. IIRC there was also a Mustang that was trialed with 2pdr anti-tank cannons.
I'd say that there is a lot of difference with a test mule carrying bombs vs. a claim "In the ETO they were heavily used for fighter bomber duties in the run-up to 6 Jun 1944. " by another member here.

Hence why in the instances when the RAF Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IA were used for bomber escort duties, they were primarily used for the escort of 2Group Bostons, Mitchells and Venturas on low level bombing operations.

Thank you again.

2TAF and RAF Tac/R tactical doctrine was not to use drop tanks on Tac/R aircraft when conducting low level Tac/R operations due to the excessive risk and danger to the aircraft if the drop tank were to be hit by light or medium flak whilst still on the aircraft. Tac/R versions of the Spitfire did not have the range and did not perform as well at the lower altitudes required in the Tac/R role;

A 30 or 45 gal tank can be used up and discarded prior making the land fall. Spitfire XII was pretty fast down low, too.
RAF can opt for having Mustang IIs shipped to the UK from August-September of 1943 and convert them into Tac-R machines. They can also ask for A-36s before that.

The FR versions of the Spitfire also had more limited camera fitment options, basically a single sideways oblique, unless fitted with additional camera(s) by such means as cameras mounted in modified drop tanks or similar. Whereas, the Tac/R Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IA were initially single oblique, then upgraded to oblique plus vertical, then dual oblique with vertical and a later modification implemented onto a number of Mustang Mk.II of four oblique and one vertical - all mounted within the available space in the Mustang airframe without negative impact on fuel able to be carried or performance.

Per my scenario, we'd have Tac/R units outfitted with less-than-ideal aircraft (in case where all Mustang Is are converted and no extra P-51As or A-36s are shipped in the UK). In another hand, we'd have a fighter that can do the escort job past Ardennes and well into Germany proper, hitting the Luftwaffe fighter force, depleting both their aircraft stocks and pilot pool, preventing bomber losses (both of aircraft and crews), and enabling the said bombers to unload more bombs.

I'd take the trade.

 

[MIflyer]

"In the ETO they were heavily used for fighter bomber duties in the run-up to 6 Jun 1944. " by another member here.

Okay, let me spell it out.

1. You were talking about Mustang X's. I was talking about P-51B/Mustang III, obviously. The reason for the comparison is obvious. Of course the P-51B originally was assigend to 9th AF until Blakeslee made his famous "We will learn to fly them on the way to the target." and that, combined with the Munster and Black Thursday 1943 missions, changed everything.
2. Missions: The units equipped with Mustang Mk I were TAC/R. Refit their airplanes with 2 stage Merlins and their mission would not change. They would not change over to dueling with the Luftwaffe at 25,000 ft just because they could. Admittedly, the Mustang X could still do the TAC/R job, probably even better than the MKI, but it did not need those cpabilities.
3. In the book 'D Day Bombers" they describe a daylight mission to the Cherbourg Penn where the Lancs were escorted by Mosquito, presumable MKVI. I do not know how often this occurred; I had never heard of it before. By the way your comment remphasizes what I said about unit missions.

I got the engine back on my airplane yesterday, so I have to go off and accomplish the rest of the w ork to get her back in the air. Bye.

 

[ColFord]

I'd say that there is a lot of difference with a test mule carrying bombs vs. a claim "In the ETO they were heavily used for fighter bomber duties in the run-up to 6 Jun 1944. " by another member here.

I would suspect the other poster was referring to the RAF's use of Mustang IIIs in the fighter bomber role in the lead-up to D-Day and the period up until the end of September 1944 when the aircraft swap between AGB/FC and 2TAF occurred.

If the Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IA had been re-engined as you proposed, it may have thrown the War Office and British Army into another of their frenzied demands for the creation of their own dedicated Squadrons of specialised CAS aircraft, which may in turn have been used as an excuse to delay the invasion until 1945 as the required squadrons were formed and equipped............what if............

 

[tomo pauk]

I would suspect the other poster was referring to the RAF's use of Mustang IIIs in the fighter bomber role in the lead-up to D-Day and the period up until the end of September 1944 when the aircraft swap between AGB/FC and 2TAF occurred.

From the post #34 in this thread:
How many RAF Mustang I, IA, II, or III were ever used for escort? The first Mustang III went into service with 19 Sqdrn in Feb 1943. The Mustang was purchased for Army Co-operation missions and replaced Tomahawks, Whirlwinds, and Kittyhawks for those missions. In the ETO they were heavily used for fighter bomber duties in the run-up to 6 Jun 1944.

Mk.I and IA were not 'heavily used for fighter bomber duties'. Mk.II was not used in the run-up to 6 jun 1944, being used elsewhere (Med, CBI). Mk.III was certainly used as a fighter bomber, however, not in 1943, certainly not from February to November of 1943.

If the Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IA had been re-engined as you proposed, it may have thrown the War Office and British Army into another of their frenzied demands for the creation of their own dedicated Squadrons of specialised CAS aircraft, which may in turn have been used as an excuse to delay the invasion until 1945 as the required squadrons were formed and equipped............what if............

Delay of the invasion after the late spring/early summer of 1944 will happen over Roosevelt's dead body.

 

[drgondog]

Okay, let me spell it out.

1. You were talking about Mustang X's. I was talking about P-51B/Mustang III, obviously. The reason for the comparison is obvious. Of course the P-51B originally was assigend to 9th AF until Blakeslee made his famous "We will learn to fly them on the way to the target." and that, combined with the Munster and Black Thursday 1943 missions, changed everything.

Yes, and No. The P-51B was assigned to TAC by Air Defense Directorate in approximately May 1943. That said, while the 354th, 357th and 363rd were originally assigned to 9th AF, several key actions changed the course. First, Eaker appealed for Mustangs and Lightnings in July 1943 - ASAP. Second, Arnold changed priorities for new P-38 FGs (55th and 20th) from MTO to ETO. Third, he asked Portal to trade Mustang III delivered through 1943, for future deliveries. Fourth, authorized 8th AF Operational control over IX FC (ALL IX FC including P-51B/P-47D) which extended through April, 1944. Fifth, while 8th was not able to acquire 354th and 363rd FG outright, Spaatz was able to trade P-47D 358FH for 357 FG (P-51B) effective Jan 31st, 1944. The 355th FG was tasked for P-47D to P-51B after 56th FG turned down the conversion, and received about 20 P-51Bs. Last, Blakesleee convinced Doolittle that the 4th should be next - and committed to on the job 'education' as you stated above. The 355th turned over their consignment after Big Week and flew its first P-51B mission on Feb 28th. The 4th returned their 'laners' back to the 355th on the 8th of March and the 355t flewits first 'all P-51B' op on March 9th.

2. Missions: The units equipped with Mustang Mk I were TAC/R. Refit their airplanes with 2 stage Merlins and their mission would not change. They would not change over to dueling with the Luftwaffe at 25,000 ft just because they could. Admittedly, the Mustang X could still do the TAC/R job, probably even better than the MKI, but it did not need those cpabilities.
3. In the book 'D Day Bombers" they describe a daylight mission to the Cherbourg Penn where the Lancs were escorted by Mosquito, presumable MKVI. I do not know how often this occurred; I had never heard of it before. By the way your comment remphasizes what I said about unit missions.

I got the engine back on my airplane yesterday, so I have to go off and accomplish the rest of the w ork to get her back in the air. Bye.

To further clarify the Mustang III 'role' in RAF. It's first and primary mission was TAC under Leigh Mallory - but Arnold persuaded Portal to continue loaning RAF squadrons to mid-range daylight escort of 8th AF (no 85 gallon fuselage tanks until the P-51B-10s started arriving). IIRC they returned to TAC command and control near the end of April when the Rail Campaign took very high priority.

 

[Shortround6]

There may have been only a few (or one?) Planes with the "low attack wing".

Photos do show 40mm cannon like the Hurricane, they do show rocket rails like the Hurricane and one or more photos do show bombs.

However, on the photos where details can be made out (or serial numbers seen) the fuselage guns are plated over and only one gun port is visible in each wing.
This sort of makes sense if they were looking at a faster Hurricane IV for ground attack but that is not a conventional fighter bomber.
I don't know if this guess is correct or what the goal of the "low attack wing" was.

On a trials aircraft the reduction in machine guns might make sense to reduce weight for the trial installations.
Another guess.
But trying to convert already existing airframes to heavier power plants and drop tanks and keep usable firepower might be more trouble.

The P-51A already has the underwing racks and the higher gross weight, it just doesn't speed up the delivery time by more than a few weeks, if not actually be later than the P-51B.

 

[ColFord]

There may have been only a few (or one?) Planes with the "low attack wing".

From memory, there were four, maximum six, Mustang Mk.I used for weapons trials including the trials of the "low attack wing". (I have the details of the aircraft involved somewhere in the copies of the relevant AM files that I have). The reduction in the wing armament to the single machine gun was similar in concept used for the Hurricane equipped with the 40mm cannon pods, to assist with aiming the larger cannon and minimal self defence capability. Ditto for the aircraft fitted with the rocket rails. The removal of the nose guns was a weight saving measure and they were also not considered essential to be fitted during the trials. As it was, the trials showed that whilst the Mustang equipped with the "low attack wing" would be an improvement over the Hurricane, the negative impacts on the performance of the Mustang would make it vulnerable operating in a highly contested environment. As it was, they were already looking at the Typhoon as the best alternative for the CAS role, given its greater engine power and more rugged airframe.

At the time the concept for the low attack wing modification for the Mustang was initially created and plans for the trials commenced, the RAF still had the possibility of further follow on orders of Allison engine Mustangs, and was looking at technical information from their trials that they could feed back to NAA for modifications to be implemented into the production lines at NAA to have the Mustangs include a "universal wing" where relatively quick modifications to the wing armament and stores carriers (hard points) could be made at unit level in theatre as requirements for particular types of operations changed. The concept and the outcomes of the trials were overtaken by events and development of other aircraft more suited to the CAS role, plus NAA's own initiatives in their work to produce Mustang variants more suited to USAAF requirements. The RAF ACC Squadrons had also early on quickly identified the Mustangs suitability for the low level Tac/R role and so had done their own lobbying to keep their Mustangs "as is" for that role - their higher priorities were for the modifications they considered more essential for that role including the camera installations both oblique and vertical.

The Mustang was purchased for Army Co-operation missions and replaced Tomahawks, Whirlwinds, and Kittyhawks for those missions.

The Mustang was not purchased by the AM or RAF for Army Co-operation. They were purchased as another fighter type aircraft, likely to be useful in the defence of the UK or as a fighter type in RAF service in overseas commands. At the time they were ordered in 1940, the RAF was looking for fighter aircraft from all sources to increase the available numbers and offset potential for shortfalls in UK production due to German attacks on aircraft plants in the UK. At the time the Mustang was ordered, the standard aircraft for ACC Squadrons was the Westland Lysander and the RAF had not yet experienced in the Battle of France what would happen to aircraft like the Lysander when they came up against enemy fighters and flak. What types of higher performance aircraft might be of use in future Army Co-operation Squadrons given what happened in France did not start to occur until August-September 1940 - the time when you see consideration of equipping the Army Co-operation Squadrons with Fairey Battles or B.P. Defiants, or even specialist types capable of dive bombing to answer the British Army's demands for a Stuka equivalent to support them (Chesapeakes, Bermudas, Vengeances) but a preference was being shown for Hurricanes, which were not available at the time because of the demands made by FC. The Tomahawk which was coming through from the French orders and early RAF orders was considered a suitable alternative to the Hurricane and so that is why the AC Squadrons started to receive them. Even as late as mid to late-1941 before the first Mustangs arrived in the UK, the then formed ACC was lobbying for the release of Hurricanes to be used for AC Squadrons and repeatedly being rejected by FC. Of note, at the time the Mustang made its first flight, Army Co-operation Command had not even been formed (formed 1 December 1940, first Mustang flight 26 October 1940), and what was the Army Co-operation Group, 22 Group, still resided within Fighter Command.

 

[pbehn]

Always a mystery to me, with the obvious advantage that the Mustang had in range, why didnt the USA order it for high altitude bomber escort in 1940?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Always a mystery to me, with the obvious advantage that the Mustang had in range, why didnt the USA order it for high altitude bomber escort in 1940?

1) "Bombers don't need escort", by the American doctrine of the day.

2) I don't know that an Allison Mustang would be as effective at high-altitude as it was at low altitude.

 

[drgondog]

There may have been only a few (or one?) Planes with the "low attack wing".

Photos do show 40mm cannon like the Hurricane, they do show rocket rails like the Hurricane and one or more photos do show bombs.

However, on the photos where details can be made out (or serial numbers seen) the fuselage guns are plated over and only one gun port is visible in each wing.
This sort of makes sense if they were looking at a faster Hurricane IV for ground attack but that is not a conventional fighter bomber.
I don't know if this guess is correct or what the goal of the "low attack wing" was.

On a trials aircraft the reduction in machine guns might make sense to reduce weight for the trial installations.
Another guess.
But trying to convert already existing airframes to heavier power plants and drop tanks and keep usable firepower might be more trouble.

The P-51A already has the underwing racks and the higher gross weight, it just doesn't speed up the delivery time by more than a few weeks, if not actually be later than the P-51B.

The difference in NAA Delivery of P51A versus P-51B-1 was about four weeks. The difference between first flights were more than 3 months due to the aforementioned delays to provide NAA the Packard Merlin 1650-3.

The wing genesis was more complicated as the path to the P-51B wing was subtle - and substantially different from both NA-73/83 and the NA-91. The root of the P-51B wing was the A-36. The A-36 not only had a much more robust spar/skin combination due to dive brake aero loads but also due to a.) equivalent bomb and external combat load/drag.

The A-36 began design study for external loads beginning in November 1941 and among the armament studies, included external battery of 2x37mm per wing similar to the RAF modified NA-83. That said, the changes were numerous and Never a candidate for 'kit' and Depot mod. A new wing was crafted for AM118, requiring jigs and tooling to build the A-36 wing which was tooled, fabricated, assembled and installed between May and August 1942.

The NA-73/83 wing changes would be similarly difficult to install spar changes, skin changes and internal plumbing to feed from wing pylons to arrive in NA-99 wing configuration.

 

[tomo pauk]

Always a mystery to me, with the obvious advantage that the Mustang had in range, why didnt the USA order it for high altitude bomber escort in 1940?

As noted above, AAF doctrine was that (big) bombers will be safe flying at very high altitudes and armed with multiple guns.
AAF was looking down at P-51( (they favored the P-38 and P-47), it took them several months to actually test an XP-51 delivered to them at Wright Field in late August 1941. It took some 'maneuvering' to have at least A-36 in production by October 1942, lest the NAA production line for the P-51 is shoot down. P-51A (Mustang II) production stated in March of 1943.
3rd thing was the engine - a V-1710-33 was bad above 15000 ft for the needs of 1942 and on. The -81 that powered the P-51A was slightly better, still not something that will be on the equal footing as that will be the case with a good 2-stage supercharged engine like that was the Merlin 60 or 70 series, or a 2-stage supercharged V-1710.
Even the 1-stage Merlins like the 20 series, 45, 47 or 50, as well as the V-1650-1 Packard Merlin were considerably better than the -81 for medium and high altitudes.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Idea behind Mustang X in few hundreds by Summer of 1943 was not that they still roam the French countryside between SL and 15000 ft, but to do the escort at 25000 ft, and from position of superior performance hit Luftwaffe. The ~540 Mustangs available for conversion is a fine number, way better than my 200 of converted airframes for Summer or 1943.
Strength of Luftwaffe will be also diminishing from July-November of 1943 in an even greater rate.

100 longer range fighters in the west are not going to do a lot to the Luftwaffe, the Mediterranean and Red Air Forces did a lot of the damage July/August 1943 part of the reason for the German pull back, as well as the raids launched from Britain. And there are not 500 spare two stage Merlins available without disruption to Spitfire output. As of 30 June 1943 the Luftwaffe quartermaster recorded 1,849 single and 194 twin engined fighters on strength, total 2,043 as of 30 November it was 1,789 single and 315 twin, total 2,104.

Work will return assets invested in a major fashion. Like the survival and greater experience of the 8th AF bombers' crews (and their A/C), enabling them to do more damage, all while inflicting an even greater casualty list for the Luftwaffe.

Actually given what the 8th was doing at the time and where its losses were being taken your statement is incorrect. How many of the bomber losses is a Mustang X force expected to save versus historical losses?

The USAAF statistical digest reports to end 1943 the 8th Air Force had lost 1,078 heavy bombers on operations, 737 to fighters, 228 to flak, 113 to other causes. The incomplete loss list I am working from identifies 1,223 losses on operations, including 642 to fighter, 255 to flak, 103 to flak and fighter, in reasonable enough agreement for losses considered caused by the defences, then comes 55 battle damage, 51 lack of fuel, 47 collisions, 37 mechanical failure and other various causes. A loss is defined as failed to return or written off.

Richard Davis notes the 8th Air Force had 10,976 bomber sorties attacking Germany to end 1943, the top 7 targets were
Bremen 2,326, Emden 1,185, Wilhelmshaven 1,005, Kiel 801, Ludwigshafen 653, Miscellaneous 554, so various targets of opportunity etc. by a few bombers at a time, Munster 500, Schweinfurt comes in at 411 attacking, Regensburg at 126.

All up a little over 100 locations identified, most are in Western Germany, so the obvious question is rather than spend all that effort converting Allison P-51 to Merlin why not put it into earlier and bigger drop tanks for P-47 and a wing or two of Spitfire VIII with rear fuselage tank that is a lot less effort.

Back to the loss list, to end October 1943 it says 364 8th Air Force bombers lost to fighters, 111 to flak and 42 to flak and fighters when attacking Germany, total 516, unsurprisingly Schweinfurt tops the list for attacking bombers lost to fighters or a combination of flak and fighters, Schweinfurt 93, Kiel 38, Bremen 29, Munster 26, Wilhelmshaven 24, Regensburg 18, Stuttgart 18, Emden 17, Anklam 17, Hannover 14, Wangerooge 11, Oschersleben 10.

Again, given the targets, using Spitfire VIII and P-47 with drop tanks as escort seems viable for most. Norwich to Kiel is 382 miles, Bremen 314 miles, Munster 273 miles.

 

[tomo pauk]

100 longer range fighters in the west are not going to do a lot to the Luftwaffe, the Mediterranean and Red Air Forces did a lot of the damage July/August 1943 part of the reason for the German pull back, as well as the raids launched from Britain. And there are not 500 spare two stage Merlins available without disruption to Spitfire output. As of 30 June 1943 the Luftwaffe quartermaster recorded 1,849 single and 194 twin engined fighters on strength, total 2,043 as of 30 November it was 1,789 single and 315 twin, total 2,104.

'500' is a bigger number than '100'. Five times as big.
Yes, production of Spitfires with 2-stage engines will take a hit between late 1942 and late 1943.
Luftwaffe's 'West' and 'Reich defence' lost 2100+ fighters from Sept 1943 to Dec 1943 (another 454 in Italy & Balkans). During the Big Week, the small number of P-51Bs (ranging from 57 to 73 A/C in the 1st 5 days, and 139 A/C in the 6th day) was making it's presence felt well in the Germany proper, even when we allow for reduction of German losses because of over-claiming.

Actually given what the 8th was doing at the time and where its losses were being taken your statement is incorrect. How many of the bomber losses is a Mustang X force expected to save versus historical losses?

You are certainly entitled to an opinion about whether my statement is correct or incorrect.

The USAAF statistical digest reports to end 1943 the 8th Air Force had lost 1,078 heavy bombers on operations, 737 to fighters, 228 to flak, 113 to other causes. The incomplete loss list I am working from identifies 1,223 losses on operations, including 642 to fighter, 255 to flak, 103 to flak and fighter, in reasonable enough agreement for losses considered caused by the defences, then comes 55 battle damage, 51 lack of fuel, 47 collisions, 37 mechanical failure and other various causes. A loss is defined as failed to return or written off.

Richard Davis notes the 8th Air Force had 10,976 bomber sorties attacking Germany to end 1943, the top 7 targets were
Bremen 2,326, Emden 1,185, Wilhelmshaven 1,005, Kiel 801, Ludwigshafen 653, Miscellaneous 554, so various targets of opportunity etc. by a few bombers at a time, Munster 500, Schweinfurt comes in at 411 attacking, Regensburg at 126.

Going by this graph, the monthly loss rate average was a bit greater than 20% from May to October of 1943 (~640 A/C total). Providing a decent escort and thus cutting the loss rate to 15% from July to October (when the 8th AF lost ~550 bombers) saves ~140 bombers.

All up a little over 100 locations identified, most are in Western Germany, so the obvious question is rather than spend all that effort converting Allison P-51 to Merlin why not put it into earlier and bigger drop tanks for P-47 and a wing or two of Spitfire VIII with rear fuselage tank that is a lot less effort.

Back to the loss list, to end October 1943 it says 364 8th Air Force bombers lost to fighters, 111 to flak and 42 to flak and fighters when attacking Germany, total 516, unsurprisingly Schweinfurt tops the list for attacking bombers lost to fighters or a combination of flak and fighters, Schweinfurt 93, Kiel 38, Bremen 29, Munster 26, Wilhelmshaven 24, Regensburg 18, Stuttgart 18, Emden 17, Anklam 17, Hannover 14, Wangerooge 11, Oschersleben 10.

Again, given the targets, using Spitfire VIII and P-47 with drop tanks as escort seems viable for most. Norwich to Kiel is 382 miles, Bremen 314 miles, Munster 273 miles.

I'm all for the Spitfire VIII with the aft tank, ditto for the P-47 with wing drop tanks. Combine these with several hundreds of Mustang X in 1943 and Luftwaffe will not just be in bad shape hardware-wise, but also with the question of whom to seat in a fighter that is just delivered from a factory. Longer range escorts enable the bomb runs against the German fuel infrastructure - another weak link for the Nazis.

With that said, we've discussed the long-range fighter options as were the suitably modified Spitfire and P-47 ad nauseam in this forum for the last 15 years. Hence this thread.

 

[drgondog]

Sinclair misses two key points with a suggestion that 'efforts to increase combat tank capacity for P-47 and internal fuel for Spitfire would be better than up-engining the Mustang X. Combat tanks were already a high priority in February 1942 following the Arnold Hosted Fighter Convention and the Fairchild led FAREP to expedite production features to extend escort fighter combat range, including adding internal fuel and external combat tanks. Despite the priorities set in 1942, Materiel Command dragged its feet until General Barney Giles lit a fire under Echols in June-July 1943.

As I noted above, installing additional wing fuel capability ranged from zero (P-47D and P-51B) to good (P-38J). Republic was reduced to designing and producing pylon/fuel feed kits while awaiting the production P-47D-15 (added pylon/fuel feed) and the far future P-47N (added wing fuel). The 150 gal 'flat' tank for C/L didn't arrive until early 1944.

The Mustang X on internal fuel only would not have been as capable - range wise - as the P-47C/D with 75 gal C/L tank.

I still doubt very seriously that external rack/combat tank capability for 75 and 108 gal tanks could have been 'kitted' along with Depot level 'unskinning, adding structural integrity for external 500/800 pound wing load, re-skinning and flight testing by January 1944

 

[Shortround6]

I still doubt very seriously that external rack/combat tank capability for 75 and 108 gal tanks could have been 'kitted' along with Depot level 'unskinning, adding structural integrity for external 500/800 pound wing load, re-skinning and flight testing by January 1944

The British might have been able to use 44imp gallon tanks from Hurricanes? but may have been speed restricted.
We also have not addressed the armament situation. I doubt the .50 cal guns in the fuselage would have stayed what with the bigger supercharger and plumbing in the cowl and unless the "allied forces" involved were happy with two .50 and four .303s there was more work that needed doing on wings.
Not hard work or impossible work, but work that could be done while on the "unskinning", structural integrity and fuel lines for the drop tanks.
It is just more work. Change gun bay doors, change ammunition trays/boxes change outer gun gun bay mounts firing arrangements.

 

[tomo pauk]

The British might have been able to use 44imp gallon tanks from Hurricanes? but may have been speed restricted.

One of options is to use the space, previously devoted to the cameras, to install an additional fuel tank.

We also have not addressed the armament situation. I doubt the .50 cal guns in the fuselage would have stayed what with the bigger supercharger and plumbing in the cowl and unless the "allied forces" involved were happy with two .50 and four .303s there was more work that needed doing on wings.
Not hard work or impossible work, but work that could be done while on the "unskinning", structural integrity and fuel lines for the drop tanks.
It is just more work. Change gun bay doors, change ammunition trays/boxes change outer gun gun bay mounts firing arrangements.

Perhaps start out with the Mustang IA at 1st, it features 4 cannons by default. 150 were delivered to the RAF by NAA from July 1942.
Wrt. Mustang I, the 'cheek' HMGs will need to go, probably getting installed instead of the LMGs in the wings?

 

[tomo pauk]

As I noted above, installing additional wing fuel capability ranged from zero (P-47D and P-51B) to good (P-38J). Republic was reduced to designing and producing pylon/fuel feed kits while awaiting the production P-47D-15 (added pylon/fuel feed) and the far future P-47N (added wing fuel). The 150 gal 'flat' tank for C/L didn't arrive until early 1944.

The P-47N additional fuel tanks in the wings were located at the leading edges, aft the wheel bays, and between the wheel bays and fuselage. The LE tanks and the ones located aft the wheel bay were probably not requiring the wing 'plugs' (as featured on P-47N) like the ones next to the fuselage did.
(attached is the diagram of fuel system of the P-47N)

 

[ColFord]

One of options is to use the space, previously devoted to the cameras, to install an additional fuel tank.

The initial oblique camera installations were basically in the areas where the rear quarter windows in the cockpit were, immediately behind the pilot's head's armour plate. Some of the radio equipment and supporting ancillaries got moved from that area for the initial oblique camera installation, so there is in fact little moved into the fuselage where a fuselage fuel tank might go. The vertical camera mount was just in front of the rear tailwheel bay, so again, not where the fuselage tank was placed in the later Mustang models - in fact in the USAAF modified Tac/R Merlin engine Mustangs they could have the cameras and the fuselage tank.

Perhaps start out with the Mustang IA at 1st, it features 4 cannons by default. 150 were delivered to the RAF by NAA from July 1942.

As noted the NA-91 P-51/Mustang Mk.IA only had 150 delivered, if as you propose a re-engining program were initiated earlier, potentially greater pressure would have been placed to produce more of that model. If the re-engined Mustang was seen as a stop-gap long range escort by the USAAF for their bomber operations over Europe, it may have kept derivatives of the cannon armed Mustang in production longer and in greater numbers than they were. As it was the RAF had been planning on receiving follow on additional orders of developments of the NA-91 but the US entry into the War in December 1941 changed that and other than the 50 P-51A/Mustang II they received in part compensation for the P-51/Mustang Mk.IA they did not receive from the initial order, they never received the Allison engine versions of the Mustang in the quantities they had projected or hoped for - partly due to change to Merlin engined Mustang to meet the long range capable fighter priorities.