Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Yes, but if he ended up as a test pilot rather than anything else, keeping the pre-Wever death leadership in place, what is the result of that?Udet was Germany's second highest ranking ace from WW1. He was well liked, affable. He was drawn into the Luftwaffe by Goering. He would have been better of and happier staying out of it. He was a superb aerobatic pilot, performing in America. He ran a small light plane manufacturing company.
He was probably unsuited to the position he was placed. He was of course a big supporter of dive bombing
Might the Jumo 222 pan out without Milch's fight with Koppenburg? Or might the DB603 not be cancelled in 1937? Would the Me210 production fiasco happen without Udet?
The chances of the Jumo 222 working out are slim and none no matter who was in charge.
Not canceling the DB 603 in 1937 does NOT get you a 1750hp engine in 1940. Not unless you think that the DB 603 development team was sealed in a vacuum bubble and learned absolutely nothing from the development of the DB 601 and DB605 during the period the DB 603 was on pause.
1500hp in 1937 is not producing that reliably yet. The Db603 historically never reached 20000hp despite being developed from 1939-45 and likely won't before the 222, which had lower fuel consumption than the 603 and guaranteed 2000hp when the best the 603 could develop by 1942 would be 1600-1750hp depending on reliablity.DB603 prototype number 1 produced 1,500hp during 1937 after only a year of development. It's reasonable to assume DB603 would be producing 2,000hp after five years of continuous development.
What's the sense of developing Jumo222 engine which produces 2,000hp during 1942? If RLM is set on developing a new engine initial performance bar should be at least 2,500hp with follow on development to 3,000hp. Otherwise just stick with full funding for less expensive DB603 engine program.
It was running at that in 1939-40. Ultimately it did run well enough to get into production before bombing made that impossible in 1943 at 2500hp.I suspect salesmen said something similar when asking RLM for BMW801 engine program funding.
There are no performance and reliability guarantees when developing an entirely new engine of an unproven design. You simply push ahead and hope it works.
Junkers still did not give up. Using the original 46.4 litre displacement A/B design, they added a new two-stage supercharger including a trio of aftercoolers, one per pair of neighboring cylinder banks for high-altitude use, producing the 222E and F-series. Although sea-level performance was unchanged, the engine was able to produce 1,439 kW (1,930 hp) at 9,000 m (29,530 ft). By this point it appeared that the problems were finally being worked out, but bombing of the Junkers Motorenwerke's headquarters factories in Dessau made production almost impossible. A final attempt for even higher altitude performance resulted in the turbocharged 222G and H, built only to the extent of a few testbed prototypes.
The civilian consumer industry idea has been debunked since the 1990s by several historians, most recently Adam Tooze. Germany had effectively ended consumer goods production in 1938 and whatever was dedicated to that was being used to supply the military, rather than civilian consumption.There was a lot more going on with Germany's low war production rates than just a few top generals in the Luftwaffe. Keeping up production civilian consumer goods was one thing.
The Do17 had its production ended because of its poor performance and limited capabilities in France; the BoB showed it to be too vulnerable to function against a serious modern foe. It soldiered on briefly in Yugoslavia and Greece where the competition was minor and no threat to it, same with Barbarossa, but then was gone when there were enough Ju88s to totally replace it. It was a 1934 design and only used because it was all that was on hand due to the delays in the Ju88 project.The Do 17 performed fairly well in Poland and France. It even did fairly well in the BoB for a few months. It just didn't have the bomb load to be a good night bomber. It went on to give good service in the Yugoslavian and Greek campaigns and in the early part of the Russian campaign. There were over 2000 Do-17 built, many in 1937 and 1938 and these older versions helped equip the bomber schools along with newer versions.
DB603 prototype number 1 produced 1,500hp during 1937 after only a year of development. It's reasonable to assume DB603 would be producing 2,000hp after five years of continuous development.
What's the sense of developing Jumo222 engine which produces 2,000hp during 1942? If RLM is set on developing a new engine initial performance bar should be at least 2,500hp with follow on development to 3,000hp. Otherwise just stick with full funding for less expensive DB603 engine program.
DB 603N: Prototypen mit zweistufigem Lader, C3-Treibstoff; 1944/45
Startleistung: 2.060 kW (2.800 PS) bei 3.000/min, Volldruckhöhe 11.000 m
The crisis of 1941 was the most important turning point since the reorganization of the aviation industry following the Nazi takeover. Although the industry was supposedly under the centralized control of the RLM long before 1941, in practice Udet failed to exercise this control and the producers were mostly left to do whatever they wanted. Waste of valuable raw materials was one problem that can be blamed directly on lack of tight control. Messer- schmitt factories, for example, used valuable aluminum to build tropical shelters and ladders for use in vineyards.25
The crises in aircraft production came to a head shortly before the invasion of the Soviet Union, as Udet's office could no longer hide the growing disparity between planned and actual production. Göring reinstituted Milch's status and placed him above Udet with the responsibility to generally supervise and reorganize production and supply. Göring and Milch gradually sidelined Udet and he gradually lost his power. This humiliation, together with the realization of the chaos he had created, led to his suicide on 17 November 1941.
Meanwhile Milch made plans to fulfill Göring's order to quadruple aircraft production. In September 1941, even before Udet's death, he submitted a plan to produce 50,000 aircraft by March 1944. In order to achieve this goal he decided to impose tighter control on the industry, forbidding the development of new types (although contrary to common belief, he authorized continued development of rocket and jet aircraft), put a stop to raw material waste by the factories, and strictly obliged factory mangers to provide their allocated quo- tas.26
Milch spent most of 1942 trying to repair the damage caused by Udet and the rogue industry under his authority. In retrospective he fought a losing battle, but at that time the damage looked reversible, mainly due to the availability of large amounts of unused capacity within the aviation industry and due to emerging revolutionary aviation technologies that started to appear as flying prototypes. Many crucial decisions which had an impact on late war production were made at that time, but these could not change the fate of German air- power. As airpower historian Williamson Murray remarked: "Between July 1940 and Decem- ber 1941, the Germans lost the air war over Europe for 1943 and 1944."28
Beside the failure to produce enough aircraft to support the expanding commitments of the Luftwaffe, the development and procurement of several new aircraft types went badly wrong. As part of the early streamlining drive, Udet and his staff strove to focus most of the production capacity in the production of four main types: the Me 109 as single-engine fighter; the Ju 88 as medium bomber; the He 177 as heavy bomber; and the Me 210 as twin- engine multi-role fighter. The plan was largely shattered as the last two aircraft proved to be costly failures.
The RLM awarded Heinkel a contract to produce the He 177 bomber in 1939. The aircraft flew for the first time on 20 November 1939. It was supposed to enter service in 1941, but due to serious technical problems with the prototypes, including two crashes, the RLM halted work on the aircraft in early 1940. The main reason for the troubles was the effort to take a heavy bomber and make it a "jack of all trades." It turned out to be master of none. In addition to normal level bombing, it was also supposed to dive-bomb, perform high-altitude bombing, deploy guided weapons and even serve as a "destroyer"—a heavy fighter-bomber.21 Another source of problems was the aircraft's unique coupled engines arrangement, which caused heating and engine fires. Heinkel redesigned the plane and sub- mitted a new design several months later. The RLM reapproved the procurement of the aircraft, but the redesigned version was still unsatisfactory and its flight testing proceeded extremely slowly. Even after low-rate preseries production started in early November 1941, some 170 design changes were incorporated in order to rectify different issues.22 Only in mid–1942 did first-series He 177s start leaving the production lines and even then in small numbers. It entered large-scale production only in late 1943. The He 177 and its troubled history are going to appear again later in this book.
The Me 210 was an even bigger failure. The RLM ordered 1,000 aircraft of this type even before it flew for the first time, but flight testing soon revealed grave problems with its flight characteristics. The RLM made another mistake by authorizing production of the aircraft before the problems were ironed out. Messerschmitt even optimistically licensed three other firms to produce the plane, but it soon became clear that the program was in deep trouble. The RLM suspended the production of the Me 210 on 14 April 1942 after only 184 aircraft were produced, using as a pretext Messerschmitt's failure to provide an improved version of the aircraft on time. Messerschmitt's losses due to this failure were estimated at around 38 million RM; total costs of the failed program were estimated at around 200 million RM. Around 1,000 trainloads of 300 almost complete aircraft, manufacturing tools, parts and metal cut for 800 additional planes were sent to the scrap yard and the Luftwaffe lost almost 2,000 aircraft. Following the Me 210 debacle, Milch removed Willy Messerschmitt from his position as chairman and general director of his company; he nevertheless stayed chief designer and retained influence because of his prestige as a genius designer.
The He 177 and Me 210 affairs clearly demonstrated the complexity of manufacturing modern military aircraft and the cost of mismanaging their procurement.24 As a result of these and other failures, German airpower in 1941 suffered a blow from which it never recovered.
Couldn't they have put greater emphasis on developing/refining a WM/50 injection? ( I know the DB-603 adapted to the Mercedes-Benz T80 featured water/methanol injection, but that's a race/sprint engine, not something ready for mass production -more akin to the late 30s Rolls Royce R variants)Also without C3 fuel in abundance I don't think the DB603 was capable of 2000hp or greater. The DB603N was cancelled for the lack of C3 fuel and that wasn't available as an option until mid/late 1944 historically.
I don't think that system could be moved up any sooner than it historically appeared.Couldn't they have put greater emphasis on developing/refining a WM/50 injection? ( I know the DB-603 adapted to the Mercedes-Benz T80 featured water/methanol injection, but that's a race/sprint engine, not something ready for mass production -more akin to the late 30s Rolls Royce R variants)
Couldn't they have put greater emphasis on developing/refining a WM/50 injection? ( I know the DB-603 adapted to the Mercedes-Benz T80 featured water/methanol injection, but that's a race/sprint engine, not something ready for mass production -more akin to the late 30s Rolls Royce R variants)