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I have been asking the question (in one form or another) being discussed in this thread for a long time. It is a question that is still constantly being asked (in one form or another) by modern aircraft designers and operations analysis personnel - although not necessarily in an as absolute (ie "single" factor) manner.
My answer and the answer of operational analysis (I think) is whichever allows you to get the first effective shot at the e/a.
But, since in a WVR maneuver combat somewhere around 70-80% of aircraft that get shot down are not aware of the aircraft that is about to shoot them down, how does that modify the importance of the various factors?
NOTE that in modern jet fighter WVR combat the 70-80% number still applies - when radar (whether on-board or GCI) and IRST are not used. Possibly BiffF15 can add to this. A friend of mine who used to be a fighter pilot and instructor mentioned several examples where seriously disadvantaged aircraft (in terms of speed, climb, g limit, etc) were able to shoot down a much higher performance aircraft due to the victim's loss of/never had awareness of the shooting aircraft. In modern terminology this is defined as a lack and/or loss of situational awareness.
One example of the importance of getting the first effective shot occurred sometime in the mid-1990s, shortly after East and West Germany merged and their newly reorganized air forces were involved in exercises with the USAF. One of the first WVR squadron level exercises involved the Luftwaffe MiG-29s vs the USAF F-16s. In head-on merges after which maneuver combat began, the MiG-29s achieved 19 kill shots (judged by impartial umpires) before the F-16s achieved one. This was judged to be due to the pilots of the MiG-29s having helmet-mounted cueing systems combined with off-boresight launch capable IR-AAMs (I do not remember what the specific missile the Luftwaffe used in the exercises - maybe the Aphid?). Needless to say, this event shook up the status quo views of the time.
Another example of first effective shot capability is the 'Snap-Shot' type of gun systems that have become common on modern aircraft. For those of you not familiar with them, this is a system where the FC radar continuously tracks the e/a and will fire the gun at the proper moment in the attack as long as the trigger is held down - regardless of whether the shot being taken is directly from astern, head-on, or at high deflection. This allows single-burst hit rates of somewhere in the ballpark of 80-90% (I think).
I also assume the original post is in regard to WWII WVR engagements. In my modern example(s) of ACM technology I am simply more easily pointing out another factor for ACM that comes into play - that of achieving the first effective shot, which may be technology based as well as maneuver based.Unfortunately, I feel that the question is posed far, far too generally. I suspect that the initial question applies to WW2 dogfighting gun combat, but that is my guess?
Even if that is so, the variables are still hugely situation-based, and the defining factor in an attempted merge will depend upon the circumstances and the response of each combatant.
There are always strengths and weaknesses of each combatant but, often the individual pilots were not able to fully employ the strengths that they could have, so where do you place a combatant aircraft/pilot which loses a turning fight against a worse turning opponent through lack of skill?
Overall, in simple day forward firing gunfighting the general situation is that a easily faster combatant can control the fight if they stay fast and use fast tactics, whereas a easily better manoeuvreing combatant can win a turning fight if flown to its advantage. Note, neither situations really apply in a merge where the target aircraft is unaware of its attacker and also, if one combatant has real advantage in both turning fighting and easily available speed, then that aircraft /pilot combo has the advantage, except if surprised.
As regards modern off-boresight etc weapons, these are missile fights and there really is a different world of fighting. Intelligent or predictive gun firing is not a panacea, cueing may help but the aiming solution still has to be achieved. I have not used this type of air-to-air gun firing but it might help some pilots. My view is that if you can manoeuvre to achieve a firing solution, you can recognise a modern CCIP pipper on target and press the trigger.
Cheers
Eng
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I also assume the original post is in regard to WWII WVR engagements. In my modern example(s) of ACM technology I am simply more easily pointing out another factor for ACM that comes into play - that of achieving the first effective shot, which may be technology based as well as maneuver based.
In WWII, did the reflector gunsight have a significant advantage over the ring & bead gunsight? I think that everyone with the manufacturing capacity switched to the reflector gunsight if possible - even for free-swinging guns, aircraft gun turrets, and sometimes on ground or ship mounted AA weapons. I have never read any quantified values of advantage for the reflector sight over the ring & bead sight, but the early and rapid changeover indicates that they thought the reflector sight had an advantage.
If my information is correct, the GGS (Gyro Gun Sight, aka lead-predicting gunsight) of the later-war period increased the chance of an effective hit by a factor of around 2x. As with the reflector sight, this type of sight was also mounted increasingly in aircraft gun turrets and on ground and naval light & medium AA guns, as the sights became available and manufacturing capacity allowed. The most notable, among the naval and ground uses perhaps being the mounting of the GGS on Oerlikon, Bofors, and 2pdr mountings. Again, this indicates that they thought there was an advantage to the GGS.
So if the above is accurate then I think it is safe to say that any combination of technology (eg the GGS) & methodology (eg some combination of maneuvers or any one ability that might allow an increased chance of getting the first effective shot) in ACM that helps get the sight on the target sooner or more easily is worth considering. To me the question becomes is there any one factor among those listed in the OP that would aid in this more than the others.
Also, as Shortround6 points out above, altitude advantage is perhaps another factor, though maybe it would be better put in terms of having a higher operational ceiling or combat ceiling. Having a higher operational or combat ceiling is usually the result of more power at higher altitudes, so perhaps having a higher engine/aircraft critical altitude should be included in the original OP.
And yes, it is not directly answering the question in the OP, but it is pointing out other aspects that may not have been taken into consideration when forming the original question.
My understanding is that for the majority of pilots around 5 miles is the normal maximum ~reliable spotting distance for e/a in the single engine category, with about 10 miles as the max for 4-engine bombers (not counting large formations or contrailing aircraft).