Further to my post #187 and this comment
Reading back through this thread, I'm beginning to sense that the RN/FAA didn't have a clearly defined vision for the role of the aircraft carrier and this shows in the types of aircraft being designed and flip flopping in design specs. Thinking about the Corsair vs Seafire part of this thread, the Corsair must have been a real boon to the FAA especially given its capacity as a multi-role platform. Ordnance capacity (other than the torpedo) is on par with the Barracude and well above the Seafire all the while being able to serve as an air superiority fighter. One could imagine that if enough had been available that you could have seen carriers with a majority of Corsairs and very few other types.
I'll try to summarise the RN fighter position interwar. Friedman's "Carrier Air Power" and "Fighters over the Fleet. Naval Air Defence from Biplanes to the Cold War" are good reads on the subject. But first turn the clock back to 1920 and review the carrier position.
USN
The USN only began conversion of the collier Jupiter to CV-1 Langley in March 1920, completing her 2 years later. Capacity 36 but with very difficult hangar operation (aircraft had to be craned on and off the lift as it was not flush with hangar floor).
IJN
Hosho laid down Dec 1920 and completed 2 years later with RN assistance. Capacity 15 aircraft.
RN
Ignoring the semi-carriers Furious & Vindictive, the RN completed Argus (capacity 18), the world's first flush decked carrier, in Sept 1918. Eagle's conversion was suspended after trials in 1918 pending experience with Argus. Construction began again in 1921 and she completed in early 1924 (capacity c30 aircraft). Hermes, the world's first purpose designed carrier, laid down Jan 1918 and underwent several redesigns before completing in 1924. Capacity 20 aircraft.
July 1920 the RN decides to convert Furious & Courageous to full carriers, beginning the strip down of Furious in 1921 before the Washington Conference starts. Glorious is added to the schedule post Washington. These complete F 1925 (capacity 36), C converted 1924-28 (capacity 48) and Glorious converted 1924-30).
Washington Conference
Allows the US and Japan to realise something from their to be cancelled capital ship programmes by allowing conversion of two ships each of a size in excess of the carrier Treaty limit of 27,000 tons. Britain has no such ships building at the time of the Conference. Hence Lexington and Saratoga (completed late 1927 capacity 90 aircraft) and Akagi & Kaga (completed 1927-29 capacity 60).
After that the USN goes smaller with the unsuccessful Ranger and Japan also goes smaller, trying to exploit a Treaty loophole closed in the 1930 London Treaty, with the even less successful Ryūjō. A period of experimentation for them.
So Britain leads the world in carrier development in the early 1920s. It falls to it to work out how best to equip and use the aircraft carrier.
How did the RN see the roles for its carrier aircraft? Dec 1919 CinC Atlantic Fleet defined them as:-
Reconnaissance (edit - to find the enemy fleet)
Spotting (edit - for the fleet's big guns)
Torpedo attack (and depth bombing subs) (edit - to slow down the enemy fleet for RN big guns to catch them)
Machine gun attack on hostile aircraft and on exposed personnel aboard enemy ships and destroyers. (Edit - principally to allow unimpeded torpedo attack)
But the focus was on obtaining air superiority by destroying an enemy's carriers so denying them a platform to strike back.
So the initial fighters were WW1 types followed by the unsuccessful Nieuport Nightjar (a version of the RAF Nighthawk) and then the purpose designed Fairey Flycatcher (because the RAF Sopwith Snipe wasn't suitable for carrier use). That led to the Hawker Nimrod in the early 1930s. (Which was still in service in 1938).
But it was the reconnaissance task that led to the development of the two seat fighter. What the RN defined as "Fleet Reconaissance" involved the initial search for an enemy fleet, after which aircraft involved could retreat. The other task, defined as "Contact Reconnaissance", later called "Fighter Reconnaissance",involved shadowing the enemy, possibly under the threat of interception, which required a faster more manoeuvrable aircraft. But that type still required two seats so that it could radio its contacts to the fleet and find its way back to the parent carrier. That led to the two seat Hawker Osprey. A secondary role for that aircraft then became supporting the torpedo bomber attack by machine gunning the AA crews on enemy ships. And from that it became short step to adding bombs and the design of the dive bomber and the Blackburn Skua.
As for defence of the fleet itself (or for knocking down an enemy's gunfire spotters when both fleets were in proximity to each other) that involved single seaters that couldn't venture far from the fleet or they wouldn't find their way back. Added to that the problem was that spotting an enemy attack depended on the Mk.I eyeball. And exercises in the late 1920s revealed that pilots on standing patrols (CAP in today's terms) had difficulty spotting an enemy, often more-so than spotters on the ships that they defending. And single seat fighters of the period did not carry radios, let alone voice radios, allowing direction from the ship. And the carriers couldn't carry enough fighters to maintain permanent patrols in enough strength to keep the fleet safe. And as aircraft speeds increased in the 1930s the problem increased significantly as interception times shortened.
So the fleet came to depend more on its AA guns and the RN plowed a lot of money into High Angle Control Systems to increase their accuracy, with fighters providing an outer layer of defence to break up attacks. Ultimately the Abyssinian Crisis showed that fighter protection was virtually impossible and that the torpedo aircraft, needed to slow down an enemy fleet to bring it within big gun range, would need protection under armour and the Armoured carrier concept was born.
The small air groups on British carriers are often looked on unfavourably compared with the USN. USN Carrier tactics until 1942 called for them to operate individually. From the early 1930s Britain was practicing multi carrier operations, pooling the airgroups of several ships for attack & defence. 1938 plans for example called for 4 carriers in the Mediterranean, something reiterated in 1940 when carrier numbers were reviewed. Unfortunately the early outbreak of war in 1939 meant that those plans couldn't be realised.
As for aircraft radios, AIUI, HF voice radio telephony only began to appear in the early 1930s with VHF around 1939/40. Radar direction of fighters only began off Norway in April 1940 with the RN fighter direction school set up in mid-1941 with 2 US participants. The USN set up its first direction school in Sept 1941, using much of what the RN had already learned.
By 1938 the RN knew it didn't have a viable short range interceptor, hence the desire to acquire Sea Gladiator or better. Skua and then Fulmar have to fill that role short term.
Couple of points about the USN. The dive bomber grew out of 1920s attempts at fitting bombs to fighters to wreck carrier decks. All pre war US fighters were designed to carry small bombs. The USN moved away from the torpedo bomber in the early 1930s, not considering it an effective weapon. It was only revived with the TBD Devastator in 1937. Ranger was designed without any torpedo storage at all.
I can't agree that the RN had no vision for the carrier. The split of responsibilities between RAF and RN made it more difficult than in the IJN and USN to realise that vision. And as the world leader in the 1920s and early 1930s there was no book to refer to.
