FAA Seafire vs Corsair

[Thumpalumpacus]

You got a good point about the notion that scouts need radios to really work well, but even without a radio I would not go so far as to say 'useless'.

A6Ms routinely navigated over long distances in Pacific, from the Aleutians to Australia.


And you are sure they never had a long range radio in an A6M?

My understanding is that the engine itself generated static to the extent that the radio on the Zero, while not absolutely useless, was so poor that it could not reliably transmit for the four hundred or so miles of a mission round-trip back to base. It's not that they didn't have long-range radio, it's that the generator(?) in the engine gave electrical interference.

Without reliable radio, using Zeroes for scouting not only diminished a carrier's CAP, it also was not reliable enough to provide early warning. If you've got to trap on the deck before delivering intel, that could obviously be too late in many instances.

Would a Zero in the place of Tone's late scout have made a difference if its message was garbled by these known radio issues? The delayed Tone scout-plane reported by radio "one carrier" at 0740. But if it had been a Zero with the crummy radio, would Nagumo have done the order-counterorder-disorder thing because he'd have no intel until the plane landed? Or would he have blithely launched a second strike at Midway with many of his fighters flying bomber-escort instead of CAP?

The world wonders.

 

[EwenS]

I wonder how a Seafire would handle with aft fuel tanks. The added endurance would be welcome.

13's....

Concise Guide To Spitfire Wing Types

ww2aircraft.net

It was impossible to fit aft fuel tanks in the Merlin and early Griffon engined variants. Most of the naval modifications were to the aft fuselage. Catapult spools, arrester hook, fuselage strengthening etc. To maintain the aircraft within CG limits the Merlin versions had to add lead weights (c28lbs in the Mk.III) to the engine bearers.

Mike Crosley
"The Seafire, as opposed to the Spitfire, had the immense weight of an arrester hook added a long way aft of its centre of gravity , and the 28 pounds of solid lead added by the front engine bearers had not entirely corrected this tail heaviness. In the case of the Seafire III series, the aircraft was so unstable fore and aft that it should not have entered service in that condition."

It was only with the fitting of the two stage Griffon in the Seafire 46/47 that any kind of aft fuel tankage became possible (32 gals).

 

[EwenS]

The strike aircraft (Avengers and dive bombers) often had radar using the Yagi aerials. Since they had somebody besides the pilot as a radar operator they were probably a better bet for "scout duty" than using single seat night fighters were were not common.

ASB was the early search radar set in USN Carrier aircraft. This was similar to the British ASV.II.

Later the centimetric AN/APS-4 (ASH) was carried in a detachable underwing pod. This came to Britain from 1944 where it was used firstly in night fighters (as AI Mk.XV built into the nose of Mosquitos or prodded on Fireflies) or as an ASV set on the likes of the Firefly FR.I.

Information on US radars (ship and air borne) here in this 1943 document

US Radar: Operational Characteristics of Radar Classified by Tactical Application

WASHINGTON, D. C. The publication

www.history.navy.mil

 

[EwenS]

Fairey got an order for 127 Fulmars in mid 1938. It took until Jan 1940 for the first one to fly.

Actually that is not bad considering the work that needed done.

The second P4/34 Prototype, K7555, flew on 19 April 1937, was tested by the A&AEE in Sept/Oct and then went back to Fairey to become the mock up for the Fulmar (shortened wings smaller ailerons) before going back to the A&AEE in April 1938. But that was not the final aircraft. In fact there was no prototype Fulmar. A considerable amount of work remained to be done to produce the navalised fighter. The Air Ministry issued the new spec O.8/38 for the Fulmar on 24 April 1938 which specified delivery of the first aircraft in Sept 1939. Fairey presented its proposal in May and the order for 127 was immediately placed. The peacetime production rate was planned to build up to only about 20 aircraft per month.

The factory at Heaton Chapel where it was to be produced was fully engaged in making Battles throughout this period. And the Fairey design team were also working on the Albacore at this time, with work on the Barracuda just beginning as well. So some slippage was almost inevitable. And then all the new tooling had to be procured.

By way of comparison it took Westland 12 months from receiving a contract in July 1940 to delivering its first Spitfire in July 1941. Blackburn took 12 months to take over production of the Swordfish from the go ahead in Nov 1939 to delivery of the first aircraft on 1 Dec 1940. Neither involved any redesign. Blackburn even got the necessary jigs from Fairey to equip its new shadow factory where they were being built.

Enough were produced to allow the first squadron to convert in June 1940 with 3 more in existence by the end of the year.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I don't believe it was a shortage of night fighter and strike aircraft. From 1944 the USN CV Air groups all had a night fighter flight attached for defensive purposes especially around dawn and dusk.

But from Aug 1944 they started to deploy entire night air groups. First on the CVL Independence, then Enterprise, Saratoga and finally the Bon Homme Richard. Those groups fulfilled both offensive and defensive roles with F6F-5(N) and TBM Radar equipped aircraft of various models. A CVEG(N) was also being readied for service as the war ended.

Edit:- USMC squadrons also flew night fighter F6F from various Pacific shore bases. As the war was ending the first F7F night fighters were just arriving on Okinawa.

The following website provides an excellent history of USN night fighter development with respect to radar

The Night Fighters - Chapter 11 of Radar and the Fighter Directors

ethw.org

Note the tiny size of the cockpit display.
As a practical matter single seat aircraft were not suitable for search missions. Fighters were under the direction of a shipboard controller with the onboard radar used at relatively short distances. Radar equipped TBMs and SB2Cs were used for long range search missions. Two or more crew members results in a much more efficient operation

 

[EwenS]

The following website provides an excellent history of USN night fighter development with respect to radar

The Night Fighters - Chapter 11 of Radar and the Fighter Directors

ethw.org

Note the tiny size of the cockpit display.
As a practical matter single seat aircraft were not suitable for search missions. Fighters were under the direction of a shipboard controller with the onboard radar used at relatively short distances. Radar equipped TBMs and SB2Cs were used for long range search missions. Two or more crew members results in a much more efficient operation

Report on operations by CVG(N)-90 on the Enterprise along with histories of her rwo squadrons, between Dec 1944 & May 1945

Night Operations Analysis

Analysis of Night Operations Aboard USS Enterprise CV-6

www.cv6.org

VF(N)-90 Squadron History

The history of Night Fighting Squadron 90: a pioneering US Navy night and all-weather squadron, 1944-1945.

www.cv6.org

VT(N)-90 Squadron History

The history of Night Torpedo Squadron 90: one the first US Navy squadrons engaged in night and all-weather carrier operations, 1944-1945.

www.cv6.org

History of Carrier Division Seven - First Night Carrier Division

Carrier Division Seven

History of Carrier Division Seven: The Navy's first night carrier division.

www.cv6.org

Note the variety of missions being flown in daylight, bad weather and at night by the fighters. These included CAPs over the carrier groups, bombardment groups and target areas and intruder sorties over enemy territories.

The RN converted the light carrier Ocean as a night carrier between Aug & Nov 1945 immediately following her completion. She then embarked 892 squadron with Hellcat NF.II (F6F-5(N)) and 1792 with Firefly NF.I. Until April 1946 they flew trials to determine which made the best night fighter. The conclusion was that while the APS-6 radar in the structural wing pod on the Hellcat was better as an air-intercept set, the AN/APS-4 in the Firefly could also be used for surface search and could be fitted to any Firefly easily simply by moving the black boxes between airframes. In addition having an observer to work the radar was a safer option in bad weather, leaving the pilot free to concentrate on flying the aircraft. That led to the addition of so called "Black" night fighter flights to all Firefly squadrons up until the outbreak of the Korean War.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

My understanding is that the engine itself generated static to the extent that the radio on the Zero, while not absolutely useless, was so poor that it could not reliably transmit for the four hundred or so miles of a mission round-trip back to base. It's not that they didn't have long-range radio, it's that the generator(?) in the engine gave electrical interference.


Without reliable radio, using Zeroes for scouting not only diminished a carrier's CAP, it also was not reliable enough to provide early warning. If you've got to trap on the deck before delivering intel, that could obviously be too late in many instances.

Would a Zero in the place of Tone's late scout have made a difference if its message was garbled by these known radio issues? The delayed Tone scout-plane reported by radio "one carrier" at 0740. But if it had been a Zero with the crummy radio, would Nagumo have done the order-counterorder-disorder thing because he'd have no intel until the plane landed? Or would he have blithely launched a second strike at Midway with many of his fighters flying bomber-escort instead of CAP?

The world wonders.

Even with static, you could still deliver a simple morse message. I'd say send a zero out in parallel along all search axis, all they need to send back is "Who I am" "On course" "Found something"

The real question is did they ever use them in that way, well they apparently did use both A6M and Ki43 on recon flights from ground bases around New Guinea in 1942 and 43. But they were still (successfully) using G4M fairly late too, and quite often fighters escorting a bomber on such missions which solves the radio problem.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Even with static, you could still deliver a simple morse message. I'd say send a zero out in parallel along all search axis, all they need to send back is "Who I am" "On course" "Found something"

Static can interfere with morse stuff too. Was that a dit or a dah? Can't always tell if the freq is washed out by white noise. And short messages like that do little or nothiing for recon. Remember the Tone plane's first message made no mention of ship types, just that ten ships were spotted. That paralyzed Nagumo for a few minutes while he waited to learn if American carriers were present.

 

[SaparotRob]

Even Morse didn't work all the time. The one midget sub that got into Pearl Harbor tried to signal it had attacked. The signal was garbled. The operator may have hit the wrong key. Operator error happened. There's probably a lot going on in a single seat.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Even with static, you could still deliver a simple morse message.

If you have any type of shielding issue on the aircraft, the radio signal isn't going far, be it voice or Morse Code.

Insufficient shielding of the ignition system of the aircraft caused interference with reception of signals to a great degree, as did static charges generated by the passage of the airframe through the atmosphere. It seems that there were very few officers at fighter group level who were familiar with radio systems or who cared to conduct effective programs to maintain them. The resulting poor performance quickly led fighter pilots to cease using the radios and resort to the old visual methods. In the case of some land-based groups, they removed all radio equipment to enhance the performance of the planes. Ship-based planes needed to retain their radios for navigation and homing purposes.

The radio systems installed in the early A6M2 and A6M3 variants of the Zero were the Type 96 ku (aviation) Model 1 voice/telegraph system and the Type 1 ku Model 3 Radio Compass or Radio Direction Finder. The Type 1-3 was the standard RDF unit for most carrier-borne IJN aircraft. The Type 96-1 system was previously used in the A5M4 fighter series. The Type 96-1 system consisted of three components, all of which were installed in the cockpit. The transmitter and receiver were separate units that were placed low on the right side of the cockpit. They were hung in the standard shock mount that consisted of frames above and below the radio which had bungee cords secured to them. The bungees were looped around spools mounted on the radio casing. The suspended radio was protected from shocks by the flexibility of the cords.

If there were little or no radio communication available when returning to a carrier, more than likely light signals were used prompting which aircraft was cleared to land.

Radio Systems in the Early A6M Zero

 

[SaparotRob]

I wondered how those vacuum tube radios dealt with shock.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Ignition system shielding can be a huge problem on recip aircraft. The other issue is bleed over from strobe lighting

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Very interesting article, thanks for posting.

From this...

"The type 96-1 operated in the frequency range of 3.8 to 5.8 megahertz. This is the lower end of the High Frequency or Short Wave band. Quartz crystal oscillators controlled frequencies. Power of the transmitter was 8 to 10 watts in voice mode and 30 watts in telegraph mode, called CW for 'continuous wave'. In 'At Dawn We Slept' Gordon Prange relates that one of the problems encountered in the IJN's preparation for Pearl Harbor was that they had never operated fighters farther than 90 miles from their carriers. 50 miles was the practical limit of utility of the voice radios under optimum conditions. Since the fighters would be venturing around 250 miles outbound on the mission it was necessary to initiate a training program in the use of the longer ranged telegraph code communication. It may be seen in the photo that Hirano's A6M2 did not have a code key installed and his transmitter is set to voice function. It seems that not all fighter pilots were trained in code transmission. Perhaps only unit leaders were supplied with the necessary equipment. The receiver circuit was a superheterodyne type. Total weight of the system was 38 pounds."

And some other parts of the article, it sounds like the radios weren't that bad, problems were somewhat intermittent but the biggest issue was actually training. Apparently A6Ms did carry morse radio sets and could and did communicate with aircraft carriers, at a distance of 250 miles. I think this definitely puts them over the line from "useless" and well into "useful".

It seems that training and maintenance, and eventually production quality were all significant problems though and as we know by Midway they seem to have been mainly relying on the flying boats and cruiser launched seaplane scouts. I'd love to know if they were ever using zeros as armed recon later in the war.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

And some other parts of the article, it sounds like the radios weren't that bad, problems were somewhat intermittent but the biggest issue was actually training. Apparently A6Ms did carry morse radio sets and could and did communicate with aircraft carriers, at a distance of 250 miles. I think this definitely puts them over the line from "useless" and well into "useful".

Only if they worked - and from that same article it seems like they didn't most of the time. It's been well documented that maintenance and logistics were a major issue for the Japanese through out the war. Interchangeability on many components was almost non-existent.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Well yeah, that - especially the lack of interchangeability, was definitely a huge problem. I think that was also an issue with some Allied aircraft in the early years of the war.

But "they had a lot of reliability problems and many pilots were not trained to use radios" is not quite the same as "they had no radios / radios didn't work at all, therefore they were useless as scouts" since clearly they did have radio communication for Pearl Harbor, 250 miles away from their carriers, and in many other long range fighter sweeps and strike escorts they routinely conducted after Dec 1941.

To be useless as scouts they almost had to be useless as long range fighters, but clearly they were not. It's also clear that they did have a lot of problems with radios as well as their newer engines and all kinds of other machinery, though they managed to get enough of it working to still pose a substantial threat through 1943 at least.

 

[Shortround6]

To be useless as scouts they almost had to be useless as long range fighters, but clearly they were not.

They were often matched up with one or 2 multi seat aircraft to provide communications/navigation support.
This was not unique to the Japanese. Many of the fighter ferry flights to Malta had one or two multi seat aircraft providing the same support to the single seat fighters.
It might have been done by US fighter units on occasion.
If you are sending out planes on scout/ recon/ search missions you want a high likelihood that EACH plane will be able to succeed in it's function.

the passage is a also a bit selective.

. Power of the transmitter was 8 to 10 watts in voice mode and 30 watts in telegraph mode, called CW for 'continuous wave'. In 'At Dawn We Slept' Gordon Prange relates that one of the problems encountered in the IJN's preparation for Pearl Harbor was that they had never operated fighters farther than 90 miles from their carriers. 50 miles was the practical limit of utility of the voice radios under optimum conditions. Since the fighters would be venturing around 250 miles outbound on the mission

rule of thumb was telegraph mode was worth 3 times what voice mode was.
50 miles was the practical limit. Not average limit, or sure limit but not max limit either. It would allow for some repeated attempts. It was also not the limit in either optimum conditions or worsts conditions. But the Japanese were going to try for 5 times the range, not 3 times.

Are the fighters supposed to report back to the carrier or did the multi seat aircraft relay the messages?
Was the greater range capacity (which is not spelled out in the passage) to help inure that aircraft that had been separated in combat had a larger margin of error to contact the carriers on the return flight?
Please note that the passage does say they operated, at least once, about 40 miles beyond radio range. They may not have been planning for full radio coverage. Just a larger are of the flight to be in contact to provide guidance for off course aircraft.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Well yeah, that - especially the lack of interchangeability, was definitely a huge problem. I think that was also an issue with some Allied aircraft in the early years of the war.

Yes and no - the Brits had some issues, the US not so many and if anything interchangeability was quite good.

But "they had a lot of reliability problems and many pilots were not trained to use radios" is not quite the same as "they had no radios / radios didn't work at all, therefore they were useless as scouts" since clearly they did have radio communication for Pearl Harbor, 250 miles away from their carriers, and in many other long range fighter sweeps and strike escorts they routinely conducted after Dec 1941.

They did, but look what most units did with their radios.

To be useless as scouts they almost had to be useless as long range fighters, but clearly they were not. It's also clear that they did have a lot of problems with radios as well as their newer engines and all kinds of other machinery,

Scouting and conducting a specific military operation are two different animals. On a scouting mission you're gathering intelligence and looking for targets of opportunity. A strike will have a plan, briefings, etc. With all that said, if I was running a fighter unit, be it JAAF or IJN, I would not want to waste a fully functional fighter on a scouting mission, I'd send something specifically designed for that task.

though they managed to get enough of it working to still pose a substantial threat through 1943 at least.

They did but by early/ mid 1943, the writing was on the wall for both IJN and JAAF units

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

They were often matched up with one or 2 multi seat aircraft to provide communications/navigation support.
This was not unique to the Japanese. Many of the fighter ferry flights to Malta had one or two multi seat aircraft providing the same support to the single seat fighters.
It might have been done by US fighter units on occasion.
If you are sending out planes on scout/ recon/ search missions you want a high likelihood that EACH plane will be able to succeed in it's function.

yes, sending combined flights with a navigation aircraft with single seat fighters was very common in many if not all Theaters. I know for sure it was done all over the Med, in the South Pacific, in China, and in Alaska. This was one of the many roles where the Hudson and later Ventura really shined. For whatever reason they were deemed optimal in this role and they routinely accompanied flights of P-40s, F4Fs, P-38s, Spitfire VIII, or Corsairs and other single engined types (including SBDs sometimes). Beaufighters were also used this way sometimes.

There is a kind of darkly amusing episode involving Clive Caldwell, in the Pacific he was with a small flight of (two or three IIRC) Spitfire Mk VIII, and a Beaufighter was flying with them, which he assumed was doing navigation. About an hour into the flight they hit weather and he was informed by the Beaufighter crew that they had not been navigating and had no idea where they were. He got so angry he charged his guns and moved into position to shoot down the Beaufighter. Lucky for everybody they soon sighted an island and found a place to land. I imagine things were a little tense on base after that.

On the Japanese side, recon flights of say, a half dozen A6Ms and one G4M were also very common in New Guinea according to the operational histories I've been reading recently. The Japanese bomber types, by the end of 1942, were becoming more vulnerable (although not as quickly or as thoroughly as you might think) and were increasingly deemed as needing escort, though they still went out by themselves too. Sometimes one flight of six or nine A6M were sent out and could be summoned via radio (apparently) to assist patrolling G4M, H6K or other types.

Combining multiple types of aircraft in a single patrol or scout mission was not unusual by any means. So long as they could fly at the same altitude and speed. Only a few types routinely went out on solo missions, for the Japanese that would be the Ki-46 and some of the older types. I know they were using the Ki-15 this way as well for a while in the Pacific. For the Americans pretty much flying boats, cruiser launched seaplanes and land based bombers (Hudson, B-17, B-24, B-25) were more typical. Sometimes P-40s and Wildcats went out solo as well. The AVG had a P-43 they used as a recon plane. The Brits had the Beaufighter, but they also used recon Spits and Hurrcanes for Tac-R missions. Loss rates were very high!

the passage is a also a bit selective.

. Power of the transmitter was 8 to 10 watts in voice mode and 30 watts in telegraph mode, called CW for 'continuous wave'. In 'At Dawn We Slept' Gordon Prange relates that one of the problems encountered in the IJN's preparation for Pearl Harbor was that they had never operated fighters farther than 90 miles from their carriers. 50 miles was the practical limit of utility of the voice radios under optimum conditions. Since the fighters would be venturing around 250 miles outbound on the mission

rule of thumb was telegraph mode was worth 3 times what voice mode was.
50 miles was the practical limit. Not average limit, or sure limit but not max limit either. It would allow for some repeated attempts. It was also not the limit in either optimum conditions or worsts conditions. But the Japanese were going to try for 5 times the range, not 3 times.

I think they did it, and that was definitely not the only time. I certainly wasn't being selective, it points out the obvious and you were wrong, which probably rubs you the wrong way. That ain't my problem.

Are the fighters supposed to report back to the carrier or did the multi seat aircraft relay the messages?
Was the greater range capacity (which is not spelled out in the passage) to help inure that aircraft that had been separated in combat had a larger margin of error to contact the carriers on the return flight?
Please note that the passage does say they operated, at least once, about 40 miles beyond radio range. They may not have been planning for full radio coverage. Just a larger are of the flight to be in contact to provide guidance for off course aircraft.

I think they did use radios for navigation / direction finding without a doubt. But it's also pretty clear they were communicating as well. And frankly, sending a short morse message isn't as challenging on a technical level as coordinating voice communication among maneuvering fighters, IMO.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Yes and no - the Brits had some issues, the US not so many and if anything interchangeability was quite good.

yes that's what I meant. The Soviets had problems with this too.

They did, but look what most units did with their radios.

It's not clear to me how many, my understanding is that by mid-war a lot of IJN units anyway were using them.

Scouting and conducting a specific military operation are two different animals. On a scouting mission you're gathering intelligence and looking for targets of opportunity. A strike will have a plan, briefings, etc. With all that said, if I was running a fighter unit, be it JAAF or IJN, I would not want to waste a fully functional fighter on a scouting mission, I'd send something specifically designed for that task.

Well that was part of the (both planned and actual) mission of the Fulmar. And the USN certainly sent both bombers and fighters out to scout and even on "ASW" (sub-search) missions during the war. The SBD was designated as a 'scout-bomber' and some of the USN SBD squadrons were specifically designated as 'Scout-Bomber' units. Those were the ones which got some fighter training.

Whether or not to use a fighter on recon is in part a matter of balancing tactical advantages vs. strategic / operational. If you are in a carrier knowing where they enemy ships are may be more important than having one more fighter on CAP or escort.

That said, I certainly wouldn't sent a lot of fighters (or bombers) on scouting missions, but it depends what other options you have. Up to a certain point, maybe you can rely on the E-13s or the OS2U and ground based PBYs and so on. But the OS2U's didn't have such a great range, they were slow (as were the PBYs) and may not be available in numbers where you are.

They did but by early/ mid 1943, the writing was on the wall for both IJN and JAAF units

Agreed, though it took a while. They didn't disappear or lose their sting overnight.

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
The book 'Sunburst' by Mark R Peattie has some information on JNAF Recce and radio, extracts below:

Voice radio was used during WW1, the French tried it out over Verdun during 1916 (with a few problems) and the British used it over the battlefield during 1918 (air to ground) and also in the British air defence system at home.

Mike