parsifal
Colonel
And that centerpiece was checked by the Germans using tank firefighting groups to hold the Russian breakthroughs until their lines reformed.
No one is going to compare tanks because one side won a war of attrition. If that then you could throw 'is the tank is better' because of Lend-Lease or the Japanese didn't attack Siberia. Because the war could of gone the other way.
seldom happened to any significant extent. After Kursk, not a single Soviet offensive was ever stopped, or even checked. the Germans were too exhausted to make any real difference to the outcomes of battles. the limiting factor was the breakdown in Soviet logistics. They would push as far as they could until the supply ran out, and then just wait for resupply to arrive. in the meantime, the Germans might launch a counterattack here or there, inflict losses on the now seriously immobilised spearheads of the Soviet formations, and then get encircled themselves. The Germans did well, in terms of the exchange rates,, but it a post war furphy that after Kursk they held any strategic capability to halt any major Soviet effort.
Soviet losses were always staggering, but to put it into some perspective, total AFV losses for each side 1941-5 according to Krivosheev were as follows:
Total losses for tanks and SP were
Soviet 96,500 (AFV losses), over 40000 lost to May 1942
German 32,000 tank losses exceeding Soviet losses from August'44 to the end of the war
Axis 750
However elsewhere Krivosheev says that German losses were 42,700. To May 1942, they had lost (unreoverable losses) 1300 tanks (plus about 50 from the satellites), after that they lost either 30700 (plus about 700 from the allies) to the Soviet losses of 46000. thats an exchange rate of either about 1:1, or 4:3 in favour of the Axis. not that much to get excited about really is it. trouble is, I dont have detailed figure for the t-34 or the mkIV, but one should expect thgings to be in proportion. One source that I have states that nearly 8000 T-34s were lost to the end of 1942
These figures incidentally are an echo of manpower losses as well. Soviet manpower losses for the war, excluding men massacred after surrendering, and losses in occupied areas, were about 13 million to the entire war (some have claimed losses in conventional operations as high as 20million, but Dupuy has fairly comprehensively debunked this claim) . They lost nearly 7 million men according to Nagorski, in 1941, and a further 2.6 million in 1942. Thats roughly 9.6 million in that first 18 months. After that, they lost 4 million men, give or take. german losses are always hotly disputed (not least because some accounts show casualties as including thoise mean that went home after beig wounded, and then returning....is that a casualty or not?), but according to the Quartermeisters quarterly strength returns, they lost 450000 in 1941, about 550000 in 1942, and about 3.3 million men on the eastern front for the rest of the war. That means that in 1941, the exchange rate was about 20:1, dropping to 4:1 in 1942, dropping to 4:3 for the remainder of the war. By June 1944, the germans were losing, to all causes, about twice as many men as the Russians.