Fast bombers alternatives for 1939-40 (4 Viewers)

[Thumpalumpacus]

That is a persistent myth. They were unsuitable for the Battle of Britain, and took heavy losses flying in big static formations, often without sufficient fighter cover, but the BoB was by no means the end of the Stuka story. They were absolutely lethal in the battles in North Africa - right up to Kasserine Pass, and even more so in Russia, arguably. In fact I would argue that they were key to probably most of the armored breakthroughs the Germans made from 1940 - late 42, and some in 43. They were also absolutely devastating in the convoy fights in the Med. It was not until the Allies began to seriously contest (and extend) air superiority after mid 1942 that the day of the Stuka came to it's twilight due to losses becoming unsustainable and their ability to drop bombs 'in peace' diminished to almost nothing.

I should have worded it a little differently, but yes, my point was that when they could focus on the dive-bombing they were useful. Obviously if the defender is not putting up many or any fighter defenders, then the escort requirement is reduced.

I think it's a mistake to underestimate the impact, figuratively and literally, of the Stuka. There is something to be said for precision bombing, and the Stuka could achieve that. They were used to enable armored breakthroughs from the Battle of France right up to 2nd El Alamein, albeit with increasing casualties.

I don't think I'm underestimating it. I'm simply pointing out limitations that everyone took note of.

 

[yulzari]

In regard to the Stuka and operations over Britain 1941 it was known for them to carry the SC1800 (1,800kg) as far as London. Albeit in individual bombing raids at night. This meant leaving the rear gunner and his weapon etc. behind and flying solo. I seriously doubt if the SC1800 was dive bombed, especially at night, over London.

 

[Shortround6]

Stuka sometimes got credit for things it didn't do.
Germans had more artillery in the early part of the war with more ammo in the divisional ammunition train and they had better radios and better forward observer doctrine than the allies had.
Things changed on both sides during the war.
Goring was glad to the credit for his Stukas and the allies were willing to blame the Stukas because then they wouldn't have to answer questions about poor artillery design, lack of artillery numbers, lack of ammunition, lack of radios/communications, poor doctrine.
The list goes on.
Allies try dive bombers and decisive results tend to be lacking. This is different than being useful.
Dive bombers, once the army has better defense than having hundreds of men lay on their backs and shoot into air, don't bring much to the table. Trading a 1/2 dozen planes for even a 1200 ton destroy is a good deal. Trading even 3-4 planes for dozen tanks is not a very good deal. Land targets don't move as much but land targets are harder to see, on average. Dive bombing troops in the jungle didn't work much better than level bombing.

 

[z42]

Another reason for dive bombing losing some of its appeal as the war progressed might be that as aircraft got faster the drop height had to increase as well. The formula for centrifugal force is actually quadratic in velocity, so doubling the velocity would mean that the drop height (for an initial admittedly crude estimate) would have to increase by a factor of four to keep the acceleration constant. Thus losing some of the accuracy that slower speed dive bombing was able to achieve.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Stuka sometimes got credit for things it didn't do.
Germans had more artillery in the early part of the war with more ammo in the divisional ammunition train and they had better radios and better forward observer doctrine than the allies had.
Things changed on both sides during the war.
Goring was glad to the credit for his Stukas and the allies were willing to blame the Stukas because then they wouldn't have to answer questions about poor artillery design, lack of artillery numbers, lack of ammunition, lack of radios/communications, poor doctrine.
The list goes on.
Allies try dive bombers and decisive results tend to be lacking. This is different than being useful.
Dive bombers, once the army has better defense than having hundreds of men lay on their backs and shoot into air, don't bring much to the table. Trading a 1/2 dozen planes for even a 1200 ton destroy is a good deal. Trading even 3-4 planes for dozen tanks is not a very good deal. Land targets don't move as much but land targets are harder to see, on average. Dive bombing troops in the jungle didn't work much better than level bombing.

That makes a lot of assumptions.

Are they really losing 3-4 planes in a single strike every time? One thing I would observe about dive bombers is that they seem to have actually been fairly hard to hit in the dive. Loss rates varied but there were plenty of Stuka strikes all the way into 1943 which did not result in any losses.

When you are talking about knocking out a dozen tanks, is it just any random dozen i.e. in an attrition scenario? Or is it the leading formation of particularly heavily armored tanks in a counter-attack which your side was having trouble stopping, like the Stukas of StG 2 did say, at Arras? And thus, thereby, turning the tide of the battle. Or right before a German counter attack such as at say, Gazala? Or later still at Kasserine pass where they proved so valuable in taking out not just US tanks but a lot of that great, well-supplied US artillery?

I think there is a common misconception especially in American circles, that a bombers job is primarily as a 'bomb truck' - so the most payload possible delivered somewhere in the vicinity of enemy territory wins the war. This was the philosophy behind Operation Rolling Thunder, Steel Tiger, Linebacker I and Linebacker II. In terms of sheer tonnage dropped, the US should have won their war in Vietnam 100 times over. Some people are still baffled that they did not win. But, alas, they did not. Most of those bombs moved mud, some killed civilians, a very low percentage had any real effect on the outcome of the war.

The use of bombing, and therefore air power, as little drones in Ukraine are demonstrating every day by delivering teeny little explosive charges ranging from a few ounces to a few kg, is at least as much about precision, and about target selection, tempo, coordination with friendly ground forces etc. as it is about payload.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Another reason for dive bombing losing some of its appeal as the war progressed might be that as aircraft got faster the drop height had to increase as well. The formula for centrifugal force is actually quadratic in velocity, so doubling the velocity would mean that the drop height (for an initial admittedly crude estimate) would have to increase by a factor of four to keep the acceleration constant. Thus losing some of the accuracy that slower speed dive bombing was able to achieve.

Even fast dive bombers tended to dive at the same relatively lower speed.

I think there are two real reason why dive bombing faded a bit later in the war.

The first is that while early dive bombers did very well (notable successes in that role including Ju 87 Stuka, Hs 123, D3A, SBD, Pe-2) their replacements often struggled or just couldn't ultimately do the job. The A-36 was very good but it was a modified P-51, not a purpose built dive bomber, and ultimately it's wings couldn't take the high angle dive pull-out. The D4Y turned out to have several serious design flaws, plus major engine trouble with the DB 600 series engine knock off, which delayed it's entry into combat. Given it's sporadic successes later in the war the US is probably quite lucky they had serious teething problems with these when they first came out in 1942. The SB2C Helldiver had all kinds of problems, and though eventually was tweaked well enough to be of some use, ended up with relatively limited range. The Vengeance was a rather strange design, which had some promise anyway, but took a bit too long to get into action (and couldn't operate from Carriers). The Ju 88 was good of couse, but the airframe was ultimately too big and heavy for the high angle dive bombing pull-out and they stopped being used for that mission. The Barracuda was just a mess all around. The Albacore was... not as good as the Swordfish, ultimately. Both could dive bomb but were better as torpedo bombers. We all know about the sad story of the He 177 which nobody should have ever tried to make into a dive bomber.

The second is that fighter bombers - or some of them anyway- were almost as good in terms of bombing accuracy, (ok maybe half as good, which is still a lot better than most level-bombers) and were ultimately a lot cheaper to produce and convert into a fighter bomber role than a new second generation dive bomber design, and were ultimately more versatile since you could always also use them as fighters.

 

[cherry blossom]

One late war possibility for combining accurate dive bombing with an ability for the bomber to defend itself is illustrated by the F4U which could bomb quite accurately after lowering its undercarriage https://www.worldwarphotos.info/wp-...ic/peleliu/Marine_F4U_making_a_napalm_run.jpg

 

[Dimlee]

It seems that only the Germans (with the Ju 87) and the Soviets (with the the underrated and pretty fast Pe-2, and later the better and also pretty fast Tu-2) engaged in the wholesale front line battlefield use of dive bombers for the land war, with the partial exception as you note of the Vengeance in Burma and India - which I think is a bit underrated honestly, and the A-36 in Italy though that was in pretty small numbers.

Pe-2 was rarely used as a dive bomber. Interesting topic, by the way. When I attempted my humble research some years ago, I concluded that only about 10% of Pe-2 operations in 1943-1945 involved diving and the lack of training was one of the main reasons. But I'd like to see a professional study.
Tu-2, in its production modifications, was not a dive bomber.

 

[Dimlee]

I think there is a common misconception especially in American circles, that a bombers job is primarily as a 'bomb truck' - so the most payload possible delivered somewhere in the vicinity of enemy territory wins the war. This was the philosophy behind Operation Rolling Thunder, Steel Tiger, Linebacker I and Linebacker II. In terms of sheer tonnage dropped, the US should have won their war in Vietnam 100 times over. Some people are still baffled that they did not win. But, alas, they did not. Most of those bombs moved mud, some killed civilians, a very low percentage had any real effect on the outcome of the war.

The use of bombing, and therefore air power, as little drones in Ukraine are demonstrating every day by delivering teeny little explosive charges ranging from a few ounces to a few kg, is at least as much about precision, and about target selection, tempo, coordination with friendly ground forces etc. as it is about payload.

In my humble opinion, Linebacker I and II had a significant impact on the outcome, paving the way for the Paris Agreements. Strategic operations and strategic outcome. The long-term effect of the Agreements was contradictory, but this is another story.
Also, if we speculate about the Linebacker II philosophy... it was not about "payload delivered somewhere in the vicinity", certainly not. The list of targets was very clear. The results can be debated, since the comprehensive bombing survey was not possible for obvious reasons.

As for Ukraine, we can analyse the weapons' effectiveness and its impact on the outcome of the war only after the war is over. To note, according to the current information, most of the drones also do not reach their targets but "move mud", get lost in flight, are intercepted, kill civilians, even fly to other countries, etc.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Pe-2 was rarely used as a dive bomber. Interesting topic, by the way. When I attempted my humble research some years ago, I concluded that only about 10% of Pe-2 operations in 1943-1945 involved diving and the lack of training was one of the main reasons. But I'd like to see a professional study.
Tu-2, in its production modifications, was not a dive bomber.

I remember reading another post you made on this.

I think the Pe-2 being used as a 'true' i.e. high angle dive bomber is actually a fairly common issue with all dive bombers, namely that they required a lot of training to use fully effectively. So it does seem that only certain Pe-2 units were really used as dive bombers, but I'd say that was still a lot of them. I would also argue that dive bombing lends itself to this tactically. I.e. it's much more effective when used against high value / difficult to destroy targets than just against any random cluster of tanks, attritionally. This training issue may in fact be the third reason why Dive Bombers were gradually phased out. Another might be just an increasing focus on attrition war over war of position and maneuver, and a lack of naval targets in the Pacific. But Pe-2s were used several times for precision dive bombing attacks that were successful, I remember anecdotally.

I could be wrong, but I suspect Tu-2 wasn't used as a dive bomber, probably because by the time it was available in any numbers, the nature of the war had changed. It had the ability built into the design though, arguably. But yeah maybe I should just leave it off the list.

Another reason which could be in the list of why dive bombers were phased out is rockets, which (rightly or wrongly) were considered a viable alternative to dive bombing attacks.

I've learned a few things in recent years which bear on this discussion, in no particular order:

1) USMC and Army SBD / A-24 crews did not do high angle dive bombing. They did shallow angle, i.e. 30-45 degree like fighter bombers usually did, and the results were quite telling in terms of very reduced accuracy compared to USN crews.
2) USMC and Army SBD / A-24 crews had am much higher per-mission loss rate than USN crews, which may possibly be related to #3 below. Some USN (i.e. Scout squadron) pilots got significant air to air combat training and gunnery training etc.
3) One of the big advantages of the Ju 87 is that it had an automatic pull-out system so less experienced / well trained crews could still do the high angle dive bombing and even if they passed-out during pull out, they wouldn't necessarily crash.
4) Experienced dive bomber pilots in general could use the high G tolerance of the wings / airframe and usually high lift to making high G turns to evade being shot down. This was key to survival for Stuka pilots in North Africa on several occasions. It also worked for D3A, SBD, and Vengeance etc. pilots on occasion. And also with very agile like biplane fighter bombers used for dive bombing, HS 123, CR 42, I-153 etc. Most dive bomber aircraft types conversely often got slaughtered if they stayed in formation during attack by enemy fighters, because they were not well armed enough to dissuade attacks effectively (even if they did fairly routinely damage attacking fighters).
5) Continued dive bombing attacks or training (including lower angle) wore out the wings of just about any aircraft, but particularly planes not specifically built for dive bombing (like the A-36 and most fighters), or heavy ones like the Ju 88 or He 177. I know that this was one of the main reasons Corsairs and Kittyhawks were declared "war-weary" and sent to training units or scrapped (or sent to poor Allies from other countries), because the wings had taken a set. This mitigated against doing a lot of dive bomber training on type.
6) It's clear from operational histories in the South Pacific, Aleutians, and Med, that contrary to my previous beliefs, level bombing attacks, particularly from low altitude, actually could hit ships, so long as said ships did not have a lot of effective air defense. So in other words, undefended merchant ships were often hit with low-level bombing attacks (mast-head / skip bombing) by level bombers and fighter bombers, and by shallow angle dive bombing attacks, and sometimes even by medium altitude level-bombing attacks. But even a modicum of AAA on the ship could greatly reduce the likelihood of success here. Sometimes this was counteracted by the use of strafers as in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and in some cases, during attacks by the Soviets in the Baltic (allegedly). But in general, when dealing with more heavily armed warships, or well defended ground targets like say a bridge with a lot of flak emplacements around it, dive bombers become a lot more important and are much more likely to hit the targets and survive. This can be seen with SBD and SB2C and also with A-36 in Italy and Vengeance in Burma.

This is also one of the scenarios where having armor and SS fuel tanks seems to matter more than usual. Dive bombers were often hit by at least some fragments, but heavily built and fairly well protected ones like Stuka, Ju-88, SBDs, Vengeance, A-36 and F4Us seemed to survive these attacks better than the more lightly or unprotected ones like D3A. Pe-2 seems somewhere in between, but they had I think much lower losses than the Il-2, (though that's a low bar!)

 

[Steamed_Banana]

In my humble opinion, Linebacker I and II had a significant impact on the outcome, paving the way for the Paris Agreements. Strategic operations and strategic outcome. The long-term effect of the Agreements was contradictory, but this is another story.

I think that is the key part of the story. If the effects had actually been telling, the North Vietnamese would have been forced to negotiate in good faith.

Also, if we speculate about the Linebacker II philosophy... it was not about "payload delivered somewhere in the vicinity", certainly not. The list of targets was very clear. The results can be debated, since the comprehensive bombing survey was not possible for obvious reasons.

I think the self-delusion / self congratulatory nature of almost all the heavy / strategic bombing going back to WW2, tended to heavily exaggerate results. Some high altitude, heavy bomber attacks were telling, but most weren't. In Vietnam I'd say the same for most of the strikes by fighter bombers etc. except where directly interracting with ground controllers.

It's all too easy to believe what you think is good news. And a wise opponent will encourage that kind of belief.

As for Ukraine, we can analyse the weapons' effectiveness and its impact on the outcome of the war only after the war is over. To note, according to the current information, most of the drones also do not reach their targets but "move mud", get lost in flight, are intercepted, kill civilians, even fly to other countries, etc.

I think that is true of most bombing attacks of all types, historically. But we don't need a postwar analysis to see for example that drones have very clearly made it much more dangerous to use any kind of vehicles or mobile weapon systems anywhere near the front lines. And we can also see very clearly that a few ounces of TNT delivered to the right square meter is a lot more effective than thousands of pounds delivered a few hundred meters away from the target.

 

[wuzak]

This doesn't fit the required timeline, but what if there was a parallel development for the P-61 as the fast light/medium bomber "B-61".

No radar (except H2X, for pathfinder bombers), lose the turret, and the belly guns, add bomb bay doors under the wing section and create a bomb bay. Possibly need to widen the nacelle.

There are also the 4 hardpoints that can take 4 x 1,600lb bombs, though more likely to take 1,000lb GP bombs.

If the bomb bay coudl fit a single 2,000lb bomb or 2 x 1,000lb bombs, a short range maximum load may be up to 6,000lb.

 

[bf109xxl]

I concluded that only about 10% of Pe-2 operations in 1943-1945 involved diving.

What data did you use?

 

[GrauGeist]

Pe-2 was rarely used as a dive bomber. Interesting topic, by the way. When I attempted my humble research some years ago, I concluded that only about 10% of Pe-2 operations in 1943-1945 involved diving and the lack of training was one of the main reasons. But I'd like to see a professional study.
Tu-2, in its production modifications, was not a dive bomber.

The Arkhangelsky Ar-2 was actually designed as a dive bomber variant of the Tupolev SB but the Pe-2 and Tu-2 eclipsed it's performance.

 

[bf109xxl]

Tu-2, in its production modifications, was not a dive bomber.

Interestingly, the "Instructions for Pilots on the Operation and Piloting Techniques of the Tu-2 Aircraft with ASH-82FN Engines" (1945) devotes considerable attention to diving. However, the cases of using the Tu-2 as a dive bomber are not known to me. More precisely, tests revealed the propeller overspeeding during a dive. IIRC, the defect was never completely eliminated until the end of production, even after replacing the propellers. Nevertheless, later tests showed that the Tu-2 could dive normally even without dive brakes. The main problem was insufficient visibility during diving, both for the pilot and the navigator.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The heavy bomb load of the B-24s was ultimately telling in the destruction of Axis airfields in early 1943, by which time the Allies had tons of fighters including Spitfire Mk IXs and some mk VIII (I think). But they (B-24s) took fairly heavy losses. The B-25s did fairly well but were in trouble if their escorts got away from them.

First a repeat. To end May 1943, 9th Air Force, B-24 3,118 sorties airborne 30 lost, no more than 5 in a month, B-25 1,801 sorties, 20 losses, P-40 10,820 sorties, 70 losses. Over at the 12th Air Force mostly B-17 units, November 1942 to end May 1943, 3,497 sorties attacking (NOT airborne), 139 losses, monthly loss rates as a percentage of attacking 2.4, 6.9, 6.8, 4.6, 5.1, 3.9, 2.5, overall 4.0. No data for 12th AF light and medium bombers.

The additional information. 8th Air Force 93rd Bomb Group with B-24, on detached service in Mediterranean with 12th Air Force 13 December 1942 to 20 February 1943, 273 sorties, 224 effective, 4 aircraft MIA, 530.2 short tons of bombs dropped. The 12th Air Force had the B-17 groups 97th, 301st in November 1942, the 99th in February and the 2nd in March 1943.

"Early difficult" for the Desert air war = began when the Bf 109s of JG 27 (IIRC Sept of 1941) and MC 202s (Nov 41) arrived, IMO. This is when Allied aircraft losses began to really mount.

To complete the RAF Egypt casualties, all causes lost/damaged June to December 1940, 12/1, 10/7, 8/10, 7/7, 9/13, 7/6, 13/21
First 10 months in 1941, 15/20, 10/9, 5/11, 48/22, 48/15, 53/15, 26/19, 27/33, 29/12, 40/29

Repeat RAF Egypt aircraft casualties, November 1941, 131 destroyed, 74 damaged, in December 169/55. For 1942 73/11, 69/17, 54/27, 70/34, 103/44 (Gazala), 187/117, 186/114 (1st Alamein), 106/49, 106/62, 139/83 (2nd Alamein), 114/49, 45/24. US losses August to December 1942 put at 2/0, 5/1, 6/7, 8/1, 10/8.

And then you look at the army movements, September 1940 Italians move into Egypt, December Operation Compass, February 1941 Operation Compass ends, March 1941 Axis attack, ends in April, May 1941 Operation Brevity, counter attack Operation Skorpion, June Operation Battleaxe, November Operation Crusader, movement ends at end of December, January 1942 Operation Theseus, line stabilises at Gazala early February. May 1942 Battle of Gazala, end June Axis reach El Alamein line, fighting there until end July. 30 August, Battle of Alam Halfa, 23 October 8th Army main attack at El Alamein.

Two main drivers of losses, the armies engaging and the number of aircraft available, plus supply, the further forward the armies advanced the harder for the air forces to maintain high sortie rates.

There is an earlier fascinating phase involving Lysanders and Gladiators fighting CR 32s and BR.20s and a lot of other weird types, and then a bit later Hurricanes fighting G.50s and MC 200s and toward the end of it... a few Bf 110s, but I consider this the era prior to either side taking a very serious interest and casualties among pilots and aircrew on both sides were comparatively low.

RAF Middle East, including Egypt, Sudan, Palestine and Greece. 30 June 1940, strength 5 Gauntlet, 78 Gladiator, 3 Hurricane (Hurricanes were flown out just before France surrendered), 88 Blenheim I, 66 Wellesley, 8 Hardy, 29 Valentia, 15 Bombay, 27 Lysander, 10 Sunderland, total 320 aircraft. Wellingtons turned up in July (as GR), Blenheim IV in August.

Ju87 and Bf110 from February 1941, Bf109 from mid April. Tomahawks in squadrons in May.

Another repeat

When it comes to bomber losses there is Bomber Losses in the Middle East and Mediterranean Volume 1 1939 to 1942, by David Gunby and Pelham Temple. Meant to include aircraft lost on ferry flights to the theatre as well as all causes losses, pages 17 to 36 the 1940 war losses, pages 37 to 114 for 1941, pages 116 to 211 for 1942. The most common way for a formation to take multiple losses was an anti shipping strike.

A quick leaf through for multiple losses on the one raid, 1941, Western Desert unless mentioned otherwise, 4 or more
13 April, 6 out of 6 Blenheim, Greece, fighters
23 May, 5 out of unknown number Blenheim, fighters
27 May, 6 out of unknown number, Blenheim, Crete, none to enemy action
9 July, 4 out of 7 Blenheim, causes not given
12 September, 4 out of unknown number Blenheim anti shipping, flak
1/2 November, 5 out of unknown number Wellington, fog.
20 November, 5 out of 9 Maryland, army co-operation, fighters
22 November, 4 out of 6 Blenheim, fighters
10 December, 5 out of 6 Boston, fighters
12 December, 5 out of unknown number Maryland, fighters
20 December, 4 out of 12 Blenheim, fighters

In 1942,
4 February, 4 out of unknown number Blenheim, low cloud
16/17 August 4 out of unknown number Wellington, none enemy action
13/14 September 4 out of unknown number Wellington, probably none enemy action
4 December 9 out of unknown number Blenheim (NW Africa), fighters

Interesting that from pre Gazala battle daylight bomber losses to enemy action drop away.

The A-20A was almost identical to the British DB-7B / Boston III. The Boston IIIA was also very similar to the A-20C.

Goodness, who knew?

 

[Steamed_Banana]

First a repeat. To end May 1943, 9th Air Force, B-24 3,118 sorties airborne 30 lost, no more than 5 in a month, B-25 1,801 sorties, 20 losses, P-40 10,820 sorties, 70 losses. Over at the 12th Air Force mostly B-17 units, November 1942 to end May 1943, 3,497 sorties attacking (NOT airborne), 139 losses, monthly loss rates as a percentage of attacking 2.4, 6.9, 6.8, 4.6, 5.1, 3.9, 2.5, overall 4.0. No data for 12th AF light and medium bombers.

The additional information. 8th Air Force 93rd Bomb Group with B-24, on detached service in Mediterranean with 12th Air Force 13 December 1942 to 20 February 1943, 273 sorties, 224 effective, 4 aircraft MIA, 530.2 short tons of bombs dropped. The 12th Air Force had the B-17 groups 97th, 301st in November 1942, the 99th in February and the 2nd in March 1943.


To complete the RAF Egypt casualties, all causes lost/damaged June to December 1940, 12/1, 10/7, 8/10, 7/7, 9/13, 7/6, 13/21
First 10 months in 1941, 15/20, 10/9, 5/11, 48/22, 48/15, 53/15, 26/19, 27/33, 29/12, 40/29

Repeat RAF Egypt aircraft casualties, November 1941, 131 destroyed, 74 damaged, in December 169/55. For 1942 73/11, 69/17, 54/27, 70/34, 103/44 (Gazala), 187/117, 186/114 (1st Alamein), 106/49, 106/62, 139/83 (2nd Alamein), 114/49, 45/24. US losses August to December 1942 put at 2/0, 5/1, 6/7, 8/1, 10/8.

And then you look at the army movements, September 1940 Italians move into Egypt, December Operation Compass, February 1941 Operation Compass ends, March 1941 Axis attack, ends in April, May 1941 Operation Brevity, counter attack Operation Skorpion, June Operation Battleaxe, November Operation Crusader, movement ends at end of December, January 1942 Operation Theseus, line stabilises at Gazala early February. May 1942 Battle of Gazala, end June Axis reach El Alamein line, fighting there until end July. 30 August, Battle of Alam Halfa, 23 October 8th Army main attack at El Alamein.

Two main drivers of losses, the armies engaging and the number of aircraft available, plus supply, the further forward the armies advanced the harder for the air forces to maintain high sortie rates.

RAF Middle East, including Egypt, Sudan, Palestine and Greece. 30 June 1940, strength 5 Gauntlet, 78 Gladiator, 3 Hurricane (Hurricanes were flown out just before France surrendered), 88 Blenheim I, 66 Wellesley, 8 Hardy, 29 Valentia, 15 Bombay, 27 Lysander, 10 Sunderland, total 320 aircraft. Wellingtons turned up in July (as GR), Blenheim IV in August.

Ju87 and Bf110 from February 1941, Bf109 from mid April. Tomahawks in squadrons in May.

Another repeat

When it comes to bomber losses there is Bomber Losses in the Middle East and Mediterranean Volume 1 1939 to 1942, by David Gunby and Pelham Temple. Meant to include aircraft lost on ferry flights to the theatre as well as all causes losses, pages 17 to 36 the 1940 war losses, pages 37 to 114 for 1941, pages 116 to 211 for 1942. The most common way for a formation to take multiple losses was an anti shipping strike.

A quick leaf through for multiple losses on the one raid, 1941, Western Desert unless mentioned otherwise, 4 or more
13 April, 6 out of 6 Blenheim, Greece, fighters
23 May, 5 out of unknown number Blenheim, fighters
27 May, 6 out of unknown number, Blenheim, Crete, none to enemy action
9 July, 4 out of 7 Blenheim, causes not given
12 September, 4 out of unknown number Blenheim anti shipping, flak
1/2 November, 5 out of unknown number Wellington, fog.
20 November, 5 out of 9 Maryland, army co-operation, fighters
22 November, 4 out of 6 Blenheim, fighters
10 December, 5 out of 6 Boston, fighters
12 December, 5 out of unknown number Maryland, fighters
20 December, 4 out of 12 Blenheim, fighters

In 1942,
4 February, 4 out of unknown number Blenheim, low cloud
16/17 August 4 out of unknown number Wellington, none enemy action
13/14 September 4 out of unknown number Wellington, probably none enemy action
4 December 9 out of unknown number Blenheim (NW Africa), fighters

Interesting that from pre Gazala battle daylight bomber losses to enemy action drop away.


Goodness, who knew?

Good post, lots of data. I'll double check my sources but it looks ballpark correct. By 42 Blenheim seems to have been phased out, pretty much. After Gazala DAF was improving their fighter situation a lot, and unescorted / indifferently escorted bomber raids were no longer common. Bomber losses definitely went down. Boston and Baltimore raids were almost always escorted by Kittyhawks from June through the end of 1942.

 

[Dimlee]

What data did you use?

It was whatever I could find in Russian at that moment, from the early 1990s to the 2010s.

 

[Dimlee]

And we can also see very clearly that a few ounces of TNT delivered to the right square meter is a lot more effective than thousands of pounds delivered a few hundred meters away from the target.

Maybe so. Unless this is a square meter of steel and concrete covering the target.
Different objectives, different tools.

 

[SplitRz]

Possible 1-engined stuff.
The closest to the useful, faster 1-engined bomber idea for 1939-40 was probably the Hawker Henley. WIth almost 290+ mph, it was faster than many fighters in service in the day, even if the Emil will still not have problems catching it. One of the reasons the Henley was not even faster was in the choice of the wing - the big & thick wing of the Hurricane gotten even more draggier by installation of a thick wing 'plug'. If the wing is as-is from the Hurricane, and with undercarriage retracting outwards (so it leaves the space for the bomb bay), it might've come in close to the Hurricane I?

Another take is that the base is not that of the Hurricane, but that Supermarine does a light bomber based on the Spitfire, with a wing now at ~280 sq ft, 14-15% t-t-c at root, the 'beard' radiator under the engine, behind it being the bomb bay. It will loose some speed vs. the Spitfire (doh), but hopefully 320-330 mph can be achieved? Obviously the fuel tanks go in the wing. Guns' armament just 4 LMGs + the rear gun?

Why not stick with the Henley for a bit? If developed and deployed properly, it could well have presented a unique capability for the allies in the ETO and later Mediterranean (with an equally plausible maritime conversion that would have been very much superior to the Skua).

A fast and even reasonably survivable dive-bomber and/or ground attack bomber was something very lacking in 39/40 for the RAF. And although a 300mph top speed in '39/40 isn't going to make it as invulnerable as the Mosquito, its a smaller more agile machine which was highly rated by those that flew it. It would certainly would surely be more survivable than the Battle or Blenheim and, smaller bombload traded for potential better accuracy if the dive-bombing capability had been properly developed, possibly no less effective than the much appreciated Bostons and Marylands.

That thick wing section might limit top speed (though later Merlins would have helped) - but recessed bombs improve streamlining and speed before they're released. I wonder for comparison what the top speed of a Hurribomber was when carrying 2 x 500lb draggy hardpoints and bombs to the target? (I'm sure I read somewhere that the mark ii Hurricane was cut back to sub 300mph by the fitting of external racks ALONE!).