Fighter Escorts of B-29's over Japan & Pacific

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

The cost of the Doolittle raid may have been the Lexington. If the Enterprise was at the Battle of the Coral Sea instead of returning from the Doolittle raid the outcome may have been more favorable to the USN.
The most favorable outcome was already achieved when the capture of Port Moresby was delayed. Could have lost the Enterprise also.
 
I don't believe there any raids by B-24s on mainland Japan at least until the capture of Okinawa. As I noted previously the B-29s could only bomb the western part of Kyushu.

As to the diversion of resources Craven and Cate states the following:



Not trivial but certainly no a game changer in the overall scheme of things.
 
Darwin is port so the supply problems couldn't have been that bad

 
Thye were not based in China. From Craven and Cate:


I'm not suggesting they bomb Japan at all. Its simply to early for that as a practical matter.
 
Thye were not based in China. From Craven and Cate:
View attachment 668386

I'm not suggesting they bomb Japan at all. Its simply to early for that as a practical matter.
The B-29 groups were based in India, but operated from forward operating bases in China during Operation Matterhorn:

40th BG, based at Chakulia, India - operated from Hsinching, China.
444th BG, based at Dudhkundi, India - operated from Kwanghan, China.
462nd BG, based at Piardoba, India - operated from Linqiong, China.
468th BG, based at Kalaikunda, India - operated from Pengshan, China.
 
Interesting discussions of night bombing

View attachment 668389

This one is from April 5, 1945
View attachment 668390
The USAAF is starting to speak with a British accent.
The Author of these comments was certainly not one to volunteer to lead missions under the overcast in the Ruhr or Oil Targets. Even the future Tokyo strikes in March 1945 had the benefit of well defined harbor for radar signature of lead pathpinder ships to mark 'the spot' and virtually zero anti-aircraft or night fighter resistance. ETO would have a a flak dominated bloodbath rivaling Schweinfurt, given fusing boundary of overcast. Who was the author of the memo?
 

The first appears to have been sent to Lemay in China.
The second Memo was written by Lemay to Arnold. it regarding the bombing of Japan. I should made the reference clear.


 
The following is the schedule for missions using the China bases. It's a 10-day cycle. The only exception I can find is the 3 missions to Formosa on October 14, 16 and 17. In that case the aircraft launched for each mission rapidly declined from 130 to 72 to 30. This cycle also explains why it took 8 months to fly 21 missions


I found this reference to the 3 Formosa missions

 
Last edited:
After its 29th​ mission the XX Air Force abandoned the China bases and only flew from India. Of those 29 initial missions, 21 were flown from the bases in China, 8 directly from home base in India, with 1 staged through Ceylon. Of those 21 missions, 9 were flown to Kyushu, 5 to Manchuria, 6 to Formosa and 1 to mainland China.

Those 9 Japan missions were spread over 7 months. Not in any way a sustained campaign.

One of the problems with only being able to reach the west end of Kyushu is that there were no worthwhile targets. It was decided that coke ovens were the achilles heel of the Japanese economy, therefore the steel complex at Yawata and in particular the associated coke ovens would be the focus. This is a classic example of cutting the suit to fit the cloth. The coke ovens in Manchuria were also attacked. It was quickly realized that this was not a winning proposition, so the focus was shifted to aircraft, which resulted in the attacks on aircraft repair and modification facilities in Formosa. In this spirit the last 5 Japan raids were directed at the "Aircraft Factory" in Omura. To call this an "Aircraft Factory" was an exaggeration. It was a series of hangers and shops where floatplanes were assembled and repaired. I have attached a post war report documenting the damage done by the various raids.

A total of 571 aircraft took off on the 9 Kyushu missions of which 378 actually bombed the assigned target dropping 872 tons of bombs. A further 342 tons were dropped elsewhere.

Craven and Cate Volume V Section I provides an excellent review of Matterhorn.

Also in the Forward to Vol V C and C quote a passage from the remarkably prescient prewar novel by Hector Bywater


 

Attachments

  • Damage to Omaru Aircraft Facilities.pdf
    18.2 MB · Views: 20
The attached documents contain a wealth of specific information on B-29 failures including engines starting on page 33.




Students of the Vietnam War will recognize the name of the Officer in charge of analysis.



Here's a frightening stat



The reports also discuss bombing inaccuracy.


 

Attachments

  • B-29 Op Stas Mar 45.pdf
    19.4 MB · Views: 21
Last edited:
Some time ago I posted information of actual B-29 bombing altitude. I noted that contrary to perceived wisdom very few missions were conducted at above 30,000 feet. The attached document demonstrates that after a few missions the bombing altitude was reduced.

 

Attachments

  • B-29 Bombing Altitude.pdf
    1.8 MB · Views: 18
The attached documents conation a wealth of specific information on B-29 failures including engines starting on page 33.

View attachment 668736
Excellent! This is what I was talking about. Take this information and match it against engines sent out for overhaul and it will give a better picture on engine reliability.
Students of the Vietnam War will recognize the name of the Officer in charge of analysis
Ahhh, the ultimate bean-counter!
 
Some t8me ago Ii posted an excerpt from an 8th AF bombing accuracy study which suggested that the Mk.XIV was superior to the Norden in real world conditions.
The most obvious advantage of the Mk.XIV was that it didn't require a perfectly level approach to target (it could tolerate slight climb and descent angles), bank angles could be up to 60-degrees before the gyro would tumble, and the impact point could be computed in around 5-10 seconds if I recall. The Norden required a run-in time of around 30 seconds and generally required a straight-in approach, with the gyro only able to tolerate about 18-degrees of bank before it'd tumble (While I don't know if there was a 'push-to-cage' function available for the Norden, the Mk.XIV had such a feature, though the gyro could tolerate bank angles of up to 60-degrees before that'd happen).

The obvious advantages for the Norden was that it was more accurate above 20000' (The Mk.XIV was a little less at 14000-16000', but it was considered negligible, and probably worth the price for the advantages it offered) and if the gyro tumbled, it could be erected faster than the Mk.XIV (both took a considerable amount of time, however).

I'm surprised we didn't use these more often on some other aircraft of ours (the B-25 and B-26 definitely could have profited off them).
 

Users who are viewing this thread