Fighter Escorts of B-29's over Japan & Pacific

[drgondog]

Here is how the actual mission unfolded

View attachment 667524

Note that the very first B-29 raid on Japan was a night mission. One of the enduring myths of WWII is that Curtis Lemay came up with the idea of night bombing with B-29s. Night bombing was planned as a part of the repertoire before the B-29s first combat mission.

It is not an 'enduring myth' that LeMay decided to strike at low level - after exhaustive examination of B-29s ops by Possum Hansel and the lack of success of traditional 8th AF doctrine.

He didn't base his decision upon 'theoretical possibilities', but on the hard facts that Japanese a.) had poor night fighter capability, b.) inadequate infrastructure to put out fires of mostly wooden buildings, c.) much of Japan's mfg was provided by shops inside city limits, d.) engine stress to climb to high altitude was reduced, e.) pulling most armament and flying at much lower altitudes enabled 2-3 tons more bombload.

None of his subordinates came to him and said "Gee, we read that Night Bombing was part of the B-29 repertoire, so we guess that its' ok".

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

OK - and I read that - but again what IS NOT being shown, and I'll repeat one more time "is the type of overhaul."
Why is this important?!?!? Because it REALLY shows the wear and tear on the engine, RELIABILITY and what components are subject to that wear and tear.

The article is not claiming to report reliability and it clearly cannot do so. They are using when engines were removed, a big part of reliability measures is the engines that failed or were shut down because of problems but were repaired while staying attached to the aircraft, the flip side of fit the spare rather than fix the repairable existing engine.

So as stated, these numbers are wonderful but at the end of the day they don't really paint a true degree of reliability on those engines sent to "overhaul" for non-combat issues.

You have made it quite clear how varied the work can be for a non standard overhaul, versus a scheduled one, but why the need to introduce the overhaul information and the engine reliability when it is clear the report is covering operating life not reliability?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The article is not claiming to report reliability and it clearly cannot do so.

Obviously

They are using when engines were removed, a big part of reliability measures is the engines that failed or were shut down because of problems but were repaired while staying attached to the aircraft, the flip side of fit the spare rather than fix the repairable existing engine.

And that's my point and as stated; for one reason or another, is not indicated

You have made it quite clear how varied the work can be for a non standard overhaul, versus a scheduled one, but why the need to introduce the overhaul information and the engine reliability when it is clear the report is covering operating life not reliability?

Because when it's identified, the type of overhaul that was required is when you will get a TRUE indication of engine reliability! For example, you could of had an engine that had low compression, maybe due to bad rings or valves on two cylinders. Rather than repair on the aircraft (which would more than likely be considered a non-routine "repair"), the entire engine was removed and sent to "overhaul."

On the flip side you can have an engine that seized (for one reason or another) and WOULD require a complete teardown, a major "overhaul."

I think you eluded to this as well.

Depending on what part of the engine (continually) fails can be an indicator of issues of design, production quality or even operator error!

Both cases would be counted as "an overhaul" although the first example could have been repaired on the aircraft and it's possible in may cases were.

Until this difference can be identified and quantified (and I doubt it ever can) these overhaul numbers can never be an accurate indicator on how reliable these engines really were during this time period.

 

[Macandy]

It is not an 'enduring myth' that LeMay decided to strike at low level - after exhaustive examination of B-29s ops by Possum Hansel and the lack of success of traditional 8th AF doctrine.

He didn't base his decision upon 'theoretical possibilities', but on the hard facts that Japanese a.) had poor night fighter capability, b.) inadequate infrastructure to put out fires of mostly wooden buildings, c.) much of Japan's mfg was provided by shops inside city limits, d.) engine stress to climb to high altitude was reduced, e.) pulling most armament and flying at much lower altitudes enabled 2-3 tons more bombload.

None of his subordinates came to him and said "Gee, we read that Night Bombing was part of the B-29 repertoire, so we guess that its' ok".

LeMay was also aware of the results of tests on a replica Japanese village constructed at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah in1943.
The weapon, the M69 incendiary, he used to burn the heart of out Japanese towns was the fruit of lessons learned.

An excellent read (but not at that price!)

Amazon product ASIN 034528304X
View: https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/034528304X/

 

[EwenS]

LeMay was also aware of the results of tests on a replica Japanese village constructed at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah in1943.
The weapon, the M69 incendiary, he used to burn the heart of out Japanese towns was the fruit of lessons learned.

An excellent read (but not at that price!)

Amazon product ASIN 034528304X
View: https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/034528304X/

This one is a bit cheaper

Amazon product ASIN 1560986654
View: https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/1560986654/

 

[drgondog]

LeMay was also aware of the results of tests on a replica Japanese village constructed at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah in1943.
The weapon, the M69 incendiary, he used to burn the heart of out Japanese towns was the fruit of lessons learned.

An excellent read (but not at that price!)

Amazon product ASIN 034528304X
View: https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/034528304X/

Your link didn't show up, but Mission With LeMay is worth a hefty price - but I got mine a loong time ago.

 

[Skip391]

Both books much cheaper in the US. At least the used prices are cheaper. Do not know about shipping.

 

[Zipper730]

How big was a B-29 squadron in WWII?

 

[EwenS]

How big was a B-29 squadron in WWII?

Each Bomb Squadron was supposed to have 15 aircraft.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

LeMay was also aware of the results of tests on a replica Japanese village constructed at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah in1943.
The weapon, the M69 incendiary, he used to burn the heart of out Japanese towns was the fruit of lessons learned.

An excellent read (but not at that price!)

Amazon product ASIN 034528304X
View: https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/034528304X/

Four of the six first 6 B-29 combat missions were undertaken at night. The first mission (Bangkok) was originally a night mission but was rescheduled to day.

As I noted previously the first mission to Japan was at night. The second mission (no 6 overall) was a night incendiary raid on Nagasaki.

The 7th​ raid was also intended as a night incendiary raid (on Wayata) but was switched to a day raid followed by a night raid on the steel works.

The initial missions were intended to determine whether Japan should be bombed by day or night. The following are instructions to General Wolfe. Note that this was written long before Lemay started the night bombing campaign.

General Wolfe was a proponent of night bombing. The concept of stripping B-29s especially for night raids originated with him.

Wolfe also understood that bombing at night allowed greater bomb loads.

Stripping the B-29 for night bombing was also being discussed in the US.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Here's the document I gleamed all the info from (journal 1), plus 3 more.

I would also like to point out the insanity of basing the B-29s in India and flying missions via a China to drop a minuscule amount of bombs on the tip toe of Japan. 2 4 and 6 are the areas that could be reached from the bases in China and only with small bombs loads. The amount of gasoline required for each mission was astronomical.

This was a colossal waste of resources. The B-29s should have been based out of Darwin where they could have done their shake down missions at much less cost and to far more effect on the Japanese. In my opinion this was Arnold's vanity project to justify Air Force independence.

3000 tons of supplies is a staggering number to drop 158 tons of bombs.

B-29s spent far more time lifting supplies over the hump than flying combat missions.

One of the myths of the hump operation is that it suppled the Chinese Army. Only something like 5% of the supplies flown went to the Chinese ( I suspect much of that went to support Madame Chaing's lifestyle). It actually it accomplished very little in terms of the war effort and squandered vast resources that could have been better spent elsewhere.
I wish I could find the reference but I recall an historian claiming the Hump operation lengthened the war.

 

[GrauGeist]

Are you sure the B-29s based in India weren't operating from foreward operating bases in the Chengtu area of China with fuel and supplies flown in from India?

Also, a one way trip from Australia to Japan is over 4,000 miles one-way. Not even the B-19, with a max. ferry range of 7,700 miles could have made it there and back.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Staging through China from India was obviously dumb. Not sure Darwin would have been any better, and in no case would it hit the Japanese home islands. There's a reason why thousands of Marines and soldiers fought and died over the Marianas. It wasn't the moonlit walks on the beach.

 

[GrauGeist]

Bombing from China with B-29s (and some instances with B-24s) was about the only option at the time.

Aside from damage to the target(s), bombers appearing over the home islands would draw valuable resources from afield in order to bolster defenses.
It would also lend a psychological effect on the workforce (especially night bombing) as well as the fact that now, war is approaching their doorstep.

Since the Allies couldn't use Soviet bases and Alaska and Australia were too far, China was going to have to work for the time being.

 

[Shortround6]

Figure out the cost per ton of bombs dropped by the Doolittle raid.
Two carriers at how many men and how many tons of fuel oil over how many days plus escorts plus..............
As a stunt or diversion it was one thing, as an on going campaign it was another.

 

[EwenS]

While there were a fair number of air bases strung out along the Stuart Highway south of Darwin in the Northern Territory of Australia, they would have needed upgrading for B-29 operations. There would still have been supply problems but with access to the rail line running south from Darwin these would have been less than flying the Hump. But you can't reach Japan as noted above.

There was a series of articles in the adf-serials newsletters in 2020 about these bases.

ADF Serials Newsletters

www.adf-serials.com.au

 

[EwenS]

Staging through China from India was obviously dumb. Not sure Darwin would have been any better, and in no case would it hit the Japanese home islands. There's a reason why thousands of Marines and soldiers fought and died over the Marianas. It wasn't the moonlit walks on the beach.

But remember, when B-29 operations against Japan from China were first discussed in January 1943 at the Casablanca Conference, the B-29 had only flown 4 months previously and US was fighting in the Solomons and New Guinea. Deployment to India was delayed by the problems with the B-29. It was only after the "Battle of Kansas" in early 1944 that they were able to deploy to India via Africa in April. And it was scaled back from 2 Bomb Wings to 1 due to progress in the Central Pacific.

And the Japanese didn't just sit idly by. Operation Ichi-Go from April 1944 pushed deeper into China and allowed IJA bombers to threaten the B-29 forward bases. So for two months between late Aug and late Oct 1944 the XX Bomber Command were not flying missions against Japan.

The island hopping campaign in the central Pacific wasn't approved until the Quadrant Conference in Aug 1943. Planning for the first step, Operation Galvanic to the Gilbert Islands, didn't start until the beginning of Oct and the first islands targeted were invaded in Nov 1943. Those relied on the many ships that were only coming into service during 1943.

The air bases acquired and / or built on the islands taken in these early campaigns provided staging posts for later B-29 deployments to the Marianas (places like Kwajalein taken in Jan/Feb 1944). The Marianas campaign for Saipan, Guam and Tinian took place June - Aug 1944. Then the massive air bases and supporting facilities needed to be built. The first B-29 didn't deploy to Saipan until 12 Oct 1944. It was 17 Nov before the first mission was flown to Japan.

So in January 1943, the only possible route to deploying the B-29 against the Japanese Homeland, dumb though it may seem in retrospect, was from China.

Edit:- The XXI Bomber Command came into existence on 1 March 1944. It was to be responsible for B-29 operations from the Marianas.

The second B-29 Bomb Wing to be formed, the 73rd, was then training in the USA. Originally to go to China under the, XX Bomber Command, in June 1944 it was transferred to the command of XXI Bomber Command and prepared to move to the Marianas.

Meanwhile the 58th BW operated in the CBI until it flew its final operation there at the end of March 1945. It then moved to the Marianas to join XXI BC. It then moved to Tinian in April flying its first mission from there on 5th May.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

But remember, when B-29 operations against Japan from China were first discussed in January 1943 at the Casablanca Conference, the B-29 had only flown 4 months previously and US was fighting in the Solomons and New Guinea. Deployment to India was delayed by the problems with the B-29. It was only after the "Battle of Kansas" in early 1944 that they were able to deploy to India via Africa in April. And it was scaled back from 2 Bomb Wings to 1 due to progress in the Central Pacific.

And the Japanese didn't just sit idly by. Operation Ichi-Go from April 1944 pushed deeper into China and allowed IJA bombers to threaten the B-29 forward bases. So for two months between late Aug and late Oct 1944 the XX Bomber Command were not flying missions against Japan.

The island hopping campaign in the central Pacific wasn't approved until the Quadrant Conference in Aug 1943. Planning for the first step, Operation Galvanic to the Gilbert Islands, didn't start until the beginning of Oct and the first islands targeted were invaded in Nov 1943. Those relied on the many ships that were only coming into service during 1943.

The air bases acquired and / or built on the islands taken in these early campaigns provided staging posts for later B-29 deployments to the Marianas (places like Kwajalein taken in Jan/Feb 1944). The Marianas campaign for Saipan, Guam and Tinian took place June - Aug 1944. Then the massive air bases and supporting facilities needed to be built. The first B-29 didn't deploy to Saipan until 12 Oct 1944. It was 17 Nov before the first mission was flown to Japan.

So in January 1943, the only possible route to deploying the B-29 against the Japanese Homeland, dumb though it may seem in retrospect, was from China.

Edit:- The XXI Bomber Command came into existence on 1 March 1944. It was to be responsible for B-29 operations from the Marianas.

The second B-29 Bomb Wing to be formed, the 73rd, was then training in the USA. Originally to go to China under the, XX Bomber Command, in June 1944 it was transferred to the command of XXI Bomber Command and prepared to move to the Marianas.

Meanwhile the 58th BW operated in the CBI until it flew its final operation there at the end of March 1945. It then moved to the Marianas to join XXI BC. It then moved to Tinian in April flying its first mission from there on 5th May.

Right. It was still extraordinarily expensive, and largely ineffective. A better use for that 1943 time period would be attacking the refineries in NEI on a steady basis.

 

[EwenS]

Right. It was still extraordinarily expensive, and largely ineffective. A better use for that 1943 time period would be attacking the refineries in NEI on a steady basis.

It was at the Sextant Conference in Cairo in November 1943 that the decision was made to target the Japanese oil facilities.

Before that, in Aug 1943 the B-24 equipped 380th BG set out to target the Balikpapan refineries in Borneo from Fenton south of Darwin. That was the raid the "Shady Lady" took part in. It was the longest ranged bombing raid of the war up to that point being some 2,700 miles round trip.

Having commenced B-29 operations in June 1944 in the CBI, the 58th BW made a number of strikes on oil related targets in the Singapore / Sumatra area between Aug 1944 and March 1945 as well as mining operations designed to target Japanese shipping from the region.

Oil Refineries and Storage Centers under IJA Control, Bob Hackett

Singapore Oil Refineries and Storage Centers, Bob Hackett

www.combinedfleet.com

That mining campaign was then taken up by the Liberators of 160 squadron operating from Ceylon

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Figure out the cost per ton of bombs dropped by the Doolittle raid.
Two carriers at how many men and how many tons of fuel oil over how many days plus escorts plus..............
As a stunt or diversion it was one thing, as an on going campaign it was another.

The cost of the Doolittle raid may have been the Lexington. If the Enterprise was at the Battle of the Coral Sea instead of returning from the Doolittle raid the outcome may have been more favorable to the USN.