Perhaps the second is a consequence of the first? Or in other words, if they hadn't fallen behind, then a 25-30 ton tank with a 75mm gun would have been a "natural" development that might have seen widespread service during WWII.
Perhaps the second is a consequence of the first? Or in other words, if they hadn't fallen behind, then a 25-30 ton tank with a 75mm gun would have been a "natural" development that might have seen widespread service during WWII.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
I have the advantage of 20/20 hindsight 
Very few people got 25-30 ton tanks with 75mm guns into wide scale service until early/mid 1942. German MK IVF-2s with L-43 guns only started to leave the factories in March 1942.
First US M4 Sherman left the factory in Feb 1942. Didn't get into combat until end of October 1942. Granted they had to sail them around Africa to get them into combat.
Asking the Italians to beat just about everybody else to the punch is asking a hell of a lot.
Asking them to do just a bit better than the 1933/34 Soviet T-26 (modified Vickers 6 tonner) in 1939-40 is not that great an ask. Just what did the Italians think everybody else was doing in 1936-40 that made them think that coming up with a crappy 1933 design was good enough in 1939?
With 20/20 hindsight the Italians don't have to build Matilda killers. They needed to build Cruiser tank killers and Stuart killers in 1940-41.
They needed enough speed to flank Matildas/Valentines, not necessarily 30mph.
Unless the Italians can really change the course of the war in North Africa it doesn't matter what they do in late 1942 or 1943.
Italians need an army that can either win in 1940-41 or fight the British to a draw, without German aid.
A decent 47-57mm gun would take out the cruiser tanks at a good distance, assuming decent fire control (which the British do not have) and any sort of HE shell beats the British.
Italian crew layout went from abysmal (M11/39) to mediocre (M13/40). A major problem was the lack of radios. Italian HE shell advantage was partially canceled by the poor co-ax gun.
Depending on armor and gun power to make up for poor communications and poor crew layout and axillary weapons maybe focusing on the wrong things.
The German MK III is sort of a case in point. They got a lot of the fundamentals right (good view for commander, 3 man turret of decent size, radios,) that the tank was still dangerous in 1943. Getting things wrong (like poor vision for the commander and poor ergonomics for the crew) means poor combat performance despite good gun.
A 1945 Sherman was a much better tank than a 1942 Sherman for instance.
Very few people got 25-30 ton tanks with 75mm guns into wide scale service until early/mid 1942. German MK IVF-2s with L-43 guns only started to leave the factories in March 1942.
First US M4 Sherman left the factory in Feb 1942. Didn't get into combat until end of October 1942. Granted they had to sail them around Africa to get them into combat.
Asking the Italians to beat just about everybody else to the punch is asking a hell of a lot.
Asking them to do just a bit better than the 1933/34 Soviet T-26 (modified Vickers 6 tonner) in 1939-40 is not that great an ask. Just what did the Italians think everybody else was doing in 1936-40 that made them think that coming up with a crappy 1933 design was good enough in 1939?
With 20/20 hindsight the Italians don't have to build Matilda killers. They needed to build Cruiser tank killers and Stuart killers in 1940-41.
They needed enough speed to flank Matildas/Valentines, not necessarily 30mph.
Unless the Italians can really change the course of the war in North Africa it doesn't matter what they do in late 1942 or 1943.
Italians need an army that can either win in 1940-41 or fight the British to a draw, without German aid.
A decent 47-57mm gun would take out the cruiser tanks at a good distance, assuming decent fire control (which the British do not have) and any sort of HE shell beats the British.
Italian crew layout went from abysmal (M11/39) to mediocre (M13/40). A major problem was the lack of radios. Italian HE shell advantage was partially canceled by the poor co-ax gun.
Depending on armor and gun power to make up for poor communications and poor crew layout and axillary weapons maybe focusing on the wrong things.
The German MK III is sort of a case in point. They got a lot of the fundamentals right (good view for commander, 3 man turret of decent size, radios,) that the tank was still dangerous in 1943. Getting things wrong (like poor vision for the commander and poor ergonomics for the crew) means poor combat performance despite good gun.
A 1945 Sherman was a much better tank than a 1942 Sherman for instance.
Elan Vital
Airman 1st Class
- 216
- Aug 24, 2024
And even for the early countries to contemplate or make tanks with 75mm guns and a good deal of armor, France only officially orients studies towards such a tank in July 1937 (the Char G1 program with 75mm turret gun and 60mm armor) which was suspended with the outbreak of WW2 and even if it continued, prototypes were not expected before Q3 or Q4 1940 or even 1941 for the latest project.I have the advantage of 20/20 hindsight
Very few people got 25-30 ton tanks with 75mm guns into wide scale service until early/mid 1942. German MK IVF-2s with L-43 guns only started to leave the factories in March 1942.
First US M4 Sherman left the factory in Feb 1942. Didn't get into combat until end of October 1942. Granted they had to sail them around Africa to get them into combat.
Asking the Italians to beat just about everybody else to the punch is asking a hell of a lot.
For the USSR, the heavy tank with 76.2mm gun and 60mm armor (SMK and T-100) program is created in March 1938 with KV-1 entering production in March 1940, and A-32 with 30mm of armor and provisions for 76.2mm gun is decided in March 1938, the move towards T-34 levels of armor is not envisionned before June/August 1939, with T-34 getting first deliveries in June 1940.
It wouldn't have been obvious to the Italians that either country made such tanks before mid-1940, so they would have needed to be remarkably proactive to beat them to the punch.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Italian armor in the 1930s needed a coherent doctrine and a coherent implementation of that doctrine. Some Italian officers had the general brush stokes down and the Italian army was ahead of the British in combined arms doctrine. It was let down in the details, like lack of radios, supply issues, tanks with lack of vision and poor armament.
British had plenty of screw ups of their own that allowed the Italians (and Germans) to engage in seesaw campaign of North Africa.
Many countries wanted radios in the late 30s, getting any radios was problem let alone getting good ones. Without lots of radios all the combined arms doctrine is mostly writings on paper. Italians did get combined arms to work at times but the speed of response was slow and the short range radios limited the ability of long range artillery and air force to join in. Italians did better at integrating their tanks, infantry and AT guns than the British did in the first year or two in front lines (first kilometers of depth of the battle).
The Italians took a bit of a design/building holiday for tanks for several years in the late 30s. They slowed down L.3/33-35 production while they figured out what they wanted next but they took way too long and they didn't ask for increased size/weight tanks soon enough. Maybe when they had been making 3 ton tanks asking for 6-8 ton tanks seems like a big increase. Unfortunately, the French, British and Soviets were not sticking to the 6-8 ton script. They had scripts of their own that didn't agree but everybody was moving to larger tanks (10-14 tons) faster than Italians. For "Breakthrough" tanks some countries were heading for 20-30 ton tanks.
The L6/40 which went into service in early 1941 was not quite the equal to the German MK II of 1937.
The 11/39 of 1939/40 was 3-4 years behind the Czech Skoda 35 tank.
And so on. Making the leap from 3 ton tanks to 25-30 ton tanks without a few intermediate steps was probably not going to work. How many steps and how the steps needed to be is certainly up for debate.
Italians were behind in tank armament, Both in cannon and machineguns. The use of twin 8mm machine guns in the 11/39, 13/40 and Italian armored cars was due to not having a decent belt feed gun. One man trying to replace small magazines on two guns doesn't really speed up the rate of fire much. Might help keep the guns cool, it they alternate firing?
The gun in the 11/39 dates from 1919 or the early 20s. Better than the French 37mm short gun but that about covers it.
The Famous, or infamous 47mm was actually a pretty good choice, for 1937-38. Not so good for 1940 and later. Fortunately for the Italians the British persevered not only the 2pdr gun but the stupid "fire on the move" aiming system which hurt long range (over 800yds) accuracy and they persevered with the cheap AP ammo which hurt penetration at all ranges and they persevered with no HE ammo in tanks policy for several years too long.
Italian 47mm was only acceptable due to the British screwing up in several ways.
France built over 3000 tanks in 1930s. Granted fighting the mountains was hard but the Italians made little or no provisions for fighting the French armor in the 1930s?
The Char B tank looked good on paper, for about 2 1/2 minutes. Division of crew tasks was a nightmare. Making the driver the gunner for the main armament and one of the two machine guns and needed to turn the tank for any traverse at all was just stupid even using very advanced for 1930s technology. Tasking the one man turret crew (commander, turret gunner) with too much to begin with let alone spot targets for the hull 75?
The 11/39 was not as bad but cheap gets you cheap. Put the 37mm in a two man turret for better traverse, better co-ordination between the crew. Should be a no brainer.
Design a 47/40 gun to being with and use it for the towed AT gun. Using a take-apart mountain gun as your AT gun/tank gun left you with a low performing gun to match the low weight.
Or design a 47/45-50 gun.
British had plenty of screw ups of their own that allowed the Italians (and Germans) to engage in seesaw campaign of North Africa.
Many countries wanted radios in the late 30s, getting any radios was problem let alone getting good ones. Without lots of radios all the combined arms doctrine is mostly writings on paper. Italians did get combined arms to work at times but the speed of response was slow and the short range radios limited the ability of long range artillery and air force to join in. Italians did better at integrating their tanks, infantry and AT guns than the British did in the first year or two in front lines (first kilometers of depth of the battle).
The Italians took a bit of a design/building holiday for tanks for several years in the late 30s. They slowed down L.3/33-35 production while they figured out what they wanted next but they took way too long and they didn't ask for increased size/weight tanks soon enough. Maybe when they had been making 3 ton tanks asking for 6-8 ton tanks seems like a big increase. Unfortunately, the French, British and Soviets were not sticking to the 6-8 ton script. They had scripts of their own that didn't agree but everybody was moving to larger tanks (10-14 tons) faster than Italians. For "Breakthrough" tanks some countries were heading for 20-30 ton tanks.
The L6/40 which went into service in early 1941 was not quite the equal to the German MK II of 1937.
The 11/39 of 1939/40 was 3-4 years behind the Czech Skoda 35 tank.
And so on. Making the leap from 3 ton tanks to 25-30 ton tanks without a few intermediate steps was probably not going to work. How many steps and how the steps needed to be is certainly up for debate.
Italians were behind in tank armament, Both in cannon and machineguns. The use of twin 8mm machine guns in the 11/39, 13/40 and Italian armored cars was due to not having a decent belt feed gun. One man trying to replace small magazines on two guns doesn't really speed up the rate of fire much. Might help keep the guns cool, it they alternate firing?
The gun in the 11/39 dates from 1919 or the early 20s. Better than the French 37mm short gun but that about covers it.
The Famous, or infamous 47mm was actually a pretty good choice, for 1937-38. Not so good for 1940 and later. Fortunately for the Italians the British persevered not only the 2pdr gun but the stupid "fire on the move" aiming system which hurt long range (over 800yds) accuracy and they persevered with the cheap AP ammo which hurt penetration at all ranges and they persevered with no HE ammo in tanks policy for several years too long.
Italian 47mm was only acceptable due to the British screwing up in several ways.
France built over 3000 tanks in 1930s. Granted fighting the mountains was hard but the Italians made little or no provisions for fighting the French armor in the 1930s?
The Char B tank looked good on paper, for about 2 1/2 minutes. Division of crew tasks was a nightmare. Making the driver the gunner for the main armament and one of the two machine guns and needed to turn the tank for any traverse at all was just stupid even using very advanced for 1930s technology. Tasking the one man turret crew (commander, turret gunner) with too much to begin with let alone spot targets for the hull 75?
The 11/39 was not as bad but cheap gets you cheap. Put the 37mm in a two man turret for better traverse, better co-ordination between the crew. Should be a no brainer.
Design a 47/40 gun to being with and use it for the towed AT gun. Using a take-apart mountain gun as your AT gun/tank gun left you with a low performing gun to match the low weight.
Or design a 47/45-50 gun.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Still on armor.
Many nations had very poor ideas of what warfare would become in the 1940s. Most nations did not pay attention of vision out of their vehicles or didn't understand what was needed.
Many nations were still obsessed with power of the machine gun, the big killer of WW I. It wasn't, that still fell to artillery but the machine gun was a major shift. What seems to have been overlooked was not the machinegun itself but how it was used. You needed a 3-4 team to make really good use of a machinegun and often another 3-10 men to support it by carrying spare ammo, barrels, water, etc.
With motorization in 1920s and 30s many inventers tried to reduce it down to one man and one gun in a small vehicle. Hundreds of men each in his own vehicle with a machine gun.
Trouble was trying to both steer/drive and fight at the same time. and keep the enemy to front and not shooting you in back. Another problem was that there wasn't enough room in the one-man tanks for a lot of ammo or other things.
Which lead to the two man tanks so on man could drive and one man could fight and there was more room for ammo, water etc.
1920s meant that communication was still shouting, signal flags, flares, etc and if the crewmen were doing that, they weren't shooting or driving.
Two-man tanks were the minimum practical. They were still far from ideal even with radios.
Famous Matilda I. There are a number of problems that show up in a 2nd or 3rd look. Yes there is radio, located under the commander's seat? Stories of working on the radio involve crew man lying on his back with his legs hanging out the driver's hatch? Driver had good view with hatch open. With the hatch closed things were not very good. Imagine the driver in the photo trying to duck his head down to see out of the vision slit in the front plate. There was a periscope in the hatch. There were no slits to look to the side. Commander/gunner had limited vison if hatch was closed. Some accounts claim 4000 round of ammo. Getting 250 round belt in a box from the hull into the turret was a bit of a problem.
British had already solved some of the basic problems with their light tanks
The thinly armoured MK V and VI tanks with two man turrets plus driver. The Cupola offered at least some vision with the hatches closed for the commander. There was a gunner so target/s could be engaged while commander looked for new target/s or for escape route. British were now sticking the radio in the turret and at this point in time gave the gunner responsibility for the radio. British used both a .5in gun and .303 giving the tank a limited (very limited) AP capability which the Italian L.3/33 35 did not have. These tanks started showing up in 1936. The British, like the Italians, built too many of these because they were cheap. But they showed the way to go, until the British got sidetracked and traded low silhouette for vision.
Italians needed to figure out how to defeat these light tanks and enemy 10-12 ton tanks and mounting a few dozen 20mm guns into L3/35s as SP guns was not going to do it.
Maybe the Italians don't need to figure out how to defeat French Char B1 tanks in the late 30s but they do need to figure how to fight the small French 2 man tanks with 40mm armor.
They also need to figure out how to fight whatever the British come up with for cruiser tanks, the British had been fooling around with the 14 ton A7 and other prototypes during the 1930s in addition to the commercial Vickers tanks.
We can argue about how many machine guns a tank needs but a single light machinegun/automatic rifle on the roof with only a few hundred rounds is not it.
Using a Breda 30 as either an AA weapon or for infantry suppression are both lost causes.
Many nations had very poor ideas of what warfare would become in the 1940s. Most nations did not pay attention of vision out of their vehicles or didn't understand what was needed.
Many nations were still obsessed with power of the machine gun, the big killer of WW I. It wasn't, that still fell to artillery but the machine gun was a major shift. What seems to have been overlooked was not the machinegun itself but how it was used. You needed a 3-4 team to make really good use of a machinegun and often another 3-10 men to support it by carrying spare ammo, barrels, water, etc.
With motorization in 1920s and 30s many inventers tried to reduce it down to one man and one gun in a small vehicle. Hundreds of men each in his own vehicle with a machine gun.
Trouble was trying to both steer/drive and fight at the same time. and keep the enemy to front and not shooting you in back. Another problem was that there wasn't enough room in the one-man tanks for a lot of ammo or other things.
Which lead to the two man tanks so on man could drive and one man could fight and there was more room for ammo, water etc.
1920s meant that communication was still shouting, signal flags, flares, etc and if the crewmen were doing that, they weren't shooting or driving.
Two-man tanks were the minimum practical. They were still far from ideal even with radios.
Famous Matilda I. There are a number of problems that show up in a 2nd or 3rd look. Yes there is radio, located under the commander's seat? Stories of working on the radio involve crew man lying on his back with his legs hanging out the driver's hatch? Driver had good view with hatch open. With the hatch closed things were not very good. Imagine the driver in the photo trying to duck his head down to see out of the vision slit in the front plate. There was a periscope in the hatch. There were no slits to look to the side. Commander/gunner had limited vison if hatch was closed. Some accounts claim 4000 round of ammo. Getting 250 round belt in a box from the hull into the turret was a bit of a problem.
British had already solved some of the basic problems with their light tanks
The thinly armoured MK V and VI tanks with two man turrets plus driver. The Cupola offered at least some vision with the hatches closed for the commander. There was a gunner so target/s could be engaged while commander looked for new target/s or for escape route. British were now sticking the radio in the turret and at this point in time gave the gunner responsibility for the radio. British used both a .5in gun and .303 giving the tank a limited (very limited) AP capability which the Italian L.3/33 35 did not have. These tanks started showing up in 1936. The British, like the Italians, built too many of these because they were cheap. But they showed the way to go, until the British got sidetracked and traded low silhouette for vision.
Italians needed to figure out how to defeat these light tanks and enemy 10-12 ton tanks and mounting a few dozen 20mm guns into L3/35s as SP guns was not going to do it.
Maybe the Italians don't need to figure out how to defeat French Char B1 tanks in the late 30s but they do need to figure how to fight the small French 2 man tanks with 40mm armor.
They also need to figure out how to fight whatever the British come up with for cruiser tanks, the British had been fooling around with the 14 ton A7 and other prototypes during the 1930s in addition to the commercial Vickers tanks.
We can argue about how many machine guns a tank needs but a single light machinegun/automatic rifle on the roof with only a few hundred rounds is not it.
Using a Breda 30 as either an AA weapon or for infantry suppression are both lost causes.
- Thread starter
- #266
TM06
Airman 1st Class
Really the only option for a sustained-fire capable MG on the tanks would appear to be the 7.7mm Breda-SAFAT - every other Italian machine gun of the era had limited ammunition capacity. One coaxial Breda-SAFAT and one in the hull might be reasonable? Maybe a third on the commander's cupola? They'd lack the punching power of 8x59mm Breda though, which is somewhat notable.
US and Russia had HMG's mounted on their tanks for anti-air purposes with the M2 and DShK respectively, possibly opening the door for a pintle mounted 13.2 Breda 31 or 12.7 Breda-SAFAT on heavier Italian designs?
US and Russia had HMG's mounted on their tanks for anti-air purposes with the M2 and DShK respectively, possibly opening the door for a pintle mounted 13.2 Breda 31 or 12.7 Breda-SAFAT on heavier Italian designs?
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
It might not have been that hard to build the Breda-SAFAT in 8x59 if they wanted to. The rim on the 7.7mm is bigger in diameter than the 8X59 and there is only a few mm difference in overall length. the 59mm is length of case, which is also not far off.
Italians should have ditched the bow gunner, widened the upper hull and fitted a 3 man turret. Hopefully with a real 47mm gun
M4 Shermans had a lot of room for MG ammo, over twice as much RCMG ammo vs the M13/40 plus 300-600 rounds of .50 cal.
in the small Italian tanks something has got to go and 100 rounds of HMG ammo takes up the space of 400-500 rounds of RCMG ammo.
Italians should have ditched the bow gunner, widened the upper hull and fitted a 3 man turret. Hopefully with a real 47mm gun
M4 Shermans had a lot of room for MG ammo, over twice as much RCMG ammo vs the M13/40 plus 300-600 rounds of .50 cal.
in the small Italian tanks something has got to go and 100 rounds of HMG ammo takes up the space of 400-500 rounds of RCMG ammo.
For all the faults of the Italian military in WWII, the lack of punch in the 7.7mm (.303) vs. the 8x59mm seems really far down the list of priorities. Going by wikipedia figures, the .303 has a muzzle energy of around 3100J vs around 3800J for the 8x59. A better reason to adopt it might be to simplify logistics considering the 8x59 was already in use by the ground forces.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Going over to the Navy there were a number of fundamental problems that had to do with doctrine and training. Much is often made of morale when talking about the Italian Navy but they were sometimes constrained by doctrine or orders not to risk losses. Italy could not replace losses like the British could or even repair damaged ships as fast.
Italians had a real 'need for speed' which affected a lot of their ship design. We could really get lost in the weeds here but there were some problems that might have been possible to solve or at least lessen the impact from.
The 'long range fire' doctrine showed up in very high velocity guns all the way from battle ships to destroyers. But the Italians never got this to actually work. They fired more than their share of shells and got very, very few hits at long range. Of course, few people did but the Italians seem to have been well below average in an area where even one to two percent would be considered good. This also bit them in the butt because they didn't train for much of anything else. They didn't train or equipe for night action for instance. British with the aid of radar at times, dominated nighttime battles in med. But the British had been training for night battles even without radar. Maybe they were not as good as the Japanese but even without radar they were a lot better at night fighting than the Italians.
They built decent torpedoes but had not figured out how to actually use them tactically. Italian destroyers carried a light torpedo armament pf 4 or 6 tubes compared to the British 8 or 10 tubes. Some British boats lost a set of tubes for better AA but that still left them equal or nearly so to the Italians. Italian doctrine/training was to never fire all torpedoes in a single salvo but to save about 1/3 for a later opportunity. British left a bit more up to judgement of the destroyer captains.
For long range fire the Italian destroyers were in real trouble. Just about everybody thought they could fire at longer ranges from destroyers than they actually could. Destroyer hulls roll, pitch and yaw more than bigger hulls and make lousy long range gunnery platforms. Depending on situation this came be made up for by high rates of fire (Italians were on the low end for rate of fire) or large ammo capacity (also not an option for the Italians as built) or better fire control or having good mounts and here the Italians were screwed. With their common twin mount with the closely spaced guns (common cradle) the shells interfered with each other in flight and gave larger than normal dispersion. A common failing of most Italian naval guns. Twin mounts in general also give a lower rate of fire. The Italian twin was light for it's size and helped with speed but at cost. The Italians knew they had a dispersion problem but while they tried to fix it (lower muzzle velocity) they didn't really investigate any other tactics/doctrine that didn't require long range fire.
For some reason, while the Italians went to war in June of 1940 with 115 submarines (a lot more than the German had) they were way behind the times for ASW. Few ships had sonar, they had few DC throwers and only small racks to drop DCs over the stern. They hadn't really practice tactics or convoy escort. They did sink a fair number of British subs but the British subs inflected large losses on the Italian navy and merchant ships. The Italians don't seem to have made large changes in their surface fleet to handle the British Subs.
Italians had a real 'need for speed' which affected a lot of their ship design. We could really get lost in the weeds here but there were some problems that might have been possible to solve or at least lessen the impact from.
The 'long range fire' doctrine showed up in very high velocity guns all the way from battle ships to destroyers. But the Italians never got this to actually work. They fired more than their share of shells and got very, very few hits at long range. Of course, few people did but the Italians seem to have been well below average in an area where even one to two percent would be considered good. This also bit them in the butt because they didn't train for much of anything else. They didn't train or equipe for night action for instance. British with the aid of radar at times, dominated nighttime battles in med. But the British had been training for night battles even without radar. Maybe they were not as good as the Japanese but even without radar they were a lot better at night fighting than the Italians.
They built decent torpedoes but had not figured out how to actually use them tactically. Italian destroyers carried a light torpedo armament pf 4 or 6 tubes compared to the British 8 or 10 tubes. Some British boats lost a set of tubes for better AA but that still left them equal or nearly so to the Italians. Italian doctrine/training was to never fire all torpedoes in a single salvo but to save about 1/3 for a later opportunity. British left a bit more up to judgement of the destroyer captains.
For long range fire the Italian destroyers were in real trouble. Just about everybody thought they could fire at longer ranges from destroyers than they actually could. Destroyer hulls roll, pitch and yaw more than bigger hulls and make lousy long range gunnery platforms. Depending on situation this came be made up for by high rates of fire (Italians were on the low end for rate of fire) or large ammo capacity (also not an option for the Italians as built) or better fire control or having good mounts and here the Italians were screwed. With their common twin mount with the closely spaced guns (common cradle) the shells interfered with each other in flight and gave larger than normal dispersion. A common failing of most Italian naval guns. Twin mounts in general also give a lower rate of fire. The Italian twin was light for it's size and helped with speed but at cost. The Italians knew they had a dispersion problem but while they tried to fix it (lower muzzle velocity) they didn't really investigate any other tactics/doctrine that didn't require long range fire.
For some reason, while the Italians went to war in June of 1940 with 115 submarines (a lot more than the German had) they were way behind the times for ASW. Few ships had sonar, they had few DC throwers and only small racks to drop DCs over the stern. They hadn't really practice tactics or convoy escort. They did sink a fair number of British subs but the British subs inflected large losses on the Italian navy and merchant ships. The Italians don't seem to have made large changes in their surface fleet to handle the British Subs.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Italian navy was not very good at the two most important jobs in had in WW II. These may be a bit different than what was planned/envisioned for it.
1. Stop the British (and French?) from transiting the Med. For the French this means stopping/interfering with the trade from North Africa. The Italians did stop the British from transiting the Med from 1940 to 1943.
2, Prevent the British and French from interfering with Italy's trade or supplies going to North Africa. Communications with Eritrea were pretty much a lost cause although they tried airlift.
This was a major shift for the Italian navy which up to and including WW I was pretty much focused on the Adriatic and Austro-Hungaria.
The French were seen as the biggest threat/rival and the med was seen as an easier place to operate than the Atlantic. Which caused several miscalculations as to needed stability for ships and the need for both high speed and short range. To be fair a number of navies miscalculated the needed range/endurance for smaller ships. Arial reconnaissance in the 1920s/30s forced higher cruising speeds than in WW I to change location overnight or between sightings.
Had the Italian navy been better at either job or both the war in the Med might have lasted somewhat longer and been more costly for the British.
Malta may have been either neutralized or even invaded?
The Italians might have gotten a much higher percentage of shipped supplies to their forces in North Africa.
Invasion of Sicily/Italy might have been delayed a few months to nearly a year?
Once the US gets in the war and starts shipping tanks/artillery and other stuff by the hundreds Italy was going to go down. Question is how long was that going to take?
But the Italian navy failed to do either job well.
Not due to lack of bravery but due to poor equipment and poor doctrine/training for the situations they found themselves in.
A few factoids. Of the 59 Destroyers the Italians had at the start of the war, none sank an enemy ship by gun fire.
The 59 ships only scored one torpedo hit during the war sinking a British destroyer.
Of the 59 ships 10 were sunk in surface action, 5 by subs, 13 by air attack and 22 by other causes (mines, scuttling. etc)
Not asking for the Italians to dominate the RN, just do better than they did.
1. Stop the British (and French?) from transiting the Med. For the French this means stopping/interfering with the trade from North Africa. The Italians did stop the British from transiting the Med from 1940 to 1943.
2, Prevent the British and French from interfering with Italy's trade or supplies going to North Africa. Communications with Eritrea were pretty much a lost cause although they tried airlift.
This was a major shift for the Italian navy which up to and including WW I was pretty much focused on the Adriatic and Austro-Hungaria.
The French were seen as the biggest threat/rival and the med was seen as an easier place to operate than the Atlantic. Which caused several miscalculations as to needed stability for ships and the need for both high speed and short range. To be fair a number of navies miscalculated the needed range/endurance for smaller ships. Arial reconnaissance in the 1920s/30s forced higher cruising speeds than in WW I to change location overnight or between sightings.
Had the Italian navy been better at either job or both the war in the Med might have lasted somewhat longer and been more costly for the British.
Malta may have been either neutralized or even invaded?
The Italians might have gotten a much higher percentage of shipped supplies to their forces in North Africa.
Invasion of Sicily/Italy might have been delayed a few months to nearly a year?
Once the US gets in the war and starts shipping tanks/artillery and other stuff by the hundreds Italy was going to go down. Question is how long was that going to take?
But the Italian navy failed to do either job well.
Not due to lack of bravery but due to poor equipment and poor doctrine/training for the situations they found themselves in.
A few factoids. Of the 59 Destroyers the Italians had at the start of the war, none sank an enemy ship by gun fire.
The 59 ships only scored one torpedo hit during the war sinking a British destroyer.
Of the 59 ships 10 were sunk in surface action, 5 by subs, 13 by air attack and 22 by other causes (mines, scuttling. etc)
Not asking for the Italians to dominate the RN, just do better than they did.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,307
- Jun 25, 2013
All the Axis navies failed at their jobs. So did their armies and air forces.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
True, since they lost but some forces did better than others for the money/effort invested.
Some sources rate the Italian navy as the 4th largest in the world in 1939/40. Some may rate it as a near tie to France. It was certainly much, much bigger than the German navy in 1939/40.
As noted earlier the Italians were not trying to contest the RN on the high seas, except for a few long-range submarines. Getting surface ships out past Gibraltar with little or no damage was too much of gamble. Italy could aspire to making the Med an Italian lake. They didn't come close even with the French taking themselves out of the problem. Italians don't have to get within 450-500 miles of Gibraltar or 450-500 miles of Alexandria. They just have to keep the British out of the central Med. British cannot afford to loose a number of large ships on a one for one basis as that would leave them too weak in other places. I am talking about planning in 1938-39.
Italian navy failed to be able to fight one for one with cruisers or destroyers.
Italian navy failed to be able to fight a decent anti-sub war.
Italian navy failed to be able to fight a decent submarine war of their own or perhaps failed to get the results expected for the investment.
Italian navy failed to be able to fight effectively with small craft.
Italian navy did do very well with special operations.
Some of this was electronics, some was training and some was doctrine.
It does seem to be an area that could have been improved without lots on new construction.
Italian navy also left their surface ships without an anti-aircraft umbrella in form of shipborne/carrier aviation. Not having the carrier aviatiopn also reduced the area and effectiveness of recon job.
No, the land-based fighters will not do the job, even if there was some fighters under the Navy's control.
No, the land-based fighters will not do the job, even if there was some fighters under the Navy's control.
- Thread starter
- #274
TM06
Airman 1st Class
Assuming that they do get carriers up and running in time, what fighters, torpedo bombers and attackers would be best suited for the role? They'd probably have to have radials but as has been established Italian radials were a sad display.
Start out with the biplanes, move to the monoplanes when these should be available (= late 1930s).
The Re 2000 fighter seem to be decent - engine making 1000 HP at 4km, wing is big enough so the wing loading is reasonable for a carrier-based A/C, aircraft is not too small thus it should be carrying enough of fuel in the internal tanks. It was turned into a bomber of sorts, so I'd suggest that it is trialed in the bomber role, too. Make something like the Nakajima Kate for a 'level bomber' duties, plus as a torpedo bomber.
As for the engines - too many ships were sunk by the aircraft powered with engines of under 1200 HP, and even by these with engines of under 1000 HP, so I would not try to make the aircraft perfect, but rather debugged and available in decent numbers.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Things actually got better for the Italians in 1940/41. To the West they always had Sardina which can extend the search radius around 200 miles more than the tip of Sicily.
They also had Pantelleria pretty much in middle of the straight of Sicily about 140-150 miles from Malta. The problem was to the east. But this was partially solved with the capture of southern Greece and Crete.
A single carrier is not going to solve a lot of problem for Italy.
Granted Italian catapult aviation was also not great. Even in the Med putting catapults on the forecastle was NOT a good idea. It worked good in a calm harbor.
Zara shows some of the other problems in air defense. As built they had 16 4in AA guns in twin mounts. Italians thought enough (sarcasm) of these guns to replace one mount on each side with a two twin 37mm mounts. British 4in twins could fire around 50% faster than the Italian guns. British fire control may have been better.
The Italian twin 37mm was had worked (trained/elevated) while most British heavy cruisers had a single octuple mount pom-pom on each side that had power traverse and elevation.
Basically, both sides AA was not good.
Italian carrier needs to completed in 1938/early 1939 to be worked up/trained in summer of 1940.
What else doesn't get built to pay for it?
From 1912 the Italians also occupied most of the islands in the Dodecanese between Greece & Turkey. These had been secured in a war against the Ottoman Empire.
en.wikipedia.org
The largest island of Rhodes had a number of air bases in June 1940, as did Leros. Both became a target for aircraft from the carriers Eagle & Illustrious from about Sept 1940. One of their successes was the torpedoing of the cruiser Liverpool on 14th Oct 1940.
The problem was the presence of Greece, especially after the Italian invasion of Greece at the end of Oct.
Italian Islands of the Aegean - Wikipedia
The largest island of Rhodes had a number of air bases in June 1940, as did Leros. Both became a target for aircraft from the carriers Eagle & Illustrious from about Sept 1940. One of their successes was the torpedoing of the cruiser Liverpool on 14th Oct 1940.
The problem was the presence of Greece, especially after the Italian invasion of Greece at the end of Oct.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
My own thinking is a bit different.
The Italians have to do better in 1940-41, so they are in a better position in 1942. Waiting to do better in 1942 just puts them in line to be run over by the American/British combination in late 1942/early 1943. Delaying things after Torch only buys a few weeks or a few months. Look at the "stuff" the Allies brought to Husky in July 1943.
The Re 2000 fighter is pretty good but it is too late in timing unless it can be speeded up some. Basically, an Italian built P-35 or non-turbo P-43. Italians bought into the integral tank nonsense that many American designers did in 1937-40. It needs some redesign to be a good combat plane.
The CR 42 may be as good a carrier plane as the Italians can come up with in 1939-40.
Single Italian carrier in early 1943 is not going to be worth much.
The Italians have to do better in 1940-41, so they are in a better position in 1942. Waiting to do better in 1942 just puts them in line to be run over by the American/British combination in late 1942/early 1943. Delaying things after Torch only buys a few weeks or a few months. Look at the "stuff" the Allies brought to Husky in July 1943.
The Re 2000 fighter is pretty good but it is too late in timing unless it can be speeded up some. Basically, an Italian built P-35 or non-turbo P-43. Italians bought into the integral tank nonsense that many American designers did in 1937-40. It needs some redesign to be a good combat plane.
The CR 42 may be as good a carrier plane as the Italians can come up with in 1939-40.
Single Italian carrier in early 1943 is not going to be worth much.
P-35A (the one with the better engine) was making 290 mph, the Re 2000 was good for 330 mph. While speed is not everything, saying that a 330 mph fighters is as good as the 290 mph does not come as a fair assessment.
Fuel tanks' thing can be rectified, as it was with the later Reggianne fighters.
True. The earlier they are better, the tougher it gets for the Allies.
Airborne2001
Airman 1st Class
- 182
- Jun 17, 2024
I was looking for this. I've read that, while not perfect, the Italian navy was pretty good when it came to convoy escorting. They had issues in other areas, but in convoy escorting they were pretty decent.
The Germans themselves stated that the Re.2001 was better than their own Bf-109T. Interestingly, a little know fact is that both the Re.2002 and Re.2005 had drawings for carrier based versions. I'm not sure about the Re.2005 given the issues it had with the small rear fuselage combined with the pressures of a tail hook, BUT the Re.2002 actually seems pretty promising. Maybe up the engine to the ~1,500hp class by either Piaggio or Alfa Romeo (a planned version of the Re.2006 was basically this, but with a Pratt & Whitney engine), and then fit it with the few tested additions to the Re.2002 (Re.2005 wing, dive breaks, torpedo carrying ability, etc.). That would probably be pretty good. Even by itself it would be fine, but I think a stronger engine would be needed to avoid the issues the Re.2001 OR faced with all of the added weight. (Again though, it was still seen as pretty good even with all of this.)
