French Army alternatives, 1935-40 (41?)

[tomo pauk]

Seems like we don't have a what-if topic for all teh things French Army, so here it goes.
Topic should be about the doctrine, tactics and gear of the army. Navy and airforce will need to sit this one out, though
Note that things of grand strategy and alliances is beyond the scope of this thread, so Maginot line still gets build, and the plan of rushing into Belgium is still the key thing to do if/when Germans come in knocking. There is also no goading the Czech, Polish or/and Russians to attack Germany when France is in need.
Ww2 still starts as it was the case, and Germans attack West as per schedule. French overseas territories and dependencies will still need some care to be taken.

Doctrine should be probably hardest to tackle, since it requires the change of the mindset among the brass that was a major player in winning in a huge war under two decades ago.

 

[Shortround6]

Send the generals to classes on radios.
Like what they are.
Things at allow communication without dispatch riders. Or semaphore flags. Or carrier pigeons.
A class or two on promptness might not be out of place.
Like not waiting overnight to issue orders.

Tomo is correct. Changing hardware is not going to have much effect unless the software is changed. Doctrine/tactics, COMMUNICATIONS.

 

[TM06]

Without getting into theory, I can tell you what was planned to happen. I'm better with hard stats anyways, so I'll leave the doctrinal and tactical changes to other people.

---

Let's start with medium tanks.

The SOMUA S.35 was a very good tank (arguably the best individual tank in the world at the time) but it was planned to be replaced by the upgraded S.40 featuring a more powerful diesel engine (220 hp compared to the S.35's 190 hp), lengthened hull, new suspension providing better climbing capabilities and a brand new 2-man ARL 2C turret providing a better commander cupola and thicker all-round armour, combined with general improvements to make it easier to mass-produce. It was planned that the S.40 would eventually be fitted with the SA 37, which was a quite good gun for its calibre. That said, it would still be somewhat crippled in action due to the lack of standardized two-way radio equipment in its early years. The S.40 would be the main Medium tank for France until the introduction of the G1 in either late 1941 or early 1942.

The AMX 40 - not to be confused with the 1983 cold-war era AMX-40 (note the hyphen) - was also important. Largely inspired by the British Cruiser tanks, the AMX 40 was supposed to replace the S.35 and S.40 in the cavalry roles. It was a fast and nimble little tank fitted with Christie suspension featuring surprisingly excellent protection - strongly sloped armour up to 60 mm in thickness with no right angles.
Despite being faster than the S.40, it used a less-powerful Aster engine making 160 hp with plans to upgrade it to 220 hp with a 6-cylinder version. It was fairly technologically advanced for a French tank, featuring a two-way radio, panoramic periscope and even a rangefinder.
It would definitely enter service far later than the S.40, with its design only starting in March 1940 while being far more complex.

The star of the show however is the Char G1 - specifically the G1R (Renault).
The tanks from the G1 competition were quite a marvel for their time, including things like a telemetric rangefinder, a semi-automatic loader and even gun stabilization. Torsion bar suspension was eventually settled on, and the tanks would eventually be planned to fit a 75 mm gun (either based on the 75 mm SA 35 howitzer with a 32 calibre barrel or a modernized version of the Canon de 75 modele 1897). There were several engines planned from Hispano-Suiza (280 hp) Potez (320 hp), Renault (350 hp), and Panhard (450 hp).
The G1R is the only real canidate for production with the armour set to be made by Schneider in July 1940, the transmission and gearbox being almost complete and the 350 hp engine nearing its final testing phase, with either the 5.7 tonne ARL 3 turret or the 7.5 tonne FCM F4 turret. However the main issue was the Inspectorate of Tanks and their decision to focus on only 3 tank types, none of which the G1 fell under. Do not that mistake that for a death nell though, the G1 almost certainly would've been produced anyways seeing that Renault was singled out for continued development along with France learning from German tactics.
The G1 would be highly competitive and capable tanks upon their introduction, being similar to the M4 Sherman and T-34 but with a lower profile and a rangefinder. The armour profile was robust but likely would get upgraded as time went on, and the ARL 42 turret featuring a 75/44 gun would likely follow suit.

From what little I could find, FCM and ARL were in the process of designing turrets to fit the 75 mm mle 39 TAZ with a 57 calibre barrel. There's not much on the gun itself - being two prototypes that were destroyed during the German invasion - but Brandt designed an APDS shell for it. From what I can glean about the gun, it was created after it was realized that the 25 mm SA 34 and the 47 mm SA 37 would be inadequate for dealing with heavier tanks, and they based the gun on either the Schneider CA 75 or the Canon de 75 mm modèle 1924 - the latter being the most likely. Nothing is known about the gun's performance other than that the crew could fire at a rate of one shot per 2 seconds and that it had a range of 12,500 m.

 

[tomo pauk]

French brass might've notice that threat from the air is not something that will mess with with the good sleep and rest of their troops, but something that can blast obstacles to the German armies, as well as that can generate a lot of problems with logistics with aircraft busting railroads, roads and trucks. Hence a much better attention need to be devoted to the air defence - both to the hardware and training of the troops in using it - as well as 'air protection' - camouflage, dispersion, fast repairs once the air attack is gone etc.
AA guns also need to be capable of engaging the ground targets, luckily this is very easy to do with the AA guns, provided that sights and training is up to the job.

Historically, French did just the opposite, fielding just a small number of HMGs and 25mm AA guns, with a just token number of 37mm guns (20 total in May of 1940), as well as with the mostly obsolete 75 mm guns. Perhaps a couple of hundred of 25mm was used by the French? The repurposed 20mm guns originally intended to be aircraft guns were also used.
The 25mm AA gun was reasonably good, and so was the 37mm type - making much more of them early on would've been badly needed, eg. the 37mm was known initially as 'model 1930'. Both of them can hurt a tank badly, so a win-win.
(here is a write-up about the French 37mm guns and ammo by Tony Williams)
A French version of the Bofors 25mm AA gun, that uses the 25mm ATG ammo might've been useful; the ATG used the rimmed cartidge as did the Bofors designs, and the 25mm ATG is verging on obsolescence by now. Will need HE shell for it, though.

For the heavy AA guns (75 to 100 mm here), Army should be taking a good look on what is being manufactured for the navy and piggy back on that, there is no need to reinvent the wheel.

 

[SaparotRob]

Send the generals to classes on radios.
Like what they are.

 

[TM06]

For the heavy AA guns (75 to 100 mm here), Army should be taking a good look on what is being manufactured for the navy and piggy back on that, there is no need to reinvent the wheel.

They already largely had 75 mm covered with the Canon de 75 contre avion modèle 1940 Schneider, which was sufficient. But they'd probably attempt to crank up the muzzle velocity to a more respectable level. I think the best choices for the other major calibre benchmarks in this range would be the Canon de 90 mm Modèle 1926 for the 85~90 mm class and the 100 mm/45 Modèle 1933 for the 100 mm class.
If we want to go over 100 mm for superheavy batteries, the Canon de 130 mm Modèle 1932 and later 1935 would probably be the best choices, being roughly comparable to the 12.8 FlaK 40, 120 mm M1, QF 4.5 inch gun and Type 3 12 cm.

 

[tomo pauk]

They already largely had 75 mm covered with the Canon de 75 contre avion modèle 1940 Schneider, which was sufficient. But they'd probably attempt to crank up the muzzle velocity to a more respectable level. I think the best choices for the other major calibre benchmarks in this range would be the Canon de 90 mm Modèle 1926 for the 85~90 mm class and the 100 mm/45 Modèle 1933 for the 100 mm class.

I have a problem with anything named 'modèle 1940' - that means there is barely any to actually use in 1940
French 90 and 100 mm cannons were just fine, again there needs to be a lot of them to cover the points of interest.

If we want to go over 100 mm for superheavy batteries, the Canon de 130 mm Modèle 1932 and later 1935 would probably be the best choices, being roughly comparable to the 12.8 FlaK 40, 120 mm M1, QF 4.5 inch gun and Type 3 12 cm.

The more, the merrier.

 

[Shortround6]

I have a problem with anything named 'modèle 1940' - that means there is barely any to actually use in 1940

Very, very true.

Anything that was on paper is very unlikely to show up before 1942. See British Cavalier tank.

The French armor was truly split. On a armor thickness, gun power, speed scale it was actually rather good. It's ability to actually fight well had some real problems. Individual crews fought well but that was part of the problem, lack of radios as built was much much less common that what was planned and trying to coordinate attacks/movements was nearly impossible. Fitting an improved diesel engine to the S-35 was not going to fix that.

Before this gets too much into a French bashing session lets just say that one of the biggest advantages the French armor had was a gift from the German high command when they stuck with the 37mm gun in the MK IIIs rather than go to the short 50mm in 1989/39.

In a lot of war games and articles a lot is made of a tanks rate of fire, mainly because it shows up in many reports(all countries) . What is actually important is the rate of engagement. How many different targets can the tank/crew hit per minute. The fact that the gun can be fired 15 rounds per minute AT THE SAME TARGET WITHOUT THE TANK MOVING doesn't really reflect what the tank needs to do in combat. This was a major failing in quite a number of tanks, German MK I, MK II, Czech 35 & 38 for example.
In fact rate of fire doesn't even include slewing the turret even a few degrees onto a new target. ALL the single man turret tanks and many of the two man turrets had rates of engagement much lower than than their rates of fire.

I will also note that the French fascination with rangefinders shows they had little idea of what they really needed for tank combat. One of the last things a 2 man turret crew needs is to fool around with a range finder while acquiring a new target. If you stick a decent gun in the tank to begin with like the 47mm AT gun you have a point blank range around 1000 meters. If you are banging away with 47mm guns at much greater range you may be wasting your time. The whole AMX 40 was black hole. A tank with very poor vision and a 47mm SA 35 gun showing up when the MK III is getting the 50mm L60 gun is not going to go well.

What could the French have done differently in 1935-40 without going into the blackhole of future French tank projects.

 

[TM06]

I have a problem with anything named 'modèle 1940' - that means there is barely any to actually use in 1940

The Schneider CA gun was in production before long before 1940, the first one showed up a whole decade earlier in 1930, with updates in 32, 33, 36 and 40. That specific model was the latest version.

 

[Shortround6]

French artillery was a disaster area.
AA needed a lot of improvement. Not that anybody else was really great in 1940 but the Germans were well in the lead.

For the French
Forget anything over 90mm right from the start, France had 17 (?) 90mm guns in the spring of 1940.
Germans don't have any high altitude bombers anyway. Get the 90mm guns into production, they had from 1926 to do it.
French have bit of a dilemma with the 75mm AA guns, they just aren't that good. MV of about 700m/s is very 1928.
But they don't have enough of them as it is so more mediumish guns or fewer better guns (750-800m/s)?

Light AA is another problem with the automatic 37mms being very rare.
Navy 1925 and 1933 guns are not automatic weapons. They eject the cartridge case like an AT gun and are then hand loaded for each shot.
The 1935 gun was pretty much experimental and needed either lower performance, water cooling or lots of spare barrels and well trained crew.
Needing new barrels in 400-600 rounds was not a viable light AA gun.

And that leaves them with the standard Hotchkiss 25mm AA gun which was used to such effect by the Japanese (sarcasm).
And the Hotchkiss 13mm machine gun.

Perhaps they could have bought something else in the early 30s in time to get it into production?

 

[Shortround6]

French field artillery.
They need different doctrine and hundreds if not over 1000 additional 10.5cm howitzers.
The 1897 75mm was not anywhere good enough even on a carriage that would allow motor towing.
Many of the few hundred 10.5cm howitzers they did have had wooden wheels (or at least non-pneumatic tires).
The Germany army divisions had a much greater throw weight of artillery projectiles leaving the French at a major disadvantage even if they had better communications.
Luftwaffe got some of the credit that should have gone to the German Artillery.
The French had neither.

 

[TM06]

French have bit of a dilemma with the 75mm AA guns, they just aren't that good. MV of about 700m/s is very 1928.
But they don't have enough of them as it is so more mediumish guns or fewer better guns (750-800m/s)?

It's feasible that they could let the 90 fill that niche instead with its 850 m/s, they'd have enough guns if they were producing it en masse from 1926 onwards. An alternative could be attempting to re-bore the 870 m/s 65 mm Modèle 1902 to 75mm, but I'm not sure how effective that would be.
Another option would be to buy the Bofors 75/80 mm guns to fill those roles, as those two were quite excellent.

Perhaps they could have bought something else in the early 30s in time to get it into production?

Pom Poms or Bofors guns would be the safest bets for the purchasable light AA. I'm leaning towards the Bofors from a performance standpoint but the proximity of Britain means you could get more Pom Poms to the front faster. For the lower-end, maybe Oerlikons would be on the table? I doubt they'd be able to get enough HS 404's from Hispano, so the Oerlikons could be a backup platform for SHORAD?

 

[Shortround6]

Pom Poms or Bofors guns would be the safest bets for the purchasable light AA. I'm leaning towards the Bofors from a performance standpoint but the proximity of Britain means you could get more Pom Poms to the front faster. For the lower-end, maybe Oerlikons would be on the table? I doubt they'd be able to get enough HS 404's from Hispano, so the Oerlikons could be a backup platform for SHORAD?

British were having trouble making Pom Poms for the RN fast enough. Unfortunately the same applied to the 40mm Bofors and the 20mm Oerlikons. The home factories could supply orders of dozens of guns, they could not supply hundreds in the same amount of time, which is why The US, Britain and others bought licenses. There was no storehouse of hundreds of guns that just needed shipment.
If you had ordered in 1937-38 maybe you could haven gotten delivery. But in the mid 30s local companies would be demanding the politicians bought domestics produced guns.

It's feasible that they could let the 90 fill that niche instead with its 850 m/s, they'd have enough guns if they were producing it en masse from 1926 onwards. An alternative could be attempting to re-bore the 870 m/s 65 mm Modèle 1902 to 75mm, but I'm not sure how effective that would be.
Another option would be to buy the Bofors 75/80 mm guns to fill those roles, as those two were quite excellent.

The gun barrels are only part of the problem. You need recoil systems and suitable mounts.

A lot of money went to the Maginot line. According to Wiki (better source certainly welcome) only 192 of the 700m/s guns were in service while an estimated 913 75mm guns using 1897 barrels were still in use in 1940. Some of the modern barrels/recoil systems had been mounted on older mountings (still post WW I) and/or new mounts were given 1897 barrels while waiting for the new barrels.
For these guns to be effective against modern planes they needed fire control systems that grouped guns into batteries and that used fuse setting devices. Local control of single guns was near useless except for morale.

The Maginot line worked but it sucked up a lot of money and left many of the areas/dept of the French military very short of funds.

 

[ThomasP]

FWIW

Something I have not seen mentioned in this thread (or other threads on the forum?) is that the French were working on APDS rounds for their tank and anti-tank guns - before the war started. They were a bit different in concept than the later British types, but testing proved them to be quite effective. There were a number used during the invasion but, unfortunately, the war emergency and the FoF ended the endeavor. The French did, however, manage to send examples of the rounds to the UK, along with research/development/test records, and the British subsequently used this information to aid in the development of their own APDS types.

The French had APDS rounds (in small numbers) for the 75mm, 47mm, and 37mm guns (maybe others?). Basically, one type of 75mm round used a slightly modified standard 47mm(IIRC) APCBC projectile for the penetrator and one version of the 37mm round used a modified 25mm(I think) AP projectile. I do not remember what sub-caliber the 47mm used. I do not have my notes on these rounds to hand at the moment, but from memory the 75mm APDS round would have penetrated any(?) of the PzKw IV variants that saw service during the war - out to over 1000 yds. In the testing they were found to be quite accurate at such ranges. I do not remember what the 47mm and 37mm APDS were capable of but they were somewhat impressive for the sizes. I am not sure, but I do not think they intended to use tungsten carbide (TC) penetrators for the 75mm and 47mm rounds, but one type of the 37mm ended up with a TC core for the 25mm sub-caliber projectile.

I will see if I can find my notes.

The French had also developed various APCR/HVAP and squeeze bore rounds, though I do not know if these were used in combat.

 

[Elan Vital]

It must be remembered that whatever gets built is dependent on the industrial buildup and in turn on investment and labor policies from the government and a few powerful private manufacturers. Upgrading existing stocks may not necessarily be doable at the same time as producing new gear. That's why even though upgrading the short 37mm guns and 75mm guns beyond OTL decisions was certainly technically feasible, it won't necessarily improve the overall situation. OTL, spamming more 105mm artillery was made impossible by committments to the AA and antitank gun programs, which were an arguably more pressing matter when France OTL could already meet its minimum artillery needs.

AA is certainly the field of artillery that needed the most extra effort, both in terms of the guns themselves but also more importantly the additional elements (fire control). That sector seems to have been plagued by perfectionism which delayed the introduction of the 13.2, 25, 37 and 90mm designs even though the French had a severe shortage of guns in these categories in the first place. The modernisation programs were hit hardest by budget cuts before 1935 and the post 35 effort was a bit late (bulk of the spending happens after 1938).

A lot of the systems France fielded in 1940 had been selected before 1935 and the exigencies of mass production require a sufficient lead time, so these systems can not be cut out too quickly after 1935, and our material focus should be on the post 1935 programs and the distribution of follow-up orders.

Doctrine and materiel are also interelated because while doctrine can help specify what is needed or is structured with what exists in mind, at the end of the day your forces still need to have the materiel on hand to verify or invalidate the doctrinal concepts and to train sufficiently to actually apply that doctrine. There were recurring themes in OTL France of training grounds or special schools being closed as part of the deflationary policies before 1936, of large field exercises or reforms not taking place in peacetime due to lack of equipment or geopolitical crises (Rhineland, Anschluss, Sudetenland). A lot of the equipment was only delivered in after 1938 or even during the mobilization period in 1939-40, and before that, was so rare that it had to be used parcimoniously to not wear too quickly.
Training, especially in large maneuvers, was quite neglected in spite of the concerns of many mid/high level officers, which is an oddity for an army so dependent on the good combined arms warfare of enormous conscripted armies.
Of course, you sometimes have to compromise with what you have and Germany demonstrated a willigness to adapt even with limited equipment before 1940, but overall it would have been important for France to have a smoother rearmament with greater production in 1935-39 even if the eventual ceiling was no higher than that expected in 1940-41 OTL.​

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I'm more versed with the tank situation, so I will focus on that more specific topic from now on. The good thing is that I have found an archived document from the General Tank Inspector (General Keller) from 1941 precisely looking at the lessons learned from the battle of 1940, plus some letters or comments from previous actors in the field of French armor.

Doctrinally, there were some good things in the Instruction for Large Units of 1936 (IGU 1936 in French), subsequent 1937 amendments and the 1938 Instruction for the DCR type Armored Divisions.

The core issues in doctrine or execution can be summed up as such (notwithstanding all the remarks on maintenance, logistics, organisations and comms which inevitably arise with battle experience):
- the IGU 1936 was built largely around the thinking that antitank guns were the same threat to the tank as the machinegun to the infantry. This was flawed in that antitank guns were slow firing, less maneuverable and harder to hide, and that the French tanks after 1933 had precisely been armored to provide a good degree of protection at medium ranges, which is something the IGU itself admits. Combined with a fear of losses and risk, this largely explains why tanks were kept so subordinated to the infantry and artillery instead of being able to act independently (if necessary to take out the AT guns as well) or as the vanguard with support from the other two branches. Of course, this was secretely influenced by the bias against the idea of tanks as its own separate branch like in Germany, the UK or US.

- not enough focus on massed employment of tanks. The 1938 instruction for the DCR does emphasize massed employment but the DCRs were too inexperienced anyway. The IGU however allocated only one or at best two companies of tanks (13 and 26 tanks respectively) to a battalion-level infantry attack, far too little. Too many tanks were part of general reserve independent battalions, not enough as part of large tank units (DCR or DLM). This was not helped by the complete inexperience of many infantry commanders who, unlike in WW1, felt they knew better than tank commanders and misused those independent battalions by hoarding them after an attack (preventing maintenance or regroupment) and spreading them very thinly. The obsession on continuous fronts which was a more general issue in the army contributed to tanks being spread extremely thinly. It was more important to be strong in a few places than weak everywhere. Overall, the doctrine simply required too many tanks compared to what the French had in 1940 to do everything. It might have been doable in 1941 with production now being massive, but in 1940 or before it wasn't. Keller felt that with the numbers France had, they needed to gather around 200 tanks to be really effective against the Germans who massed tanks.

- poor infantry/tank cooperation. This is correlated with the closure of the Tank/Infantry school in the 30s and the lack of tanks in peacetime, such that the infantry rarely saw anything more modern than a Renault FT. Infantry commanders hoarded tank units, asked too much of them (not enough time for maintenance), sent them on dangerous or useless missions where they were slowly attrited... The counterattacks were often rushed and done piecemeal. For example one DCR attacked with 50 tanks only when 48 hours later it could have assembled 168 a force of tanks. Time is of the essence but what can you do with such meager means other than feeding limited ressources to the enemy...

- Late constitution of the DCRs. The DLMs were more or less okay, but the first two DCRs were only formed during the Winter of 1939/40 and many of their constitutive elements only trained together very shortly before May 1940 and many elements were still understrength. This is in spite of the fact that the manuals and training regimes were ready for a constitution in peacetime in May 1939 or so. Overall, the DCRs needed an additional 3 months of training that can only be obtained with sufficient production (or a willigness to strip normal infantry units and independent tank units) early. Even then, the DCRs were often stripped of important elements during the battle.

- Lack of second crews to relieve the exhausted crews, like done in the UK and Germany. Fatigue after the first few days was a big factor in French problems during May/June 1940.

- Not enough focus on specialization. AA and Engineers were hit particularly hard here as the former required specialist personnel and some of the latter had to specialize for use in armored divisions.

Production wise, you may be surprised that the actual costs of tank programs recommended by high level tank officers were not actually that high compared to the sheer expenditure after 1936. Usually around 2 billion francs, or the cost of a new battleship. The Maginot Line itself was not the biggest obstacle to spending on a proper maneuver army, the general political/fiscal consensus until 1936 was, and in any case everyone involved always intended BOTH the fortifications and the army to complement each other.
One big issue was that no large orders over a long period were made for most of the 1935-40 period to get the manufacturers out of their sleep and organise for true mass production, which would kick the French hard before things were finally somewhat sorted out by late 1939.


So, what about the tanks themselves?

By 1935, most of the key components of the 1940 force were adopted or were about to be:
- Char B1 Battle Tank
- Somua S35 (Cavalry tank, but de facto a Battle Tank)
- Infantry light tanks (Renault, Hotchkiss and FCM)

With limited orders of the Char D2 Battle Tank, and the orders for previous programs to be completed more or less quickly. Battle Tanks were most suitable for armored divisions due to being fitted with a radio and dedicated operator from day one, and due to their better armament and crossing capability.

Other than the wartime Keller program to replace all tank classes in 1941-42, the only tank program for common vehicles was the G1 Battle Tank. Originally, it was conceived as an Infantry "S35" or "modern D2", so a cheap, fast battle tank which was simple to operate by conscripts, to complement the B1 which was complex enough to truly require professional personnel, was too slow for the motorized infantry divisions that France wanted to make, was expensive and not quick enough to build. It also was to be under 20 tonnes as beyond that you see a sudden drop in logistical convenience (specialized wagons needed, fewer compatible bridges... For reference, 1930s France had 3 main logistical categories: under 13 tonnes, under 20 tonnes and under 35 tonnes, the latter being relaxed to 45 tonnes in 1940 owing to improvements in logistical infrastructure and the need for greater performance).

In practice, it started in 1936 as a "modern B1" with the same dual armament. Finally, in late 1937 it was adjusted to have a single 75mm gun in a 2 or 3-man turret. The unfortunate consequence of this is that the proposed designs had been designed with the "S35" or "B1" configuration in mind, such that the hull form factor was weight-inefficient when going to the 75mm turret (huge hulls designed for a hull gun) and the engines were a little weak. The constant changes also demoralized manufacturers who put the projects on the backburner for much of 1937 and 38, such that nothing was expected other than the Renault G1 in mayyyybe 1941.

Considering the relative importance of the Battle Tank compared to the Infantry Light Tank in every single document after 1935 and in armored divisions, it would have been best to orient limited funds and industrial means to that category even at the cost of the total number of tanks both classes combined. The situation for the Infantry Light Tanks could have been made better, but overall they never posed the industrial/fiscal challenge than their heavier brothers did. IMO, the G1 program was the centerpiece of the entire problem and is where you need to make the biggest departure from OTL.
The time to make a "better S35" or "B1" had passed. Even if they stuck to either configuration, the winner(s) would inevitably had entered production well after the alternatives: simply focusing on the B1 and S35 series. On the other hand the configuration they eventually arrived at in 1938 (75mm turret, non-envelopping tracks, compact hull with rear-drive) was very progressive. IMO, even if the French had simply started that program in late 1937 around this configuration, so no later than OTL, it would at least have benefitted from the proposed designs being tailored to it from the very start. I also think that this configuration was much better suited to meet the future battle tank program for 1941-42 than either the B40 (compromised by its Char B roots so heavier than it needed to be for a 75mm turret) or its competitors; all that would have been needed is updating the program to account for higher mobility and 70-80mm of armor.

In the meantime, the cheap battle tank role could be taken by the stopgap D2 (at least order 3 battalions/150 tanks from the start, consistent with the original 1934 plan and the order for 160 D1s before) and the S35 (the production potential of which was always quite underexploited before 1940). Fixing some issues in the form of the S40 would have been even easier to do if the tank catches such a bigger interest and if Somua does not waste time in the G1 program.

The B1, meanwhile, would benefit from the lack of competition from the G1. It would be possible to bring the peacetime orders (300 or so) closer together in time and to invest in the manufacturers which were behind schedule for certain parts to get to the sustained 10/month production rate mentioned in 1936. This alone would accelerate completion of B1 battalions so much earlier that it would be possible to experiment with DCRs early with B1, D2 and S35 battalions. The B1 Ter, which was originally (1934-35) intended to be the third batch of B1s just after the B1 Bis, and thus intended to be built in 1936, could meet most objective of the "modern B1" part of the OTL G1 program by complely overhauling many assemblies (electrical system, cooling system, hull gun mount, lubrication system, transmission) and simplifying production, maintenance and use. What it needed was more focus and an investment necessary for 3 new-built prototypes, as using the prototype built from an older B1 was simply too slow.​

 

[tomo pauk]

That's why even though upgrading the short 37mm guns and 75mm guns beyond OTL decisions was certainly technically feasible, it won't necessarily improve the overall situation. OTL, spamming more 105mm artillery was made impossible by committments to the AA and antitank gun programs, which were an arguably more pressing matter when France OTL could already meet its minimum artillery needs.

Upgrading the 75mm guns with retrofitting the split carriage instead of the 1-leg carriage allows for a greater elevation, that in return incresaes the range. Split carriage also allows for the greater azimuth to be used before the carriage needs to be dug out - useful for anti-tank job.
I agree that the short 37mm guns were too much beyond the curve, replacing these with 47mm weapons should've started post haste.

There was not much to show for wrt. the effort to make AA artillery, the French deployed perhaps 200 of modern AA guns between 25 and 40 mm by May 1940? Add perhaps a few dozen of repurposed aircraft 20mm guns? Compare with Germany, that fielded many thousands of guns between 20 and 37mm, as well as 2500-3000 of heavy guns, that were also more modern than the French heavy AA guns - mostly left-over ww1 spin-offs from the mlle 1997 field gun.

AA is certainly the field of artillery that needed the most extra effort, both in terms of the guns themselves but also more importantly the additional elements (fire control). That sector seems to have been plagued by perfectionism which delayed the introduction of the 13.2, 25, 37 and 90mm designs even though the French had a severe shortage of guns in these categories in the first place. The modernisation programs were hit hardest by budget cuts before 1935 and the post 35 effort was a bit late (bulk of the spending happens after 1938).

Fire control is mostly, if not always of a 'local' type on the small guns, like the 40mm and smaller. Even the 'spider web' sight will do.
I don't think that the 13.2mm was on the receiving end on the perfectionism, eg. it lacked the belt feed, while being with a sedate RoF. The 37mm AA gun seem to be offered to the Army already in 1930, but Army was not interested?

Of course, you sometimes have to compromise with what you have and Germany demonstrated a willigness to adapt even with limited equipment before 1940, but overall it would have been important for France to have a smoother rearmament with greater production in 1935-39 even if the eventual ceiling was no higher than that expected in 1940-41 OTL.

Certainly, waiting for the perfect equipment will mean that such the equipment is never ready.

Before 1940, Germany have had a much larger production of aircraft and AA guns - any French/Allied air attack was sure to be met with thousands of shells buzzing around. French army had no such luxury, be it from the own AA or from AdA.
Germans were faster to adopt the modern 105 and 150 mm guns. German tanks were not better than the French on paper, what gave them the edge was the wide usage of radios and the 3 men turrets on the Pz-III and-IV. Germans were also much better in the combined arms warfare, that also included the usage of close support aircraft against the enemy's strongpoints. In the same time, cooperation even between French bomber and fighter units was spotty, to be generous.
Numerous German servicemen were with some combat experience, and even lower-tier units were with some freedom to act if needed, in order to prevail.

French can counter this a good deal with greater firepower and coordination/cooperation, but installing this in the heads of the people in command would've been a huge task, especially since it is never easy to implement new ideas into the heads of the people that consider themselves crucial for wining the last big war. Time-sensitive warfare cannot be run via curriers and runners, with many hours elapsing between the receipt of crucial information and the unit(s) in contact acting per orders from the HQ dozens if not a hundred miles away. Especially since the independent action was not a thing in the French interwar army.

 

[Shortround6]

A problem for the French is a large numbers of the S.35 never got radios despite plans/intentions.
This severely limited their ability to co-ordinate/co-operate.
The B I bis was given priority and even here the fitting not complete and there were 3 different radios (?) maybe four.
Early radios were short range and key (Morse code?) only. Then there was a voice radio. Platoon commanders got a different radio and higher command (company commander and above?) got a different set. Now if the company commanders tank breaks down there is no vehicle he can grab and maintain radio contact with higher formations.

Many of the 2 man tanks got no radios even on the platoon commander lever.

French lack of artillery creates repercussions. You can't steal 75mm guns from the Field artillery to make anti-tank guns when the field artillery is already understrength.
Now you have some better AT guns but you have hurt your general artillery support which was none to good to begin with.

 

[ThomasP]

Whoops! Just saw Elan Vital's post over in the "Alternative light and anti-tank guns, 1935-45" re the French pre- and early-war efforts in the APDS/APCR/HVAP development. Missed it till now.

 

[tomo pauk]

French small arms anyone?
They were on forefront with the light machine gun idea and execution back in the Great war, and were also the only major country that developed and issued the self-loading rifles. They also fiddled a bit with the pre-intermediate cartridge with the 8mmx35, and with the pre-assault rifle for it.
In the interwar period, that level of innovation pretty much died out.
(see here the RSC models of 1917 and 1918 firing it out 100 years after the ww1)

So I'd suggest that they still have the RSC 1918 in some production, it will be using the left over 8mm Lebel cartridges anyway. Try and make the 7.5mm version of it in the meantime. A carbine made around perhaps the 7.5mmx35 round might've been usful.
The lack of a good, modern SMG also needs to be addressed. The light MG FM 1924 seems to be the only success story - so just make more of these?
Surprisingly enough, there was a lack of a modern repeating rifle in the interwar period - bar a the small number of MAS 36, it was the ww1 left overs and that's it? This also need to be rectified.
There is also no belt-fed MG for the Army.
Any worth in an ATR in 13.2mm calibre? It was not like the German tanks before 1941 were that well armored, after all.

 

[yulzari]

In terms of numbers and equipment the French generally had at least a parity and probably an advantage over the Germans in May 1940. Clearly there were weaknesses but overall they were not at a disadvantage. Where there were weaknesses it stemmed from the real underlying weakness.

That being command and control. Inadequate commanders who failed to arrange for the best to be made of the resources in procurement and planning. Glacial decision making grossly exacerbated by poor senior officers and further worsened by equally glacial communications. All allied to a history of fear of left and right wing politics between the army and parliament.

A reflection of the same in French politics generally and the French love their politics at all levels. My great grandfather, as the mayor of a small town, had to build a second set clothes washing facilities on the outskirts of the town to avoid fights between the right wing catholics who lived in the old centre where the old facilities were by the church and with the left wing socialist ladies who lived more on the outskirts.

To be fair the Maginot Line worked much as intended but the lumbering mobile French army covering Belgium was overwhelmed by the more agile and better and more effectively commanded Germans. Not that the French troops were lacking in martial spirit. The Battle of France was hard fought with major casualties on both sides during the fighting during the nearly seven weeks of battle as a look at French village memorial lists will readily show albeit less than those of the long grind of the Great War.

The alternative for the French army was the removal of most of the senior staff replacing them with well staff trained new staff officers looking at what new things would alter the practices of the previous war. Done quickly enough for them to replace the old guard. Whilst there were changes in equipment etc. that may be better than those actually used the real need is to have new doctrines planned and practiced together with the means to gather intelligence, skills to interpret it and make use of it and the means to transmit the conclusions to the units to enable them to act in near real time. For example, the French air force did not need to make more reconnaissance flights but did need to have the result promptly delivered to the army and for the army to take account of them whereas in the real period they were often either discounted if they did not fit the army's preconceptions or took so long to be delivered and the army reaction so slow that they were pointless.

Essentially the French army alternative is new modern command with new modern communications. New kit has a touch of Titanic deckchair rearrangement. A palliative rather than a solution.