Fulmar II versus F4F-4 under 10,000 ft.

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The F6F and especially the F4U could not operate efficiently from a CVE.

The TO distance for an F4U-1 with 15/25 knot wind = 475ft/340ft @ 12039lbs; with full fuel @ 12835lb = 555ft/408ft; with one external tank @ 13259 = 835ft/625ft.
The most common USN escort carrier had a 475ft flight deck.
It is pretty easy to see that these aircraft will struggle to TO under windless conditions on an 18 knot CVE (which might not be able to make 18 knots, depending on its state of repair). OTOH if there is insufficient wind to TO, they won't and thus won't be exposed to landing accidents.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4u/f4u-1-acp.pdf
So they could operate from CVEs but with many restrictions, including no external stores.
The f6F-3 was somewhat better: The TO distance for an F6F-3 with 15/25 knot wind = 418ft/294ft @ 12575lbs; with one external tank @ 13632lb= 519ft/372ft.
The Seafire LIIc was better yet, The TO distance for an LIIC with 20/30 knot wind = 330ft/220ft @ 7006lbs. I would suspect that the Seafire III would be somewhat worse.
 
This is a commentary I found with regard to the F4U:

The Ensign Eliminator

The first production F4U-1 made its first flight on 25 June 1942. The USN received its first aircraft on 31 July.

Overall handling of the F4U-1 was acceptable, but not very good. In level flight the Corsair was stable enough to be flown hands-off. The ailerons were light and effective, and the high roll rate was used with good effect in combat with the A6M, which suffered from bad aileron response at high speeds. The elevators were heavy, but effective. Only the rudder really stiffened with increasing speed. For combat maneuvering, the flaps could be deployed 20 degrees.

After the first delivery of an F4U-1 on 31 July 1942, more than two years passed before the US Navy cleared the type for shipboard operations. The Corsair was found to be much too difficult to land on a carrier deck. First of all, the pilot could hardly see the deck, because he sat so far aft of the bulky engine. The F4U tended to stall without warning, and was then certain to drop the starboard wing. Quick action had to be taken to prevent a spin. Spin recovery was difficult. In landing configuration, the F4U-1 would stall at 141km/h. A warning light would light at 148km/h. On touchdown, the F4U-1 had sluggish controls and insufficient directional stability. It also was prone to "bounce" because of overly stiff landing gear oleo legs.

These characteristics had already been there on the XF4U-1, and if anything they were worse on the production type. Carrier qualification trials on the escort carrier USS Sangamon Bay, on 25 September 1942, caused the US Navy to release the type to the US Marine Corps. After all, the US Navy still had the Grumman F6F Hellcat, which did not have the performance of the F4U but was a far better deck landing aircraft. The Marines needed a better fighter than the F4F Wildcat. For them it was important that the F4U could be put on a carrier, but they usually flew from land bases.

Marines

During the Pacific war, the strategy of "island hopping" turned islands into forward operating bases for the aircraft of the US Marine Corps, the US Navy and the Army Air Force. Essential to this strategy was that no attempt was made to conquer all Japanese strongholds in the Pacific. Instead, they were neutralized by attacks, cut off from the main Japanese forces, and left behind.

The islands from which the advanced units operated were often very small. If they were larger, they were often covered with a dense jungle, and only a small part of the island was used by the combatants. The climate was often unhealthy, both for people and aircraft, and standards of living were primitive. Missions often involved long over water flights. The island group of the Eastern Solomons, for example, extends over more than 1000km.

The first USMC unit to equip with the F4U was VMF-124, which was declared operational on 28 December 1942. VMF-124 was quickly deployed to Guadalcanal, where it flew its first combat mission, also the first of the F4U, on 11 February 1943. Fighting over Guadalcanal was intense. The first air-to-air combat took place on the 14th, when a mixed force of P-38s, P-40s, PB4Ys and F4Us lost ten aircraft to the Japanese, and claimed four A6M "Zero" fighters.

As on this first mission, the aircraft involved in an operation were often of different types, belonged to different services, and belonged to different bases. The coordination between them was not always what it should have been.

The first Narine F4U equipped marine unit to be embarked was VMF 124, which was attached to USS Essex. This was in the latter half of 1944. I cannot find examples of it being embarked on the "standard" escort carrier before then. Perhaps it was done unnofficially, but the USN was pretty steadfast in not allowing it to be shipped aboard until the bounce issue had been solved, and this did not occur until the latter part of 1944. The fact that service trials were undertaken from the Sangamon is significant. This class of four ships were by far the largest, fastest, and most capacious of escort carriers ever built. The fact that the USN rejected their use even from these large carriers is significant.

For the RN, the first carrier to embark the F4U operationally was the Illustrious, in July 1943. I am unsure yet whether they were ever deployed onto any Brit CVEs but hazard to think that they may have.

All of this circumspection at best suggests that it had difficulties, at the very least, to deployment onto the short runways, and slow speeds of the Jeep carriers. It was anything but an unqualified success, I agree.
 
Further to the above, this online source I am looking says "in one respect the F4U must be considered a partial failure: More than two years passed before the Corsair became an acceptable deck-landing aircraft. Of the 64051 combat missions flown by the type in World War II, 54470 were flown from land bases. If Grumman had not hastily produced the F6F Hellcat, the US Navy could have been in serious trouble"

Moreover, I have read somewhere that the Corsair suffered over 900 serious landing/TO stacks. Thats an acident rate of 1.5% of the total missions flown. Compared to the Seafire Operations off Okinawa, where 9 aircraft suffered serious damage operational accidents, over 900 sorties flown, the Seafire suffered a 1% attrition rate. These attrition rates are probably not completely comparable, but it at least gives an indication about how maligned the Seafire III is in its so-called poor landing characteristics. The safety record of the Corsair is not much better than the Seafire. seems the myth is starting to unravel rather quickly.....

With over 85% of its missions flown from land bases, and not being cleared for carrier operations for more than two years after its service entry, its hard to see how the type can be seen as an unqualified success. Successful, yes, but is its service afloat that much superior to that of the Seafire?????
 
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parsifal said:
The safety record of the Corsair is not much better than the Seafire. seems the myth is starting to unravel rather quickly.....
Click to expand...

You are spot on parsifal. One pilots had learned the characteristics of the Seafire it was a superb additional to any naval air force. The Corsair, while a formidable aircraft ,was not in the same league.

There are no theatres of war where the Spitfire/ Seafire were significantly bettered by allied or Axis fighters.

Cheers
John
 
Oh the Corsair was exceptional, and the quote I posted has to be treated as a little on the cheeky side. However, to view the Corsair as a some kind of panacea to which all other types taken to sea must bow down in fealty is just a bit rich in my opinion. It was a great aircraft, but it was not an invincible aircraft. That image has been built up by post war propaganda
 
Fortunately for the Allies and unfortunately for the Axis, the USN did not understand that Hellcats and "especially" Corsairs could not operate "efficiently" from CVEs. For instance, during the invasion of the Gilberts, three CVEs carried FM-1s, the other five CVEs carried Hellcats. During the Marshall's campaign also many CVEs carried Hellcats. Interestingly, I have always associated the Wildcat with Grumman while knowing that Eastern produced a lot of FM-1s and 2s. The fact is that of the 7905 Wildcats produced, Eastern produced more than 5000. The USN credited the Wildcat, in 1941-1943, with 905 kills with 178 losses. A victory to loss ratio of 6.9 to 1. Not too bad.

The Corsair was the most used US naval aircraft by the British in WW2 with 2012 Corsairs going to the FAA. Rex Barber, a highly successful AAF P38 pilot said that if the US had to only produce one fighter bomber, in WW2 "it should have been the F4U." Because of it's superior performance, the USN strived to replace all fighters in the Pacific Fleet with Corsairs as quickly as possible when the Kamikaze threat manifested itself. The F8F, when it became available, was supposed to be the Navy's pure fighter, while the Corsair was to be the fighter bomber but before the Korean War began, the F8F, because it was not well suited to the fighter bomber role, was replaced by the Corsair, the all around best piston engined fighter the USN ever had and probably one of the top two or three best piston engined fighters ever built.
 
I dont think the comments were that the later US types did not, or could not operate from escort carriers, just that when they did, there were restrictions on their opereational uses. Further my comment was that with 85% of the Corsairs flying time as a shore based aircraft and a two year delay in its carrier acceptance, it cannot be viewed as a complete success. The fact that it was taken aboard some escort carriers before that date, does not necessarily mean they were embarked. Many escort carriers were used as floating reserves, as aircraft transports and the like. What you would need to show is that they were being used operationally, and with no restrictions on their usage.

And whilst I am the first to applaud the Corsair and its record, the comments you are posting are cleverly dodging the issue. The Corsair was not ideal to operate from escort carriers, it also suffered a non combat loss rate at least as big as that of the Seafire in 1945. It was not the panacea to solve all problems. It had a terrific kill loss ratio, it was a very effective fighter bomber, it was rugged, but it had its weaknesses, no less so than the Seafire did.
 
Its worth noting that if you look at the USN order of Battle at the end of the war, Corsairs were only on the Essex Class carriers. I do not doubt that they could and did operate on other carriers hen needed but as an indication of preference I believe that is an interesting observation.
 
Hello
at Leyte in Oct 44 only 3 of the longer Sangamon class CVEs carried F6F-3s, the 4th, Santee, carried FM-2s as did all the shorter Casablanca class CVEs. But that was not a problem, FM-2 was quite capable to handle Japanese planes and as was shown off Norway, at low level it could handle 109G too.

Juha
 
Much of the "information" posted above about the Corsair is incorrect. For example, the left wing of the Corsair stalled first, not the right wing. Comparing operational losses of the Corsair versus the Seafire is ridiculous because you are not comparing comparable missions. If you want to continue to insist that the Seafire was as safe or safer to operate from carriers, you ignore reality. The British operated Corsairs from carriers in spite of the plane's early shortcomings. They liked it because it was rugged, long ranged, fast, survivable in combat and at least gave the pilot a chance in a ditching.

From the official Naval Aviation Combat Statistics:
USN Corsairs flew 6488 action sorties from carriers and had 48 operational losses. Many of those losses were caused by weather and navigational problems.
As quoted before Marines flew 3093 action sorties from carriers and had 21 operational losses. Same issues as above. Many of those sorties were flown from CVEs.
By the end of the war, Marine squadrons were flying combat from CVEs Block Island, Gilbert islands, Vella Gulf, Cape Gloucester and Suwanee. Corsairs were operated from CVEs in the Korean War also.
In WW2, Marines flew 52852 action sorties in Corsairs from land bases and had 157 operational losses.

All of the above losses were on action sorties.

Initially the Corsair had characteristics which made it a difficult deck landing aircraft. Those characteristics were poor visibility over the nose, the bouncy landing gear and the left wing drop when stalled. The FAA went on and used the Corsair with those characteristics because they had nothing better or as good. One USN squadron, VF17, in September, 1943, had the Corsair ready for operations on carriers and was eqipped with the factory built F4U1A with the right wing spoiler and the debounced landing gear as well as the raised seat but was substituted for by VF18 flying Hellcats primarily because Corsair parts and equipment were not in the supply line to the Pacific. Earlier VF12 had begun to receive it's Corsairs in January, 1943, and was switched to Hellcats in the summer of 1943 because of the parts and supplies problems. The commanders of these squadrons knew the Corsair was a winner and was superior to the Hellcat in performance but they had to wait until later to use that winner off of carriers.
 
Well, on the basis of your figures, for carrier non-combat losses in carrier based operations, the Corsair in USN service flew 9581 sorties off carriers, and lost 69 aircraft. Thats a loss rate of 0.7%. Seafire III operations off Okinawa and Japan in 1945 flew 990 sorties and lost either 6 or 9 aircraft permanently written off. Thats a loss rate of 0.61% to 0.91%. Now, you can protest all you like, but they are numbers. Seafire (for 1945) and Corsair operational loss rates were very similar (infact during the hectic operations off Okinawa, Corsair loss rates were about 20 aircraft per 1000 sorties, or roughly 3 times that of the Seafire) . Moreover, whilst the British were forced to push the Seafire into carrier service early, and on the wrong ships, the Americans had the luxury of not authorizing the embarkation of the Corsair for more than two years. As you say they also pushed the Corsair into service afloat, a year before the Americans did. This doesnt help to determine the Corsair loss rate in the RN, it just underlines that the RN saw it as a necessary expedient in the same light as they saw the Seafire deployment as a necessary expedient.

Evidence that the Seafire after its initial problems was at least as succesful as the Corsair can be derived from its postwar service. Seafires remained in frontline sertviuce with the RN until 1950, and in other airforces until 1954. AFAIK the Corsair was retired from the USN in 1952, so their service records are at least similar. That tells you the RN was happy with the Seafire.

I put it to you the literature you are relying on is too biased and tainted by "King-itis" to be relied upon......
 
Readie said:
You are spot on parsifal. One pilots had learned the characteristics of the Seafire it was a superb additional to any naval air force.
Click to expand...

It took significant changes to the landing gear struts to make the Seafire acceptable - just barely - for carrier operations

The Corsair, while a formidable aircraft ,was not in the same league.
Click to expand...

In what respects was the Corsair "not in the same league?"

Speed, turn performance, range, armament, combat load?

There are no theatres of war where the Spitfire/ Seafire were significantly bettered by allied or Axis fighters.
Click to expand...

Spitfires were significantly bettered by the Zero over Darwin... losing out at a rate of about 3:1
 
It took significant changes to the landing gear struts to make the Seafire acceptable - just barely - for carrier operations

In what respects was it "just barely" adequate. What is your basis for a statement like that. Please table information that shows it to be "Just barely" adequate. In fact, if you research the issue even a little, you will find the British viewed it as essential in their integrated defence arrangements. It was by far the best CAP aircraft that they possessed below 5000 feet, which is where it mattered against the Kamikazes, and by far the most important weapon system available to the BPF in its battle against this threat.

In what respects was the Corsair "not in the same league?"

In the sense of having far superior climb , far heavier and effective armament (20mm are acknowledged by all except those diehard Americans who think 6x 50s are better than anything except 8 x 50s) higher accelaration and better speed below 5000 ft. Turn radius was better as well. "Not in the same league" is not the same as trying to say "superior to"...more "better at certtain things"....


Speed, turn performance, range, armament, combat load?

Sppeed below 5000 ft was superiuor in the Seafire, turn performance far superior in the Seafire, armament was far heavier in the Seafire (though I will never have that acknowledged I know, but its a fact, I assure you) , range was superior in the Corsair, but not greatly so, if effctive combat radii are being talked about, combat load, well, the Corsair had it all over the Seafire in that regard.



Spitfires were significantly bettered by the Zero over Darwin... losing out at a rate of about 3:1

And this is different to the Corsair in what respects????? In their first encounters with zeroes they lost about twice as many of their number as the zeroes lost. The Spits over Darwin used the wrong tacticws, lost more aircraft to running out of fuel, and overall were poorly used. their combat records are not that much worse than other types like the P-40 at the time and in any event, the defence at Darwin was a difficult target to defend. To say nothing of comparing apples to oranges
 
The Spitfire was not significantly bettered by any aircraft...

It seems accepted 'wisdom on line' that the Zero easily mastered the Spitfire throughout 1943, winning the air war over Australian skys. I've always been curious why a fighter that did so well in every other theater could be so badly beaten there.

The post war, confirmed records show the Japanese lost 65 aircraft over Darwin. They shot down 16 Spitfires. I'm not a researcher and I don't read Japanese, but I accept the official history of the RAF. Their account of the Battle of Britain was the first modern work to confess that they'd overclaimed by almost three times the number of losses the Germans actually sustained. Their European numbers have stood the test of time and numerous assaults by revisionist historians, I see no reason why their Pacific account should be any different. Below is an account of the RAAFs brave defence of Darwin, the victories are those claimed during the war. Please remember that the Japanese habitually overclaimed, while the Australians were painfully open about their own losses. Consider too, that our modern perception may be slanted by General MacArthurs staff releasing a highly questionable report on the air battle fought on the 2nd May...

After Darwin was bombed repeatedly in 1942 the British Prime Minister dispatched a Wing of Spitfires to defend the city. The squadrons became known as the 'Churchill Wing', although they were almost entirely Australians. They benefited from experience gained over Britain, France, Malta and North Africa, and counted a number of aces in their number. The difficulties inherent in getting 54 modern, high performance aircraft, aircrew and supplies operational on the other side of the world, 10,500 miles away, were considerable. It would be February 1943 before they went into action.

On the 6th Feb '43 they drew first blood, shooting down a Ki-46 Dinah recce bomber, but it was to be the 2nd Mar that they first faced Zeros. 21 A6Ms of the 202nd Kokutai escorted 9 G4M Bettys of the 753rd on a raid against Darwin. 20 miles off the coast, low on fuel, a flight of 6, 54 squadron Mk Vc Spitfires caught the raiders. A swift, confused, 8 minute dogfight ensued. Both sides claimed to have shot down several enemys, but in fact only one Spitfire and two Zeros were damaged.
Wg Cdr Caldwell noted that in tight, 160 mph turns, the Zero didn't get dangerously close until after the Spitfires' speed had begun to wash off after the second turn. He "easily evaded" the Zero with a downward break.

On the 15th Mar '43, returning from night ops and with their oxygen supply depleted, 452 sqn attacked a force of 50 Japanese aircraft, split evenly between fighters and bombers. Four Spitfires were lost, but four Zeros were shot down, three of the bombers destroyed and a further seven Japanese aircraft were damaged. It was a cold comfort, two of the Spitfire pilots downed were killed, including seven 'kill' ace Sqn Ldr Thorold-Smith, 452s CO.

Worse was to come. On the 2nd May'43 another 50 'plane Japanese raid was met by all 33 of the Wings operational fighters. In a gruelling twenty five minute running battle the Spitfires had five of their number shot down, but took ten enemy aircraft in return, with many more damaged. However, a further ten Spitfires were lost to fuel shortages and mechanical failures! The press release from Gen. MacArthurs office stated they had suffered a "severe reverse". With no way of knowing how many of their damaged foes made it back to base there was no way to refute the report. Mud sticks. When the air war over Darwin is mentioned today, the loss of 15 Spitfires for just 10 enemy aircraft inevitably surfaces. Usually with a snide comment about the accuracy of the 10 claimed by the Australians.

On 9th May '43 Spitfires operating out of a satelite field destroyed two Zeros and damaged a third. The victory was mared when they lost a Spitfire in a landing accident.

28 May '43 six Spitfires met thirteen Japanese aircraft. They lost two fighters, but shot down two bombers and damaged a third.

20th June '43 the JAAF decided to try their luck. 30 bombers and 22 Ki-43 Oscars were met by 46 Spitfires. 9 bombers were destroyed, 8 more damaged, 5 fighters were shot down, 2 damaged without the Wing losing a single Spitfire.

28 June '43 a mixed bag of 18 Zeros and Bettys were bounced by 457 sqn. 3 Zeros were destroyed, 2 bombers probably joined them, for no Australian loss.

30 June '43 Fenton, the base of the USAAF 380th BG, was attacked by 27 Bettys and 20 Zeros. 4 bombers were destroyed, 4 more probably destroyed, 3 Zeros were destroyed with 6 probables, for no Spitfires lost.

6 July '43 saw 26 bombers and 21 fighters being engaged by the Wing. 9 Japanese aircraft were destroyed, 2 Spitfires were shot down, but 6 more were lost to mechanical defects.

The Japanese had finally had enough. They switched to night bombing. The Spitfires, almost 11,000 miles from their supporting factories, often heavily outnumbered and suffering from conditions that their desert fighters were never designed to cope with, had achieved the task Churchill set them. Far from being defeated by the Zeros, they doggedly ground them down until they could no longer support further attacks. They might not have been the magic bullet an adoring public wanted, but skill, courage and a superb fighter carried the day.

Cheers
John
 
From "Aircraft of WW2" by Kenneth Munson
Page 147 Supermarine Seafire (F.MkIII)-Max speed-352 mph at 12250 feet, service ceiling 33800 feet, normal range 465 miles, armament two 20mm cannon and four 303 Mgs, one 500 pound bomb or two 250 pound bombs optional

Page 50 F4U4 Corsair- Max speed 447 mph at 26000 feet, service ceiling 41000 feet, max range 1562 miles( normal from me, 1000miles), armament, six 50 cal Mgs, two 1000 pound bombs or eight RPs.

The F4U4 could do 380 mph at SL so was almost 30 mph faster at SL than was the Seafire at it's best altitude. The F4U had one of the best roll rates of any fighter in WW2, much better than any Spit or Seafire. The F4U carried enough ammo for 26.7 seconds of firing time, probably twice the firing time of the Seafire. One can argue all day about which plane was most heavily armed but the six fifties was more than adequate against Japanese fighters, bombers and kamakazes and the longer firing time was indispensable. So the Corsair in action during the last months of the war in the Pacific was almost 100 mph faster than the Seafire at best altitude and was faster at SL than the Seafire was at best altitude. It could fly higher and that Corsair could climb to 20000 feet in 6.8 minutes and had an initial rate of climb of 3870 fpm. The initial rate of climb of the Seafire IIC was 2950 fpm. I can't find the ROC of the III C.

So the Corsair could climb faster, was much faster in level speed, could get higher, carry a lot more bombs, a lot more ammo, roll better, was a lot more rugged( it could not be brought down by a single rifle caliber bullet in the cooling system) was built for carrier use at the outset and was more survivable in a ditching.

The only reason the RN continued to use Seafires after WW2 was that the Corsairs and Hellcats they had needed to be returned since they were lend leased.

Don't let nationalism stand in the way of common sense.
 
Theres only one problem with your last statement. i'm not british, never have been, and have as much affinity and allegiance to US aircraft as I do to British aorcraft

Care to retract that statement about nationalism (implying I am British), as it is offensive to me, or do I start calling you "that blasted mexican"
 
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