Freebird
Master Sergeant
Do we know how many Fulmar's were lost in air combat?
Fulmar II versus F4F-4 under 10,000 ft.
- Thread starter RCAFson
- Start date
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Do we know how many Fulmar's were lost in air combat?
I only have figures up until 6 November 1941:
73 kills
10 probables
37 damaged
16 fulmars shot down
5 fulmars damaged
11 fulmars slightly damaged
Freebird
Master Sergeant
Where is that data from?
Have the 73 claims been compared to Axis loss records?
Any breakdown of the 73 into German/Italian or Fighter/Bomber?
(Thanks!)
They're Admiralty figures from 28 Nov '41.
So no doubt are actually somewhat lower.
Fulmar Kills
3 x Cant 501
10 x Cant 506
1 x Cant 1007
1 x Cant ?
22 x Sm 79
2 x SM 83
1 x Do 18
1 x Do 24
3 x He 111
6 x Ju 88
5 x Ju 52
6 x Ju 87
1 x BR 20
1 x Cap 133
2 x Me 110
1 x Me 109
2 x CR 42
Fulmars Destroyed
2 x Me 109
5 x SM 79
1 x SM 83
1 x Cant 506
1 x Cant 1007
1 x Ju88
1 x Ju52
1 x Ju87
1 x CR 42
1 x unknown (CR42 or Ju 87)
1 x unknown
So no doubt are actually somewhat lower.
Fulmar Kills
3 x Cant 501
10 x Cant 506
1 x Cant 1007
1 x Cant ?
22 x Sm 79
2 x SM 83
1 x Do 18
1 x Do 24
3 x He 111
6 x Ju 88
5 x Ju 52
6 x Ju 87
1 x BR 20
1 x Cap 133
2 x Me 110
1 x Me 109
2 x CR 42
Fulmars Destroyed
2 x Me 109
5 x SM 79
1 x SM 83
1 x Cant 506
1 x Cant 1007
1 x Ju88
1 x Ju52
1 x Ju87
1 x CR 42
1 x unknown (CR42 or Ju 87)
1 x unknown
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parsifal
Colonel
The 73 kills to 28 November 1941 is consistent with one of my sources. But the Fulmarts are credited with another 39 or 59 additional kills, depending on who you believe.
I actually think the claimed kills are going to be fairly close to the mark, because I am reasonably certain these kills were recorded after confirmation by intelligence. Moreover, if we are going to check the claims by the Fulmars, why would we also not need to check the claims by the Wildcat?
I actually think the claimed kills are going to be fairly close to the mark, because I am reasonably certain these kills were recorded after confirmation by intelligence. Moreover, if we are going to check the claims by the Fulmars, why would we also not need to check the claims by the Wildcat?
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Michael, thanks for reading my original statement about overall most effective Allied ship board fighter, 1941-early 1943. I believe we are pretty much on the same page.
As far as most effective Allied shipboard fighter in 1940: From "Aircraft of World War Two" by Kenneth Munson, Page 71, Fairey Fulmar. "First announced in action in September, 1940 after it had been in service for three months."
Fulmar Mk I-Vmax 280 mph, service ceiling-26000 feet, normal range 800 miles.
Same source, page 82, Grumman Wildcat
F4F3-Vmax-328 mph at 21000 feet, service ceiling-37500 feet, max. range 1150 miles
From Dean, By October 31, 1940, 81 Martlets had been delivered to the RN. December 25, 1940, a Martlet on patrol near Scapa Flow shot down a JU88. Eric Brown said that the Fulmar would have a very difficult time even catching a JU88 unless the JU88 was carrying external stores.
Enough said about Wildcat-Fulmar in 1940.
Look at the numbers from Munson on F4F3 and now from Munson on Seafire, Page 147.
Seafire F. Mk III- Vmax-352 mph at 12250 feet, service ceiling 33800 feet, normal range 465 miles.
Dean also says that the F4F3 could achieve ranges of around 1100 miles.
Now I know those ranges are so called "yardstick" ranges but for comparison it looks like the Wildcat with internal fuel could get about twice as far as the Seafire. Thus my comment about the Wildcat running the Seafire out of fuel.
I just received my copy of the Fighter Conference Records in 1944 and there was a Seafire and Firefly there. The comments on the Firefly by the British representative at the beginning of the conference are interesting but I have not gotten into the Seafire info yet. More later.
As far as most effective Allied shipboard fighter in 1940: From "Aircraft of World War Two" by Kenneth Munson, Page 71, Fairey Fulmar. "First announced in action in September, 1940 after it had been in service for three months."
Fulmar Mk I-Vmax 280 mph, service ceiling-26000 feet, normal range 800 miles.
Same source, page 82, Grumman Wildcat
F4F3-Vmax-328 mph at 21000 feet, service ceiling-37500 feet, max. range 1150 miles
From Dean, By October 31, 1940, 81 Martlets had been delivered to the RN. December 25, 1940, a Martlet on patrol near Scapa Flow shot down a JU88. Eric Brown said that the Fulmar would have a very difficult time even catching a JU88 unless the JU88 was carrying external stores.
Enough said about Wildcat-Fulmar in 1940.
Look at the numbers from Munson on F4F3 and now from Munson on Seafire, Page 147.
Seafire F. Mk III- Vmax-352 mph at 12250 feet, service ceiling 33800 feet, normal range 465 miles.
Dean also says that the F4F3 could achieve ranges of around 1100 miles.
Now I know those ranges are so called "yardstick" ranges but for comparison it looks like the Wildcat with internal fuel could get about twice as far as the Seafire. Thus my comment about the Wildcat running the Seafire out of fuel.
I just received my copy of the Fighter Conference Records in 1944 and there was a Seafire and Firefly there. The comments on the Firefly by the British representative at the beginning of the conference are interesting but I have not gotten into the Seafire info yet. More later.
- Thread starter
- #67
Its true that a high altitude Ju-88 would present major problems for a Fulmar, but they certainly shot down a number of Ju-88s. Under 10K ft Fulmar II could probably catch an early JU-88.
Most, if not all of these early Martlet acquisitions were not carrier capable, and even if they were, a fixed wing Martlet was inferior to the Sea Hurricane which is probably why the Sea Hurricane commenced operations (July 1941) from CVs before Martlets.
Fuel capacity:
Fulmar 155 ig, Fulmar II 155ig + 60ig DT
Sea Hurricane IB, 97ig, Sea Hurricane II 97ig + 2 x 45 ig DTs
Seafire 85ig + 30ig SS combat stressed DT or larger non SS DT.
F4F-3, 120ig no DTs
F4F-4, 120ig no DT in early and mid 1942 (IIRC) 2 x 49ig in later models.
all above with SS tanks. Some early Martlets and F4F-3s had non SS tanks with 133 - 136ig capacity.
Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
Interesting thread. I had always thought that the Americans had rather cornered the market where carrier borne aircraft were concerned by making them tough, reliable and, with the exception of the Corsair, easy to land on a moving piece of metal.
WW2 US Navy Aircraft
And, much as I admire the Spitfire I would not begin to suggest that the SeaFire was a truly succcessfull carrier borne fighter.
I'll have to go and sit down now having typed the last sentence through gritted teeth....
Hi John
Overall, US types were better, but the differences are less pronounced than you think. For the Seafire, it has some unfortunate experiences, but once these were ironed out the type actually did some good work. At the other end of the spectrum, the comparison of the Fulmar v Wildcat fails to take into account the time difference....the Fulmar was operational whailst the Wildcat was still working out some issues. Its the same argument that bedevils this Seafire v Wildcat discussion
The pinnacle of British propellor driven carrier aircraft is surely represented by the Sea Fury, the Seafire 47 and the Firefly FB6. These types are considerably superior to the USN propellor driven types, including the Corsair.
The British were not that far behind the USN. It was just that they were a bit busy winning the war.....
Hi parsifal,
True enough and well said.
Cheers
John
parsifal
Colonel
I did read your posts, and may have missed what you were trying to say, but the comments made were also somewhat unclear as well. It seemed that you were trying to say the Wildcat was superior to the Seafire in all years, and under all conditions.
Facts are that under some conditions the Seafire would outshine the Wildcat by a considerable margin. For example, much has been made of the poor deck handling capabilities of the Seafire, yet this was not the fault of the aircraft, but the circumstances that it was forced to fight under. On board escort carriers, with no standard operating procedures worked out it suffered heavy atrition. The operations off Salerno perhaps best illustrate this. To fight off 160 enemy aircraft, losing just three in combat, they lost a further 39 in accidents. Not a great record.
However, whilst people are quick to point to this embarraassing situation as proof of the types failure, they conveniently overlook the types performance off Okinawa and Kyushu in April-August 1945. here there were two groups operating Seafire L-IIIs with a total of 88 aircraft. During the course of 1578 sorties, these two wings lost just 9 aircraft to all causes including deck landing accidents. this is actually a much lower attrition rate than that suffered by the Hellcats and Corsairs of the USN. The Hellcats, for example were suffering about 20 losses per 1000 sorties due to deck accidents. Given that the Seafires lost 3 aircraft in combat, their adjusted accident rate is about 4 per 1000 compared to 20 for the vaunted American types. People dont quote these numbers because it doesnt fit the preconceived notions about the Seafire failings, failings that in fact in 1945 did not exist.
As far as the range issue is concerned, I dont doubt that the "official" ranges are those that you are quoting. Again I challenge you to find even a single instance where that often quoted 1150 nm range was actually used.You wont find any. In fact, fully equipped and ready for battle, the Wildcat had an effective range of about 220 nm, and no more.
In the case of the Seafire, Donald Nijboer in his book "Seafire Operations in the Pacific - 1945" gives a very good explanation as to why those officieal figures are just no good. "Whilst ashore (in Sydney), attention was turned to the limited endurance of the Seafire. Both wings found interesting ways to fit larger than standard drop tanks to their aircraft which lifted the endurance of the aircraft significantly. In the case of No 24 Wing, 90 Imp Gallon slipper tanks were appropriated from RAAF stocks. In the Case of No 37 Wing, similar sized tanks were obtained from the USAAC warhawk stocks in exchange for two full cases of fine scotch whisky.
So equipped, the Seafires maximum range was increased to 710 miles, and its operational range to 195nm. This was used to full effect in the upcoming campaign, with strikes out to the 195nm mark being escorted by Seafires in June and July. at last, the Seafires could undertake offensive operations in the same manner as the Hellcats and Corsairs of the USN...."
Again, for mainly political reasons, this is an unbcomfortable fact never acknowledged in the post war wash up. To the Americans, they wanted history to read that it was their air force, their navy, their aircraft that brought Japan to its knees, and refuse to acknowledge any useful contribution made by any of its allies. This explains why they sent the RAAF 1st TAF abd the 1 Aus Corps off to that pointless sideshow Borneo and viewed the operations of the BPF with barely concealed hostility, even refusing the british anchorage rights to any US fleet base. This I would suggest, is why the histories you are reading are giving you the results that they are. I can assure you they are wrong...
With regard to the F4Fs received by the RN, those first 88 that you mention were never used from carriers, and suffered numerous teething troubles that were never fully ironed out until the following April. The lists of faults were alarming....the fuel tanks leaked, the guns froze up and continually jammed, landing gears gave trouble, ther was no armour, and the list goes on and on. AFAIK, Martlets were never used afloat in the RN until either November or August 1941. It comesas a bit of a shock to Americans that their vaunted Wildcat was a total dog at the time of its service delivery. I cant speak for the USN copies, but the RN copies were not combat ready. As for Fulmars not being able to catch a Ju88, , hardly, they managed to shoot down 6 out of a total force of 42 (in FK-X). When fully loaded, a Ju88 was nearly as vulnerable as a He111, though its manouverability and armour did make it a tough opponent. Plus the Fulmar in Septemeber 1940 carried armour, and was a fully operational type
Facts are that under some conditions the Seafire would outshine the Wildcat by a considerable margin. For example, much has been made of the poor deck handling capabilities of the Seafire, yet this was not the fault of the aircraft, but the circumstances that it was forced to fight under. On board escort carriers, with no standard operating procedures worked out it suffered heavy atrition. The operations off Salerno perhaps best illustrate this. To fight off 160 enemy aircraft, losing just three in combat, they lost a further 39 in accidents. Not a great record.
However, whilst people are quick to point to this embarraassing situation as proof of the types failure, they conveniently overlook the types performance off Okinawa and Kyushu in April-August 1945. here there were two groups operating Seafire L-IIIs with a total of 88 aircraft. During the course of 1578 sorties, these two wings lost just 9 aircraft to all causes including deck landing accidents. this is actually a much lower attrition rate than that suffered by the Hellcats and Corsairs of the USN. The Hellcats, for example were suffering about 20 losses per 1000 sorties due to deck accidents. Given that the Seafires lost 3 aircraft in combat, their adjusted accident rate is about 4 per 1000 compared to 20 for the vaunted American types. People dont quote these numbers because it doesnt fit the preconceived notions about the Seafire failings, failings that in fact in 1945 did not exist.
As far as the range issue is concerned, I dont doubt that the "official" ranges are those that you are quoting. Again I challenge you to find even a single instance where that often quoted 1150 nm range was actually used.You wont find any. In fact, fully equipped and ready for battle, the Wildcat had an effective range of about 220 nm, and no more.
In the case of the Seafire, Donald Nijboer in his book "Seafire Operations in the Pacific - 1945" gives a very good explanation as to why those officieal figures are just no good. "Whilst ashore (in Sydney), attention was turned to the limited endurance of the Seafire. Both wings found interesting ways to fit larger than standard drop tanks to their aircraft which lifted the endurance of the aircraft significantly. In the case of No 24 Wing, 90 Imp Gallon slipper tanks were appropriated from RAAF stocks. In the Case of No 37 Wing, similar sized tanks were obtained from the USAAC warhawk stocks in exchange for two full cases of fine scotch whisky.
So equipped, the Seafires maximum range was increased to 710 miles, and its operational range to 195nm. This was used to full effect in the upcoming campaign, with strikes out to the 195nm mark being escorted by Seafires in June and July. at last, the Seafires could undertake offensive operations in the same manner as the Hellcats and Corsairs of the USN...."
Again, for mainly political reasons, this is an unbcomfortable fact never acknowledged in the post war wash up. To the Americans, they wanted history to read that it was their air force, their navy, their aircraft that brought Japan to its knees, and refuse to acknowledge any useful contribution made by any of its allies. This explains why they sent the RAAF 1st TAF abd the 1 Aus Corps off to that pointless sideshow Borneo and viewed the operations of the BPF with barely concealed hostility, even refusing the british anchorage rights to any US fleet base. This I would suggest, is why the histories you are reading are giving you the results that they are. I can assure you they are wrong...
With regard to the F4Fs received by the RN, those first 88 that you mention were never used from carriers, and suffered numerous teething troubles that were never fully ironed out until the following April. The lists of faults were alarming....the fuel tanks leaked, the guns froze up and continually jammed, landing gears gave trouble, ther was no armour, and the list goes on and on. AFAIK, Martlets were never used afloat in the RN until either November or August 1941. It comesas a bit of a shock to Americans that their vaunted Wildcat was a total dog at the time of its service delivery. I cant speak for the USN copies, but the RN copies were not combat ready. As for Fulmars not being able to catch a Ju88, , hardly, they managed to shoot down 6 out of a total force of 42 (in FK-X). When fully loaded, a Ju88 was nearly as vulnerable as a He111, though its manouverability and armour did make it a tough opponent. Plus the Fulmar in Septemeber 1940 carried armour, and was a fully operational type
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
I have often wondered why the Fulmar II didnt get the 1,640hp Merlin 32 and 4 blade prop fitted to the Barracuda II. The extra 340 hp must surely have been useful or were there reasons why it wasnt used, possibly it was in short supply and the heavier Barracuda needed it more.
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
Didnt mean upgrade the Fulmar II I just wondered why it didnt get the Merlin 32 in the first place. They must have known the Fulmar needed all the oomph it could get, anyway the Firefly was a long way off in 1941.
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
That explains it thanks. I thought the 32 was available earlier.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
For the record, I said, referring to the F4F3 "was a decent shipboard fighter and on balance was the best in the world in the Allied quiver in 1942-early43." I apologise that I was not more clear in my statement
As for the Fulmar and Wildcat versus the Ju88, Brown could not be more clear that the Ju88A-4 was faster than the Fulmar and he could not be more clear than that the Wildcat was a better opponent versus the Ju88 than the Fulmar.
As for range of Seafire versus Wildcat in 1942 early 43, if one cannot believe that the combat radius of an AC with twice the "yardstick" range of another does not have a substantially better combat radius, then I guess logic does not prevail. The Seafire carried 102 gallons of fuel. The F4F3 carried 147 gallons and the F4F4 144 gallons in protected tanks
From Commander D R F Campbell, DSC, RN at the Fighter Conference, 1944. The Firefly Mark 4 "The performance is nothing to write home about." "The engine is a Mark II RR Griffon, 1725 HP 54. Performance is even more contemptible than I thought at 300 mph top speed and I think that is about all on that." Looks like the Firefly carried on where the Fulmar left off
As for the Fulmar and Wildcat versus the Ju88, Brown could not be more clear that the Ju88A-4 was faster than the Fulmar and he could not be more clear than that the Wildcat was a better opponent versus the Ju88 than the Fulmar.
As for range of Seafire versus Wildcat in 1942 early 43, if one cannot believe that the combat radius of an AC with twice the "yardstick" range of another does not have a substantially better combat radius, then I guess logic does not prevail. The Seafire carried 102 gallons of fuel. The F4F3 carried 147 gallons and the F4F4 144 gallons in protected tanks
From Commander D R F Campbell, DSC, RN at the Fighter Conference, 1944. The Firefly Mark 4 "The performance is nothing to write home about." "The engine is a Mark II RR Griffon, 1725 HP 54. Performance is even more contemptible than I thought at 300 mph top speed and I think that is about all on that." Looks like the Firefly carried on where the Fulmar left off
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Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
'Again, for mainly political reasons, this is an unbcomfortable fact never acknowledged in the post war wash up. To the Americans, they wanted history to read that it was their air force, their navy, their aircraft that brought Japan to its knees, and refuse to acknowledge any useful contribution made by any of its allies. This explains why they sent the RAAF 1st TAF abd the 1 Aus Corps off to that pointless sideshow Borneo and viewed the operations of the BPF with barely concealed hostility, even refusing the british anchorage rights to any US fleet base. This I would suggest, is why the histories you are reading are giving you the results that they are. I can assure you they are wrong...'
This is interesting Parsifal....While we are all grateful for the late American involvement in both WW's it did come with a price attached. In our case a generation of debt and Au bitterness over Borneo. If its any consolation my Dad was in the Western Desert - Italian campaign and to the day he died he never forgave the American dismissal of the British Commonwealth effort at Mount Casino and in Italy generally.
'A side show to D day?' Hardly....
Cheers
John
This is interesting Parsifal....While we are all grateful for the late American involvement in both WW's it did come with a price attached. In our case a generation of debt and Au bitterness over Borneo. If its any consolation my Dad was in the Western Desert - Italian campaign and to the day he died he never forgave the American dismissal of the British Commonwealth effort at Mount Casino and in Italy generally.
'A side show to D day?' Hardly....
Cheers
John
- Thread starter
- #77
As for the Fulmar and Wildcat versus the Ju88, Brown could not be more clear that the Ju88A-4 was faster than the Fulmar and he could not be more clear than that the Wildcat was a better opponent versus the Ju88 than the Fulmar.
As for range of Seafire versus Wildcat in 1942 early 43, if one cannot believe that the combat radius of an AC with twice the "yardstick" range of another does not have a substantially better combat radius, then I guess logic does not prevail. The Seafire carried 102 gallons of fuel. The F4F3 carried 147 gallons and the F4F4 144 gallons in protected tanks
From Commander D R F Campbell, DSC, RN at the Fighter Conference, 1944. The Firefly Mark 4 "The performance is nothing to write home about." "The engine is a Mark II RR Griffon, 1725 HP 54. Performance is even more contemptible than I thought at 300 mph top speed and I think that is about all on that." Looks like the Firefly carried on where the Fulmar left off
It's hard to find performance curves for the Ju-88, especially since there were so many variants. Here's the data from IL-2 Compare for a Ju-88 A-4:
The Seafire had the option to use a combat stressed, SS, 36 usgal DT, and with that tank it still outperformed the F4F and had equal range.
According to Mason and The Secret years, the Firefly I @ 11830lbs had a max speed of 315 mph at 16800 ft, a max climb of 2140 fpm at 3800ft, and could climb to 20000ft in 12.4 min. It seem likely that combat climb figures would be somewhat better.
Edit: That reminded me of something else that I read regarding the Fulmar II:
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renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Just turning does not win fights. Lowering those flaps and turning well was mentioned by Campbell but he obviously was not enamored of the Firefly. I don't even understand why the British even built the darn thing and it seems he was a little puzzled about that too.
parsifal
Colonel
I should also make a quick note concerning Brownss thoughts ideas on the Seafire. Ren posted a quote from him about the unsuitability of the types. True enough, but he also made plenty of comment about how enthusiastic he was about getting the type on board ship. I will dig them out when I get home tonite.
With regard to my comments about the the re-writing of history. In general US versions of history are accurate and balanced. Their burden is light on us lesser mortals. However in regards to the naval campaigns, and in particular that which occurred in the pacific, one has to remember the personalities. Specifically one Ernest J King. His hatred of the British is legendary. I would go so far as to say that he allowed this hatred to rule his thinking so much, that he almost lost the war over it. Small wonder then, if he rejected offerss of British help in '42 when he really did need their help, how much less would he be prepared to accept help in '45, when the excercise was more about re-establishing british prestige and reputation than it was driven by necessity. Do not under-estimate the anglophobia contained within this man.
With regard to my comments about the the re-writing of history. In general US versions of history are accurate and balanced. Their burden is light on us lesser mortals. However in regards to the naval campaigns, and in particular that which occurred in the pacific, one has to remember the personalities. Specifically one Ernest J King. His hatred of the British is legendary. I would go so far as to say that he allowed this hatred to rule his thinking so much, that he almost lost the war over it. Small wonder then, if he rejected offerss of British help in '42 when he really did need their help, how much less would he be prepared to accept help in '45, when the excercise was more about re-establishing british prestige and reputation than it was driven by necessity. Do not under-estimate the anglophobia contained within this man.
- Thread starter
- #80
The Firefly/Griffon engine was slated to be the RN's standard carrier recon/fighter/DB by 1942, but its development was badly delayed due to RAF aircraft and engines being given priority. The Griffon engine was originally an RN project, for example, and was nearly cancelled during the BofB. As it was it was still a useful strike fighter in 1944/45 but was overshadowed by aircraft that had nominally higher performance. In 1942 it would have decimated the IJNAF.
