"To hell with manuals, we're replacing the engines when we decide so" said no crew chief ever.
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Well i think every skilled pilot have avoided using WEP except life saving measures - WEP it was and still is available in military powerplants as a real "red line" measure. Pilot may use it but he must realizing that price will be almost instant damage to the engine. I talked with former ground crew chief of 131 PAF fighter wing and he told me that Merlins have been ever replaced after overboost usage was reported by pilot - not very affordable situation with limited supply of replacement engines.
Pilot may use it but he must realizing that price will be almost instant damage to the engine.
That may be the situation on fighters but most Merlins were put in bombers. If a Lancaster or Halifax lost two engines the remaining two were massively overworked, between throwing out any excess weight and pushing the engines as far as possible the only important factor was maintaining altitude and getting back. The choice was bailing out or possibly blowing up the engines and then bailing out, so long as you stay above a height that you can bail out why wouldn't you risk it? There is massive survivor bias in these anecdotes, we don't read about those whose engines blew up.Well i think every skilled pilot have avoided using WEP except life saving measures - WEP it was and still is available in military powerplants as a real "red line" measure. Pilot may use it but he must realizing that price will be almost instant damage to the engine. I talked with former ground crew chief of 131 PAF fighter wing and he told me that Merlins have been ever replaced after overboost usage was reported by pilot - not very affordable situation with limited supply of replacement engines.
Unlimited duration for Emergency power? Please, do tell, if possible without 'I believe' and 'possibly'.
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When the 801 TU and TS came in to use to it incorporated improved supercharger fluid dynamics and modifications to improve cooling as well as improved components such as stronger gearbox and from the planned 801E such items as vacuum caste heads. The 1.65 ata time rating became unlimited.
Fuel was consumed at 60-65 LPM and since a 190 only carried 580L any time limitation was purely hypothetical.
First of all, the La-5 and La-7 job units was not Il-2 close escort. That was Yak units job. If Las participated, they did high cover.im not convinced. If Soviet aircaft such as the IL-2 were attacking german supply columns, armour or infantry they would presumably be below 1000m and their escorts of La-7 at maybe 2000m. In that case the Power to Weight ratio advantage would likely remain. The wing loading as well. I'm not exactly aware of the typical engagement altitude but that sounds likely.
It's form excellent Artem Drabkin's book "Ja drialsa s asami Luftwaffe" - a collection of interviews with VVS veterans (sorry for Google translation).- And yet, did not our fighters try to take over German tactics?
- In its pure form - no. Then, when we had more fighters, we happened, and singled out a "clearing group", whose task was to get ahead and tie up enemy fighters in the bombing area (just like this did the Germans). Such a group did not always stand out. Basically - with cover for bombers (attack aircraft in the overwhelming majority cases were managed with one direct cover). Of the "yaks", the "clearing group" was rarely made, usually from the "aircobras" or "lavochkins". It was smart. First, of these three types of fighters The yak, as a close cover fighter, was the best. Secondly, the "clearing group" often entered the battle at 4500-5000, and sometimes up to 7000 meters. For a yak with its low-altitude engine, this is a bit high.
Soviet fighters were very short-legged if they used high power settings. I guess that was the reason why Il-2 close escort didn't weave:From my understanding escort fighters weaved to maintain speed. i can not see combat taking place between escort fighters and interceptors at 4000 meters if the ground attack aircaft are at 1000.
( "Штурмовиков прикрывали на их скорости, редко когда делали «качели».".)The Sturmoviks were covered at their speed, we rarely weaved
580L carried by Fw 190 - any source for that?
Good question. 524 ltr in 2 main tanks plus 85 ltr in aux tank = 609 ltr
I have a total of 3 D-0s, 3 D-1s, 2 D-2s, 1805 D-9s, 17 D-11s, 3 D-12s, and 17 D-13s accepted. I do not have a total for them delivered to active combat units, but I do not believe anywhere near the entire total of D-9s saw active service, and VERY certainly not all at the same time. I'd guestimate maybe a maximum total of about 600 - 700 in operation at most, at the same time. spread over wherever the Luftwaffe wanted them. Likely that was the about the max and was considerably less most of the time.
By that, I mean something similar to the Me 262: We all kinow there were about 1,430 Me 262s built, but according to Adolf Galland, who certainly should know, there were never more than about 50 - 60 in operation at any one time, and no more than about 300 ever saw combat. That from the guy who was charged with their operation. More than 500 were destroyed by bombing raids before they could leave the factory. Reported kills were either 509 or 542, edepending on who you believe against 100 combat losses.
So, all in all, it didn't do quite as well in combat as the F4F Wildcat, which had an overall 6 : 1 kill-to-loss ratio. I don't have the operational losses, but we KNOW many went down with mechanical issues and likely not a few to running out of fuel. Pilots just weren't used to anything with legs as short as the early jets ... definitely shorter time aloft than a Bf 109, which was the standard for "short range."
of course every time when pilot have decided to use WEP the engine is in "straight out of assembly line condition" like during stand test????? and of course ground test is replicating all combat loads imposed to powerplant?? come on guys - please be little bit more realistic and slightly with bigger distance to "engine manual said" type knowledge. I'm more in position to believe in opinion expressed by guy who spend 35 years in aviation business including 6 years maintaining airplanes in war condition, than to what you are able to find in what left out of manuals. I think none of us have doubts that theory sometimes is quite far from reality - aviation in general, and topic of this particular discussion is no exception from this rule."To hell with manuals, we're replacing the engines when we decide so" said no crew chief ever.
That may be the situation on fighters but most Merlins were put in bombers. If a Lancaster or Halifax lost two engines the remaining two were massively overworked, between throwing out any excess weight and pushing the engines as far as possible the only important factor was maintaining altitude and getting back. The choice was bailing out or possibly blowing up the engines and then bailing out, so long as you stay above a height that you can bail out why wouldn't you risk it? There is massive survivor bias in these anecdotes, we don't read about those whose engines blew up.[/QUOTE
excellent comment - that was my point - WEP was thought especially for cases like this - it is matter of picking what is more important - proceeding with your mission or engine - in combat reality economic damage to the equipment is part of calculated risk factor but it does not means that it was part of everyday flying drill (you have something like this but please never use - unless you are really forced to)
There are stories of P-38 pilots at the end of the war ferring aircraft pretty much from the factory to the scrap yards and using WEP power from take-off until backing off for landing, no blown engines.
of course every time when pilot have decided to use WEP the engine is in "straight out of assembly line condition" like during stand test????? and of course ground test is replicating all combat loads imposed to powerplant?? come on guys - please be little bit more realistic and slightly with bigger distance to "engine manual said" type knowledge. I'm more in position to believe in opinion expressed by guy who spend 35 years in aviation business including 6 years maintaining airplanes in war condition, than to what you are able to find in what left out of manuals. I think none of us have doubts that theory sometimes is quite far from reality - aviation in general, and topic of this particular discussion is no exception from this rule.
agree 100% - this is why discussions like this one always leading to the dead end - combat reality is far too complex to give answer based on numbers from manuals.I have no problems with people having opinons, and sometimes not doing the things by the book. However, a story of outright replacing engines when WER (or it's equivalent, depending on nomenclature of a service/county) was used belongs to the same universe with XP-39 making 400 mph and Yak-3 deciding the outcome of the Kursk battle.
First of all, the La-5 and La-7 job units was not Il-2 close escort. That was Yak units job. If Las participated, they did high cover.
Apart from that, main Las units job was escorting bombers and fighter sweeps.
As to heights at which Las usually operated, let me us words of a VVS vet:
It's form excellent Artem Drabkin's book "Ja drialsa s asami Luftwaffe" - a collection of interviews with VVS veterans (sorry for Google translation).
As you can see, engine power at 4500-5000 meters was vital for La-5 or La-7, not at ground level and not even at say 2000 meteres.
Il-2 attack was a fragment of a mission, most of which was flying towards the target and back. If weather permitted they would go to the targer at 1000-1500 meters, if not, at tree tops, which was also how they usually retreated. Yaks of close escort rarely exceeded 2000 meters.
Soviet fighters were very short-legged if they used high power settings. I guess that was the reason why Il-2 close escort didn't weave:
( "Штурмовиков прикрывали на их скорости, редко когда делали «качели».".)
Said post doesn't say they did that frequently. In the scale of whole VVS and whole war that was surely infrequent. I mean vast majority of VVS combat was indeed at low altitude, as it was indeed closely related to Il-2s and fighters attacking ground targets (the latter early, often armed with RS rockets). Those flew low and fighters escorting them did too. Only later in war Soviets had enough fighters to provide high cover and escorting twin-engined bombers was relatively minor proportion of all missions.Post #167, saying the Soviets flew and fought up high frequently, goes against every other reference I have read, and all of the Soviet reports I have read that mention altitude. That amounts to very many reports of heavily low-altitude operation.
Mr. Kozhemyako fought in frontline air armies.Of course they had a few high-altitude squadrons operating sometimes experimental high-altitude fighters and fighter prototypes, but they didn't represent the vast majority of PVO or even VVS.
Well, there's no reason for that, since engine was the same as was airframe geometry and La-7 was lighter.The La-5 was also high-altitude capable but, according to most of what I have read, did not often fight there. The La-7 had a service ceiling about 3,000 feet lower than the La-5.
That's surely true. Yet there were times and units in frontline air force which operated as high as 4500 - 5000 m or even 7000 meters. Those surely were exceptions in the scale of the whole war and whole frontline VVS.While the USSR DID have high-altitude capability, my reading and talking with 3 former Soviet VVS pilots tells me they heavily preferred NOT to use it very much. They operated very much mostly in support of ground operations, which generally don't manage to get to high altitudes.
During the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the "cobras" of our corps initially occupied a height of 5 thousand meters. They spent there all day, and the Germans just didn't go to this height. This is understandable - "Messers" go where the attack aircraft (and therefore the "yaks"). We (like the regiment armed with "lavochkins") led the hardest air battles, losses were heavy, but the "cobras" land, and almost every report of their pilots: "There were no enemy aircraft." The corps commander raged: "How was it not ?! And where do the "yaks" and "lavochkins" find Germans ?! " "Aircobras" at that time shot down only those who left us to the height. This is how they caught single "messers", clamped them in pincers and knocked them down. Then the corps commander began to set tasks for "cobras" at low altitude - 3,000 and below. And losses of the cobras went up, because at this altitude, the cobra's maneuverability is not very different from the maneuverability of the sturmovik. It's good that this happened already at the end of the Battle of Kursk, otherwise the losses of the "Cobras" would have been even greater. Above 3 thousand, the "Airacobra" greatly added, and above 4 thousand, the advantage from the "yak" was already unambiguously transferred to the "Aircobra".