Fw200 Cost Effectiveness

[parsifal]

My source also states that Condors generally attacked in groups of four, and never attacked below 9000 feet, it being expressly forbidden, in their standing orders


And having checked the flak losses for BC in this period, it seems that LW ammunition expenditures per kill were far higher than I had originally posted.


Disreagrding the Light AA expenditures per kill, the average flak expenditure in the period Jan-April was 8250 rounds per kill. Thats heavy AA only. Best month was April, with only 4353 per kill, worst month was january with 11881 rpk. A total of 144 BC aircraft were lost to flak defences.

After April the LW began to install radar directed flak, which had a dramatic impact on flak effectiveness, to the point that they couold claim temporary victory over BC by the end of the year. Once of the consequences was to force the operating altitude of the RAF to be raised, from around 14k to around 19k, which had an exponential effect on bombing accuracy.

 

[davebender]

How can that be if Fw200s preferred to skip bomb?

The Luftwaffe war diaries: the ... - Google Books
Swedish Turnip Attack Method.
- Invented by a guy named Harlinghausen during the Spanish Civil War.
- A form of skip bombing.
- Normally used against naval targets.
- Approach speed of about 200 mph.
- Altitude of 45 meters.
- Bombs released while 240 meters from the target. They hit the target side or in the water next to the hull.
- Bombs had an 8 second delay. This allows time for the aircraft to fly past the blast area.
- This attack method could be used by any level bomber provided the pilot was properly trained.
- Employed by Fw-200s during their relatively short period of use as maritime bombers.
- Employed by the majority of Ju-88A4s during the devastating 2 Dec 1943 attack on Bari, Italy.

 

[parsifal]

How can that be if Fw200s preferred to skip bomb?

The Luftwaffe war diaries: the ... - Google Books
Swedish Turnip Attack Method.
- Invented by a guy named Harlinghausen during the Spanish Civil War.
- A form of skip bombing.
- Normally used against naval targets.
- Approach speed of about 200 mph.
- Altitude of 45 meters.
- Bombs released while 240 meters from the target. They hit the target side or in the water next to the hull.
- Bombs had an 8 second delay. This allows time for the aircraft to fly past the blast area.
- This attack method could be used by any level bomber provided the pilot was properly trained.
- Employed by Fw-200s during their relatively short period of use as maritime bombers.- Employed by the majority of Ju-88A4s during the devastating 2 Dec 1943 attack on Bari, Italy.

You'll need to give sources for that, because according to the source i have, which says it is quoting directly from Flieger Fuhrer Atlantik war diaries, this never happened. They were prohibited from attacking below 9000 feet.

 

[Shortround6]

From the source Mr. Bender gave.

"By June (of 1941) the losses were so heavy that Harlinghausen had to bar the method of attack he himself had introduced in 1939."

And

"In mid-July,1941, co-operation between the two arms............though the U-boat operations were thus again within the Condor's range, low level attacks, except occasionally on isolated ships, were now out of the question."

 

[parsifal]

I'll correct my own post. I checked my source, and cross checked against another (the second source being Condors vs Atlantic Convoys, Robert Forczyk Osprey military press 2010)

The prohibition on attacks under 9000 ft was issued in July 1941, and remained in place thereafter. Prior to July, the Germans would employ low level attacks against independantly sailing merchantment, or where flak defences were considered to be sufficiently weak.

This is well illustrated in their attacks on shipping in November 1940. A total of 4 ships were sunk in this month, one using low level attacks, the remainder by high level bombing. 7 other ships were damaged, all by high level attack.

The star of the low level attack methods was a man named Petersen.

By December the Condors had sunk 19 ships and damaged another 37. 100000 tons of shipping had been lost, and not a single condor had been lost to flak.

In January, realizing the inneffectiveness of the RNs low level defences, the Condors pressed home their low level attacks to a much greater extent. There were 19 ships sunk, and a further 7 damaged. Ship losses were 65000 tons. These were nearly all low level attacks, with just one loss to flak. This loss was for FW200C-03 attack on the Rescue Tugboat, which just happened to have been re-equipped with 4x20mm LAA. It was one of the first ships to have been so re-armed.

February 1941 was the worst month for the british, however there was a perceptible change in German tactics as well. Low level attacks were restricted to lone stragglers, attacks on the convoys were almost exclusively restricted to high level attacks. 21 ships were lost, totalling 84000 tons, of these 21, 11 were sunk to low level attack, the remainder to high level attack.

There was a lull in operations in March, but there were 74 combat sorties in April, with major attacks on the 6th and 16th April. Seven Condors were lost in April, 3 to ground bombardment, one to Beafighters, and 3 to AA fire. These were all lost to low level attacks as shipping operating in the combat area at last began to receive 20mm AA defences.

Forzcyk states in his book that though the Condors made major efforts to locate convoys for themselves and the u-boats, and to carry out their own attacks as well, they failed in both missions. They managed to locate four convoys, but could not maintain survellance, Donitz lost patience with KG450, and moveed his U-Boats further to the west, where results were instantaneous and spectaculaly successful. For the Condors, however, it was a miserably unsuccessful month. Forzcyk states "the noticeably omproving low level defences of the british mercahnt marine contributed significantly to the low success of KG40. In May they managed to sink only 3 ships...." A further seven aircraft were shot down to AA fire.

This led directly to Harlinghausen issuing the prohibition in July to any further use of low level attack methods, including the Swedish turnip method, because of the improved British defences and the increasing loss rates to ground fire.

4 Condors were lost operationally in July, 2 to aircraft, and 2 to AA fire. Things were getting tougher for the Condors

 

[davebender]

Forzcyk states in his book that though the Condors made major efforts to locate convoys for themselves and the u-boats, and to carry out their own attacks as well, they failed in both missions. They managed to locate four convoys, but could not maintain survellance

I'm not surprised, with only 4 Fw200s purchased per month resulting in only 74 combat sorties during April 1941.

What I find amazing is a couple dozen converted airliners managed to sink 84,000 tons of shipping during February 1941. Even if the entire Fw200 force had been destroyed during these attacks the results are still very lopsided in favor of Germany.

 

[parsifal]

The results were impressive, but need to be kept in perspective. At that same time the allies were losing 84000 tons to the condors, they also lost 200000 tons to the u-boats, 20000 tons to mines, 80000 to naval raiders, 78000 tons to merchant raiders, and 22000 tons to eboats. Moreover, the Condors were a rapidly wasting asset, though they possessed great potential.....the weaknesses were in the design, and to a lesser extent in the attack methods the germans were forced to adopt. The lack of an effective aerial torpedo at this time greatly reduced their effectiveness. The Condors had to either adopt increasingly suicidal short range, low level bombing runs, or drop their bombs at altitude, and suffer far less accuracy. If they had possessed an effective aerial torpedo, they could have made effective attacks at ranges outside the 20mm effective range and achieved high levels of accuracy as well.

 

[davebender]

An effective aerial torpedo attack requires you to launch within 2,000 meters of the target. Better then the 240 meters required by skip bombing but still within range of light flak.

I think numbers are the answer. Swamp the enemy defenses. A few aircraft get shot down by flak but the convoy gets torn to pieces. Ships and their cargo cost a lot more then aircraft so the attacking air fleet comes out way ahead in the exchange.

 

[drgondog]

An effective aerial torpedo attack requires you to launch within 2,000 meters of the target. Better then the 240 meters required by skip bombing but still within range of light flak.

I think numbers are the answer. Swamp the enemy defenses. A few aircraft get shot down by flak but the convoy gets torn to pieces. Ships and their cargo cost a lot more then aircraft so the attacking air fleet comes out way ahead in the exchange.

The 5th AF in PTO, particularly with the up gunned B-25s, were extremely effective at low altitude attacks, ranging from skip bombing to massive concentrated 50 caliber forward firing batteries.

Battle of Bismark Sea was the first of many successful low altitude forays by land based twin engine bombers.

 

[Shortround6]

Numbers are going to have to be very large.

you are going to need the strike force itself.

you are also going to need perhaps two- three times the number of Condors as were used historically just for locating and trailing the Convoy's until the strike force can reach it.

The Condors did not spot a convoy on every flight so launching squadron to gruppe sized strikes on the chance of blundering into a Convoy is a waste of resources.

The Condor that does spot a Convoy is going to have to stay on station until relived by another Condor and more often than not a 3rd Condor would be needed to maintain contact until the strike force arrives. Given the flight times and endurance of the Condors I am guessing that one Condor would have to take-off every three hours or so, 3rd one might have to be in the air before the 1st makes contact. Strike group has to be bombed and fueled, ready to go.
you are dealing with targets that move 7-10 miles an hour that are 4-8 hours flight time from the base/s of the Condors.

you also have to deal with what ever counter measures the British come up with. We Know what the reaction was to the number of Condors that were used. Hiding 4-6 times the Number of Condors and their production until surprise first use seems a little difficult and once the first few raids are conducted what is the British response?
Increased bombing raids on the Condor Bases?
More Cam ships?
A different AA gun allocation?
More and faster work done on auxiliary carriers?
Redeployment of existing carriers?
HMS Audacity's Wildcats claimed to have shot down 7 Condors while escorting 4 Gibraltar convoys before she was sunk by a U-boat. One Wildcat admitted lost to the Condors.

 

[parsifal]

An effective aerial torpedo attack requires you to launch within 2,000 meters of the target. Better then the 240 meters required by skip bombing but still within range of light flak.

I think numbers are the answer. Swamp the enemy defenses. A few aircraft get shot down by flak but the convoy gets torn to pieces. Ships and their cargo cost a lot more then aircraft so the attacking air fleet comes out way ahead in the exchange.

I agree with the second paragraph, but need to point out the flaw in your first statement. 20mm guns did not have an effective range of 2000m. Though in thoery they had a range of 4400m, their effective range was a maximum of 1500m.

And torpedoes aerial topredoes had greater effective ranges than that....the german F5b had an effective range of 2000m @40kts, and 6000m@24kts. The more widely used Italian F5w had an effective range of 3000m @40kts.

However, even if the 20mm tried to stretch their gunnery and engage the torpedo dropping aircraft, there would be no time to mount an effective barrage. This was because the aircraft did not need to spend any time in the kill zone of the 20mm gun.

This is the principal reason why all forms of low level close range bombing is inferior to torpedo attack. It can only be done at close range.....the attacking force either needs to detail units for flak suppression, or run a lengthy gauntlet against the defending flak, as the attacking aircraft fills an increasing percentage of the sky as it approaches the target...


Getting back to the numbers issue, however, an elvated level of Condor activity would almost certainoly invoke some sort of reaction by the RAF and RN. An increased air threat at sea must come at a price elswhere in the German attacking inventory, and this means the British would in all likelihood be able to achieve some sort of quid pro quo....such as an earlier introduction of more escort carriers, or more Beafighter patrols

 

[Shortround6]

The 5th AF in PTO, particularly with the up gunned B-25s, were extremely effective at low altitude attacks, ranging from skip bombing to massive concentrated 50 caliber forward firing batteries.

Battle of Bismark Sea was the first of many successful low altitude forays by land based twin engine bombers.

Quite true but there are several key differences.

One as you noted was the increased forward firing armament of many of the Allied aircraft that was very useful for flak suppression in addition to damage to the ship. The Beaufighters with their 20mm guns might have been very useful in this role. The higher performance of the twin engined planes, speed in strafing runs may have helped.
Not to mention the patrol planes that were able to keep tabs on the Japanese Convoy. Something like 188 Allied planes were used in the Battle of the Bismark sea (granted some were fighters flying top cover to keep Japanese fighters away)and distances were short enough that some aircraft were able to fly two missions in the same day.

What was the AA armament of the Japanese transports?

 

[Glider]

One as you noted was the increased forward firing armament of many of the Allied aircraft that was very useful for flak suppression in addition to damage to the ship. The Beaufighters with their 20mm guns might have been very useful in this role.

The Beaufighter strike wings in the UK normally fought in groups of two or three. One or two groups would go for the flak vessels with their guns and rockets whilst the torpedo armed beaus would attack the primary targets.

I have no reason to doubt that similar tactics would have been effective against any enemy, remembering that the rockets were large enough to do significant damage to escorts and destroyers.

 

[davebender]

How do you define "very large"?

Historically Germany purchased 4 x Fw200s per month. Let's multiply that by ten. 40 x naval Fw200s per month are not particularly large numbers for WWII aircraft production but I think they would do a lot of damage to Allied shipping.

 

[davebender]

An increased air threat at sea must come at a price elswhere in the German attacking inventory

That's a no brainer. The historical KM Z Plan of January 1939 is cancelled in favor of naval aircraft.

 

[parsifal]

That's a no brainer. The historical KM Z Plan of January 1939 is cancelled in favor of naval aircraft.

But that plan was cancelled pretty much with the outbreak of hostilities. There were a couple of exceptions like the Graf Zeppelin, but even these were at first curtailed, and then cancelled within a few months of the war. The differences in lead times also need to be considered. It takes years to derive benefit from naval construction programs, whereas for aircraft construction there is a lead time of just a couple of months. Obtaining the pilots and ground crews might take a little longer.....No, curtailing the naval construction program is not going to deliver much in the way of additional aircraft.

Another thing to consider is the actual proportion of resources poured into the naval construction program, versus the amount put into aircraft production. Just comparing the annual defence spending directed to the KM, versus that spent on the LW, the amount spent on the KM was about 5% of the annual budget, whilst that spent on the LW was more than 50% of the reich defence budget in 1939. Moreover of that 5%, less than 1/5 was being spent on capital ship procurement. So, expressed as a percentage of total Reich expenditure, only 1% was being expended on the surface navy.

To build a credible aero-naval strike force, you are firstly going to have to develop credible weapon systems, which in this field, in 1939, the germans did not possess. The aircraft (the FW200) was not a combat ready platform, and the ordinance (a credible aerial torpedo) needed a lot of work (if not developed , the force is going to suffere crippling losses to flak, or lose effectiveness if stand off bombing is used). Further, to make any difference to the outcome, you are going to need lots of aircraft. I would argue somewhere between 500 and 1000. A fully developed Condor variant is not going to be a cheap off the shelf modification, its amajor redesign, and a lot of resources, which adds to its procurement cost......just counting engines your looking at an exchange rate of two medium bombers scrapped (or not produced) for every Condor received

This is all very rough, and I dont pretend to say I am trying to be accurate in terms of numbers. The point I am making is; it is sheer wishful thinking to believe that a credible force structure can be built at little or no cost. It would cost a lot to build amaritime strike force, and this would have tangible effects on the german force structure overall, and because of that, one needs to consider the likely or at least plausible British response to that altered force structure. One of the worst things that a military plan can do is to to not expoect any reaction from the enemy....to expect the enemy to be compliant to ones own efforts for victory.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... it is sheer wishful thinking".

I like it when you says those words, Parsifal.

MM

 

[parsifal]

maybe a little un-subtle, but true nevertheless. The other quid pro quo that might arise from the Germans not building a surface navy is that the British are also relieved of that responsibility. Whereas the Germans might not have to build the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau Bismarck and Tirpitz, the British would achieve much larger savings....no KGVs, no cruisers but more CLaas, no fleet destroyers, more ASW escorts, no fleet carriers, but more trade protection carriers.

I have a simulation called World At War that allows for this type of speculation. Standard tactics for the un-initiated German player is not to "waste" their pre-war money on building a surface fleet. Standard British response to that is to refrain from building a blue water navy, or at least a big part of it. The pre-exapansion navy is more than enough to deal with the Italians....Not having to build the illustrious class fleet carriers yields twice as many CVLs or four times as many CVEs.

In this scenario, the British would be protecting their western approaches with about 12 CVLs by mid 1941, or earlier if the Germans start their maritime air strike force development earlier. They could commision about 30 escort carriers by the end of 1941. No need to embark anything better than Fulmars and Swordfish, so exapansion of the FAA occurs much quicker

People often overlook the value of the Km as a deterrent force, a "fleet in being" Its a concept not understood by protagonists with a strictly continental strategic viewpoint....yet the continued existence of the KM surface fleet into 1944 was one of the least understood "victories" for the germans at that stage of the war...

 

[drgondog]

Quite true but there are several key differences.

One as you noted was the increased forward firing armament of many of the Allied aircraft that was very useful for flak suppression in addition to damage to the ship. The Beaufighters with their 20mm guns might have been very useful in this role. The higher performance of the twin engined planes, speed in strafing runs may have helped.

IIRC, the Beaufighters were superb in antishipping, when in range - both with 20's and rockets

Not to mention the patrol planes that were able to keep tabs on the Japanese Convoy. Something like 188 Allied planes were used in the Battle of the Bismark sea (granted some were fighters flying top cover to keep Japanese fighters away)and distances were short enough that some aircraft were able to fly two missions in the same day.

What was the AA armament of the Japanese transports?

Short answer - I don't know. I have seen photos of various freighters with what appears to be a fore and aft deck gun but hard to tell if 20mm or something larger..googling Japanese WWII Freighters, Maru, etc didn't yield much on the armament.

 

[Shortround6]

And torpedoes aerial topredoes had greater effective ranges than that....the german F5b had an effective range of 2000m @40kts, and 6000m@24kts. The more widely used Italian F5w had an effective range of 3000m @40kts.

Effective range and max range for aerial torpedoes are two widely different things.
The German F5b is going to cover 2000m @40kts but then the motor stops and the torpedo slows to a stop fairly quickly. You also have to consider;
A. that an 8kt ship will cover 400 meters in the same time as the torpedo takes to cover 2000 meters. a 10kt ship will cover 500 meters. how fast is the target ship?
B. what is the actual intercept angle? is the torpedo dropped at 90 degrees to the ships path or at 75 degrees or at 105 degrees? each would require either a different lead or a different drop/run time.
C. How accurate is the torpedo at following the intended course? How many degrees of deviation will result in a miss from 2000meters? The same deviation will result in half the miss distance form the intended aim point when dropped at 1000meters. How long is the ship?
D. What is the run time of the torpedo? the launch of the aerial torpedo is pretty well know to the target compared to a submarine launch. At a range of 2000 meters the target has about 90 seconds to change course/speed (take evasive action). Turning away from the torpedo launched at extreme range has the advantage of adding to the range and perhaps causing the torpedo's motor to run out of fuel (battery power?)

However, even if the 20mm tried to stretch their gunnery and engage the torpedo dropping aircraft, there would be no time to mount an effective barrage. This was because the aircraft did not need to spend any time in the kill zone of the 20mm gun.

the torpedo dropping aircraft had to be flying straight and level at the time of the drop and pointed a bit ahead of the intended target (collision course for the speed of the torpedo). Upon drop the plane can START it's evasive maneuver/s. It can roll away from the ship to initiate a maximum G turn to minimize the distance but this presents the belly of the plane to the ship (largest target) and slows the airspeed down. It might try a half loop but again this presents a large target, a lot of hang time and the portability of an inverted stall with no room to recover. Early war torpedoes did not take kindly to either high speed drops or high altitude drops, high altitude in this case being even 200 ft. This leaves the plane with adding power to the engine to pick up speed while doing a more gentle turn to keep the wings more horizontal to present a smaller target ( say less than a 60 degree bank )
while 'jinking' changing course and altitude by small amounts to throw off AA gunners aim. It does mean the plane will pass closer to the target ship and quite possibly other ships in the convoy.

This is the principal reason why all forms of low level close range bombing is inferior to torpedo attack. It can only be done at close range.....the attacking force either needs to detail units for flak suppression, or run a lengthy gauntlet against the defending flak, as the attacking aircraft fills an increasing percentage of the sky as it approaches the target...

torpedoes were the preferred method for sinking ships because a torpedo hit guaranteed letting water into the ship which could lead to it's sinking. A bomb hit on the superstructure or upper hull, while certainly damaging could not guarantee the loss of water tightness of the hull. Skip bombing could not guarantee this either although it was more likely than some other forms of bomb attack. Very near misses were actual as dangerous as actual hits, as the underwater explosion could spring or buckle plates/seams causing major leaks.